General Provisions
Over the past two decades, all relatively large-scale military conflicts with the participation of the United States and NATO countries have included the massive use of sea- and air-based cruise missiles (CR) as an obligatory element
The US leadership is actively promoting and constantly improving the concept of "contactless" war using long-range precision weapons (WTO). This idea assumes, firstly, the absence (or reduction to a minimum) of human losses on the part of the attacker and, secondly, the effective solution of the most important task characteristic of the initial stage of any armed conflict, the conquest of unconditional air supremacy and the suppression of the enemy's air defense system. The infliction of "non-contact" strikes suppresses the morale of the defenders, creates a feeling of helplessness and inability to fight the aggressor, and has a depressing effect on the highest command and control bodies of the defending side and subordinate troops.
In addition to "operational-tactical" results, the attainability of which the Americans have repeatedly demonstrated in the course of anti-Iraqi campaigns, strikes on Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, etc., the accumulation of the CD also pursues a "strategic" goal. The press is increasingly discussing a scenario according to which the simultaneous destruction of the most important components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) of the Russian Federation by conventional warheads of the Kyrgyz Republic, mainly sea-based, is assumed during the first "disarming strike." After such a strike, command posts, mine and mobile launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, air defense facilities, airfields, submarines in bases, control and communication systems, etc. should be disabled.
The achievement of the required effect, according to the American military leadership, can be ensured thanks to:
- reduction of the combat strength of the RF SNF in accordance with bilateral agreements;
- an increase in the number of WTO funds used in the first strike (first of all, the CD);
- the creation of an effective anti-missile defense of Europe and the United States, capable of "finishing off" the Russian strategic nuclear forces that were not destroyed in the course of a disarming strike.
It is obvious to any unbiased researcher that the US government (regardless of the name and color of the president's skin) is persistently and persistently pursuing a situation in which Russia, like Libya and Syria, will be cornered, and its leadership will have to make the last choice: to agree to full and unconditional surrender in terms of making the most important foreign policy decisions, or still try out on oneself another version of "decisive force" or "indestructible freedom."
In the described situation, the Russian Federation needs no less energetic and, most importantly, effective measures that can, if not prevent, then at least postpone D-Day (maybe the situation will change, the severity of the threat will be reduced, new arguments will appear against the implementation of ", the Martians will land, the American" upper classes "will become more sane - in decreasing order of probability).
With huge resources and reserves of constantly improving WTO models, the US military-political leadership rightly believes that repelling a massive strike by the Kyrgyz Republic is an extremely costly and difficult task, which today is beyond the reach of any of the potential adversaries of the United States.
Today, the capabilities of the Russian Federation to repel such a strike are clearly insufficient. The high cost of modern air defense systems, be it anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) or manned aircraft intercept systems (PAK), does not allow them to be deployed in the required quantity, taking into account the enormous length of the borders of the Russian Federation and the uncertainty with the directions from which strikes can be delivered with the use of CD …
Meanwhile, possessing undoubted advantages, CDs are not devoid of significant drawbacks. Firstly, on modern models of "lionfish" there are no means of detecting the fact of the attack of the CD from the side of the fighter. Secondly, cruise missiles fly at a constant course, speed and altitude over relatively long sections of the route, which facilitates interception. Third, as a rule, CDs fly to the target in a compact group, which makes it easier for the attacker to plan a strike and, in theory, helps to increase the survivability of missiles; however, the latter is carried out only if the target channels of air defense systems are saturated, otherwise the indicated tactics play a negative role, facilitating the organization of interception. Fourth, the flight speed of modern cruise missiles is still subsonic, of the order of 800 … 900 km / h, therefore, there is usually a significant time resource (tens of minutes) to intercept a cruise missile.
The analysis shows that to combat cruise missiles, a system is needed that is capable of:
- to intercept a large number of small-sized subsonic non-maneuvering air targets at extremely low altitude in a limited area in a limited time;
- to cover with one element of this subsystem a section (boundary) with a width much larger than that of existing air defense systems at low altitudes (approximately 500 … 1000 km);
- have a high probability of completing a combat mission in any weather conditions, day and night;
- to provide a significantly higher value of the complex criterion "efficiency / cost" when intercepting CDs in comparison with classic air defense systems and PAK interception.
