Ho Chi Minh trail. The fighting for Vietnamese communications in Laos is inseparable from the Lao civil war. In a sense, this war was a war for communications, at least the American-sponsored forces tried to break through exactly where these communications passed, and local socialists from Pathet Lao created their strongholds in these areas.
Attack vector
After the failure of Operation Pigfat, everything worsened even more - the main military force opposing the communists was now the Hmong, and they were focused on war near their area of residence and for their sacred places.
And their sponsors, the Americans, needed a victory or at least not a defeat in Vietnam - and this set the same vector of attacks, but with a different goal - to cut the "path".
After all, the Valley of Kuvshinov (located south of the previously lost area of Nam Bak) is located only 100 kilometers north of the narrowest point of Lao territory, a kind of bottleneck that on the one hand borders Thailand - a huge American base in the region in those years, and on the other - the rocks of the Annamsky ridge … through which the "path" itself begins. Having taken the Valley of Kuvshinov, you can move along the only road to the southeast - and because of poor communications, the enemy will have nothing to fend off this march. And not to strike from the flank, because the flanks are protected by natural barriers and Thailand. And after two hundred kilometers you have to turn "left" to the mountains … and the "path" is closed. But first it was necessary to take the central part of Laos, the very Valley of the Jugs and the areas south of it, including the roads going from east to west, along which the Vietnamese transferred reinforcements for the Lao war proper. Without this, the "path" could not be cut - the Americans will try to do it more than once during the war, with a natural result. So, we must first defeat the Vietnamese here.
And this meant endless attempts to break through to the Valley of the Jugs, and the area around. Gradually, the civil war was localized in the part of the country where the Valley was located.
Of course, the battles were fought not only there, moreover, “separately” from the battles around the Valley, pro-American forces carried out separate operations against the “trail” and in other places, in the south of the country, where it actually passed. The royal army of Laos even invaded Cambodia, and more than once - and also for the sake of cutting the "path". But the battles in the central part of Laos were decisive for both sides.
Interestingly, the actions of the Vietnamese were quite consistent with the logic of the actions of their opponents - a breakthrough from the Valley of Jugs to the operational space in the western direction allowed, in theory, to cut the road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, at the same time capturing the Hmong strongholds, and the only hard-surfaced airfield in the region in Muay Sui … And this meant the victory of the communists in the war for Laos, and, consequently, the relative security of communications in the war for South Vietnam.
So the actions of the Vietnamese also had a quite obvious direction of concentration of the main efforts.
The valley of Kuvshinov, the areas adjacent to the south and the exit from it to the west simply had to turn into a battlefield - and they turned into it.
Operation Dance in the Rain
The heavy defeat of the Hmong created an extremely dangerous situation for them - the Vietnamese were tens of kilometers from their traditional areas of residence, moreover, in their rear there was a logistics route on which they could rely on supplies - Lao route number 7 - part of the Lao road network, a feature which had a hard surface of the roadway - which means, the ability to pass transport even in the rainy season.
The Vietnamese, however, did not attack - and, moreover, reduced their military presence to a force of about four battalions. But this was unknown to their opponents.
US Ambassador Sullivan and Prime Minister of the loyalist government Souvanna Phuma, the leader of the Neutralist Party concurrently, and even a member of the ruling family in the country, shared Wang Pao's concern about the proximity of the Vietnamese to the Hmong areas, and to the communications that are vital for keeping Laos as a whole. Under these conditions, a response to a successful Vietnamese counterattack was inevitable. Active planning began in February 1969. American aerial reconnaissance, mainly aircraft from the Raven Forward Air controllers, taking advantage of the insufficient attention of the Vietnamese to camouflage this time, carried out detailed reconnaissance of targets in the bombing zone, revealing 345 objects that were part of the Vietnamese military infrastructure, and the Air Force command ensured that no there will be no reduction in the agreed number of sorties. True, instead of the eighty demanded flights, only sixty-five were guaranteed, but it was guaranteed firmly.
The Americans planned to provide the Hmong with such powerful air support that no resistance was possible. In addition, unlike the previous breakthrough, a separate detachment of forces was allocated to isolate the battlefield - regular strikes along route 7, aimed at preventing reserves from approaching along it.
