BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE THEATER OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN DONBASS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE GROWING COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF THE MINSK AGREEMENTS
The civilian population, as well as servicemen of the People's Militia Corps of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, for more than 2.5 years of incessant tragic incidents associated with the deaths of hundreds of people from artillery strikes from Ukrainian regular formations and paramilitary units of the nationalist organization "Right Sector" to understand that the fault was the completely discredited and obsolete “Minsk agreements”. Let's call things by their proper names! Each time after the conclusion of any "deals" with the Ukrainians, after only a few days of ghostly "operational silence", active hostilities flare up with renewed vigor, starting with shelling from the Ukrop subdivisions, which to this day occupy the western and northern regions of the LPR.
The activity of the patrols of the OSCE special monitoring mission also raises huge doubts, because more than once clear interaction was observed between representatives of the OSCE SMM and the Ukrainian side. For example, patrols often "take their feet" a few minutes or even hours before the start of active work of the Ukrainian artillery in one or another operational direction, or are not present at all during the massive use of heavy weapons by the junta. Naturally, violations are recorded only by representatives of the defense ministries of the republics, to whom the so-called "world community" does not listen at all.
As provocations with further accusations of the Armed Forces of Novorossia, Ukrainians regularly open fire on territories under their control, an example of which is the shelling of the private sector of Avdeevka on May 13, 2017, where in the 53rd house on the street. Sapronov, 4 people were killed by a 122-mm shell from a D-30 howitzer or a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled gun. As many remember, an even more terrible shelling from the Ukrainian "Grad" and "Vasilkov" had to endure the Eastern microdistrict of Mariupol, where, according to unofficial data, more than 100 people died. For us, residents of Mariupol, Avdiivka, Konstantinovka, Artyomovsk, Kramatorsk, Slavyansk and other cities occupied by Ukrainian security forces, Ukraine as a state ended in the spring of 2014, after the events in the Mariupol GUVD and its environs, where from small arms and RPGs from Central Ukrainian and more than 30 people were killed in the West Ukrainian scum.
Nevertheless, the liberation of Mariupol from the then nationalist battalion "Azov" (now a regiment) and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, expected on September 6, 14, was stopped by the so-called "Minsk Protocol", which can be considered the "foundation of problems and torments" of the Russian people of Donbass. At the stage when Crimea successfully became part of the Russian Federation, the “Big Game” doomed Donbass to long-term problems and hardships. And now, in order to avoid condemnation from the same "world community", the command of the "corps" of the republics is forced to wait for an offensive from the Ukrainian side, after which the countermeasures expected by all of us should follow. It is still impossible to say exactly when this will happen, but the operational-tactical situation in the Donbass theater of operations already indicates a slow exit from the process of stagnation.
For example, if earlier the meetings of the contact group in Minsk sometimes led to the establishment of temporary operational silence, today this is practically impossible. The next such consultations, which took place in the Belarusian capital on May 15, ended with groundless accusations against the LPR about the shelling of the territory controlled by Kiev, as well as the need to "withdraw the Russian contingent from the territory of Ukraine," which is not even close there. Only such statements already indicate the inadequacy of the Ukrainian side and the lack of the possibility of concluding any agreements with it. The second indicator of the approaching escalation can be considered the meeting of the illegitimate Ukrainian President Poroshenko with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following which it is planned to search for "levers" of pressure on Russia in order to "force" the implementation of the "Minsk Agreements".
Vasily Stoyakin, director of the Ukrainian Center for Political Marketing, expressed a rather interesting opinion about the radically changed position of Merkel. According to him, if initially Merkel, using various methods, tried to position herself as a political figure-peacemaker, “nullifying” the conflict in Donbass, today a diametrically opposite picture is being observed. Her point of view more and more converges with the extremely inadequate overtures of Poroshenko regarding "Russian aggression." To put it in a more understandable language, Merkel “puts an end to the Minsk Agreements” and switches to the so-called anti-Russian “accusatory method” inherent in the British Foreign Office, beloved in the West. That is, Europe, exactly like 3 years ago, is completely far from an objective assessment of what is happening in Donbass.
