We continue our series of publications about Israel's Special Forces. Today I will tell you about another well-known unit - Shaetet 13 (Flotilla 13), the elite special forces of the IDF Navy, also known as naval commandos.
Shaetet 13 (Flotilla 13)
Shaetet 13 is a secret Israeli Navy unit for special operations. Despite being tied to the navy, this is a fairly versatile multi-profile unit capable of also performing special tasks on land and landing from the air.
The main purpose of the unit is, of course, reconnaissance and sabotage and special operations in the enemy's rear. Naturally, the sea to this day is the optimal way of covert penetration into enemy territory and an equally optimal way of withdrawal.
This unit, like MATKAL, closely cooperates with the Israeli military and foreign intelligence, most of the operations are classified.
Soldiers of Sh 13 during the exercise. Photo by Ziv Koren.
History
In 1943, a separate detachment was created in the PALMAKH structure, the PALYAM subdivision (Plow Yamit - a naval company) - in fact, the progenitor of the Israeli Navy.
By the mid-40s, the Agana leadership had serious disagreements with the British authorities. The British authorities began to actively resist the arrival of Jews in mandated Palestine.
Since the main route of delivery of repatriates from Europe was the sea, the main forces of the British were concentrated in this direction. The British not only harshly suppressed attempts to deliver repatriates by sea, they also used the fleet to deport Jews to special concentration camps in Cyprus.
Therefore, it was decided to create detachments capable of resisting them, including sabotage against British warships and deportation ships.
Yohai Ben Nun
Yohai Ben Nun - Israel's first naval commando commander and first commander of Sh'13
So in 1945, the Naval Saboteur Link was born under the command of Yohai Ben Nun. Yohai Fishman was born in Haifa to the family of a native Israeli woman and a repatriate from Russia. He spent his childhood in Jerusalem in the 1930s, where Arabs often smashed their Jewish neighbors. According to Yohai's recollections, this was the reason for his life choice.
At the age of 16 he entered Agana, at the age of 18 he graduated from college and entered PALMAKH. In 1944, he left PALMAKH and began his studies at the Faculty of Medicine of the Hebrew University.
But a year later he met Abraham Zakai, who convinced him to return to PALM, to the newly created naval company. He graduated from the course of commanders and already in 1945 began to conduct operations against the British, which continued until the proclamation of the UN plan for the partition of Palestine.
Yohai Ben Nun commanded a number of sabotage operations against the ships of the British fleet. During the bloody events in the Haifa port of 1947, Yohai and his men guarded the Jewish workers in the port and trained them in self-defense.
They also carried out raids in two Arab villages, from which the pogromists came out.
In 1948, he commanded units in the battles near Jerusalem. But soon he was returned to his duties, he commanded ships sailing to Europe for new immigrants and weapons. Brought the ship of the Russian Fleet "Albatross" to Israel.
Upon completion of these operations, Yohai Ben Nun was instructed to create a special detachment of naval saboteurs already in the IDF structure. The detachment was given 6 Italian torpedo boats capable of carrying 300 kg of explosives each and developing speeds of up to 35 knots.
This weapon, developed by the Italians in WWII, was a boat filled with explosives. He was controlled by one soldier, who at high speed had to send him to the enemy ship, and he himself jumped 100 meters to the point of collision.
Then the commander's boat picked up the fighter.
A sketch of the Italian boat MTM, in Israel these boats were nicknamed Karish (Shark in Hebrew)
The people were selected from PALIAM immigrants and Jewish veterans of the British naval forces. The first instructor of the new unit was the Italian Fiorenzo Capriotti, a soldier of the 10th MAS flotilla. Fiorenzo was captured by the British during a sabotage in Malta in 1941. He spent about 6 years in British and American captivity.
After his release, he was recruited by the Israeli Mossad Le Aliya Bet to purchase and inspect the very torpedo boats and other equipment for the nascent Israeli naval forces. In 1948, Capriotti arrived at the port of Haifa under the guise of a Jewish repatriate.
Capriotti began training with Ben Nun's fighters and quickly found a common language with them. He was an accomplished naval demolitionist with an excellent understanding of the technical and tactical aspects of the use of boats. The skills transferred to them were needed even before the end of the training.