The actions of the Americans were facilitated by the fact that by that time they had not carried out serious bombing in the east of the Valley of Kuvshinov - the royalist government did not give them the go-ahead for this, fearing for the historical monuments of the Valley. As a result, the Vietnamese concentrated too many of their objects there, and they did not take camouflage as seriously as usual.
On March 17, 1969, the Americans began Operation Rain Dance. For the first three days, the airstrikes were carried out not on forward positions, but on rear targets in the east of the Valley. No action was taken on the ground, which led the Vietnamese to think that it was necessary to disperse the troops and take under increased control precisely the rear facilities, which at that time were vulnerable to raid actions.
The Americans tracked the results of the bombing by secondary explosions of ammunition and fuel. On the third day of the "Dance", 486 of them were recorded. Separately, the destruction of 570 buildings, the destruction of 28 bunkers, fires in 288, destroyed 6 artillery positions and, separately, one howitzer. Of the 345 objects identified on the trail, 192 were destroyed as a whole. But reconnaissance found another 150 group objects to defeat.
On March 23, after six days of bombing, the Hmong went on the offensive, this time with their allies - a group of "neutralists" - a political movement neutral to the Royalists, but unfriendly to Vietnamese foreigners. While the neutralists were "squeezing" the Vietnamese from the previously captured airfield in Muang Sui, the Hmong moved south of the Valley and entered route 7. Then there was an attempt to cut the road, but the Vietnamese recaptured it. Then the Hmong turned along the road, and dug in so as to keep under fire control any movement along it.
Meanwhile, the neutralists took Muang Sui. The Americans extended the operation until April 7, and by that day the number of destroyed supply depots had reached 1,512.
At this moment, the command of the operation matured a plan to reinforce the Hmong with some new units and occupy the Valley entirely - to do what the royalists had not been able to do since the early 60s, when the Pathet Lao front dug in the Valley. The operation was again extended, albeit with a reduction in daily combat missions to 50. The 103rd Parachute Battalion of the Royal Lao Army was transferred to the aid of Wang Pao and his men, after which the Hmongs and paratroopers moved back to the northwest, to the very center when- then the stronghold of "Pathet Lao" and their Vietnamese allies - the city of Phonsavan.
It is not for nothing that the war in Laos is called the "Secret War" in the United States - few people in the country knew about it, and the hands of the Americans were completely untied. A series of airstrikes and subsequent shelling naturally wiped out the city from the face of the earth. The Hmongs entered it without firing a single shot. The remains of a pair of BTR-40s, 18 trucks, a pair of anti-aircraft batteries with 37-mm cannons and an old 75-mm howitzer were found on the ruins. The Hmongs took the city on April 29, and after another two days they moved north-west, overcoming insignificant resistance, until they reached the Vietnamese communications of route number 4.
There they discovered medical facilities that were enormous for Laos. 300 tons of stored medicines and medical supplies. Underground hospital for 1000 beds. A serious hospital, most Hmongs just never saw such a thing - equipped medical laboratories, dressing rooms, operating rooms and even two X-ray machines.
A day later, Air America helicopters were already carrying explosives so that the Hmong could detonate it all. I must say that such large-scale structures among the Vietnamese were not uncommon. A week earlier, a missile strike in a cave discovered from the air led to a series of underground explosions that lasted 16 hours, and after which a village located a kilometer away was completely wiped off the face of the earth.
At first glance, it all looked like a victory, but by mid-May, reconnaissance discovered the advance of the first Vietnamese units towards the Valley. According to intelligence, it was about three battalions. On May 21, these three battalions materialized in front of the enemy as the 174th Infantry Regiment of the VNA. The Hmongs knew very well what to do in such a situation and began to retreat. But the 103rd Parachute Battalion decided to play elite troops. On the same day, one of his companies left more than half of the fighters in the hills around Phonsavan, and almost immediately the Vietnamese reached the rest of the battalion's forces in the city itself, or rather what was left of it. Realizing what the difference in "level" was, the royalists began to withdraw, but as already mentioned, the VNA surpassed their opponents in their ability to maneuver in the difficult mountainous terrain of Laos. By the end of the day, the 103rd battalion had already lost 200 men, while the rest were disorganized and terrified trying to break away from the more mobile Vietnamese infantry.
