During the Second War in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand), Thailand was one of the main allies of the United States. In fact, it was a key ally, without which the conduct of the war in the form in which it was going, would have been impossible in principle. This state of affairs had solid foundations.
Anti-communist citadel
The spread of leftist ideas in Southeast Asia, from the very beginning, was seen by Thai elites as a threat to the existence of monarchical Thailand. If in Laos and Cambodia representatives of monarchical families were simultaneously left-wing leaders and spearheaded the transition to a republican form of government (which resulted in civil wars), then in Thailand there was a strong national consensus about socialism, communism, and the need to adhere to the traditional monarchical form of government. Seeing the growing popularity of leftist ideas, both in Thailand itself (to a limited extent, mainly among ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese) and around, all the leaders of Thailand, who periodically replaced each other during the coups, relied on cooperation with the United States.
Since the days of Truman and the Korean War, Thailand has been involved in US military operations against the "communist threat." The Communist victory in Vietnam made Thais fanatical supporters of the United States, ready to both deploy American troops on their territory and participate in American operations. The growing influence and power of Pathet Lao in Laos and the growing involvement of Vietnam in this country made Thais even more supporters of harsh measures than the Americans themselves were.
Not surprisingly, Thailand became one of the first countries of SEATO, a pro-American military bloc in Asia.
The Americans did not remain in debt and, at their own expense, built civilian infrastructure in Thailand, for example, roads, and in large volumes beyond the capacity of Thailand. This stimulated the economic development of the country and further strengthened the pro-American sentiments among the local population.
Field Marshal Sarit Tanarat, who came to power in Thailand in 1958, took his place in the American "ranks" at the earliest opportunity. In 1961, the US Ambassador to Bangkok, W. Johnson asked Tanarat to deploy American troops in Thailand to conduct covert operations against the Pathet Lao. Such consent was obtained, and since 1961, the Thais have embarked on covert operations with the United States.
Since April 1961, the CIA launched Operation "Project Ekarad", the essence of which was to organize the training of the Lao military in camps in Thailand. President Kennedy also personally made sure that the Thai army provided instructors for the "project". Moreover, Tanarat ordered that the Americans could recruit professional Thai military personnel as mercenaries. These people were excluded from the lists of personnel and they were sent to Laos as instructors, advisers, pilots, and sometimes fighters. There they wore the uniforms and insignia of the royal army. The United States paid for all these actions, and, in principle, a significant part of Thai military expenditures.
This approach was nothing new, the Americans trained the Thai National Police (TNP) for special operations in Laos back in 1951, and the Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit (PARU) was trained by them at the same time. conducting air counterinsurgency operations. Later, PARU will fight in Laos, secretly of course. The number of CIA operatives back in the distant 1953 was equal to two hundred, and by 1961, everything had only worsened. After all, opposition to the left in Laos was in the vital interests of Thailand, which needed a "buffer" between itself and the growing strength of North Vietnam. At first, however, everything was limited to 60 Thais in the royal army of Laos, raids by PARU and border guards on Lao territory, reconnaissance and training of Lao in Thai training camps.
Military successes "Pathet Lao" forced to reconsider the situation. The Thais put pressure on the United States, demanding additional security guarantees, and better, open intervention in events. Although Kennedy did not perceive Laos as a vital point in the fight against communism, the Thais eventually got their way and, in May 1962, the US Marines began unloading at Thai ports. On May 18, 1962, 6,500 Marines disembarked from the Valley Forge on Thai soil. In addition, the United States deployed an additional 165 special forces from the Green Berets and 84 instructors from other branches of the military. By this time, the Thais had already deployed several thousand soldiers along the Mekong River, in readiness to invade Laos.
US troops did not stay in Thailand for long - after the signing in Geneva of a truce between the warring parties of the Laotian war, Kennedy withdrew the troops back. But by that time, the interaction between the Americans and the Thais had already been established at a very high level, an American presence was deployed at Korat and Tahli airbases, and American aircraft from these bases were already conducting reconnaissance over Laos and sometimes launched air strikes on Pathet Lao. Tahli also became home to the U-2 and SR-71 scouts and Air America aircraft and helicopters. All the infrastructure to allow the Americans and Thais to work together was already in place and ready for a "restart." By the end of 1962, it became clear that the Vietnamese were not going to leave Laos, despite the fact that the civil war there had died down, and that the number of their contingent had already reached 9,000 people, stationed in the mountainous eastern provinces. The Vietnamese had already created the very Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was supposed to help them unite the country, and were already delivering supplies for the Viet Cong to the south along it. The Americans soon began to consider returning to Thailand.
