And why did you end up losing?
Evert Gottfried (Lieutenant, Wehrmacht infantry): Because a flea can bite an elephant, but it cannot kill.
Anyone trying to study the history of war in the air in World War II is faced with a number of obvious contradictions. On the one hand, the absolutely incredible personal accounts of the German aces, on the other, the obvious result in the form of the complete defeat of Germany. On the one hand, the well-known brutality of the war on the Soviet-German front, on the other hand, the Luftwaffe suffered the heaviest losses in the West. Other examples can be found.
To resolve these contradictions, historians and publicists are trying to build various kinds of theories. The theory should be such as to link all the facts into a single whole. Most are pretty bad at it. To reconcile the facts, historians need to invent fantastic, incredible arguments. For example, the fact that the Red Army Air Force crushed the enemy with a number - from there, and large accounts of the aces. The large losses of the Germans in the West are explained allegedly by the fact that the air war on the Eastern Front was too easy: the Soviet pilots were primitive and frivolous opponents. And in these fantasies, most ordinary people believe. Although you do not need to rummage through the archives to understand how absurd these theories are. It is enough to have some life experience. If the shortcomings attributed to the Red Army Air Force were in reality, then no victory over Nazi Germany would have happened. There are no miracles. Victory is the result of hard and, most importantly, successful work.
In this article, the author tried to link some well-known facts about the war in the air into a single coherent theory without far-fetched fantastic explanations.
The beginning of the war in the East and the personal accounts of the German aces
The pre-war theory of air combat was based on the requirement to achieve decisive victory in air combat. Each battle was required to end with a victory - the destruction of an enemy aircraft. This seemed to be the main way to gain air supremacy. Shooting down enemy aircraft, it was possible to inflict maximum damage on him, reducing the number of his fleet to a minimum. This theory was described in the writings of many pre-war tacticians both in the USSR and in Germany.
It cannot be asserted with certainty, but, apparently, it was in accordance with this theory that the Germans built the tactics of using their fighters. Pre-war views demanded maximum concentration on victory in aerial combat. The focus on the destruction of the maximum number of enemy aircraft is clearly visible by the criteria that were taken as the main ones, when assessing the effectiveness of combat operations - the personal account of downed enemy aircraft.
The very accounts of the German aces are often questioned. It seems incredible that the Germans managed to achieve such a number of victories. Why is there such a huge gap in the number of victories compared to the allies? Yes, in the initial period of World War II, German pilots were better trained than their American, British or Soviet counterparts. But not at times! Therefore, the temptation is great to accuse the German pilots of banal falsification of their accounts for the sake of propaganda and their pride.
However, the author of this article considers the accounts of the German aces to be quite truthful. Truthful - as much as possible in the confusion of war. The enemy's losses are almost always overestimated, but this is an objective process: it is difficult in a combat situation to determine exactly whether you shot down an enemy plane or just damaged it. Therefore, if the accounts of the German aces are overstated, then not 5-10 times, but 2-2, 5 times, no more. This does not change the essence. Whether Hartman shot down 352 planes, or only 200, he was still too distant in this matter from the pilots of the anti-Hitler coalition. Why? Was he some kind of mystical cyborg killer? As will be shown below, he, like all German aces, was not much stronger than his colleagues from the USSR, USA or Great Britain.
The fairly high accuracy of the aces' accounts is indirectly confirmed by statistics. For example, 93 best ace shot down 2,331 Il-2 aircraft. The Soviet command believed that 2,557 Il-2 aircraft were killed by fighter attacks. Plus some of the "unknown cause" were probably shot down by German fighters. Or another example - one hundred of the best aces shot down 12,146 aircraft on the eastern front. And the Soviet command considers 12,189 aircraft shot down in the air, plus, as in the case of the Il-2, some of the "unidentified" ones. As we can see, the figures are comparable, although it is obvious that the aces nevertheless overestimated their victories.
If we take the victories of all German pilots on the Eastern Front, it turns out that these victories are greater than the number of aircraft lost to the Red Army Air Force. Therefore, of course, there is an overestimate. But the problem is that most researchers pay too much attention to this issue. The essence of the contradictions lies not at all in the accounts of the aces and the number of downed planes. And this will be shown below.
The day before
Germany attacked the USSR with a significant quality superiority in aviation. First of all, this applies to pilots who had rich combat experience in the war in Europe. Behind the shoulders of German pilots and commanders are full-scale campaigns with massive use of aviation: France, Poland, Scandinavia, the Balkans. The assets of the Soviet pilots are only limited in scope and scale local conflicts - the Soviet-Finnish war and … and, perhaps, everything. The rest of the pre-war conflicts are too small in scope and mass use of troops to be compared with the war in Europe in 1939-1941.