The VNA quickly recaptured the entire territory, except for Muang Sui, for which the remnants of the royalists, the remnants of the neutralists, and the Hmong fought stubbornly, but most importantly, the American pilots, who, despite the next flight of their protégé on the ground, were not at all going to stop the bombing. which continued as Operation Strangehold. The Vietnamese were forced to operate under continuous air strikes. It was not possible to take Muang Sui under such conditions and the VNA stopped the offensive.
The losses of the Vietnamese in people were unknown to the Americans, but the material losses were great, and the Americans were sure that the crisis had been overcome for a while.
Soon the more was their surprise.
Counter attack
Very soon it turned out that Vietnam had transferred not only three infantry battalions to the Valley. In fact, by the time the Americans reduced the intensity of the bombing, and the Hmongs decided that it was possible to "lick the wounds" in the area, units of the 312th Infantry Division of the VNA and the 13th Special Forces Battalion were already concentrated. Moreover, this time the Vietnamese decided to reinforce the attacking units with armored vehicles and delivered tanks to the Valley.
True, these were lightly armored PT-76s and there were only ten of them. The road conditions on the terrain where they were to fight did not give the Vietnamese firm confidence that heavier tanks would be able to operate effectively on the ground. Then such confidence appeared, and heavier machines also contributed to the victory, but the first were light amphibians. However, in the absence of anti-tank weapons at the enemy, any tank turns into an absolute value.
The purpose of the Vietnamese was to seize Muang Sui in addition to the returned territories.
Muang Sui, essentially a village on the runway, was defended by the former 85th Parachute Battalion, now part of the Lao Neutralist military wing, a small Hmong "reinforcement", and a squad of Thai mercenaries who controlled the cannons. The number of the defenders was about 4,000 people.
Of these units, as subsequent battles showed, only a detachment of Thais, which was classified according to American documents as "Special requirement [unit] 8" - a battalion (in Soviet and Russian terminology, a battalion) of howitzer artillery, armed with 105 caliber howitzers, was something combat-ready. and 155 mm.
Despite the loud name of the 312th division, from the division there was only one of its 165th regiment and a small number of auxiliary units. In general, the number of Vietnamese troops was three times lower than the number of the defenders.
Lao neutralists "asked to leave" almost immediately. The very first clashes with single Vietnamese tanks sowed horror in their ranks - they did not have any anti-tank weapons, and they could do absolutely nothing against the Vietnamese infantry.
Before dawn on June 24, units of the 165th VNA regiment, tankers and special forces from the 13th battalion, divided into several groups, infiltrated through the thickets and surrounded the positions of neutralists and Thai mercenaries. All the parts of the neutralists that got in their way were easily dispersed. By dawn, the Vietnamese approached the main defensive positions. By this moment, the Americans had "woken up" and brought down the entire power of their aviation on the VNA units. On the very first sorties, they managed not only to inflict significant losses on the advancing troops, but also to disable four tanks out of ten. But this was not enough. The Vietnamese, despite hurricane air strikes, managed to reach the infantry throw distance to the neutralist positions and even bring all the remaining six tanks to the line of attack. A fire fight ensued. The neutralists, faced with the fire of 76-mm tank guns, wavered, they had practically nothing to get the tanks in response. Having lost only two killed, they fled from the defended positions, dragging with them the wounded, which, however, turned out to be as many as 64 people. They would have left Muang Sui even under such a slight onslaught, but there were Thais and Hmong behind them.
The neutralists fled to the location of the gunners, moreover, on their shoulders the Vietnamese broke into the abandoned positions and were able to capture 6 howitzers - three 155-mm and three 105-mm. However, the Hmong who were farther rested and fired back without retreating a meter - behind them was their land and their villages and they did not particularly want to retreat. The Thais did not disappoint either. They rolled their howitzers out of cover for direct fire and opened fire on the advancing Vietnamese troops. And American aviation again fell from the sky.
