The best way would be to reanimate the "Perimeter" system.
There is an intense discussion of military reform in the media. In particular, many journalists demand to name all possible opponents by name.
I hasten to reassure everyone, at the present time there will be no big war for sure. The blue dream of pacifists - "XXI century without wars" has come true. Since 2000, not a single country in the world has been in a state of war for a single day, although not a single day has passed without hostilities in one or several parts of the world.
FRENCH OPTION FOR RUSSIA
Now the war is called "the fight against terrorism", "peacekeeping activities", "peace enforcement", etc. Therefore, I propose to change the terminology and talk not about war or defense of the fatherland, but about the reaction of the RF Armed Forces to threats to national security. The illusions of some liberals, who believed that the source of the Cold War was communism and that after its disappearance peace and general prosperity would come, turned out to be a delusion.
Moreover, if until 1991 the UN Security Council and International Law to a certain extent contained conflicts, now their effect is negligible. As for the notorious world public opinion, during the August 2008 conflict everything fell into place. The entire world community supported the aggressor, not his victim. Western TV channels showed burning streets of Tskhinval, passing it off as Georgian cities.
The time has come to remember the behest of Alexander III the Peacemaker: "Russia has only two allies - her army and navy." Does this mean that Russia in a crisis should get involved in a symmetrical arms race like the USSR? Until 1991, the USSR traded in arms mostly at a loss, selling them cheaply to “friends”, or even simply giving them away.
It is curious why our politicians and the military do not want to remember the French phenomenon of 1946-1991? France was devastated by the Second World War, then took part in two dozen large and small colonial wars in Laos, Vietnam, the 1956 Suez Canal War, and the Algerian War (1954-1962). Nevertheless, the French managed, independently of other countries, to create a full range of weapons from ATGMs to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), almost not inferior to the superpowers. All French ships, including nuclear submarines with ICBMs and aircraft carriers, were built in French shipyards and carry French weapons. And our Defense Department now wants to buy French warships.
But the French people, in order to create the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, did not pull their belts at all. The market economy was intensively developing in the country, the standard of living was growing steadily.
The casket opens simply. Between 1950 and 1990, approximately 60% of the weapons produced by France were exported. Moreover, the export was carried out in all directions. So, in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the armies of Israel and all Arab countries were armed to the teeth with French weapons. Iran and Iraq also fought each other with French weapons. England is France's NATO ally, but in the Falklands War it was French-made aircraft and missiles that inflicted the greatest damage on the British fleet.
I fully admit that a refined intellectual will be indignant: "The French arms trade is immoral in all directions!" But, alas, if these weapons systems were not sold by France, they would be guaranteed to be sold by others.
A rhetorical question arises: can our nuclear submarines, sold to Iran, Venezuela, India, Chile, Argentina, etc., even hypothetically harm Russia at least in a separate future? What about nuclear boats? Let's take purely defensive weapons - anti-aircraft missiles. Why can't the S-300 anti-aircraft complex be sold to Venezuela, Iran, Syria and other countries?
AMERICAN ROCKET CALL
Unfortunately, our politicians and the media pay very little attention to the American ship missile defense system, created during the modernization of the Aegis anti-aircraft complex. The new missile was named Standard-3 (SM-3) and after certain modifications (which exactly the Pentagon keeps secret) it can be equipped with any of the 84 US Navy ships with the Aegis system. We are talking about 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 57 Airlie Burke-class destroyers.
In 2006, the CG-67 cruiser Shiloh hit a missile warhead with an SM-3 missile at an altitude of 200 km, 250 km northwest of Kauan Island (Hawaii archipelago). Interestingly, according to Western media reports, the warhead was guided from the Japanese destroyer DDG-174 Kirishima (total displacement 9490 tons; equipped with the Aegis system).
The fact is that since 2005 Japan, with the help of the United States, has been equipping its fleet with SM-3 anti-missiles of the Aegis system.
The first Japanese ship equipped with the Aegis system with the SM-3 was the DDG-177 Atado destroyer. He received anti-missiles at the very end of 2007.
On November 6, 2006, SM-3 missiles launched from the DDG-70 Lake Erie destroyer intercepted two ICBM warheads at an altitude of about 180 km.