The military equipment of the Germans was excellent: the most massive Soviet fighters I-16 and I-153 were inferior to the German Bf-109 model E in most of their characteristics, and the F model was absolutely inferior. The author does not consider it correct to compare the equipment according to the tabular data, but in this particular case there is even no need to get into the details of air battles in order to understand how far the I-153 is from the Bf-109F.
The USSR approached the beginning of the war in the stage of rearmament and transition to new technology. The samples that have just begun to arrive have not yet had time to master them perfectly. The role of rearmament is traditionally underestimated in our country. It is believed that if an aircraft leaves the factory gates, it already counts towards the total number of aircraft in the Air Force. Although he still needs to arrive at the unit, he must be mastered by the flight and ground crew, and the commanders must delve into the details of the combat qualities of the new equipment. For all this, a few Soviet pilots had several months. The Red Army Air Force was distributed over a vast territory from the border to Moscow and could not coherently and concentratedly repel the strikes in the first days of the war.
The table shows that 732 pilots could actually fight on the "new" types of aircraft. But the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 did not have enough aircraft for them. So the total number of combat-ready units is 657. And finally, you need to think carefully about the term “pilots retrained”. Being retrained does not mean that they have mastered the new technique to perfection and have caught up in the ability to conduct aerial combat with German opponents. Think for yourself: Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft began to arrive in 1941, i.e. for the months remaining before the war, the pilots simply physically could not have time to gain sufficient and full-fledged experience in conducting combat on a new aircraft. It is simply unrealistic in 3-4 months. This requires at least a year or two of continuous training. With the MiG-3, the situation is a little better, but not at times. Only the aircraft that entered the troops in 1940 could be more or less qualitatively mastered by the crews. But in 1940, only 100 MiG-1 and 30 MiG-3 were received from the industry. Moreover, it was received in the fall, and in winter, spring and autumn in those years there were known difficulties with full-fledged combat training. There were no concrete runways in the border districts; they had just begun to be built in the spring of 1941. Therefore, one should not overestimate the quality of pilot training on new aircraft in the fall and winter of 1940-1941. After all, a fighter pilot should not only be able to fly - he should be able to squeeze everything out of his car to the limit and a little more. The Germans knew how. And ours just received new planes, there can be no talk of any equality. But those of our pilots who have long and firmly "rooted" in the cockpit of their aircraft are the pilots of the outdated I-153 and I-16. It turns out that where there is a pilot's experience, there is no modern technology, and where there is modern technology, there is still no experience.
Blitzkrieg in the air
The first battles brought severe disappointment to the Soviet command. It turned out that it is extremely difficult to destroy enemy aircraft in the air using the available military equipment. The high experience and skill of the German pilots, plus the perfection of technology, left little chance. At the same time, it became obvious that the fate of the war is being decided on the ground, by ground forces.
All this pushed to fit the actions of the Air Force into a single, global plan for the actions of the armed forces as a whole. Aviation could not be a thing in itself, act in isolation from the situation at the forefront. It was necessary to work precisely in the interests of the ground forces, which decided the fate of the war. In this regard, the role of assault aviation was sharply increased, and the Il-2, in fact, became the main striking force of the Air Force. Now all aviation actions were aimed at helping their infantry. The character of the outbreak of war quickly took the form of a struggle precisely over the front line and in the near rear of the sides.
The fighters were also reoriented to address two main tasks. The first is to protect your attack aircraft. The second is to protect the formations of their ground forces from retaliatory strikes by enemy aircraft. Under these conditions, the value and significance of the concepts of "personal victory" and "shooting down" began to fall sharply. The criterion for the effectiveness of fighters was the percentage of losses of protected attack aircraft from enemy fighters. At the same time, you will shoot down a German fighter or simply by shooting on the course you will make him evade the attack and go to the side, it does not matter. The main thing is to prevent the Germans from aiming at their IL-2.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich (fighter pilot): "Our rule was that" it is better not to shoot down anyone, and not to lose a single bomber, than to shoot down three and lose one bomber."
The situation is similar with enemy strike aircraft - the main thing is not to let the bombs drop on your infantrymen. To do this, it is not necessary to shoot down the bomber - you can make it get rid of the bombs before approaching the targets.
From the NKO Order No. 0489 of June 17, 1942 on the actions of fighters to destroy enemy bombers:
“Enemy fighters, covering their bombers, naturally strive to pin down our fighters, to prevent them from reaching the bombers, and our fighters go to this trick of the enemy, get involved in an air duel with enemy fighters and thereby enable enemy bombers to drop bombs on our troops with impunity, or on other objects of attack.
Neither pilots, nor regiment commanders, nor division commanders, nor commanders of the air forces of fronts and air armies understand this and do not understand that the main and main task of our fighters is to destroy enemy bombers in the first place, to prevent them from dropping their bomb load on our troops, on our guarded facilities."
