The Spanish fleet under the early Bourbons was a rather peculiar picture. Service on it was quite a prestigious business, the fleet developed, demanded more and more new personnel …. But the people from the titular Castilian provinces did not go there. As a result, there were recruited various foreigners like Irish and Italians, and representatives of national minorities - Catalans and Basques. The latter, as a result, provided the largest number of outstanding officers to the Armada. The most famous of them in the 18th century is, of course, Cosme Churruca, the scientist, organizer, explorer and hero of Trafalgar, whose San Juan Nepomuseno fought more desperately than other allied ships. But he, for all his advantages, was more a creative person than a naval commander. Therefore, the title of the best naval commander can be safely given to another native of the Basque Country - Don Jose de Mazarredo, the most capable admiral of Spain in its entire history.
Another Basque in the Royal Navy
Jose de Mazarredo Salazar Muniatones and Gortazar was born in 1745 into a family of hereditary sailors. His father was Antonio José, lieutenant of the Armada, rejidor and mayor of Bilbao, who died when young José was only 8 years old, and his mother was Maria Joséfa de Gortazar and Perez de Arandía. Of course, he did not interrupt the family tradition and went to serve in the navy. In 1759, at the age of fourteen, he was already listed as a midshipman in Cadiz, and his first duty was the sloop Andalus under the command of the captain of the frigate (capitan de fragata) Francisco de Vera. On the night of April 13, 1761, Masarredo first declared himself as a brave, stubborn, cold-blooded and skillful sailor - in a storm, when the sloop was at sea and did not see land, he, anticipating unkindness, contrary to the opinion of other officers on the boat went to scouting and discovered that the Andalus was about to land on the rocks. He risked himself, since a small boat could easily be turned over in a storm, and he would then have drowned, but as a result, the midshipman managed to save the lives of three hundred people who were on board the ship at that moment. After that, the authorities noticed a young and capable Basque, and he began to gradually move up the career ladder. In 1772, he went on a scientific expedition with Juan de Langara to the Philippines, and in the coming years he became his constant companion and friend. However, soon fate divided his friends, returning him to Spain, and sending him to serve in the Mediterranean Sea. Having passed the path of a peaceful scientist and explorer, Masarredo soon embarks on the path of war.
In 1775 he took part in an expedition to Algeria, which boiled down to a landing in the Oran region and an attempt to capture it. Masarredo was responsible for organizing both the landing and the necessary navigation calculations, and they were performed in an exemplary manner. And although the expedition itself ended in failure, the officer's skillful actions were noticed by the authorities, and he was promoted, but with a temporary transfer to land. There, José de Mazarredo develops a vigorous scientific activity, improving his education, and at the same time working as a teacher and researcher. At this time, he was already publishing several of his own works on navigation and maneuvering ships, got acquainted with the works of Jorge Juan, and studied the basics of cartography.
The latter came in handy when in 1778 he became the commander of the battleship "San Juan Batista" and carried out a large-scale volume of hydrographic work, mapping the coast and bottom depths near the Iberian Peninsula. When the Maritime Atlas, a collection of maps, is soon published in Spain, many of its maps will be drawn by the hand of Mazarreda. At the beginning of 1779 he received the rank of Major General, and published his old work, which was awaiting its time - "Fundamentals of Naval Tactics." In it, Masarredo for the first time tries to revise the standard tactical methods of combat at sea, seeks to invent something new instead of the old hackneyed battle line, to derive a certain victory formula that would allow him to defeat any enemy, including the British. The work turned out to be good, but clearly incomplete, which the author himself felt. Major discoveries were yet to come….
A meteoric rise…
When Spain entered the war with the British in 1779, Mazarredo became chief of staff of Admiral Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba, becoming in fact the second man after him in the Armada. In addition to the usual worries for such a position, he had to perform another important function - to urge his boss, prompting him to take active actions, because by the time the war began, Cordoba was already 73 years old, and senile passivity and caution had already taken possession of his mind. It was at this time that he met Antonio Escagno, who quickly became his friend and assistant, providing all kinds of assistance in the theoretical research of Masarreda. Strongly dissatisfied with the activities of the "Other Armada", Jose, at the same time, sees serious shortcomings in poor cooperation between the fleets. Therefore, already in 1779, he created tabular "Signals Instructions", which greatly simplify and unify the signaling system of the allies, which makes it possible to give orders and execute them much faster and more accurately. In 1780, Masarredo became the author of a risky, but fully justified plan to capture a British convoy at Cape Santa Maria, as a result of which the Spanish-French fleet received rich trophies, including 5 East Indies ships, which were soon included in the fleet as frigates.