And on March 21, 2008, an SM-3 rocket from the same Lake Erie struck at an altitude of 247 km and shot down the American secret L-21 Radarsat satellite with a direct hit. The official designation for this secret spacecraft is USA-193.
So, in the Far East, American and Japanese destroyers and cruisers can shoot down ballistic missiles of Russian submarines at the initial stage of the trajectory, even if they are launched from their own territorial waters.
Note that American ships with the Aegis system regularly visit the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas. The naval missile defense system is dangerous for the Russian Federation not only during the war. The US military deliberately exaggerates its capabilities by deceiving incompetent people in the US and Europe, from presidents and ministers to shopkeepers.
The possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union scared everyone, and since 1945 there has been no direct military clash between the West and Russia. Now, for the first time in 60 years, politicians and inhabitants of NATO countries have created the illusion of their own impunity. Meanwhile, it does not occur to our media to spoil this euphoria, recalling the American tests of nuclear weapons at altitudes from 80 to 400 km in the summer of 1962 on Johnson Atoll. Then, after each explosion, radio communications were interrupted for several hours throughout the Pacific Ocean.
In 2001, the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduce Agency (DTRA) attempted to assess the potential impact of the test on LEO satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - like a bomb dropped on Hiroshima), detonated at an altitude of 125 to 300 km, “is enough to disable all satellites that do not have special protection against radiation ". Plasma physicist at the University of Maryland Denis Papadopoulos had a different opinion: "A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, detonated at a specially calculated height, could lead to the loss of 90% of all LEO satellites in about a month." It is estimated that the cost of replacing equipment, disabled by the consequences of a high-altitude nuclear explosion, will amount to more than $ 100 billion. This is not counting the total economic losses from the loss of opportunities provided by space technology!
Why not ask American missile defense specialists to explain how the Aegis and other missile defense systems will work after two dozen hydrogen charges explode in low orbits? Well, then let the Western taxpayers think for themselves what the Pentagon spends its money on during the crisis.
BURNED "TOMAHAWKS"
Another weapon that has created instability in the world and generates a sense of impunity among the military and politicians are the American Tomahawk-class cruise missiles with a firing range of 2,200-2,500 km. Already now, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the United States and NATO countries can launch thousands of such missiles at the Russian Federation."Tomahawks" can hit ICBM mines, mobile complexes of ICBMs, communication centers, command posts. Western media argue that a surprise attack with conventional cruise missiles could completely deprive Russia of the ability to launch a nuclear strike.
In this regard, it is surprising that the issue of Tomahawk missiles is not included by our diplomats in the framework of negotiations on strategic offensive arms.
By the way, it would be nice to remind our admirals and designers of the Novator design bureau that our counterparts to the Tomahawks - the various “Grenades” and others - are no match for American cruise missiles. And I am not saying this, but Aunt Geography.
The US Air Force and Navy will never allow our ships to reach a distance of 2500 km from the shores of America. Therefore, the only Russian response to American Tomahawks can be Meteorite and Bolid ship missiles or their more effective counterparts with a firing range of 5-8 thousand km.
WELL FORGOTTEN OLD
The best way to rid the West of its illusions about the possibility of delivering an unpunished strike against Russia would be to revive the Perimeter system.
The system scared the West so much in the early 1990s that it was called the "Dead Hand". Let me briefly recall the history of this horror story.
In the 1970s, the United States began developing the doctrine of the "Limited Nuclear War". In accordance with it, the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces will be destroyed by the first strike, and the surviving communication lines will be suppressed by electronic interference. In this way, the US leadership hoped to avoid a retaliatory nuclear strike.
In response, the USSR decided, in addition to the existing RSVN communication channels, to create a special command rocket equipped with a powerful radio transmitting device, launched in a special period and giving commands to launch all intercontinental missiles on alert throughout the USSR. Moreover, this rocket was only the main part of a large system.
To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was originally designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is capable of deciding on a retaliatory strike on its own, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. The system included numerous instruments for measuring radiation, seismic vibrations, it is connected with early warning radars, early warning satellites for missile attacks, etc. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will abandon the concept of a preemptive crushing strike.