At the same time, the Ukrainian side is increasing the daily number of shelling of the LPNR cities (from 400 to 800 shells and mines per day), again using rocket artillery (on the night of October 23, the Donetsk ON started using MLRS BM-21 "Grad"), and also prepares offensive operations in the Novo-Azov and Telmanov areas, in which it is planned to involve units of the so-called "Marine Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" (in particular the 36th brigade), the formation of the "Azov" and "PS" regiments. Confirmation of this is the next 10-hour high-altitude reconnaissance operation of the heavy RQ-4A "Global Hawk" radio and optical-electronic reconnaissance drone conducted near the contact line in Donbas on May 14, 2017. The trajectory of the UAVGH000, based at the Sigonella airbase, passed at an altitude of 15.5 km over the territories of Romania and the central regions of Ukraine, after which the RQ-4A patrolled about 60 km from the territory of the LPNR along the Kuibyshevo - Krasnoarmeisk - Novoaydar line, approaching the air border of Russia at a distance of 70 km.
On this day, over most of the Donbass, a powerful atmospheric front with thick stratus-rain clouds was established, which caused only the radio-technical mode of operation of the Global Hawk. All reconnaissance was carried out using an airborne radar complex with AN / ZPY-2 MP-RTIP AFAR in the synthetic aperture mode (SAR), as well as passive electronic reconnaissance equipment. Apparently, the RQ-4A, using MP-RTIP, carefully scanned the terrain in the territories of the republics, revealed the few positions of the defensive artillery batteries of the People's Militia Corps of the LDNR (most of the systems were assigned to the rear zones of the republics), after which the coordinates were transferred to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was after this reconnaissance flight that Ukrainian militants began shelling with renewed vigor the positions of the fortified areas of the DPR army in the region of Horlivka, Donetsk and Dokuchaevsk.
From this conclusion: despite the refusal of the administrative and budgetary department of the White House to continue providing gratuitous military assistance to Kiev, Washington will continue to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the broadest information support, ranging from radio-technical and optical-electronic data of strategic reconnaissance drones RQ-4A and ending with satellite data -spies. For your information: 2 days after the radio-technical reconnaissance by the UAVGH000 board near the contact line, a TV tower near Telmanovo, broadcasting Russian digital TV channels in DVB-T2 format to Mariupol temporarily occupied by the Kiev regime, part of the Azov region and Volnovakha, was disabled by the APU's point artillery fire.
And finally, the most important indicator indicating the approaching active phase of hostilities in Donbass is the situation on Debaltsevo ON and in the area of Stanytsia Luhanska. So, on the western bank of the Svetlodarsk reservoir (Novoluganskoe settlement), the 53rd separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine seized several residential buildings in order to conduct counter-battery fire in the Gorlovsky and Debaltsevo operational directions. The houses contain 11 positions of 2B11 120-mm mortars with full ammunition. Moreover, various sources report a difficult situation in the area of height 223 and the Kikimora stronghold (Svetlodarskaya arc, between Lozovoe and Logvinovo). Did the DPR Armed Forces manage to keep this defensive midfielder? Also, additional armored vehicles, artillery and personnel are being transferred to Svetlodarsk with the aim of a possible local offensive in the "gray zones", as well as distracting from the impending large-scale offensive in the Telman and Novoazov areas.
Very serious and alarming information has come over the past two days from the servicemen of the 7th Slavic Brigade of the DPR Armed Forces on the Svetlodar arc. As one of the fighters of the 7th brigade told the Radius staff correspondent, the 54th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was replaced by the Azov unit, which, unlike the first, behaves more aggressively and motivated, often uses well-trained snipers, from whose actions the militias have already suffered their first casualties. From a distance of 600 m, in rather windy weather, the nationalists managed to "remove" from the position of a young soldier of the DPR Armed Forces, leaning out of cover for a second. According to the militias, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began to use 240-mm "Tulips" north of Uglegorsk.