This system should be interfaced with other air defense / missile defense systems and means in terms of command and control, reconnaissance of the air enemy, communications, etc.
Experience of fighting the Kyrgyz Republic in military conflicts
The scale of the use of CD in armed conflicts is characterized by the following indicators.
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, 297 Tomahok-class SLCMs were launched from US Navy surface ships and submarines deployed in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, as well as in the Persian Gulf.
In 1998, during Operation Desert Fox, a contingent of the American armed forces used more than 370 sea- and air-based cruise missiles against Iraq.
In 1999, during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia as part of Operation Resolute Force, cruise missiles were used in three massive air-missile strikes that took place during the first two days of the conflict. Then the United States and its allies turned to systematic hostilities, during which cruise missiles were also used. In total, during the period of active operations, more than 700 launches of sea and air-based missiles were carried out.
In the process of systematic hostilities in Afghanistan, the US armed forces used more than 600 cruise missiles, and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, at least 800 missiles.
In the open press, as a rule, the results of the use of cruise missiles are embellished, creating the impression of the "inevitability" of strikes and of their highest accuracy. So, on television, a video was repeatedly shown in which a case of a direct hit of a cruise missile in the window of a target building was demonstrated, etc. However, no data were provided either on the conditions in which this experiment was carried out, or on the date and place of its carrying out.
However, there are other assessments in which cruise missiles are characterized by markedly less impressive effectiveness. We are talking, in particular, about the report of the commission of the US Congress and about the materials published by an officer of the Iraqi army, in which the share of American cruise missiles hit by Iraqi air defenses in 1991 is estimated at approximately 50%. The losses of cruise missiles from Yugoslav air defense systems in 1999 are considered somewhat smaller, but also significant.
In both cases, cruise missiles were shot down mainly by portable air defense systems of the Strela and Igla types. The most important condition for the interception was the concentration of MANPADS crews in missile-hazardous areas and timely warning of the approach of cruise missiles. Attempts to use "more serious" air defense systems to combat cruise missiles were difficult, since the inclusion of a target detection radar from the air defense system almost immediately caused strikes against them with the use of anti-radar aviation weapons.
Under these conditions, the Iraqi army, for example, returned to the practice of organizing air observation posts, which detected cruise missiles visually and reported their appearance by telephone. During the period of the fighting in Yugoslavia, the highly mobile Osa-AK air defense systems were used to counter cruise missiles, which included a radar station for a short time with an immediate change of position after that.
So, one of the most important tasks is to exclude the possibility of "total" blinding of the air defense / missile defense system with the loss of the ability to adequately illuminate the air situation.
The second task is the rapid concentration of active funds in the directions of strikes. Modern air defense systems are not quite suitable for solving these problems.
Americans are also afraid of cruise missiles
Long before September 11, 2001, when kamikaze planes with passengers on board hit US facilities, American analysts identified another hypothetical threat to the country, which, in their opinion, could be created by "rogue states" and even individual terrorist groups. Imagine the following scenario. Two hundred or three hundred kilometers from the coast of the state, where the Happy Nation lives, a nondescript dry cargo ship with containers on the upper deck appears. Early in the morning, in order to use the haze that makes it difficult to visually detect air targets, cruise missiles, of course, Soviet-made or their counterparts, "concocted" by craftsmen from an unnamed country, suddenly launch from several containers on board this vessel. Then the containers are thrown overboard and flooded, and the missile carrier pretends to be an "innocent merchant" who happened to be here by accident.
Cruise missiles fly low and are difficult to detect.
And their combat units are not stuffed with ordinary explosives, not with teddy bears with calls for democracy in their paws, but, of course, with the most powerful toxic substances or, at worst, anthrax spores. Ten or fifteen minutes later, rockets appear over an unsuspecting coastal city … Needless to say, the picture is drawn by the hand of a master who has seen enough American horror films. But persuading the American Congress to fork out requires a "direct and clear threat." The main problem: to intercept such missiles, there is practically no time left to alert active interceptors - missiles or manned fighters, because the ground-based radar will be able to "see" a cruise missile rushing at a 10-meter height at a distance not exceeding several tens of kilometers.
