Literally every week, reports continue to come in about incessant reconnaissance flights by NATO tactical and strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the most powerful air zones of prohibition and restriction of access and maneuver (A2 / AD), created in the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions. We are talking about the strategic RER aircraft of the RC-135W type of the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force of Great Britain, as well as the lighter RER "Gulfsream 4" aircraft of the Swedish Air Force. Moreover, near the Russian air borders over the southern part of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, it is extremely common to find long-range anti-submarine aircraft P-8A "Poseidon", prowling over the water area in search of magnetic anomalies and sources of acoustic radiation, indicating the presence of diesel-electric submarines of the project 877 "Halibut" and other military underwater vehicles. The presence of Poseidons in this region is unlikely to cause serious concern for the command of the Baltic Fleet, because the acoustic profile of these submarines has probably already been studied along and across by means of RSL dropped by patrol aircraft and Type 212A submarines patrolling the waters of the Baltic Sea.
Nor should we expect any serious consequences that threaten the security of the state from the use of the MX-20i integrated optical-electronic survey complex installed on the P-8A. Despite the television and infrared channels of this complex, as well as 50-70x long-focus optics, which makes it possible to classify ground units of military equipment at a distance of more than 50 km, the MX-20i is unable to recognize camouflaged objects. As for the airborne radar station AN / APY-10 (AN / APS-137D (V) 5), it is represented by a parabolic antenna array operating in the centimeter X-band and has a resolution of about 3.5-4 m. number of operating modes, including synthetic aperture (SAR) and reverse synthetic aperture (ISAR), the above resolution in the mapping mode does not allow identification of remote coastal objects on the coast of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, and the ISAR mode with a resolution of 1 m is achieved exclusively due to loitering around the reconnaissance object, which in the operational-tactical conditions of the Russian A2 / AD zones in the Baltic States is an unrealizable task.
An immeasurably greater threat is posed by the RC-135W and Gulfstream 4 electronic reconnaissance aircraft. The basis of the Rivet Joint onboard avionics in the Block 8 version is the 85000 and 55000 electronic and radio-technical intelligence systems. protected channels between surface, ground and air combat units. So, for example, the RER 85000 complex can intercept radio channels for transmitting information about the air situation from A-50 AWACS aircraft to consumer terminals (Su-27SM / 30SM and Su-35S); there is no exact data on the possibilities of its decoding yet. Most likely, due to the application of the mode of pseudo-random tuning of the operating frequency, the decoder operators and decryption software of the RC-135W work terminals are not subject to such abilities. The distributed aperture of the 85000 complex is represented by a network of bladed and whip antennas integrated into the lower generatrix of the fuselage and wing tip, respectively.
One of the key features of the "85th" complex is the ability to take direction finding of any omnidirectional radio stations operating in the frequency range from 0.04 to 17.25 GHz. Together with the ability to analyze the frequency parameters of the signal, this makes it possible to form a satisfactory frequency algorithm for the formulation of directional radio-electronic interference. As you know, their setting can be carried out by the most advanced tactical electronic warfare aircraft F / A-18G, the terminal of which will receive the above algorithm via the Link-16 radio channel. The equipment of the 85000 complex, also known as ES-182 MUCELS (Multiple Communication Emitter Location Systems), has an average range of detection and signal interception of about 900 km (depending on the height of the radiation source and its frequency of operation).
With a standard RC-135W flight path over the southern part of the Baltic Sea, the radius of electronic reconnaissance in the eastern operational direction can cover St. Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and almost the entire central strip of Russia. Confusing the ES-182 MUCELS complex is possible only through the large-scale use of ground-based electronic countermeasures such as "Krasukha-4" or "Murmansk-BM". The former are capable of partially "blind" MUCELS in the entire range of its operating frequencies, the latter - in the shortwave. Nevertheless, the activation of all electronic warfare systems in the Western and Southern military districts for the sake of suppressing the avionics of the only RC-135W "Rivet Joint" seems completely absurd: regular "games" of this nature in non-war times can cause significant interruptions in radio communications for civilian purposes, as well as not bad ruffle the defense budget.
A good solution could be the formation of a specialized squadron of electronic countermeasures (REP), represented by 12 multipurpose Su-30SM fighters with Khibiny complexes on board, which, according to target designation of the AWACS radar in the Kaliningrad region, would rise from airbases in the western part of Russia and formed on the eastern air direction (on the way of the "Rivet Joint" survey) several echelons of radio countermeasures, turning into an excellent air barrier. A more economically feasible solution could be the deployment of multi-frequency electronic warfare systems on specialized airships located on the most important sections of the western air border of Russia. As we know, the United States has vast experience in using airships for AWACS, and in a similar way they can be adapted to the tasks of electronic countermeasures.
An even more serious threat is posed by the 55000 AEELS (Automatic Electronic Emitter Location System) radio complex, designed for direction finding of such radiation sources as ground-based radar detectors (Protivnik-G, VVO 96L6E, 64N6E, Sky-SV, etc.). and multifunctional radars for illumination and guidance of air defense missile systems (30N6E2, 92N6E, 9S32M, 9S19M2 "Ginger", etc.), airborne radars of army, tactical, strategic and patrol aircraft, as well as active radar homing heads of anti-aircraft guided missiles and missiles air-to-air class. AEELS is represented by a spaced two-way aperture of two interferometric antenna arrays built into the side generators of the fuselage nose. The total viewing area of these antenna arrays is 240 degrees (120 degrees on each side), while there are 60-degree "dead zones" along the aircraft roll axis in the front and rear hemispheres.
The accuracy of determining the coordinates of radio-emitting objects is 0.01 °. When flying along our air borders in the European theater of operations, the AEELS complex allows you to "probe" all the survey, accompanying and firing frequency parameters of the above classes and types of radars, which allows the American Air Force to receive a detailed report on the frequency profiles of the functioning of a large list of radar facilities in advance. The result can be considered an improvement in the level of training of the crews of electronic warfare aircraft, as well as tactical and strategic aviation for a possible confrontation with the Russian Aerospace Forces in the event of a probable start of a regional conflict. The sensitivity of the AEELS interferometric antenna arrays is tens of times higher than that of most well-known radiation warning stations (IRS) of tactical fighter of the 4th and transitional generation, therefore, in combat conditions, 16 operators of the complex will be able to cover tactical information about the air situation much earlier than other airborne reconnaissance assets.
To counter these Rivet Joints complexes, the same electronic countermeasures are excellent, which were described above for the ES-182 MUCELS (85000) RER complexes. Nevertheless, today (from the point of view of the Aerospace Forces) they can be considered very "exotic", because the concept of developing large airships in Russia is just beginning to slowly move from the level of research work to the conceptual design of a future prototype. So, relying on the statement of the president of NPO Rosaerosystems-Augur, Gennady Verba, the construction of the first experimental airship of the Atlant family will be completed only by 2022. Only after that it will be possible to discuss more extensively the possibility of using airships for electronic warfare in relation to the Russian Aerospace Forces.
As for the countermeasures being taken today, aimed at counteracting the American, British and Swedish RER aircraft that are "playing" in the Baltic sky, the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy will make its move. According to the May statement of the BF Commander Alexander Nosatov, by the end of this year the naval aviation of the fleet will be equipped with 17 Su-30SM multipurpose fighters. These vehicles, equipped with the H011M Bars onboard radar, will be able to begin tracking the approaching US and British Rivet Joints from about 2 times greater distance than the Su-27 do today. Optimism is also added by an anonymous source, who told Interfax the day before that the aviation component of the Baltic Fleet will significantly expand due to the increasing presence of NATO contingents in the Baltic countries.