In Stanitsa Luganskaya, a pronounced pre-escalation environment is also observed. In addition to the fact that all attempts of the People's Militia Corps of the LPR to withdraw large-caliber artillery from the contact line according to the "mirror" principle were unsuccessful due to constant ignorance on the Ukrainian side, the latter also regularly commits flagrant crimes against the local population. In particular, dill are deploying batteries of self-propelled guns and mortars right on the land plots of civilians, knowing full well that the militias are not firing at these areas. An impressive network of trenches and dugouts is being created in the areas of the private sectors of Stanytsia Luhanska and neighboring settlements to contain the LPR army after it launched a counteroffensive in the northern ON.
As for the counter-offensive by the armies of the DPR and LPR after the "suppression" of Kiev's offensive actions on the Northern Front, it can in no way be called a successful strategic action. Here, at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteer territorial natsbats, mercenaries and NATO instructors, there is an extensive network of large villages and cities, which are 2 powerful defensive lines with already built strongholds and fortified areas. The first line includes the cities closest to the contact line with developed infrastructure: Konstantinovka, Artyomovsk, Soledar, Novoaydar. The second line is represented by the cities: Druzhkovka, Kramatorsk, Slavyansk, Lisichansk, Severodonetsk, Starobelsk. To advance in these directions, the LDNR Armed Forces need a numerical superiority of assault units, which is not currently observed.
On the Southern Front, where immediately after the line of contact the ukry do not have a serious network of large settlements with fortified areas, it will be much easier for the People's Militia Corps to attack. The main task will remain only the initial containment of the offensive of the Ukrainian formations, which moved out of Mariupol and Volnovakha, with a total number of about 7-8 thousand people (the remaining 8-10 thousand will remain in the infrastructure of the cities). The successful capture of Mariupol in the "cauldron" will be possible only after the defeat of the Armed Forces group in Volnovakha. This is the main key to the further liberation of the entire Azov region. The likelihood of an escalation of the conflict in Donbass in the summer period remains extremely high, regardless of the outcome of the meeting of the contact group within the framework of the "Minsk Agreements" on May 24, 2017.
ESTIMATION OF POSSIBILITIES OF RESTORED UKRAINIAN T-80B / BV SENT TO DONBASS. COUNTER-ACTION MEASURES
A separate item for consideration is the dispatch by Kiev to the Donbass theater of operations of the repaired T-80B / BV main battle tanks. The restoration of capacities for overhaul and modernization of gas turbine MBTs of the T-80B family on the basis of the State Enterprise "Kharyokovsky Armored Plant" became known back in May 2015 from a statement by the director of the enterprise, Viktor Kozonak. According to the information in the reference book "The Military Balance", there were 123 T-80B modification vehicles and 25 more modern vehicles in the T-80BV version in storage of the Armed Forces, which stood in the open air for about 30 years. Previously, the T-80B / BV were in service with the advanced armored units of the Group of Soviet Forces in the GDR. There they played the role of a "breakthrough backbone" capable of reaching the English Channel in 2 - 2, 5 days (with battles). But at that time it never came to that and the legendary "Eightyards" returned to storage bases in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. And so, the Ukrainian "Eighty" decided to hastily restore and send to the Donbass against the peaceful Russian population and servicemen of the armies of the young republics.
What is even more unpleasant moment, at the disposal of the "Kharkov Armored Plant" and at the Ukrainian storage bases by some miracle turned out to be the most advanced 1250-horsepower gas turbine engines GTD-1250, while the T-80B / BV were usually equipped with an early version of the GTD- 1000TF with a capacity of 1100 hp This engine will give Ukropov's tank crews unprecedented mobility on the battlefield, which DPR armored units do not currently have. As you know, at the moment, the so-called "Highly mobile" troops of Ukraine (according to the standard - the Airborne Forces) are armed with about 20 such tanks, transferred back in 2015. The number of cars in the new batch was not officially announced, it is obvious that it is about the same.