By the end of daylight hours, the number of sorties of American aircraft against a handful of advancing Vietnamese reached 77. Howitzers fired at them with direct fire, they conducted a heavy continuous assault for more than half a day, from the night, and could not advance further.
By sunset, the American "Ganship" AC-47 flew to the scene, strengthening the defense of Muang Sui.
By nightfall, the units of the VNA rolled back, leaving the defenders in the ring of the fire blockade.
The next day the Vietnamese retreated from the heavy assault and put themselves in order, hiding under a cover of vegetation. Fortunately for them, the weather turned bad that day, and instead of many dozen air strikes, the Americans were able to inflict only 11.
Among the neutralists, who understand that the calm will not last long and the Vietnamese will soon come for them, and from all directions, desertion began - taking advantage of the calm, single soldiers and small groups withdrawn from their positions and went into the jungle, hoping to slip through the Vietnamese, while the latter are not strong many.
Under these conditions, the military attaché of the army made one mistake. Believing that the neutralist soldiers would feel more confident if their families and loved ones were evacuated to safety, the attaché planned to airlift all non-combatants as long as the weather allowed.
The evacuation began on June 26 by Air America helicopters and special squadrons. But instead of inspiring the neutralists to fight more courageously, it was the other way around, causing panic and mass exodus. All day, the Thais watched in amazement as the troops, which they had to support with fire, were removed from positions in whole squads and platoons, and went into the jungle. In the late afternoon, Thai general Fitun Inkatanawat, who oversaw the actions of the mercenaries, was airlifted to the position in Muang Sui in order to find out what was happening there. With him were brought several officers from the Royalist army and supplies for the soldiers.
By nightfall, the Vietnamese were able to bring up their artillery. They were again helped by bad weather, which allowed the Americans to make only 13 sorties. During the night, Vietnamese shells hit Muang Sui. By that time, in addition to the Thai battalion and several hundred Hmong, only 500 Lao soldiers remained in positions, the rest had already deserted. In the morning, 200 of the remaining five hundred were already somewhere far away.
In the morning in Muang Sui, a meeting took place between the Thai commanders, including the general who had flown in, and the US military advisers who had accompanied the Thai battalion from the beginning. It was decided what to do next, in connection with the desertion of the bulk of the troops. The Thais insisted on continuing resistance. The Americans pointed out that they had nowhere else to take people, and this was indeed the case, the royalists had almost run out of mobilization resources, the Hmong, too, and they were already recruiting children to training camps.
The neutralists showed themselves just now in all their glory, and the mercenary units that were preparing at that time in the camps of Thailand were not yet ready. In such conditions, there was no one to fight, and the Thai battalion would have to hold Muang Sui alone against the Vietnamese, whose numbers were slowly growing and who had tanks. Under these conditions, the Thais had to admit that resistance was useless.
The weather forecast for the day was optimistic compared to the previous two, and an evacuation operation was scheduled for 14.45.
Taking advantage of the weather, US aircraft flew 12 sorties to strike Vietnamese troops in half a day, and 15 more planes from the Laotian Royalist Air Force were added. At 14.45, according to the schedule, American helicopters began the mass export of some of the non-combatants remaining in Muang Sui, in the amount of two hundred people, as well as fifty-one Hmong and two hundred and thirty-one Thais. The rest of the forces began to leave the encirclement on foot, hiding behind the arriving AS-47. The Vietnamese tried to resist the withdrawal, but they did not have the strength to do it, and there was no desire to get hit by an airstrike, so all they managed was to shoot down one American helicopter with fire from the ground, from which the Americans were also able to save the crew.
At 4.45 pm, the last pro-American fighter left Muang Sui. Soon, it was occupied by Vietnamese troops.
The Vietnamese immediately dug in, and from the direction of Vietnam itself there were already reinforcements - battalion after battalion. And since the use of tanks in difficult Laotian terrain was successful, so too were tanks, albeit a little.
However, the fighting on Muang Sui did not end.
Operation "Off Balance"
The next day, Wang Pao was already planning a counter-offensive. True, he had no people at all. It got to the point of curiosities. When a CIA liaison officer arrived at the Hmong positions on June 29 to speak with Wang Pao, he found Wang Pao in a trench firing a mortar at the Vietnamese. This was not due to the fact that he wanted to fight on the front line, it was just that there was no one else to put to the mortar at that moment.
