Developing an offensive in Polesie, the troops of the 65th Army in December 1943 reached Parichi, deeply wedging into enemy territory. The enemy took a foothold here in settlements and created a focus defense. Between the cities of Parichi and Ozarichi, there were several large gaps in the enemy defense line, which were widely used by the Belarusian partisans to communicate with the units of the Red Army, and the troops - to send reconnaissance and sabotage groups to the enemy rear.
In order to unite the groupings of their troops leading the defense in the Ozarichi and Parichi area, create a continuous front line here and close the "partisan gates", the German command of the forces of the grouping of forces consisting of three infantry and two tank divisions, urgently transferred from Bobruisk and from other directions, inflicted a counterstrike on the right flank of the 65th Army on December 20. The situation on this sector of the front, where there were only two rifle divisions (37th Guards and 60th), was very difficult. The Nazis were able to break through the defense line of the 60th Infantry Division, push our troops back 25-30 km and close the "partisan gates".
In the enemy's rear, among other scattered units, was the 1st battalion of the 1281st rifle regiment of the 60th rifle division. Together with the battalion, Colonel N. I. Frenkel. Since it was not possible to break through to the units of the division, he, as a senior in position and rank, decided to withdraw the battalion and other divisions of the division that were close to the area controlled by the partisans of the Polesie formation - to the village of Zaozerye. Here, part of the soldiers of the 60th and 37th divisions, who were also cut off from their units or were carrying out combat missions in the German rear, joined the battalion.
Wasting no time, Colonel Frenkel immediately established contact with the commander of the partisan brigade F. I. Pavlovsky, whose headquarters were located in Karpilovka, and then with the commander of the Polesie partisan formation I. D. Wind. The meeting of the commanders took place in the village of Buda. It was decided to create a Consolidated Detachment from the soldiers of the 65th Army, who found themselves in the German rear, and to act with its forces in conjunction with the partisan formations. This decision was communicated over the radio of the partisan formation to the military council of the 65th Army. At the same time, the leadership of the partisan unit issued a decree to provide assistance to the regiment with food and ammunition.
December 24 Colonel N. I. Frenkel, having received powers from the military council of the army, gave an order, which, through the commanders of the partisan detachments, was passed on to all servicemen of the 65th Army stationed in the rear of the German troops in the zone of action of the partisans of the Polesie and Minsk regions. It stated that the servicemen were obliged to arrive in the village of Karpilovka by December 29, having with them personal weapons, machine guns, ammunition, communications equipment that remained and received from the partisans, as well as horses, carts and other military equipment with which they ended up in the partisan zone. In total, 47 officers and more than four hundred fighters from various formations of the army gathered in Karpilovka. In addition, the command of the partisan formation transferred 147 unarmed partisans to the command of the regiment being formed, as well as 29 Slovak soldiers who went over to the partisans in order to fight in the future as part of the Czechoslovakian brigade L. Svoboda.
The Military Council of the 65th Army appointed Colonel N. I. Frenkel, his deputy for political affairs, Major B. M. Chertok, and in administrative and economic terms - Major A. I. Yagupova.
The consolidated detachment was formed in a few days as part of 2 battalions (commanders of senior lieutenants F. A. Losev and F. M. Grinchuk), reconnaissance (commander Lieutenant V. I. Zass) companies and service units.
Using the help of the Polissya partisans and local residents, the rear units of the regiment procured grain, meat, vegetables and salt. A bakery was built on its own, boilers for cooking were made. Much attention was paid to the issues of engineering equipment of the location area and increasing the readiness of personnel to repel a surprise attack by the enemy. In the villages of Zaozerye, Zatishye, Bubnovka, Leski, company strongpoints with bunkers and dugouts, main and reserve positions for mortars and heavy machine guns were equipped, trenches and communication trenches were dug. Anti-tank blockages have been set up on the main roads leading to Zaozerye. Gradually, the regiment's personnel equipped two battalion defense centers in Zatishye and Bubnovka. Unarmed partisans who were part of the sapper company were engaged in engineering work, as well as the procurement of food. Thus, in a short time, the regiment created a solid defensive position in one of the main directions of the partisan zone. It served as a base for training subunit personnel to conduct combat operations, raids on fascist garrisons, sabotage, and search for scouts.