On October 27, 1948, Yochai Ben Nun's fighters conducted their debut operation, sinking the flagship of the Egyptian fleet, the patrol ship Amir Farouk, and damaging the minesweeper that accompanied him off the coast of Gaza.
In 1949, it was decided to combine the subdivisions of boats and combat swimmers-saboteurs into one.
Ш'13
So on January 1, 1950, Flotilla 13 was born, the first commander of which was appointed Yochai Ben Nun. The number 13 was the lucky number of the detachment since the days of PALIAM, whose fighters were going to "raise a glass" every month on the 13th.
This became a tradition after one of their first ships sank in the sea during a storm, and the soldier Zeev Fried reached the shore by swimming.
The assembled team was already quite experienced in a wide variety of activities. They have learned a lot over the years of fighting the British.
They worked closely with European representatives of the nascent Mossad intelligence service, often under the guise of sailors, they traveled abroad, studying the structure of ports and the nuances of sabotage work on the ground.
They also made reconnaissance sorties to the closest neighbors in Lebanon and Egypt. So the deputy commander of Sh'13 was appointed Yossi Dror, the PALMACH man, who led the operation to sink a ship with weapons for the Arabs in Italy.
In general, Chaettet 13 in Italy by that time already had trips to Italian combat swimmers for the purpose of training and purchasing equipment.
Throughout the 1950s, the Shaetet 13 fighters continued to train and improve their skills. At first we worked with Italians, then switched to the French and British. In general, the fighters of Flotilla-13 preferred to train and learn from everyone who succeeded.
So a number of Sh'13 officers visited the training bases of French combat swimmers and received training from the British SBS. The acquired skills and the use of new equipment allowed the unit to reach a new level.
The training became longer and more extensive, even then the course of the Sh'13 fighter became one of the most difficult courses in Israel. At the end of the course, the fighters made a grueling march more than 200 km long.
In the mid-50s, fighters switched to French equipment, which greatly expanded their capabilities. The new breathing apparatus provided a particularly tangible advantage. Also, the fighters carried out many training and reconnaissance operations in the Mediterranean waters.
However, in the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War, the Navy's special forces did not conduct high-profile successful operations. The detachment consisted of only a few dozen fighters and was not particularly used for its intended purpose.
A number of operations have even failed. The morale in the detachment suffered greatly after 6 soldiers were captured by the enemy during a failed operation in the port of Alexandria.
The first mission operations in many years began in the late 1960s during the War of Attrition. Raids on Adabia and Green Island and sabotage in Egyptian ports. Here the detachment again suffered losses, but the tasks were completed.
Green Island
In 1969, Egyptian commandos conducted a daring operation at the Israeli stronghold Metzach on the east bank of the Suez Canal. 7 Israeli soldiers were killed and 5 wounded, and the Egyptians also took prisoners.
These events severely undermined the morale of the personnel of the Israeli strongholds in the Suez Canal. The command instructed Sh'13 to carry out a retaliation action. The target was the well-fortified Egyptian stronghold on the Green Island.
For a successful assault, at least 40 special forces soldiers were needed, but Sh'13 at that time had fewer people. Then they decided to involve the fighters of sayret MATKAL.
But those, in turn, had no experience in using scuba gear, so it was decided that the MATKAL fighters would come up on boats after the signal to capture the bridgehead from the Sh'13 divers. But the operation did not go according to plan and a fierce battle ensued on the shore.
A detachment of 20 commandos cleared most of the island in 17 minutes, only then MATKAL came to the rescue. Commander Senior Lieutenant Amikhai Ayalon then demonstrated personal prowess and heroism.
Several times wounded by grenade shrapnel, he personally cleared several machine-gun nests under heavy fire, continuing to command the detachment until the end of the operation, despite severe injuries and severe bleeding.
Half of the Sh'13 attack aircraft were wounded by the time MATKAL arrived. Green Island was completely cleared, about 80 Egyptian soldiers were killed defending the position. Among them, 12 Egyptian commandos, the entire OP infrastructure was destroyed by explosive charges, including radar and air defense weapons.
The spetsnaz detachment also came under shelling, which the garrison called upon itself. In total, 3 soldiers of Sh'13 and 3 more from MATKAL were killed in that battle.