Sarit Tanarat died a few weeks after the assassination of Kennedy, but the arrival of the new Prime Minister, Field Marshal Tanom Kitticachon, did not change anything - the cooperation continued and grew. In 1964, when the Americans began Farm Gate project - Secret bombing of the Viet Cong and Ho Chi Minh Trails on old combat aircraft, Thai airbases were at their service.
After the Tonkin incident and the open entry of the United States into the war, the Thais took a bite at the bit. The Thai military, together with the Americans, prepared an invasion of Laos, the Thai pilots trained by the Americans participated in the Lao war openly, sometimes allowing themselves to bomb targets for which the Americans did not consent to strikes (for example, the Chinese cultural and economic representations, which were in fact residencies). In addition to Korat and Tahli, the Americans received Udorn airbase. The number of US Air Force bases in Thailand has grown steadily. In 1965, most of the American sorties against North Vietnam and against the Ho Chi Minh Trail were carried out from Thai territory. If at the beginning of 1966, 200 American aircraft and 9,000 people of the US Armed Forces were based in Thailand, then by the end of the year there were already 400 aircraft, and 25,000 people.
In the spring of 1966, the Americans completed the construction of the Utapao airbase, from which B-52 Stratofortress bombers began flying on sorties. Each such combat mission saved the United States $ 8,000 on an aircraft when compared to the cost of flights from Guam. From the moment of commissioning until the end of 1968, Utapao provided 1,500 sorties against Vietnam every week, and in total, about 80% of all American sorties were carried out from Thai bases. There were six such bases with Utapao.
At the same time, the territory of Thailand was used by the Americans as a large recreation area. If someone is not in the know, then the tourism sector of the Thai economy began to take shape precisely thanks to the American military vacationing.
Today, historians are unanimous in the opinion that without Thailand's help, America would not have been able to wage the kind of war it was waging against North Vietnam.
Lyndon Johnson, who came to power in the United States after the assassination of Kennedy, was, however, interested not only in such support. Back in 1964, he announced the More Flags program, the goal of which was to attract new allies to the Vietnam War. And if Australia openly sent its military contingent to Vietnam, then other countries trivially rented their soldiers in exchange for American money. The list of these countries included South Korea, the Philippines and, of course, Thailand.
The idea of fighting against communism rocked Thai society. As soon as Kittikachon announced the sending of troops to help the United States in early 1966, volunteers began to besiege recruiting centers - in Bangkok alone, 5,000 people were recruited in the first few months of 1966. These people were trained by the Americans, after which they were organized into combat units and sent to the combat zone.
By the end of 1971, two divisions of Thais, the King Cobras and the Black Panthers, totaling 11,000 men, were already fighting in South Vietnam, being trained and equipped to American standards. At the same time, the first Thais arrived in Vietnam much earlier, the first detachments appeared there back in 1967.
But the Americans had another problem point where people were needed - Laos. The country where they had to, and win the local civil war, and defeat the Vietnamese aliens who kept their communications with the Viet Cong. And there, in Laos, the Americans needed significantly more people, because in Vietnam they could fight themselves, but they could not invade Laos, this war was "secret", and so it went down in their history. By 1969, when both the Hmongs of General Wang Pao and the royalists began to run out of not only personnel, but also a mobilization resource, the Americans who supervised this war were closely faced with the question of where to get manpower for this war - as for the actual battles for Laos and for operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which became vital in reducing the intensity of the war in southern Vietnam.
Thailand became the source of this manpower.
Operation Unity
Ever since the start of training for the Lao in Thailand, the Thai army has created "Unit 333" - the headquarters for coordinating actions with the Americans. On the part of the latter, the so-called "Special Liaison Squad" of the CIA served the same purpose. When the presence of Thais in Laos became necessary to expand, these units took over the organization of their training and dispatch.
The first sign was the participation of the gunners of the Thai army, along with their cannons in the battles on the approaches to the Valley of Jugs in 1964, against "Pathet Lao" (the codename of the unit in the American training program Special Requirement 1). Later, in 1969, another artillery unit (Special requirement 8) fought in the same place, for Muang Sui, against the Vietnamese, and this time unsuccessfully. These two battalions of artillery (in our terms, two divisions) were the first Thai units to fight in Laos. Then others followed. In 1970, another battalion of SP9 artillery was deployed to help the bloodied Hmong at their main base Lon Chen. Behind him is the 13th regimental group. At that moment, Wang Pao's troops could only hold on at the expense of these people. But the peak in the number of Thais in the Lao war came in the early seventies.
In 1970, when Lon Nol seized power in neighboring Cambodia as a result of a coup, the Thai government recruited 5,000 fighters to invade that country. But the Americans managed to convince the Thais of the need to use these and other forces not in Cambodia, but in Laos. Soon, the recruitment of additional fighters, their training and use came under the control of the Americans.