ASYMMETRIC "PERIMETER"
The principle of operation of the "Perimeter" system is as follows. In peacetime, the main components of the system are on duty, monitoring the situation and processing the data coming from the measuring posts. In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack with the use of nuclear weapons, confirmed by the data of early warning systems of a missile attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically put on alert and begins to monitor the operational situation.
If the sensor components of the system confirm with sufficient reliability the fact of a massive nuclear strike, and the system itself for a certain time loses contact with the main command nodes of the Strategic Missile Forces, it initiates the launch of several command missiles, which, flying over their territory, broadcast a control signal, and launch codes for all components of the nuclear triad - silo and mobile launch complexes, nuclear submarine missile cruisers and strategic aviation. The receiving equipment of both the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces and individual launchers, having received this signal, begins the process of immediately launching ballistic missiles in a fully automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.
The development of a special command missile system "Perimeter" was ordered by KB "Yuzhnoye" by a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 695-227 of August 30, 1974. Initially, it was supposed to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) rocket as the base rocket, later they stopped at the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) rocket. The missile, modified in terms of the control system, received the index 15A11.
In December 1975, a preliminary design for a command missile was completed. A special warhead was installed on the rocket, which had the index 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by OKB LPI (Leningrad Polytechnic Institute). To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead during the flight had to have a constant orientation in space. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for a special warhead "Mayak"), which significantly reduced the cost and terms of its creation and development. The production of special warhead 15B99 was organized at the Strela Scientific and Production Association in Orenburg.
After ground testing of new technical solutions, flight design tests of the command missile began in 1979. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental silo launchers were commissioned. In addition, at site 71, a special command post was created, equipped with a newly developed unique combat control equipment to provide remote control and launch of a command missile according to orders from the highest levels of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter was built at a special technical position in the assembly body.
Flight tests of the 15A11 rocket were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by Lieutenant General Bartholomew Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces General Staff.
The first launch of the 15A11 command missile with the equivalent of the transmitter was successful on December 26, 1979. The interaction of all systems involved in the launch was checked; the rocket brought the MCH 15B99 to a standard trajectory with a summit of about 4000 km and a range of 4500 km. A total of 10 missiles were manufactured for flight tests. However, from 1979 to 1986, only seven launches were carried out.
During the tests of the system, real launches of ICBMs of various types were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the 15A11 command missile during the flight. For this purpose, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receivers of the "Perimeter" system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during flight design tests (LKI), six launches were recognized as successful, and one - partially successful. In connection with the successful course of tests and the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, the State Commission found it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten.
CURE FOR POSSIBLE ILLUSIONS
Simultaneously with the LKI of the rocket, ground tests of the functioning of the entire complex were carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. The tests were carried out at the proving ground of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at levels of exposure to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion exceeding the specified TTZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
In addition, during the tests, by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, the task was set to expand the functions of the complex with the delivery of combat orders not only to launchers of ground-based intercontinental missiles, but also to nuclear missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, as well as command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy. Flight design tests of the command missile were completed in March 1982, and in January 1985 the Perimeter complex was put on alert.
Data on the Perimeter system is extremely classified. However, it can be assumed that the technical operation of the missiles is identical to that of the 15A16 base missile. The launcher is a mine, automated, highly protected, most likely of the OS type - a modernized PU OS-84.
There is no reliable information about the system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with many communication systems and sensors that monitor the combat situation. The system monitors the presence and intensity of communications on the air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from the Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, which coincide with the sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth the crust (which corresponds to the pattern of multiple ground nuclear strikes), and the presence of living people on the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system, probably, makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike. After being put on alert, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises.
In December 1990, a modernized system was adopted, which was named "Perimeter-RC", which operated until June 1995, when, within the framework of the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty.
It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be modernized so that it can quickly respond to a strike by conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles.
I am sure that our scientists can come up with more than a dozen asymmetric responses to the US military threat, and much cheaper. Well, as for their immorality, if some British ladies consider antipersonnel mines to be weapons immoral, and "Tomahawks" - very respectable, then it's not bad at all to scare them well. And the more the ladies are screaming, the less desire our Western friends will have to bully with Russia.
