The rich combat experience gained by the engineering troops in Afghanistan remains of great importance today. About what technical and organizational measures were carried out by engineering units during this conflict, says the candidate of military sciences, professor, retired colonel Peter Antonov.
The units and subunits of the engineering troops had to carry out tasks in the difficult conditions of the mountainous desert terrain. The enemy launched a real mine war on the routes of movement of troops.
Road structures were destroyed or were prepared for destruction. So, in the direction of the offensive of the reinforced Chaugani-Banu ICBM (50 km) in 1981, the enemy destroyed 7 bridges, made 9 stone blockages, and one 700 m long, brought down the carriageway on the cornice section 200 m long, arranged 17 craters and 5 anti-tank ditches. On the Doshi-Bamyan offensive direction (180 km), the motorized rifle regiment had to overcome 36 mined rubble, fill 25 anti-tank ditches and 58 craters, restore a section of the road on a cornice 350 m long, restore or equip bypasses 18 bridges of various lengths, neutralize and remove 38 mines and land mines.
Fulfillment of a combat mission for reconnaissance of the route to the Panjshir Gorge
In the northern lowland part of Afghanistan - in the area of the settlement of Imansahib, the enemy, having destroyed the irrigation irrigation system and a dam, created vast flood zones and roads on an area of 7 square meters. km. As a result, the reinforced MSB could not overcome them.
Since 1982, the proportion of mine-explosive obstacles (MWB) in the total volume of obstacles has increased. Land mine warfare, imposed by the enemy with the active support of military firms from a number of foreign countries, dictated the need to revise the organization of combat training of engineer troops and engineering training of combat arms. In October 1983, Marshal of Engineering Troops S. Aganov spoke about this at a training meeting with officers and commanders of units and subunits.
In a short time, a training center for the engineering troops of the 40th Army was created at 45 military units, field engineering townships at the dispatch units of divisions and ISRs of individual brigades and regiments. In each division and a separate regiment, special tracks were prepared for conducting complex tactical and combat exercises with live fire. They were equipped with training points with a complex mine situation. Here combat episodes were played out, tactical techniques were worked out.
The issues of accumulation, generalization and implementation of combat experience in engineering support into the practice of troops were revised. The widespread use by the enemy of new foreign-made mines with plastic hulls required the most serious attention to be paid to the training of units of sapper-dog breeders.
Combat group of sappers
In the companies and battalions of the engineering troops, journals were kept for recording the results of actions, as well as reporting cards with the engineering situation in the divisional dispatch and 45 missile missions, which were mandatory combat reporting documents. On their basis, the analysis of hostilities was carried out, the most characteristic moments of the battle were noted, new in the tactics of mining the rebels and promptly developed methods of neutralizing the MVZ, which were then formalized in the form of express information and communicated to the troops.
To improve the level of training of the commanding staff of divisions, brigades and individual regiments at the army training center at 45 regiments, 3-4-day training sessions were held twice a year to organize the engineering support of combat operations.
Engineering training of non-standard sappers was carried out at 7-12-day training camps. The classes were conducted by experienced sappers. Along with training personnel for hostilities, timely and reliable intelligence information contributed to the successful advancement of the advancing troops. Engineering reconnaissance established not only the place and type of obstacles, destruction, but also their nature and parameters.
Planned shooting from aircraft made it possible to determine the places of destruction, vulnerable areas of the terrain, to produce destruction and to install a cost center. More detailed reconnaissance from helicopters made it possible to determine the nature of the destruction. The intelligence data made it possible to plan combat actions, determine the composition of the main forces and reinforcements, and build the battle formation of the advancing units and subunits.
Engineering exploration of a water source
As combat experience shows, subunits and units operating in the first echelon performed two tasks - fire engagement and destruction of the enemy, as well as demining, barrage and restoration of movement routes. Therefore, the first echelon ICBM was supported by artillery, tanks, air defense systems and aviation, reinforced by a barrage and movement support detachment, usually on an armored base. The composition of such a detachment usually included: a tank platoon with 1-2 BTU and 1-2 KMT-5M, IMR, MTU, an engineer platoon with 2-3 mine detection dogs, 500 kg of explosives and 20-30 pcs. KZ. It was also envisaged to transport by helicopters to the place of installation of bridge trusses, individual bridge structures, usually from the "Crossing" set. The actions of such a detachment were covered by 1-2 MSV.
The experience of military operations in Afghanistan has shown that a detachment for clearing and ensuring movement is capable of ensuring in mountainous terrain an offensive rate of ISM of 2–2.5 km / h.
Engineering units in Afghanistan themselves also installed a large number of cost centers. In the interests of direct combat, MVZ were used little (about 12% of the total volume of all obstacles), mainly for ambush operations. The bulk of the mines were placed for the purpose of self-defense, to cover the border.
Dog breeders before going on a mine scouting mission
The minefields were permanent and temporary. In the first case, the minefields were covered with fire from the guard units, their combat state was monitored, if necessary, the cost centers were increased, and if they lost their combat effectiveness, they were destroyed and new ones were deployed. The so-called active cost centers were especially effective. Since 1984, they have been used on a massive scale to cover caravan routes.
In the mountains, on caravan routes, the device of mine "bags" was used with various variants of the layout of mines and with different periods of bringing them into a combat position. This kept the enemy in suspense and forced him to look for new routes.
High temperatures, dry and hot air with a high degree of dustiness had an exhausting effect on the personnel and caused an urgent need for water. Water was prized as ammunition, food, and fuels and lubricants.
The task of extracting, purifying water and providing the troops with it without interruption had to be solved in an unfavorable sanitary and epidemiological situation.
The use of tank trucks and other containers made it possible to increase the supply in the battalion to 90-100% of the daily water requirement.
Water was delivered to hard-to-reach areas by helicopters. Sometimes it was dropped by parachute into the RDV-200, but not always successfully, some of them crashed. Then they began to use pieces of fire hoses, from the ends clamped with special devices (capacity 10-12 liters), which withstood impacts on the ground.
In a minefield exploration class
