The downed Korean Boeing in September 1983 has truly become a mystery of the 20th century. Until now, there are disputes not only about the place of death of the liner, but also about whose missiles shot it down: Soviet or … American? Moreover, as many researchers suspect, a real air battle of several Soviet and American fighters was going on over the Sea of Okhotsk. The world was no longer on the threshold, but beyond the threshold of the Third World War.
According to the official version, which is known to the whole world, on September 1, 1983, a Boeing 747 of a South Korean airline violated Soviet airspace, after which it was shot down by a Su-15 fighter. The liner fell into the sea near Sakhalin Island. 269 people died. However, the facts tell a different story.
A significantly smaller number of people know that this plane did not just fly not along its usual safe route, but deliberately flew into the territory of the USSR and flew over it on an espionage mission. He was supposed to provoke the inclusion of radars of the Soviet air defense, and the American satellite located above him - to determine the parameters of these radars. (In this regard, the Boeing took off from Anchorage specifically 40 minutes later than the schedule in order to be over the territory of the USSR at the same time as the satellite.) it will be impossible to detect because of the "dead zones", as well as to be able to develop means and methods of suppressing the radar in the desired areas.
What confirms this conclusion? The deliberately deceitful behavior of the Reagan administration in all matters related to the investigation of this case.
The investigation of this disaster, like any plane crash, in the United States should have been taken up by the National Transportation Security Administration - since this is the direct business of its specialists. But the agency was immediately banned by the US government. The "investigation" was taken up by the US State Department (the Department of Foreign Affairs, in our opinion), although there are no specialists there. As a result of such an "investigation", the records at the tracking stations of this aircraft were destroyed, the negotiations between the American and Japanese dispatchers disappeared, the tape of the recording of our pilot's conversations with the guidance stations was so crudely forged that even correspondents noticed it at the very first sounding, etc. etc. And so on. That is, the American side falsified the case insolently and crudely - so that even the "democratic" journalists devoted to the USA, with all their desire, cannot keep silent about it.
After the incident, many specialists had many questions, to which there is still no official answer. The first question is, how did the Korean airliner end up in Soviet airspace? Why did an experienced pilot, using the most modern equipment, deviate so far into the depths of Soviet territory? All three "inertial navigation systems" (INS) installed on the Korean aircraft had gyroscopes and accelerometers that were supposed to guide the aircraft along a predetermined route. To avoid system failure, all three computers worked autonomously, receiving information independently of each other. Could it be that wrong coordinates were entered into all three computers? Is it possible that the crew neglected the obligation to verify the coordinates of the INS with the coordinates on the flight charts, as is usually done? Could an experienced pilot have forgotten to check if the actual position of the aircraft matches the control points marked by the INS during the flight? Or has electrical failures paralyzed critical navigation systems, lights and radio transmitters? The likelihood of such a development of events is extremely small. Each of the three INS units had an autonomous power supply. They were maintained in working order by any of four electrical generators, one for each jet engine of the aircraft. Until the fatal explosion, the crew did not for a minute lose contact with ground tracking stations located along the route.
Commander Chun, in his last radio contact with Tokyo, confidently reported that he was 181 km southeast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. In fact, it was located exactly 181 km north of the island. Why didn't the air traffic controllers tell him about the error? The plane was already flying on the Romeo-20 route, in the immediate vicinity of Soviet territory. Crews made sure to use weather radars to make sure they did not cross the border. Documents show that never before during a regular flight, the liner did not deviate from the approved flight plan. In addition, the South Koreans knew better than others about the risk of off-course. In 1978, the Soviet military fired at a lost Korean liner and forced it to land. The Boeing 707 then lost control and descended by almost 10,000 meters before it could be leveled and landed beyond the Arctic Circle, on a frozen lake near Murmansk. Two passengers were killed; the survivors, including 13 wounded, were rescued. The Soviet side billed the South Korean government "for services" - 100 thousand dollars.
Boeing 707 forced to land
According to the ICAO Secretary General's report on page thirty-nine, paragraph 2.10.2 states:
“If the air traffic controllers who were flying knew about such a significant deviation from the course, corrective measures would be taken. . The pilot, however, reported: passes through those points through which he should have passed if he flew along the standard route. A pilot with vast experience could not be mistaken. Is it possible to confuse land with the water surface of the ocean? So he deliberately deceived the dispatchers. But why?