Wang Pao and his people
However, neither Wang Pao nor the CIA planned to surrender. Muang Sui had a strategically important solid airstrip, the only one in the region whose control would give the Royalist the ability to provide rapid air support throughout central Laos, without waiting for Americans from Vietnam or Thailand. Second, it was clear that time was working for the Vietnamese, and that they would build up their forces faster than their opponents.
In a few days, the neutralists were able to assemble what looked like an infantry battalion from a multitude of deserters. Another 600 people were able to scrape together Wang Pao among the Hmong - albeit at the cost of the fact that he himself had to carry mines due to a lack of people, and take 12-17 year old recruits to training camps. And, most importantly, the royalist army by this moment was able to allocate a battalion of paratroopers - the 101st.
The Khmongs were organized into two battalions - the 206th and 201st, all at the very least capable of fighting neutralists, in the 208th commando battalion, the rest in the 15th infantry battalion. Together with the 101st Parachute Battalion of the Royalist Army, they had to try to throw out the Vietnamese units that were there from Muang Sui, and faster than reinforcements would arrive on the ground. The attackers were outnumbered and could rely on American air support when weather permitted.
The operation began on July 1 with American airstrikes. American airstrikes targeted fuel and weapons depots and vehicle hideouts that could be found with reconnaissance aircraft. On the first day, the Americans carried out 50 airstrikes, all of which were quite successful.
On the same day, American helicopters transferred the attacking troops to the approaches to Muang Sui. The 101st Royalist Parachute Battalion landed to the southwest of the target, the 201st Hmong and 15th Neutralist battalions landed north of Muang Sui, the 206th Hmong battalion landed northeast of the target and there should was on the march to connect with the 208th battalion "commando" neutralists.
On July 2, the weather prevented the aviation from flying, and slowed down the advance of the advancing units towards Muang Sui. On July 3, the Americans flew again and performed 24 sorties, and on the 4th they were again chained to the ground.
By July 5, the 15th Neutralist Battalion had deserted at full strength. The rest of the units continued to move, and the Hmong battalions entered into fire contact with the Vietnamese. The latter defended Muang Sui with about a couple of battalions and did not intend to retreat.
On July 5, American and Royalist aircraft jointly flew 30 sorties against the Vietnamese, which helped the Hmong to advance to the airfield at Muang Sui up to five kilometers. They could have covered five kilometers in a day if it had not been for interruptions in air support, but from July 6, the weather has deteriorated completely. Shortly before this, American air reconnaissance counted 1,000 trucks and eight tanks going to the aid of the defending Vietnamese. It turned out to be impossible to do something with them, however. Until 11 July, the aviation managed to make only six sorties. And the 1st 2nd Battalion of Lao Neutralists deserted.
It was the end. Even the available forces without air support could not break through the Vietnamese defenses, although they pushed them back. Now, with the loss of another battalion and the approaching Vietnamese reinforcements, the offensive has completely lost its meaning. On the same day, the Hmong and Royalist paratroopers began to withdraw.
Another series of battles for the Valley of Kuvshinov was lost. But now, with much more serious consequences than before.
results
Soon the Vietnamese counterattacked and occupied several more areas, including those from where the last offensive began. Wang Pao faced powerful pressure from tribal leaders, many of whom demanded the Hmong withdraw from the war due to heavy casualties. However, now he would not have been able to attack with the support of tribal leaders - it took him at least a year for new "soldiers" to grow up. The Americans, however, were convinced that it would not be possible to take control of central Laos and from there move to the southeast and cut the "path".
We will have to look for other options, each of which, according to the terms of communications, was much more difficult, and had significantly lower chances of success. We will have to conduct a full-scale escalation in Cambodia, we will have to sharply intensify the training of mercenaries in Thailand, and we will also have to fight for central Laos, but then, when people again appear for this. And this was not promised soon.
In the meantime, the Americans could only try to bring the many times defeated local allies to life, and bomb as much as possible.