The main distinguishing qualities of the "resurrected" and modernized T-80B / BV with GTD-1250 engines will be: high power density of 27.8 hp / t, speed of 75 - 85 km / h, good acceleration and ease of replacing gas turbine power plant (about 5 - 6 hours in the field). In the People's Militia Corps of the LDNR, the main armored "fist" is represented by the MBT T-64BV, a number of captured Ukrainian T-64BM "Bulat", T-72A / AV / B. Most of these machines have a mass from 42.4 tons (T-64BV) to 44.5 tons (T-72B) and are equipped with 5TDF (700 hp) and V-84-1 (840 hp) engines, respectively., and therefore their power density barely reaches 16 and 18.9 hp / t, and the travel speed is only up to 60 km / h. Moreover, these types of diesel engines have a much lower reserve of torque and traction capabilities in comparison with the GTD-1250. "Flying" T-80B / BVs will be much more "nimble" than the main battle tanks in service with the armies of the republics. Designed for a sudden and lightning-fast "breakthrough" of the enemy's defensive lines, the restored Ukrainian "Eighty" will mostly be sent to those units of the Highly Mobile Armed Forces of the Armed Forces, which the command of the "Independent" army will throw into the offensive "backbone" in Telman and Novo-Azov operational directions. Will the DPR People's Militia Corps be able to resist, for example, 1 T-80B / BV battalion (31 tanks), supported by a similar number of T-64BVs in the Kominternovo area?
Naturally, they can, but you have to work hard. If only conventional T-72A or T-64BV will be fielded against the T-80B, then you should not count on an early superiority. 1, 5 times more high-speed "Eighty" is quite capable of even breaking through the "tactical corridor" in the defense of the DPR Armed Forces along the line "October - Sakhanka", and then advance to N of the item. Mitkovo-Kachkary. Ukrainian T-64BV and T-72 can follow the T-80BV along the "corridor". The further offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction will be stopped by additional armored units that have moved out from Telmanovo, Novoazovsk and Bezymenny, as well as batteries of cannon and rocket artillery of the 1st AK MoD People's Militia of the DPR. Despite the fact that the Ukrainian tank battalion will eventually be defeated, the army units of the NM DNR will have a huge temporary “gap” that will need to be closed immediately. Only a quick counteroffensive with the liberation of new settlements on the near approaches to Mariupol (Lebedinskoe, Vodyanoe) can solve the issue.
In order to avoid significant losses of the DPR Armed Forces in the course of a clash with the Ukrainian "Eightyards", tankmen and anti-tank crews of the republic's army should remember that despite the excellent speed and agility of the T-80B / BV gas turbine, they have a whole list of design flaws that can be used in the course of the battle. Firstly, the armor protection of the turret and the tank hull is rather mediocre. The upper frontal part with built-in elements of dynamic protection 4S20 "Contact-1" has an equivalent resistance against BOPS of the order of 400 - 450 mm and against "kuma" (shaped-charge projectiles) of the order of 850 - 900 mm. Consequently, the VLD of Ukrainian T-80B / BV can be pierced by the following list of armor-piercing shells: ZBM-22 "Hairpin" (at a distance of about 1200 m), ZBM-26 "Nadezhda-R" (about 1.8 km), ZBM-32 "Vant" (2, 5 - 3 km), ZBM-42M "Lekalo" and more modern BPS from a greater distance. The list of cumulative shells that penetrate the VLD of T-80B / BV tanks includes: tandem round PG-7VR "Resume", tandem ATGM 9M131 and 9M131M anti-tank complex "Metis-M / 1", tandem ATGM 9M113M complex "Konkurs-M", anti-tank 9K119 missiles of the Reflex complex, etc. "Metis" of the early version 9K115, as well as "Malyutki" with the VLD of this tank will not cope.