In some cases, taking advantage of the lull, the command carried out combat and tactical exercises in order to cobble together subunits. The personnel were trained in the tactics of partisan detachments, the forms and methods of combat operations behind enemy lines. Intelligence was carried out extensively. It was led by horse and foot scouts, who were led by the chief of staff of the regiment of st. Lieutenant N. F. Gormin and the chief of intelligence, Lieutenant I. F. Yurasov (from the partisans). Intelligence activities mainly consisted of organizing systematic daily observation of the Germans in the area of Shkava, Moiseevka, Podgat, Koptsevichi. On all roads and in settlements, the headquarters set up reconnaissance posts. Sabotage actions were carried out at the initiative of the regiment command. They without fail had to be coordinated with the command of the partisan brigades of F. I. Pavlovsky, V. 3. Putyato and others, as well as the Polesie partisan formation. Combat operations were planned in close cooperation with partisan detachments stationed near the location of the regiment. All this was done in accordance with the order of the headquarters of the 65th Army, the essence of which was that the regiment should act on its own initiative and wait for the approach of the army's troops.
The obtained intelligence data were transmitted daily by the messengers to the headquarters of the Polesie partisan formation, and from there they were communicated by radio to the headquarters of the 65th Army and the Belorussian Front. In particular, the reconnaissance group of lieutenants V. I. Mayboroda and V. S. Miroshnikovs regularly penetrated the enemy's location and collected the most important information about the enemy and his intentions. Subversive groups were also active. So, in one week from December 29, 1943, they hit and blew up 12 enemy trucks with mines, killed and wounded up to 40 enemy soldiers and officers, dismantled and blew up 4 bridges.
During this period, the troops of the 65th Army, stopping the enemy and starting to restore the position that had developed on the right flank, launched an offensive on Kalinkovichi. At dawn on January 14, after two days of fierce fighting, the formations of the 65th and 61st armies, supported by the cavalry corps of generals V. V. Kryukova and M. P. Konstantinov, as well as tank units of General M. F. Panov and Polissya partisans, defeated large German forces near Mozyr and Kalinkovichi and took control of these important points.
Acting behind enemy lines, the Consolidated Detachment provided all possible assistance to the 65th Army. So, from January 5 to February 14, 1944, his units, in cooperation with the partisans of the Polesie formation, conducted several successful battles against the garrisons, punitive, security and rear units of the enemy. The first battle (conducted by the 1st battalion) was in the nature of a night raid on the fascist garrison located in the village of Koptsevichi. It was also attended by two partisan detachments under the command of F. G. Ukhnaleva and G. N. Vasiliev, and other divisions. The plan was developed by the headquarters of the Polesie partisan formation with the participation of the command of the regiment and partisan detachments. Preparing the attack, the command brought the task to each executor, taking into account information about the size of the garrison, the most advantageous approaches to the settlement and the system of fire. The battalion and partisan raid began simultaneously on a common signal (red rocket) on the night of January 9th. The carefully prepared attack was so sudden that the Nazis did not manage to fire a single shot. The attackers broke into the village from all sides and threw grenades at the huts where the Germans were located. As a result, the enemy garrison was defeated, about 200 fascists were destroyed. The success of the battle in Koptsevichi was largely facilitated by the raid of the partisan brigade of A. F. Zhigar to the enemy garrisons in the neighboring villages of Filippovichi and Novoselki.
The fighting of the regular unit of the Red Army in the German rear caused the fascist command to have an exaggerated idea of the size and combat capability of the Consolidated Regiment. So, among the enemy troops, a rumor quickly spread that a special guards division, specially sent to the rear, was operating in conjunction with the partisans. After the defeat of the garrison in Koptsevichi, the Nazis significantly increased the number of troops in settlements adjacent to the partisan zone of the Polesie region, reinforced them with tanks, artillery and armored vehicles.
It is characteristic that in the battles conducted by the Consolidated Regiment, the tactical techniques of the Red Army and the methods of partisan warfare were widely combined. The battle order of subunits usually included the following groups: reconnaissance, cover, shock. In addition, the decision determined the positions of the fire weapons, the locations of the command post and the rear. Communication was maintained by messengers (foot and horse messengers), as well as with the help of pre-established observation posts. The soldiers attacked the enemy suddenly where he least expected. Possessing good personal weapons, they fired only aimed fire, threw grenades at firing points that hindered progress. During the battle, the fighters and partisans worked closely, always came to each other's aid.