In 1998, money was allocated for the first time in the United States under the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) program to develop a means of protection against the nightmare of cruise missiles arriving "from nowhere". In October 2005, research and experimental work was completed to test the ideas for feasibility, and Raytheon was given the go-ahead to make prototypes of the JLENS system. Now it was no longer about some unfortunate tens of millions of dollars, but about a solid amount - $ 1, 4 billion. In 2009, the elements of the system were demonstrated:
a 71M helium balloon with a ground station for lifting / lowering and servicing, and Science Applications International Corp. from St. Petersburg received an order for the design and manufacture of an antenna for a radar, which is the payload of a balloon. A year later, a seventy-meter balloon first took to the sky with a radar on board, and in 2011 the system was tested almost in full: first, they simulated electronic targets, then a low-flying plane was launched, after which it was the turn of a drone with a very small RCS.
Actually, there are two antennas under the balloon: one for detecting small-sized targets at a relatively long range, and the other for accurate target designation at a shorter range. Power is supplied to the antennas from the ground, the reflected signal is "lowered" through an optical fiber cable. The system's performance was tested up to an altitude of 4500 m. The ground station has a winch that provides the balloon ascent to the required height, a power source, and a control cabin with workstations for the dispatcher, meteorologist and balloon operator. It is reported that the equipment of the JLENS system is interfaced with the shipborne Aegis air defense system, the Patriot air defense systems, as well as with the SLAMRAAM complexes (a new self-defense air defense system, in which converted AIM-120 missiles are used as active means, previously positioned as air-to-air missiles). air").
However, in the spring of 2012, the JLENS program began to experience difficulties: the Pentagon, within the framework of the planned budget cuts, announced its refusal to deploy the first batch of 12 serial stations with 71M balloons, leaving only two already manufactured stations for fine-tuning the radar, eliminating the identified shortcomings in hardware and software …
On April 30, 2012, during practical launches of missiles at a training ground in Utah, using target designation from the JLENS system, an unmanned aircraft was shot down using electronic warfare equipment. A Raytheon spokesman said: “The point is not only that the UAV was intercepted, but also that it was possible to fulfill all the requirements of the technical specifications to ensure reliable interaction between the JLENS system and the Patriot air defense missile system. JLENS, because it was previously planned that the Pentagon will purchase hundreds of kits between 2012 and 2022.
It can be considered symptomatic that even the richest country in the world, apparently, still considers the price that would have to be paid to build a "great American anti-missile wall" based on the use of traditional means of intercepting an interceptor missile, even if in cooperation with the latest systems for detecting low-flying air targets.
Proposals for the appearance and organization of countering cruise missiles using unmanned fighters
The analysis shows that it is advisable to build a system for combating cruise missiles on the basis of the use of relatively mobile units armed with guided missiles with thermal seeker, which should be promptly focused on the threatened direction. Such units should not have stationary or low-mobile ground radars, which immediately become targets for enemy strikes using anti-radar missiles.
Ground-based air defense systems with surface-to-air missiles with thermal seeker are characterized by a small heading parameter, amounting to a few kilometers. Dozens of complexes will be required to reliably cover the 500 km line.
A significant part of the forces and means of ground-based air defense in the event of an enemy cruise missile overflight along one or two routes will be "out of work."Problems will arise with the placement of positions, the organization of timely warning and target allocation, the possibility of "saturating" the fire capabilities of air defense weapons in a limited area. In addition, it is rather difficult to ensure the mobility of such a system.
An alternative could be the use of relatively small unmanned fighter-interceptors armed with short-range guided missiles with thermal seeker.
A subdivision of such aircraft can be based on one aerodrome (aerodrome take-off and landing) or at several points (non-aerodrome start, aerodrome landing).
The main advantage of aviation unmanned means of intercepting cruise missiles is the ability to quickly concentrate efforts in a limited passageway of enemy missiles. The feasibility of using the BIKR against cruise missiles is also due to the fact that the "intelligence" of such a fighter, which is currently implemented on the basis of existing information sensors and computers, is sufficient to destroy targets that do not actively counter (with the exception of the oncoming detonation system for nuclear cruise missiles). Warhead).