Now with regards to the security of the frontal projection of the T-80B / BV turret. The cast turret with combined armor is resistant to armor-piercing feathered subcaliber projectiles of the order of 540 mm with Contact-1 DZ (this DZ practically does not provide protection against kinetic cores) and from cumulative projectiles - about 900 mm. Consequently, the frontal plates of the tank can be confidently pierced only by the BOPS with the indexes GRAU ZBM-29 "Nadfil-2" (from 900 - 1100 m), ZBM-42 "Mango" (at a distance of 1, 3 km or less) and ZBM-42M "Lekalo" (up to 2.5 km). The list of HEAT shells that penetrate the forehead of the T-80B / BV turret is approximately the same as for the upper frontal part of the hull. The range of BOPS, tank guided missiles and CS of the armored subdivisions of the DPR Armed Forces fully contributes to the destruction of the gas turbine "Channel tanks" that have fallen into the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the front projection at a distance of 1500 - 3000 m. Meanwhile, during the "turmoil" of active hostilities so that the DPR army T-64BV and T-72B, or the 100-mm Rapier anti-tank guns will not appear in a convenient perspective with respect to the breakthrough Ukrainian T-80B / BV. It is here that the knowledge of the weak points in the side and stern projections of the tank will become very relevant.
One of the main disadvantages of booking the side projections of the T-80B / BV hull is the small diameter of the road wheels (670 versus 750 mm for the T-72B), as a result of which significant sections of the side armor plates of the hull with a thickness of about 80 mm are exposed. These areas can be hit by the following methods: 30-mm AP 2A42 BMP-2 fire with the use of ZUBR8 "Kerner" armor-piercing sub-caliber shells at a distance of about 500 m, "boots" fire (SPG-9) with the use of PG-9V anti-tank grenades, fire 73-mm guns 2A28 "Thunder" (BMP-1) using PG-15V rounds. It also plays in favor of the DPR army that the thin anti-cumulative screens of the Ukrainian "Eighty" do not accommodate the elements of "Contact-1" dynamic protection, and therefore you can immediately hit the unprotected side from any weapon with a caliber of more than 30 mm, which will lead to a sheet break and detonation of ammunition. For example, with the T-72A / B (in service with the DPR Armed Forces), in which large road wheels cover a significant area of the lateral projection of the hull, such manipulations will be more difficult. The T-80BV loading mechanism provides for vertical placement of ammunition, which increases its area several times; consequently, the chance of its detonation in the event of at least one penetration of the enemy by the projectile also increases several times.
The side armor plates of the tower are represented by steel dimensions, gradually thinning towards the rear of the tower from 320 - 340 to 70 -90 mm. In the central and front parts of the tower, this figure increases by 20 - 30 mm, taking into account the EDZ, and is about 360 - 800 mm due to the rounding of its "zygomatic" elements. It is rather difficult to cause irreparable damage to the “zygomatic” part from the side projection, and therefore it is inappropriate. The rear of the turret side plates, just like the thin aft armor plate, can be penetrated by any RPG-7 or SPG-9 round. Elements of reactive armor are absent here. Also, the rear armor plate of the tower is vulnerable to Kerner shells used in the 30-mm AP 2A42.
And finally, one more detail of the T-80B / BV family is the rather low protection of the aft part of the hull, due to the presence of large air duct channels. This can cause damage to the engine by large-caliber machine guns, automatic cannons, as well as shrapnel from exploding high-explosive fragmentation shells. Moreover, for long-term operation in the theater of operations, T-80B / BV tanks with a 1250-horsepower gas turbine power plant will require 4 times more fuel in hourly consumption and 3.7 times in travel consumption compared to the T-72B. This fact will create a lot of problems for the Ukrainian formations with the supply of fuel to the active area of the hostilities, which will unfold near Vlnovakha and Mariupol. Even American tankers, with their decent level of logistics on the battlefield, are complaining about the "gluttony" of their gas turbine "Abrams". Imagine what the situation will be with the troops of the Ukrainian junta at the time of the response of the 1st AK NM DNR from the "Grad" and artillery, when the normal work of tankers will be barely possible: their "Eighty" will corny become a "pile of stationary metal" first in a portable (due to lack of fuel), and then in the direct meaning of this expression.