Now, in light of the unusual behavior of the pilot, consider another fact from this incident that is not talked about, perhaps without noticing. This is how the pilot competently guided the plane over our territory, who, by the way, before serving in the civilian Korean airline was a pilot with the rank of colonel of the South Korean Air Force. Look. Boeing flew into our territory from Kamchatka. It was spotted by ground-based radar stations, a pair of our fighters took off, but the Boeing pilot dropped from 10 to 3 km (by the way, 3 km was never an echelon for airliners) and entered the zone of Kamchatka volcanoes impenetrable for radar. The guidance stations of our fighters lost it and were unable to direct the pair raised into the air. That, having used up the fuel, sat down. The Boeing reappeared on the radar screens, then a couple more fighters were lifted into the air, but it was already so far away that they did not have enough fuel to catch up with it. Then the Korean flew to Sakhalin, two more of our fighters were lifted into the air, but the Boeing maneuvered again and entered an area inaccessible to the ground radar, and our guidance stations lost it again, that is, they were again unable to point fighters at it.
But Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich, lifted into the air, still managed to spot the impudent onboard radar station in his Su-15 and track him down. However, upon approach, when Osipovich wanted to show himself to the Boeing and demand that he land, he made another maneuver - dropped the speed from 900 to 400 km / h.
The Su-15 cannot fly at such a speed, it overstepped the Korean and had to make new maneuvers to turn and approach the Boeing, after which there was little fuel left in our interceptor tanks, and the Korean was already close to the border. As a result, not having time to gain altitude, Osipovich lifted the nose of the Su and launched two missiles in pursuit from an atypical position - from bottom to top, from a distance of 5 km. So let's say a word of praise to the late Boeing pilot: he was “that little thing” - he knew how to fly and knew how to professionally evade a fight with fighters.
According to the official version, Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich, firing two missiles at a passenger Boeing-747 and hitting one in the fuselage, and the other in one of the four engines, said: "The target is destroyed." But, firstly, he had already turned to the airfield on the remnants of fuel and did not see the fall of the plane, and secondly, he believed that he had fired at an American reconnaissance aircraft RC-135, which was supposed to be enough with two missiles.
This is not a passenger plane. This is an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft.
But the Boeing-747 is one and a half times larger than the RC-135 (although it looks like a silhouette), and, accordingly, two missiles might not be enough for a confident defeat. Further, the Americans calculated the time of the fall of the Boeing after being hit by missiles using the marks on their radars. To an altitude of 300 m (when the mark disappeared from the radar), it fell for 12 minutes. Disappeared from radar does not mean fell into the sea. This means went into the radar dead zone, which extends below 300m above sea level. Now compare: if he just went to land, it would take him 15 minutes, but if he fell uncontrollable, then 30 seconds. So he fell or flew? That is, the Boeing may not have been shot down, the pilot simply dropped to an altitude at which normal pressure was established in the depressurized cabin and continued the flight. The British radio company BBC, very prudent and cautious in its judgments, in a program on September 1, 2003, referring to the opinion of Ben Torrey, admitted that the story of the Boeing is far from so simple. Let us quote a fragment of the program: “Hence, there are more and more reports that after the missile attack the plane did not lose control at all and the pilots controlled it for at least another 12 minutes. In theory, this time is quite enough for an emergency landing - it would be an airfield. Ben Torrey, the representative of the International Committee for Rescue of Victims of Flight KAL-007, is almost sure: there was such an airfield near the site of the tragedy … That morning, a plane landed near Moneron Island. Ben Torrey and his associates are sure that this plane was the very Korean Boeing. According to him, the passengers of the flight were taken off the board of the liner and taken away in an unknown direction, and the car itself was blown up, then spreading the fragments along the seabed."
Everything suggests that it was no coincidence that this flight was carried out with an almost doubled crew, and was headed by the former personal pilot of the Seoul dictator, Colonel of the South Korean Air Force Chun Ben Ying. The New York Times wrote about him: “Flight 007 Commander Chun Ben Ying (45) retired from active duty as an Air Force colonel in 1971. The following year, 1972, he joined the South Korean company Corian Airlines. He is an experienced pilot with 10,627 flight hours (of which 6,618 hours on a Boeing 747). On the Pacific highway R-20, he worked for more than five years; in 1982 he was awarded for trouble-free operation; in other words, this is the ace of the South Korean Air Force. Therefore, it is simply pointless to assert that he was "distracted" by something during the flight."