And soon after that he had to come into conflict with the French allies. It was planned to escort a large convoy across the Atlantic - 130 "merchants" under the protection of 66 battleships and 24 frigates, but the barometer readings indicated that a strong storm could soon happen. The French tried to go further, ignoring the warning, Count d'Estaing, with whom Masarredo had a quarrel, became an especially active supporter of the continuation of the campaign. Nevertheless, they managed to convince the allies to go to Cadiz for at least a few days. And it turned out that Masarredo, who furiously demanded a call to the port, was right - a strong storm broke out, which could send more than one ship from the allied fleet to the bottom. Alas, he did not succeed in everything - so, in 1782, he could not enough push his superior, Admiral de Cordoba and Cordoba, so that he began to take active action, as a result of which first the English convoy was allowed into besieged Gibraltar, and then the battle of Cape Espartel, characterized by an extreme degree of indecision with fairly active maneuvering.
With the end of the war, Masarredo was appointed to command his squadron of ships, which made it possible to finally consolidate the experience gained and check some theoretical developments, which led in 1789 to the beginning of writing, in collaboration with Antonio Escagno, "Resolutions" - a detailed description of the basics of naval tactics and combat maneuvering. To do this, they even had to leave the active fleet for a while, doing other things. This work proved to be a clear illustration of the scale of the figure of Masarredo, proof of the outstanding naval skills that he possessed. Rejecting the old tactics of battle in strict battle lines, he advocated decisive, proactive actions, concentrating strikes in the center of the enemy formation, and active maneuvering. He was not afraid of any rapprochement or a stronger enemy, believing that the one who breaks the enemy formation and forces him to play by his own rules will prevail in battle. In this he was like the most outstanding naval commanders of his time, in decisiveness and lack of dogmatism, standing on a par with Ushakov and Nelson. The tactics he proposed turned out to be painfully similar to what Nelson did at Trafalgar in 1805, striking a concentrated blow in the middle of an already downed allied formation. In such a blow to the center, Masarredo saw an opportunity to defeat any enemy, even inferior to that in the quality of crew training. The writing of the work took some more time, and in 1793 the "Regulations" were published in Madrid. The Armada greeted them with satisfaction and delight, and the king awarded the already officially recognized naval theorist with the status of a knight of the Order of Santiago.
In 1795, Masarreda was assigned to command a squadron that was supposed to go to the aid of the Langara squadron in the Mediterranean. Returning after a long absence to the active fleet, he found him in a disastrous state - salaries are paid irregularly, ships are in poor condition, the crews are less trained than before. Masarredo was not one of those people who would calmly endure such a situation, as a result of which he entered into an acute conflict with politicians and courtiers. He was not alone - the support of the military theorist was also provided by the former naval minister Antonio Valdes and Fernandez Bazan, who was dismissed because of his disagreement with the "general course of the party." As a result, instead of commanding a combat squadron, Masarredo was written off ashore and assigned to work in Ferrol, albeit with all the respect and honor. As a result of this, as well as other court intrigues, it was not him who was appointed to command the fleet, but the passive and devoid of naval talents Jose de Cordoba and Ramos. He did not have organizational and tactical talents, as a result of which he did not even establish more or less tolerable intelligence.
The result of this political squabble was the Battle of Cape San Vicente (Saint Vincent) in 1797, when the Armada, possessing an almost two-fold superiority in forces, lost the battle to the British, losing to them 4 ships of the line as trophies, and almost losing the fifth, " Santisima Trinidad. " A scandal erupted, Cordoba was tried and expelled from the Armada. The new commander of the fleet was about to appoint the old admiral Borja, who was not at all better than Cordoba, but the nerves of the officers could no longer stand it. Having assembled a delegation with the support of Federico Gravina, they, contrary to the charter, achieved an audience with Queen Maria Luisa, who actually ruled the country, and convinced her that only one person in Spain could effectively command the fleet - José de Mazarredo and Salazar. As a result, he was immediately returned from disgrace, put into operation, and sent to Andalusia with a simple task - to do everything in his power, since the ships of the Armada were scattered in different ports, and Cadiz at that time was already blocked by the British fleet, and there was a serious threat of the capture of the city.
