I would like to tell you about one small episode that can be useful for the "Book of Combat Experience".
… May 2002. Urus-Martan district of Chechnya. We were in the composition of the settlement police department (POM) of the Alkhazurovo settlement of the temporary department of internal affairs (VOVD) of the indicated area.
Before proceeding to a description of a specific situation in which we once found ourselves, I would like to share my thoughts on the work of the village police stations in general. (Treat the following text very carefully, since we are talking about the most urgent topic - the prevention of terrorist acts. - Ed.)
The work of POMs, of course, with the correct organization of the service, had its positive aspects for almost all spheres of law enforcement, because we constantly lived and worked among the local population. At the time of this writing, I have served in the internal affairs bodies for 26 years in various positions and I believe that I can objectively assert - the FSB, the military prosecutor's office, units of the Internal Troops, etc. often they received initial information from us or rechecked our sources of information about changes or complications in the operational situation, about illegal armed groups, persons involved in them, the mood of the population, etc.
That is why the sudden transfer of POMs to the Chechen police at that time, in my opinion, was a somewhat premature step. Only in the administrative section we served was one district commissioner, whose term of service in the militia was less than a year, and four interns from among the local youth. All these employees have zero knowledge of the legal and regulatory framework …
Of course, they do not discuss orders, but faithfully execute them … But practically before our very eyes, there have been positive changes in the attitude of ordinary Chechens towards us, towards our work. This was especially evident after systematic speeches in schools in front of students and at the so-called gatherings of citizens. As a rule, after praying at the mosque, the head of the local administration, together with the imam and the council of elders, organized meetings at our request. That is, our work became transparent in certain areas of activity, which ensured the fulfillment of one of the main tasks of the police - to find contact with the population, gain some degree of their trust, be able to receive the necessary information and, as a result, prevent what happened in Nazran in the summer. 2004 … (The material was written by the author before the events in Beslan. - Ed.)
It becomes obvious that the time of direct clashes is receding and is increasingly giving way to ambushes, raids, and local residents are also involved in them. I am sure that none of the services, except for the district police officer or the criminal investigation officer, can quickly obtain information about, for example, local men who suddenly disappeared somewhere, etc. Well, if you find out in time about the impending illegal action, then I will say this: the detected ambush is no longer an ambush, but a trap that can be avoided.
In fairness, it should be noted that with the help of the local population, we found a considerable amount of weapons and ammunition.
Now I will turn to a specific description of the episode, which can be useful for the "Book of Combat Experience".
The day before our departure, several Chechen taxis drove up to the POM in the morning, and publicly (the first oddity) reported that 50 meters from the T-junction Alkhazurovo - Urus-Martan - Komsomolskoye (that is, along the route of our) a mine was placed on the side of the road at night.
Having approached the indicated place - of course, with preliminary engineering reconnaissance - we really saw a mine and several pieces of wrapping paper nearby. Moreover, the mine itself was clearly visible from the road (second oddity), but, unfortunately, I did not attach any importance to this - that is, I acted unprofessionally … After reporting the situation by radio, we blocked the road, cordoned off the place and began to wait for military sappers. After a while they arrived in a convoy of one armored personnel carrier, an "Ural" and two UAZ vehicles. All this technique stopped directly at the intersection. A senior sapper with the rank of major got out of the car. I showed him where the mine had been planted and explained the situation, after which I went to my officers who had carried out the cordon. After 20-25 minutes the sappers blew up a mine, and we all dispersed to the places of deployment.
Literally the next morning, they reported that a mine was again installed in almost the same place! Upon arrival at the place, the whole yesterday's picture was repeated one to one. Another thing I noticed - on a rather busy highway, all movement of the local population has stopped (third oddity) …
When, after our report to the Urus-Martan VOVD, a convoy with military sappers appeared on the highway, I stopped it about 100 meters from the specified intersection. Approaching the same major who had arrived yesterday, I expressed my fears to him that perhaps this section of the road had been shot by snipers (then I thought only of snipers …) But the major answered me that fear has big eyes and the police, as always, exaggerates, and that in such a situation he defused hundreds of mines, etc.
Then I told him that the police officers subordinate to me would not go out to the intersection, and we would block the roads at a safe distance from it. The major replied: "As you wish." The entire military convoy drove into the intersection and stood on it in yesterday's places - well, just like "a carbon copy"!
And as soon as the servicemen began to get out of the cars, six explosions thundered one after the other directly under the vehicles …
As it turned out later, these were radio-controlled landmines - then they found the remains of small batteries.
The consequences were injuries, contusions and damage to equipment …
The point is that if I analyzed all the above-mentioned oddities on the very first day, then the next night (during the installation of mines) at the specified intersection it was possible to carry out certain operational measures.
So what are my mistakes? The following whys were not immediately analyzed.
1. Why were several Chechens publicly and publicly informed about the discovery of a mine? (While the previously found ammunition was talked about in confidence).
2. Why was the mine not even in the slightest degree camouflaged, but, on the contrary, was everything done so that it could be seen? (Scraps of paper wrapping around, etc.)
3. Why was the second mine planted in the same place and also not disguised?
4. Why suddenly, at a certain period, the movement of the local population on the specified section of the road stopped?
This is what the lack of combat experience means. Conclusion: CONSTANTLY, around the clock to collect information, think, analyze.