This is how Operation Unity began.
The newly trained Thais were organized into battalions of 495 men each. The term of a soldier's contract in the battalion was calculated for one year, then it could be extended. The combat-ready battalions received the Lao name "Commando Battalion" and numbers starting with the number "6" - this was the difference in the designation of Thai units from Laotian ones. The first battalions received numbers 601, 602, etc. The training of the 601st and 602nd battalions ended by early December 1970, and in mid-December they were already thrown into battle. American curators, accustomed to the worthlessness of Lao waxes, were pleasantly surprised by the results of the Thai attacks.
From that moment on, both in operations against the "trail" and in the battles for Laos itself, the role and number of Thais will continuously grow. Wanting to get as many soldiers as possible, the CIA began recruiting people with no military experience to training camps. As a result, in June 1971, if the number of Thai mercenary units intended for the war in Laos was 14028 people, then by the end of September it was already 21413. As the number of personnel decreased among the Royalists and Hmongs, the proportion of Thais became Higher and higher. By the end of 1972, in any Royalist offensive, Thais constituted the bulk of their troops. They were now fighting under the command of Wang Pao, who literally used up his people in battles. The royalists had nowhere to take their soldiers.
The Thais have done a lot. They seriously disrupted supplies along the Tropez. They once again returned Muang Sui to the Hmong and royalists. In fact, they were the only combat-ready military force that fought against the Vietnamese in Laos. The Hmongs, who could sometimes knock out VNA units from their positions with American air support, were significantly inferior to the Thais in everything. However, everything comes to an end. During a powerful counteroffensive in the Valley of Pitchers in 1971, the Vietnamese inflicted a heavy defeat on the Thais. For the first time, the Vietnamese MiGs used over Laos cleared the sky for the ground units of the VNA and provided favorable conditions for conducting an offensive.
Soviet 130-mm cannons allowed the Vietnamese to naturally incinerate Thai artillery units. Accustomed to American, Lao, and their own, Thai air support, the Thais were unable to hold positions when the enemy dominated the sky. The Thais were forced to flee from the battlefield, leaving the Vietnamese about a hundred artillery pieces and a huge amount of ammunition. Nevertheless, having reached the main Hmong base in Lon Chen, they, as they say, "rested" and again saved the situation for the Americans. Without these soldiers, the war in Laos would have been won by Vietnam and the Pathet Lao around the end of 1971. With the Thais, she dragged on for several more years.
In total, within the framework of Operation Unity, the Americans trained 27 infantry and 3 artillery battalions.
The mercenaries were "in the ranks" until the armistice signed on February 22, 1973. After that, fermentation began among the mercenaries, which quickly grew into desertion. In 1973, almost half of them fled in search of new employers or just work, whatever. The remaining approximately 10,000 fighters were eventually sent back to Thailand and dispersed to their homes.
Pilots
The Thais played a special role in the air war in Laos. And not so much as pilots (which also took place and was important), but as air aircraft controllers, Forward Air controllers. Flying in light-engine Cessna as signalmen and flyers, sometimes with American pilots (also mercenaries) sometimes on their own, the Thais made up a significant part of the unit known as the Ravens FAC. Throughout the war, this forward air guidance group provided American, Royalist and Thai strike aircraft in Laos with precise target designations and an assessment of the results of airstrikes, which was also very accurate. The Thais, often with minimal flying experience, made a significant contribution to the work of this group.
In parallel, the Americans also trained pilots who not only provided air support to the royalists in Laos, but also participated in Thailand's own war against Chinese influence in the region.
Since 1971, several UH-1 helicopters have also been piloted by Thai pilots trained by the Americans.
In conclusion, it should be said that the mercenaries fought even when their own government was already negotiating with Vietnam and groping for contacts with China.
The Americans tried to keep Operation Unity a secret. Thais did not appear anywhere under their own names, they were recorded by nicknames, when they entered the hospital, they were issued as "John Doe 1", "John Doe 2". To this day, in the research, under the photographs of Thai mercenaries, instead of names, something like Battleship, Sunrise and the like is written.
Conclusion
Thailand has benefited immensely from American aid. The level of development that this country has today is due to the huge money that the United States invested in Thailand for support in the war against Vietnam. In fact, the American war turned out to be beneficial for Thailand - it strengthened it, demanding nothing in return except a few hundred killed. Even from a military point of view, Thailand came out of it stronger than it was - a lot of experienced soldiers returned from the war, and the Americans transferred a lot of military equipment to Thailand.
There is, however, one "but". If the Thai veterans of Vietnam in the country, as they say, are "held in high esteem", then those who fought in Laos are forgotten and are not interesting to anyone but themselves. However, it is precisely this fact that hardly matters to anyone but themselves.