These changes in the nature of the combat work of Soviet aviation became the cause of post-war accusations from the defeated Germans. Describing a typical Soviet fighter pilot, the Germans wrote about the lack of initiative, passion, desire to win.
Walter Schwabedissen (General of the Luftwaffe): “We must not forget that the Russian mentality, upbringing, specific character traits and education did not contribute to the development of individual wrestling qualities in the Soviet pilot, which were extremely necessary in air combat. Primitive and often blunt adherence to the concept of group combat made him lacking initiative in an individual fight and, as a result, less aggressive and persistent than his German opponents."
From this arrogant quote, in which a German officer who lost the war, describes Soviet pilots of the period 1942-1943, it is clearly seen that the halo of a superman does not allow him to descend from the heights of fabulous "individual fights" to everyday, but very necessary in war, massacre. We again see a contradiction - how did the dull collective Russian principle prevail over the individually unsurpassed German knighthood? The answer is simple: the Red Army Air Force used tactics that were absolutely correct in that war.
Klimenko Vitaly Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “If an air battle ensued, then, by agreement, we had one pair out of the battle and climb up, from where they watched what was happening. As soon as they saw that a German was coming into ours, they immediately fell on them from above. You don't even need to hit there, just show the route in front of him, and he is already getting out of the attack. If you can shoot down, they shot him down like that, but the main thing is to knock him out of position for an attack."
Apparently, the Germans did not understand that this behavior of the Soviet pilots was quite deliberate. They did not seek to shoot down, they tried not to let their own be brought down. Therefore, having driven the German interceptors away from the patronized Il-2 at a certain distance, they left the battle and returned. The Il-2 could not be left alone for a long time, because they could be attacked by other groups of enemy fighters from other directions. And for every lost IL-2 upon arrival, they will be asked toughly. For the fact that he threw attack aircraft over the front line without cover, it was easy to go to the penal battalion. And for an unbroken messer - no. The bulk of the sorties of Soviet fighters fell on the escort of attack aircraft and bombers.
At the same time, nothing changed in the tactics of the Germans. The aces' accounts were still growing. Somewhere they continued to shoot down someone. But who? The famous Hartman shot down 352 planes. But only 15 of them are IL-2. Another 10 are bombers. 25 strike aircraft, or 7% of the total number of downed. Obviously, Mr. Hartman really wanted to live, and really did not want to go to the defensive firing installations of bombers and attack aircraft. It is better to turn around with fighters, which may never come into position for an attack during the whole battle, while an Il-2 attack is a guaranteed fan of bullets in the face.
Most German experts have a similar picture. Among their victories are no more than 20% of strike aircraft. Only Otto Kittel stands out against this background - he shot down 94 Il-2, which brought more benefits to his ground forces than, for example, Hartman, Novotny and Barkhorn combined. The truth and fate of Kittel developed accordingly - he died in February 1945. During the Il-2 attack, he was killed in the cockpit of his plane by a Soviet attack aircraft gunner.
But the Soviet aces were not afraid to launch attacks on the Junkers. Kozhedub shot down 24 attack aircraft - almost as many as Hartman. On average, in the total number of victories in the first ten Soviet aces, attack aircraft make up 38%. Twice as many as the Germans. What did Hartman do in reality, shooting down so many fighters? Repulsed their attacks by Soviet fighters on their dive bombers? Doubtful. Apparently, he shot down the guard of attack aircraft, instead of breaking through this guard to the main target - attack aircraft, killing the infantry of the Wehrmacht.
Klimenko Vitaly Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “From the first attack you have to shoot down the leader - everyone is guided by him, and bombs are often thrown at him. And if you want to personally shoot down, then you need to catch the pilots who fly last. They don't know shit, there are usually young people. If he fought back - yeah, it's mine."
The Germans carried out the protection of their bombers in a completely different way from the Soviet Air Force. Their actions were of a preemptive nature - clearing the sky on the route of the strike groups. They did not carry out direct escort, trying not to shackle their maneuver with attachment to slow bombers. The success of such tactics of the Germans depended on the skillful opposition of the Soviet command. If it allocated several groups of interceptor fighters, then the attack aircraft of the Germans were intercepted with a high degree of probability. While one group pinned down the German fighters to clear the sky, another group attacked the unprotected bombers. This is where the multiplicity of the Soviet Air Force began to affect, even if not with the most advanced technology.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “The Germans could get involved in a battle when it was not necessary at all. For example, when covering their bombers. We used this all the war, we had one group in the battle with the cover fighters, "on themselves" distracted them, and the other attacked the bombers. The Germans are happy, the chance to shoot down has appeared. "Bombers" to them at once to the side and do not care that our other group of these bombers beats as far as they can. … Formally, the Germans covered their attack aircraft very strongly, but they would only get involved in the battle, and everyone - cover from the side, were quite easily distracted, and throughout the war.”