Was it an accident that a former Air Force colonel led the crew of the ill-fated flight? Based on the facts, no. Before the KAL 007 took off from Anchorage, a number of rules were violated, as a result of which, in technical terms, the flight was illegal. The crew (pilot, co-pilot and flight engineer) did not rest for the prescribed time between flights. They were not “fit to fly” and if it was so important for them to return to Seoul on this particular flight, they should be flying as passengers. Moreover, that night, there were two more full KAL flight crews among the passengers, whose members were well rested, and one of whom had just arrived in Anchorage with a crew of 20 flight attendants. It was this crew who was supposed to be in the pilot's cabin during the journey to Seoul, and not rest in the first class cabin.
Regarding the rest period for Captain Chun's crew, the 1983 ICAO report states:
"The KAL 007 flight crew rested longer than the minimum required by KAL rules … The crew rested 22 hours on their first visit to Anchorage, 31 hours in New York and 11:43 on their return to Anchorage." This short passage contains two likely deliberate errors. The first one is arithmetic. The report said the crew spent 11 hours 43 minutes in Anchorage. But the rest did not start until 14.37 and ended at 01.50 (Anchorage local time). The difference is 11 hours 13 minutes, not 11 hours 43 minutes.
The second mistake is more serious. As stated in the KAL operating manual, the minimum rest period should be one and a half times the total flight time of the previous flight, unless the next flight is a charter or cargo flight, in which case the minimum rest period should be at least equal to the duration of the previous flight. In addition, the rest period does not include one hour after the last flight and two hours before the next. Chun Bun-Ying and two other members of his flight crew (by the way, one of them was also a former Air Force pilot with the rank of lieutenant colonel) arrived in Anchorage from New York via Toronto on cargo flight KAL 0975, which was in flight for 8 hours and 46 minutes … Their rest period was supposed to be one and a half times more than 8 hours 46 minutes, or 13 hours 9 minutes. The crew, responsible for the safety of 269 passengers on board KAL 007, thus rested 1 hour 56 minutes less than the allotted time. Captain Chung and his flight crew arrived in Anchorage from Toronto on cargo flight KAL 0975. There were no flight attendants on board. When Captain Chun took command of Flight 007 in Anchorage, he was given a crew of flight attendants. Nevertheless, those flight attendants who were vacationing in Anchorage, waiting for 007, did not arrive alone. Another crew brought them in. What happened to him? The answer to this question raises several important questions. This flight crew, rested for the allotted time, boarded the KAL 007, not piloting the plane, as one might expect, but taking seats in first class as passengers. Flight cabin personnel and flight attendants constitute the full crew of the passenger aircraft. Flight 007's flight personnel, who were vacationing in Anchorage with the flight attendants, were suddenly replaced by Captain Chun and other members of his flight crew shortly before departure. The fact is that the originally assigned flight crew of KAL 007 was not only unoccupied, but also on board as passengers, and that Captain Chun's crew did not have a proper rest period and thus broke the rules. All of this suggests that that night someone, for reasons that were not then obvious, wanted to see Captain Chun - and no one else as the commander of KAL 007.
Many researchers involved in the KAL 007 mystery have intensely discussed the loading of fuel on board the KAL 007. Captain Chung reviewed the flight plan and made several corrections, including an estimate of fuel consumption. Captain Chung accepted computer calculations of in-flight fuel consumption for an estimated 7 hours 53 minutes of flight time, which was £ 206,400. However, he crossed out all the remaining figures, including calculations to determine an estimate of the fuel reserve, which the flight plan gives as:
Alternate (optional) 19,800 lbs.
Holding (held) 12,000 pounds.
Contingency (10%) (contingency) £ 17,600
Total: 49,400 lbs.
Crossing out these calculations, which were nothing more than alleged analysis done by the flight controller, Captain Chung rewrote the calculations on another document, the Flight Issue Sheet, in which he added information that did not appear in the Operational Flight Plan, such as the flight time at which his estimates were based:
Fuel reserves:
Alternate 0 hours 40 minutes 19,800 pounds.
Holding 0 hours 30 minutes 12,000 pounds.
Contingency (10%) 0 hours 47 minutes £ 17,600.
Total: 45,300 lbs.