A small unmanned cruise missile fighter (BIKR) should carry an airborne radar with a detection range of an air target of the "cruise missile" class against the background of the earth about 100 km (Irbis class), several UR "air-to-air" (class R-60, R- 73 or Igla MANPADS), as well as, possibly, an aircraft cannon. The relatively small mass and dimension of the BIKR should help to reduce the cost of vehicles in comparison with manned fighter-interceptors, as well as to reduce the total fuel consumption, which is important given the need for massive use of the BIKR (the maximum required engine thrust can be estimated as 2.5 … 3 tf, t e. about the same as the serial AI-222-25). To effectively combat cruise missiles, the maximum flight speed of the BIKR should be transonic or low supersonic, and the ceiling should be relatively small, no more than 10 km.
The control of the BIKR at all stages of the flight should be provided by an "electronic pilot", whose functions should be significantly expanded in comparison with typical automatic control systems for aircraft. In addition to autonomous control, it is advisable to provide for the possibility of remote control of the BIKR and its systems, for example, at the takeoff and landing stages, as well as, possibly, the combat use of weapons or the decision to use weapons.
The process of the combat employment of the BIKR unit can be briefly described as follows. After detection by means of the senior commander (a low-mobile ground surveillance radar cannot be introduced into the unit!) Of the fact that enemy cruise missiles are approaching into the air, several BIKRs are raised so that, after reaching the calculated areas, the detection zones of the onboard radars of unmanned interceptors completely overlap the width of the entire covered plot.
Initially, the area of maneuvering of a specific BIKR is set before departure in a flight mission. If necessary, the area can be specified in flight by transmitting the appropriate data over a protected radio link. In the absence of communication with the ground command post (radio link suppression), one of the BIKR acquires the properties of a "command apparatus" with certain powers. As part of the "electronic pilot" of the BIKR, it is necessary to provide an air situation analysis unit, which should ensure the massing of the BIKR forces in the air in the direction of the approach of the tactical group of enemy cruise missiles, as well as organize the call of additional duty forces of the BIKR if all cruise missiles are not manages to intercept the "active" BIKR. Thus, the BIKR on duty in the air to a certain extent will play the role of a kind of "surveillance radar", practically invulnerable to the enemy's anti-radar missile defense systems. They can also deal with the flows of cruise missiles of relatively low density.
In case of distraction of the BIKR on duty in the air in one direction, additional devices must be immediately lifted from the airfield, which must exclude the formation of open zones in the subunit's area of responsibility.
During the threatened period, it is possible to organize continuous combat alert of several BIKR. If the need arises to transfer a subunit to a new direction, the BIKR can fly to a new airfield "on its own". To ensure landing, a control cabin and a calculation must be delivered to this airfield in advance by a transport aircraft, which ensures the performance of the necessary operations (it is possible that more than one "transporter" is required, but nevertheless the problem of transferring a long distance is potentially easier to solve than in the case of an air defense system, and in a much shorter time). During the flight to the new airfield, the BIKR should be controlled by an "electronic pilot". Obviously, in addition to the "combat" minimum of equipment for ensuring flight safety in peacetime, the BIKR automation should include a subsystem for avoiding collisions in the air with other aircraft.
Only flight experiments will be able to confirm or deny the possibility of destroying the KR or other unmanned aerial vehicle of the enemy by fire from the onboard BIKR cannon.
If the probability of destroying a cruise missile by cannon fire turns out to be high enough, then, according to the criterion "efficiency - cost", this method of destroying enemy cruise missiles will be beyond any competition.
The central problem in the creation of the BIKR is not so much the development of the actual aircraft with the appropriate flight data, equipment and weapons, but the creation of effective artificial intelligence (AI), which ensures the effective use of the BIKR units.
It seems that AI tasks in this case can be divided into three groups:
- a group of tasks that ensures the rational control of a single BIKR at all stages of the flight;
- a group of tasks that ensures the rational management of the BIKR group, which covers the established boundary of the airspace;
- a group of tasks that ensures the rational control of the BIKR unit on the ground and in the air, taking into account the need to periodically change aircraft, build up forces taking into account the scale of the enemy's raid, and interact with the reconnaissance and active assets of the senior commander.
The problem, to a certain extent, is that the development of AI for BIKR is not a profile one for the creators of the actual aircraft, nor for the developers of on-board ACS or radar. Without perfect AI, a drone fighter becomes an ineffective, expensive toy that can discredit an idea. The creation of a BIKR with a sufficiently developed AI may become a necessary step towards a multifunctional unmanned fighter capable of fighting not only unmanned, but also manned enemy aircraft.