A very contradictory situation is emerging with the control complex of the MBT T-80BV. The machine uses the automated control system 1A33 "Ob", which is represented by the 2E26M stabilizer (the same set is installed on the T-64BV). Nevertheless, on the "Eighty" it is much more effective than on the T-64BV, due to the softer and more perfect running gear. So, even the first experimental modification of the T-80 ("Object 219") demonstrated very high fire and dynamic capabilities during tests in the distant 75th year. In particular, according to the testimony of the command of one of the experienced battalions of these vehicles in the Baltic Military District, the "Eighty" with the GTD-1000T engine was distinguished by the following characteristics: 30% greater effective fire range, maintaining accuracy at 2 times the speed, 2 times higher travel speed at a 15-degree rise, 70% acceleration time, 2 times less losses in the theater due to the highest mobility, 2, 1 times less time to prepare the first shot, etc. Moreover, MTO with the selection of torque to the driving wheels (through the gearbox) from a free turbine makes it possible to maintain work even in the event of a collision with a "critical" obstacle. Neither the T-72B nor the T-64BV have such abilities.
Let's go back to the FCS "Ob" with the 2E26M stabilizer. According to various sources, as well as military personnel, despite the automation of this system and a successful chassis, it absolutely cannot compete with the more advanced weapon stabilizer 2E42-2 "Jasmine" (installed on the T-72B), which makes it possible to accurately "lead" enemy units even at higher own speeds, and therefore the accuracy of firing on the move in the T-72B, although insignificantly, is higher than that of the T-80BV. Here, the armored units of the DPR Armed Forces will have an advantage over Ukrainian tankers.
An equally interesting fact is the superiority of the T-72B over the T-80B / BV in terms of the armor protection of the frontal projection, as well as the security of individual components and assemblies of the vehicle. For example, in addition to the lightly protected early versions of the T-72 Ural and T-72A, the DPR army has the T-72B / B1 / 3 MBT equipped with the Kontakt-1 and Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armor kits. Moreover, Nizhny Tagil vehicles of this modification received a completely new type of "semi-active" type of armor, represented by special niche containers with "reflective sheets". These niches make up about 50% of the physical dimensions of the turret frontal armor plates and are inclined at an angle of 54-55º relative to the longitudinal axis of the tank cannon. Each niche contains a 390-kilogram armor package, consisting of 20 3-layer special armor blocks with a thickness of 30 mm, each of which contains a 21-mm armor plate and a 6-mm rubber sheet for the effect of "advance run" of a thin 3-mm plate on the penetrating cumulative jet. Such special armor increases the equivalent resistance from HEAT shells by 1, 4 times.
Thus, even without dynamic protection, the frontal projection of the T-72B is well protected from shots from the SPG-9. With the Kontakt-1 reactive armor, it increases to 950 mm from the KS and can protect the crew from the fire of most monoblock anti-tank weapons in service with Ukrainian formations. A fairly large number of T-72Bs in the army corps of the LDNR are equipped with the Contact-5 DZ. And in this case, the Ukrainian T-80BV with their first "Contact" generally turn out to be "below the plinth." Not only are the 4S22 elements of the built-in dynamic protection "Contact-5" not initiated from the impact of small arms bullets and 12, 7 - 14, 5 - 30-mm shells, they also do a good job of reducing the penetrating effect of armor-piercing sub-caliber shells, reducing them efficiency by 25 - 30%. While the resistance of the T-80BV tower (with "Contact-1") is about 560 mm from the BOPS and 850 mm from the KS, the T-72B with a similar attachment kit has not the worst protection against BOPS (560 - 570 mm) and a little better protection against KS (900-950 mm). The T-72B tower with "Contact-5" receives 650 - 900 mm equivalent from the BOPS and 1100 mm from the KS! How does it make a difference to you?