Golda Meir Ami Ayalon
Israeli Prime Minister awards Captain Ami Ayalon the Order of Heroism for the operation on the Green Isle. The captain is dressed in full dress uniform of the Navy with a large sign Ш'13.
The results of the Yom Kippur War were ambiguous, although the Sh'13 fighters inflicted significant damage on the Egyptian fleet, sinking several warships.
Also, the Flotilla was involved in joint operations with other units. Including, in the "Spring of Youth" I mentioned earlier.
Soldier Sh'13 with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, Pay attention to the improvised optics and the attached M203 grenade launcher, made in the USA.
Taking into account the past failures, the necessary conclusions for the future were drawn and III'13 in the mid-70s began to work in the northern direction of Lebanon and Syria.
As a result of their active and coordinated actions with intelligence, a large number of ships with weapons for Palestinian terrorists were sunk.
During this period, Ami Ayalon, an ambitious and talented officer, became the commander of Sh'13.
In April 1980, a detachment of Sh'13 fighters secretly sailed to the Lebanese coast at night. Having landed on the shore, they quietly surrounded the militants' camp. Taking positions, they suddenly attacked the militants with heavy fire.
Then they stormed the headquarters building and blew it up. As a result, the militants lost 20 people killed, 3 of whom should have committed a terrorist attack in Israel in the near future. There were two wounded among the special forces.
The modified AK is a frequent symbol of the Sh'13 saboteurs; this shows a folding stock from the Israeli Galil.
In general, the period from the beginning of 1979 to the spring of 1981 became the finest hour of Ш'13. They conducted more than 20 operations against terrorists in Lebanon and the detachment received the highest award from Commander-in-Chief Rafael Eitan.
In 1983, the fighters conducted an operation in Syria. As planned, it was required to eliminate some of the militants by placing the blame on others. But the operation failed, as the Syrian military was killed.
In 1984, Sh'13 fighters, together with the Israeli Navy and Air Force, carried out a brilliant operation in Libya. North of Tripoli, 14 terrorists were killed. The detachment left with two lightly wounded.
The biggest tragedy of the unit was the night of September 5, 1997. A detachment of 16 fighters was on a secret mission in Lebanon and fell into a well-organized Hezbollah trap. On the way of the detachment, powerful land mines were laid.
As a result of the explosion, 11 soldiers were killed. Hezbollah also tried to capture the rest or steal the remains of the bodies. The evacuation operation also became much more complicated. And led to the death of another person from the evacuation team.
The purpose of the mission is still secret, the reasons for the failure are also unreliable. In the late 2000s, information appeared that Hezbollah was then able to intercept communication channels from an Israeli UAV.
In those years, the channel was not encrypted, so they saw which area was of interest to the Israeli military intelligence and prepared an ambush there. I have not come across an official confirmation of this information.
Practicing landing ashore. Again AK and Mini Uzi with a silencer.
In connection with the outbreak of violence in the Palestinian territories in the 2000s, the command decided to involve Sh'13 in urban police operations in the territories. This decision cost several more lives of the soldiers and officers of the unit. Dozens of terrorists were killed, and many more were arrested.
The most significant operations of the last 13 years can undoubtedly be considered the interception of ships with weapons. Hundreds of tons of various weapons, from grenades to anti-ship missile systems, did not reach the Lebanese and Palestinian addressees.
In 2002, a ship Karine A with a large consignment of weapons from Iran to Gaza was intercepted five hundred kilometers from the Israeli coast. More than 50 tons of machine guns, sniper rifles, mortars, ATGMs and ammunition were unloaded from the holds in the port of Eilat.
Then there was a number of operations against the smuggling of weapons from Iran, and according to unconfirmed reports, to Iran. During the 2000s, several ships were intercepted flying the flags of different countries with a variety of weapons including rockets, rockets and large-caliber mortars.
Soldiers of Sh'13 are practicing the seizure of the ship.
Palestinian terrorists have become another area of Sh'13's operational activities. Since the beginning of the second intifada, special forces have conducted numerous operations to capture and eliminate terrorists and to destroy the infrastructure of Palestinian terror.
Many operations were not directly related to the main profile of the unit, which caused an ambiguous assessment of this practice. In any case, the soldiers of the special forces of the Navy showed a high level of work. However, there were some losses - 6 special forces soldiers were killed while performing operations in the territories.