In mid-January, when parts of the 65th Army were attacking Ozarichi, the Consolidated Detachment conducted several successful battles against enemy garrisons in the Demenk, Polgat area. However, his position became more and more difficult, as there was not enough ammunition. The command of the Polesie partisan formation itself felt the need for them and could not provide assistance. So, in operative bulletin No. 7 of January 25, 1944, the commander of the formation I. D. Vetrov reported to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement: “Up to 70 thousand people are under the protection of the brigades of the Polesie formation. For more than a month, the brigades have been fighting large enemy forces. 3-5 ammunition per rifle, one disk per machine gun. There are no explosives."
Despite the difficulties, the regiment was continuously engaged in active hostilities. On February 7, the regiment headquarters learned that an enemy group of up to 120 people was laying a five-wire four-core cable from the Karpilovka station (by that time it was already in the hands of the Nazis) in the direction of Demenka. We urgently developed an operation plan. The task of crushing the fascists was given to the two best companies of both battalions.
In the oral order of Art. Lieutenant F. A. Losev assigned the following tasks to the personnel of the company. The first company was to operate from the side of the village Zatishye, bypassing the group on the left, and the second - bypassing the right, from the side of Bubnovka. On a general signal, the companies were to strike in opposite directions and encircle the enemy. As a result of a fleeting battle, the companies scattered the enemy group, seized the wire and cut it to pieces. The Nazis did not manage to establish a communication line between settlements while the Consolidated Detachment was operating in this area. On February 9 and 10, the companies of the first battalion, operating in the area of Moiseevka, Zhuchkovichi, Leski, three times a day engaged enemy units heading for the front line, and the companies of the second battalion disrupted the movement of enemy echelons on the railway, and on highways - columns of troops.
In February, the regiment continued to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage work. During this time, his personnel knocked out and blew up 2 medium tanks, 4 trucks and 2 cars and several carts on mines. At the same time, more than 30 enemy soldiers were exterminated, 3 "tongues" were captured, including one officer. The command of the Polesie partisan formation, received from him, transferred important information to the headquarters of the 65th Army and the Belorussian Front. During two months of being behind enemy lines, the Consolidated Detachment fought 16 battles, destroyed 4 bridges, knocked out 2 tanks, blew up 18 enemy vehicles with mines, and destroyed about 300 fascists.
At the beginning of February 1944, the troops of the 65th Army, meeting stubborn resistance, slowed down the speed of the offensive, but continued to slowly move forward. With heavy fighting, they crossed the Tremlya River. At that time, the Germans undertook a punitive operation directed against the partisans of Polesie, who prevented them from building defensive lines west of the Ptich River and concentrating their reserves here. In the current situation, the command of the Consolidated Regiment decided to break through to their troops. With permission to break through from the command of the 65th Army, the headquarters began to vigorously prepare for the operation.
On the morning of February 12, a plan was adopted to break through the enemy battle formations of the Zhuchkovichi, Hoyna, Podgat sector in the direction of Terebovo, where the terrain most of all contributed to the passage through the enemy defenses. The columns (the regiment advanced on five routes) were led by Colonel N. I. Frenkel, Art. lieutenants F. A. Losev, N. F. Gormin, F. M. Grinchuk, Lieutenant V. I. Mayboroda. Reconnaissance groups led by the column commanders moved ahead of the main forces along each route. Each group was accompanied by 2-3 guides from among the local residents and partisans who knew the area and routes.
The regiment met stubborn enemy resistance on the approaches to the village of Terebovo. As a result of a fierce battle, the Nazis suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment, the main forces of the regiment, consisting of more than one and a half hundred fighters and 16 officers, led by the regiment commander, broke through the front line on February 14. The regiment was greatly assisted in the breakthrough by a ski battalion specially allocated for this purpose by the army command. Having joined their units, soldiers, sergeants, officers continued to fight on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. But not everyone managed to break through the front line. Some of the fighters and officers were forced to retreat to the rear of the German troops again and here they continued to fight in partisan detachments.
As you can see, despite the extremely difficult situation in which part of the units of the 60th and 37th Guards Rifle Divisions found themselves in the German rear, they were immediately united by a single command, cobbled together and trained to act together with the partisans. In close cooperation with the partisan detachments, the Consolidated Regiment inflicted significant damage to the enemy, and then in an orderly manner, by order, it broke through the main forces through the German battle formations and went out to the Soviet troops. This is strikingly different from the situation in the initial period of the war, when the encircled Soviet units, deprived of communications, were scattered, and, despite their heroism, could not, in most cases, conduct organized actions behind enemy lines. The encirclement no longer frightened Soviet soldiers and officers, they skillfully used their position, seeking to inflict maximum harm on the enemy.