As for the protection of the upper frontal part (VLD), here the T-80BV is inferior to the T-72B by about 100 mm (450 versus 550 mm, respectively) in protection against kinetic projectiles, even if the "Ural" has "Contact-1", with "Contact-5" VLD receives durability of 690 - 720 mm from kinetic projectiles and 1100 from cumulative ones. As you can see, there is complete superiority over the T-80BV. The last element confirming the complete superiority of the T-72B in terms of security is its compact carousel-type autoloader located at the bottom of the tank hull: it is securely closed by the frontal and side projections, and also has a much smaller projection area, which is additionally covered by large road wheels; hitting it is not as easy as that of the T-80BV.
At the moment, skilled defenders of Novorossia are developing new configurations for covering the vulnerable zones of T-72 tanks using the elements of dynamic protection "Contact-1" and "Contact-5". In particular, a T-72B sample was seen with a radical expansion of the overlap with 4S20 Contact-1 reactive armor elements. They are placed not only in the traditional configuration (on the tower, VLD and the front of the anti-cumulative screens), but also on the wings, the rear parts of the PQE, the aft armor plate of the hull (partially), as well as above the grill of the ejector cooling system of the engine. This solution is optimal for use in complex urban development with a huge number of high-rise buildings, from which the enemy attacks the most vulnerable (thin) areas of the upper projection, including MTO. It is unlikely that it will be possible to hit this modification of the T-72B into the section of the power plant from the first shot of the RPG (we do not take into account the shot from the tandem cumulative warhead PG-7VR "Resume" and powerful ATGMs).
The next two modifications of the T-72B can be considered the machines seen near one of the polygons of the Donetsk People's Republic. The first tank is equipped with a combined DZ based on "Contact-1/5" (photo above). Standard EDZ 4S22 are installed on the frontal armor plates of the tower with a wedge at an inclination of 60 - 70 degrees. to the normal. This moment can be considered very positive, since there is a ricochet from the cover and / or larger dimensions of the plates of the 4C22 module, which counteract the cumulative jet and the core of the armor-piercing projectile. The negative point is that due to the "wedge-shaped" placement of the EDZ, the vulnerable area of the junction of the lower part of the tower with the hull remains open for destruction by armor-piercing, cumulative and high-explosive shells of the enemy.
DPR specialists solved this technical problem in a very original way: on the lower element of each "wedge-pair" 4С22 (in the area of the joint edge with the upper element), using a bolt fastening with a steel pressure plate, they installed a thick rubber skirt, at the end of which an element of dynamic protection is fixed 4С20 "Contact-1". The latter is just at the level of the vulnerable joint of the hull with the turret. The indisputable advantage of this design is the tank's ability to squeeze through difficult sections of urban infrastructure with rubble and wooded areas with branched tree crowns without damaging the suspension elements of the Contact-1 DZ due to the flexible and movable rubber skirt.
The second tank has a similar combined DZ (photo above), but with the difference that EDZ 4S20 are fixed not on rubber skirts made of a conveyor belt, but on rigid steel brackets fastened at the inner joint of the "wedge-pair" "Contact-5". This design, of course, is not so flexible, but with the active movement of the T-72B with turret rotation, it allows you to keep the projection of the hull and turret joint under protection, because the 4S20 modules will not randomly "teleport", creating slots for enemy projectiles.
The engineering thought of craftsmen from Donbass and Russia, awakened by the barbaric attacks of aggression on the part of the Kiev Nazis against the primordially Russian mentality of our population, continues to create more and more highly effective means of waging war with the invader. And, judging by the results of the negotiations of the contact group on May 24, 2017, these funds may come in handy for the armies of the LPRP in the near future.