The most scandalous operation of recent years was the storming of the Turkish cruise liner Mavi Marmara.
Pro-Palestinian organizations, with the support of the new Turkish government, organized a major provocation, which was successfully "nibbled" by the Israeli army officials.
"Flotilla of Peace" - a project that made a lot of noise in the world press even before its release, gathered under its banners several ships that set out to break through the blockaded from the sea, as a result of the coming to power of Hamas, the Gaza Strip.
Under the guise of delivering humanitarian supplies, several hundred activists from various pro-Palestinian and peacekeeping organizations were gathered. More than 700 people were accommodated on the Mavi Marmara cruise ferry. At least one hundred of them were activists of extremist groups and had a clear plan of action.
Ships of the Israeli Navy went to the group of ships of the "Flotilla of Peace" in neutral waters and warned that their course lies in the zone of the army blockade. The ships were asked to proceed to the port of Ashdod, where the humanitarian cargo will be inspected, after which it will be delivered by trucks to Gaza, as was the case with all humanitarian aid arriving in the region.
The ferry with the activists ignored these demands and the command decided to board a special forces group. This idea ended in failure, the first few fighters were brutally attacked by an organized group of people armed with both improvised and targeted melee weapons.
The group of activists wore life jackets, had gas masks, communications equipment and were well armed. Special forces soldiers began to descend to the upper deck from a helicopter along a rope.
Not having time to touch the deck, the soldiers armed with non-lethal paintball weapons were knocked down with blows of rods and sticks. Some were stabbed. One soldier was thrown overboard to the lower deck.
The fighters were wearing Glock combat pistols in a body holster. These pistols were taken away by the activists and from them fire was opened on the special forces. One of the soldiers was dragged inside the ship.
Realizing the complexity of the situation, the commander of the operation gave the order to switch to combat weapons - the special forces began to clean the ship.
The result of the confrontation was 9 killed and 28 wounded activists, 10 special forces were injured, two of severe severity. The operation caused a violent reaction in the world and in Israel, relations between Turkey and Israel were heated to the limit.
In general, Israel suffered a crushing defeat, because the organizers of the provocation achieved the desired result. Sh'13 as performers of the assault were also hit.
One of the activists next to the captured and beaten Sh'13 fighter, his right index finger raised upwards is a symbol of Islamists.
Today, Shaetet 13 is still a secret unit in the IDF Navy. The flotilla is divided into three "palgot" companies:
Palgat HaPoshtim - Assault Company responsible for sabotage and assault operations including landings from the sea, capture of enemy targets, hostage release and counter-terrorism operations.
They undergo sabotage, sniper, counterterrorism training with elements of close-range fire combat, tactics of cleansing and storming buildings, ships, strongholds, etc. The most elite company with the highest selection requirements.
Palgat Tsolelim - combat swimmers, divers. A group whose main tasks include sabotage operations under water.
Nadvodnaya Palga - operators of high-speed boats and special ships of the flotilla, provide delivery, fire support and evacuation of the assault group. They are responsible for the combat operations of the group at sea, also working out close cooperation with the ships and submarines of the Navy.
In addition to Sh'13 itself, the IDF Navy has a number of small specialized units.
Fast boats of the 13th flotilla.
All candidates are carefully selected. To enroll in Sh'13 recruits, the conscript undergoes a grueling four-day exam and an extended medical examination.
The course of a young soldier Sh'13 lasts 20 months and includes standard infantry KMB, parachute training, shooting training, control of small speed boats, navigation, long marches with elements of survival and orientation, engineering training, hand-to-hand combat, counterterrorism.
Of course, special attention is paid to the combat diving course. Including survival in difficult conditions, hypothermia, lack of visibility and various critical situations under water.
A variety of methods of delivery to the shore, the latest scuba gear, scuba diving apparatus, options for landing from submarines and air-to-water landing are being tested. Joint exercises with similar units from abroad are regularly held.
The Young Fighter Shaetet 13 course is considered one of the most difficult in the IDF. A large number of applicants do not complete the full course, both due to excessive physical exertion and tests for moral stability and endurance, and as a result of injuries. As with other elite units, most candidates drop out during the course of the course and end up in other less elite units.
Shaetet's analogs are British SBS, American NAVY SEALS, Italian COMSUBIN.