The most surprising thing about Captain Chun's calculations is that he reduced the total supplies from 49,400 pounds to 45,300 pounds, or 4,100 pounds of fuel. It is extremely unusual for a pilot to reduce the amount of fuel he has been assigned. In contrast, pilots often request more fuel than the flight controller recommends. Captain Chun's fuel calculations immediately grab attention because they are highly unusual. Why did Captain Chun decide to juggle numbers for such an insignificant economy? Perhaps he initially knew that the flight would be a shorter route?
Also, many researchers agree that the liner had a completely different take-off weight. This opinion is confirmed by the following fact. KAL 007 departed Anchorage at 13.00 GMT and reached cruising altitude of 31,000 feet in 29 minutes at 13.29.28 GMT. In contrast, its companion, KAL 015, which left Anchorage 14 minutes after KAL 007 took off, reached its cruise altitude of 33,000 feet in just 24 minutes and climbed to 31,000 feet in 22 minutes. The seven-minute time difference between the two planes suggests that the KAL 007 was loaded much heavier than the KAL 015. What other than commercial cargo was the KAL 007 carrying? There is also no answer to this question yet. However, the features of the flight make one think about the presence of special reconnaissance equipment on board the aircraft.
As we remember, the flight was delayed, and just so much that each stage of the intruder's flight perfectly coincided with the appearance of the Ferret-D spy satellite in the area. When the Boeing stepped outside the international corridor, Ferret-D was listening to Soviet radio electronic equipment in Chukotka and Kamchatka, which were operating as usual on alert. On its next orbit, Ferret-D ended up over Kamchatka at the very moment when the intruder was passing over strategic targets in the southern part of the peninsula and recording an increase in the intensity of the work of Soviet radar systems. And the third orbit of the spy satellite coincided with the Boeing's flight over Sakhalin and allowed it to monitor the work of the additionally activated air defense systems on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
Japanese journalist Akio Takahashi noted: “All the time that Soviet fighter-interceptors were chasing the intruder in the Sakhalin sky, at the radio interception stations of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Air Force in Wakkanai and Nemuro, dispatchers on duty did not take their eyes off the radar screens. They received comprehensive information on the progress of the flight of the South Korean Boeing-747. A giant antenna system at the American base Misawa in Aomori prefecture also intercepted the radio communications of Soviet fighters with the air defense command post. The US Navy's radio interceptors in Kamisetani, on the outskirts of Yokohama, were operating at full capacity and immediately sent the information they received to the US National Security Agency (NSA). Electronic reconnaissance data received from the American RS-135 aircraft were also sent there. The NSA, in turn, reported every minute to the "situation room" in the White House on the progress of the operation with the South Korean aircraft.
The mysterious reluctance of the crew of the airliner flying over special control points to report their coordinates to the ground, which is a gross violation of flight rules, causes bewilderment. The American administration did not provide an explanation for the actions of several reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, which were in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet borders on the night of September 1. Moreover, one of them - RC-135 - for some time was accompanied by the South Korean Boeing and by the way, for some reason, also did not tell the "Korean" about entering the airspace of the USSR. But this already ceases to amaze. Especially after information appeared that the Boeing pilots were hired by the American special services for a large sum. Evidence of this was provided by attorneys Melvin Balai and Charles Harman, who represent the interests of the families of the ship's crew. According to them, the widows of the Boeing commander and his assistant told that their husbands were promised a substantial sum in dollars if they violate the USSR air border and fly over Soviet territory. A secret agreement was reached between the South Korean airline and American intelligence in advance. The pilots were forced to agree to the espionage operation.
“My husband did not hide his fear of this flight,” said the widow of Commander Cheon Yi Ji. - Two days before the flight, he became even more nervous and insured his life for a large sum in favor of the family. "I really don't want to fly - it's very dangerous," he said to me in parting."
To be continued.
P. S. The next two parts will talk about unusual finds in the search areas of the aircraft, issues related to the number of passengers, as well as the reconstructed chronology of events and the most probable versions (based on the evidence base) that will reveal the secret of the events that took place. Therefore, I want to ask readers in their comments not to get ahead of the events.
Used material:
Michelle Brune. Sakhalin incident.
Mukhin Yu. I. World War III over Sakhalin, or Who Shot Down the Korean Airliner?
Korean Boeing-747 shot down over Sakhalin //
Mazur Wolf. Black Birds over Sakhalin: Who Shot Down the Korean Boeing? // An airport.
Shalnev A. American report // Izvestia, 1993.
Red Star, 2003