The rout failed
So, having managed to rebuild tactics and having received new equipment, the Red Army Air Force began to achieve its first successes. The fighters of "new types" received in a sufficiently large number were no longer inferior to German aircraft as catastrophically as the I-16 and I-153. It was already possible to fight on this technique. The process of introducing new pilots into battle was adjusted. If in 1941 and early 1942 these were indeed "green" aviators who barely mastered takeoff and landing, then already at the beginning of 1943 they began to be given the opportunity to carefully and gradually delve into the intricacies of air warfare. They stopped throwing newcomers straight into the heat. Having mastered the basics of piloting at the school, the pilots ended up in the ZAPs, where they underwent combat use, and only then went to the combat regiments. And in the regiments, they also stopped thoughtlessly throwing them into battle, allowing them to understand the situation and gain experience. After Stalingrad, this practice became the norm.
Klimenko Vitaly Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “For example, a young pilot comes. I finished school. They let him fly around the airfield a little, then fly around the area, then in the end he can be paired. You don't let him into battle right away. Gradually … Gradually … Because I don’t need to carry the target by the tail”.
The Red Army Air Force managed to achieve the main goal - it is to prevent the enemy from gaining air supremacy. Of course, the Germans could still achieve dominance at a certain time, over a certain section of the front. This was done by concentrating efforts and clearing the sky. But, in general, they did not manage to completely paralyze the Soviet aviation. Moreover, the volume of combat work was growing. The industry was able to organize the mass production of aircraft, albeit not the best in the world, but in large quantities. And inferior to the German performance characteristics is very insignificant. The first calls for the Luftwaffe sounded - continuing to shoot down as many planes as possible and winding up the counters of personal victories, the Germans gradually led themselves to the abyss. They could no longer destroy more aircraft than the Soviet aviation industry produced. The increase in the number of victories did not lead to real, tangible results in practice - the Soviet Air Force did not stop combat work, and even increased its intensity.
The year 1942 is characterized by a surge in the number of Luftwaffe sorties. If in 1941 they made 37,760 sorties, then in 1942 - 520,082 sorties. It looks like a commotion in the calm and measured mechanism of a blitzkrieg, like an attempt to extinguish a blazing fire. All this combat work fell on the very small air force of the Germans - at the beginning of 1942, the Luftwaffe had 5,178 aircraft of all types on all fronts. For comparison, at the same time the Red Army Air Force already had more than 7,000 Il-2 attack aircraft and more than 15,000 fighters. The volumes are simply incomparable. In 1942, the Red Army Air Force made 852,000 sorties - a clear confirmation that the Germans had no domination. The IL-2's survivability increased from 13 sorties per plane killed to 26 sorties.
Throughout the war, from the actions of the Luftwaffe IA, the Soviet command reliably confirms the death of approximately 2,550 Il-2. But there is also a column "unidentified reasons for the loss." If you make a big concession to the German aces and assume that all "unidentified" aircraft were shot down exclusively by them (but in reality this could not be), then it turns out that in 1942 they intercepted only about 3% of Il-2 sorties. And, despite the continued growth of personal accounts, this figure is rapidly falling further, to 1.2% in 1943 and 0.5% in 1944. What does this mean in practice? That in 1942 the IL-2 flew 41,753 times to its targets. And 41,753 times something fell on the heads of the German infantrymen. Bombs, NURSs, shells. This, of course, is a rough estimate, since the Il-2 was also killed by anti-aircraft artillery, and in reality not every of the 41,753 sorties ended with bombs hitting the target. Another thing is important - the German fighters could not prevent this in any way. They knocked someone down. But on the scale of a huge front, on which thousands of Soviet Il-2s worked, it was a drop in the ocean. German fighters were too few for the Eastern Front. Even making 5-6 sorties a day, they could not destroy the Soviet Air Force. And nothing, they are doing well, bills are growing, crosses with all sorts of leaves and diamonds are handed over - everything is fine, life is beautiful. And so it was until May 9, 1945.
Golodnikov Nikolay Gerasimovich: “We cover the attack aircraft. German fighters appear, spin, but do not attack, they believe that there are few of them. The "silts" are cultivating the leading edge - the Germans do not attack, they concentrate, pulling fighters from other sectors. The "silts" move away from the target, and this is where the attack begins. Well, what's the point in this attack? "Silt" has already "worked". Only for "personal account". And this happened often. Yes, it has been even more interesting. The Germans could "roll" around us like this and not attack at all. They are not fools, intelligence worked for them. "Red-nosed" "Cobras" - 2nd GIAP of the Navy KSF. Well, what are they, completely headless, to contact the elite guards regiment? These and can bring down. Better to wait for someone "simpler".