… and a quick fall
The best admiral of Spain, having received the best junior flagship (Gravina) under his command, immediately took up his duties, and developed an ebullient activity in the city. Very quickly, the ships stationed here were put in order, in La Carraca, the rapid construction of light rowing ships was established, and the coastal defense was put on alert. The English fleet carried out night attacks on the city on 3 and 5 July, but was repulsed with losses; Spanish ships regularly made sorties to the sea, preventing the blockade from finally slamming, which is why merchant ships continued to break through to Cadiz. The next year, Masarredo, seeking to smash the enemy in parts, went to sea with 22 ships, and began to cruise south of the Iberian Peninsula, frightening off a patrol of 9 British ships of the line. This squadron had a real chance of running into a battle with the Spaniards and losing it, but then a storm broke out, and the British managed to escape from the blow.
After staying at sea for some time, Masarredo returned to Cadiz, and in time - less than a day later, Admiral Jervis's fleet, consisting of 42 ships, appeared near the city. No sooner had the Spaniards returned home, they would have faced a battle that, most likely, the Armada would have lost. Despite the absence of military clashes, the result of these actions was clear - the blockade of Cadiz is not reliable, and the period of crisis is over. Since the Spaniards themselves were no longer able to defeat the British, Masarredo went to Paris in 1798 in order to negotiate cooperation with the French. Alas, the combination of the candidacy of the straightforward and tough Masarreda with the realities of the time turned out to be disgusting - he hardly negotiated, and after the coup of 1799, when Napoleon came to power, things generally went very badly. It also affected the fact that Masarredo became one of those who did not support the dubious and adventurous expedition to Egypt, and blocked the participation of Spanish ships in it. Napoleon did not like the obstinate and headstrong Spaniard, and, using various methods, he first achieved the deprivation of that command over the fleet, and then his recall from Paris in 1801. From that moment on, Masarreda's career plummeted.
Upon his return to Spain, he was appointed captain-general of the department of Cadiz, which in theory was not bad, but at the same time deprived Masarreda, who was categorically dissatisfied with the emerging situation in the country in general and in the fleet in particular, of influence on the fate of the Armada. However, he did not stay here for long - in 1802 he was returned to the fleet, being appointed chief …. Naval barracks Bilbao. This was perceived by him as a slap in the face, and coupled with the growing crisis of the Armada forced the naval commander to act - to correspond with officers, send petitions to Madrid, trying to achieve any improvement, even if not for him, but for the fleet. All this caused only irritation at the court, as a result of which in 1804 Masarredo lost even the small position that he held, and went into "exile", first to Santonia, and then to Pamplona. The official reason for the exile was the accusation of trying to oppose local interests to the interests of the state, which, of course, did not correspond to reality, because the interests of the fleet always coincided with the interests of the state.
Many hoped that in 1805 Masarredo would return from exile, he would again be put in command of the Armada in order to save her from the position into which the French in general and Villeneuve drove her, but Madrid was relentless - the disgraced admiral had to remain there., where before, that is, as far as possible from the operating fleet. Broken by such a treacherous attitude on the part of the king, enraged by the news of the defeat at Trafalgar and the death of many outstanding officers, disillusioned with the Bourbons, in 1808 he committed, probably, his only truly negative, but quite understandable act, swearing allegiance to Jose I Bonaparte, and received from him the position of CEO of Armada. However, he was not destined to stay in this position for a long time - in 1812 he died in Madrid. The Spaniards forgave their great admiral for such a betrayal, especially after the lapse of time, when the whole rot of the governments of Carlos IV and Fernando VII became clear, but they still prefer to remember him not as often as those who remained faithful to the end. In honor of Masarredo, one street in Bilbao is now named, but this is where everything essentially ends - no monuments, no squares, nothing ….
Jose de Mazarredo i Salazar is considered the best Spanish admiral of the 18th century, and one of the best throughout the history of Spain. In terms of the scale of his personality, ideas, initiative, tactical literacy and organizational skills, he was, perhaps, the only allied admiral capable of fighting Nelson on equal terms. And at the same time, the history of Masarreda's service is a clear illustration of the entire history of Spain in the late 18th - early 19th centuries: recognized in the navy and abroad, he never received full-fledged independent command due to political intrigue, fell into disgrace, and as a result was removed from any affairs of the Armada when she most needed him.
It is even more a graphic illustration of the situation in which the enlightened, talented part of Spanish society found itself in 1808, forced to choose between their people, who supported insignificant rulers against the invaders, and foreigners, guided by pragmatism and the best intentions, capable of reforming an increasingly lagging behind. Spain. That is why, being a great admiral, Masarredo did not leave a big mark in world history, and now he is practically not known outside the borders of his native Motherland - for all this is the result not of his personal qualities, but of the decline of the entire state, because of which this great man did not could not prove himself to the same extent as other great admirals.
