The advent of anti-ship missiles in the second half of the last century triggered the naval revolution. True, the West realized it only after the Egyptians sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 1967. A pair of Arab missile boats armed with the P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles effortlessly sent the Israeli ship to the bottom.
Then there was the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, where the Indians with the same missiles, without really straining, inflicted huge damage on Pakistan, using Termites both against surface and ground heat and radio contrast objects.
NATO, where naval superiority over the USSR, on the one hand, was considered very important, and on the other - almost guaranteed, sounded the alarm. Already in the early seventies, several anti-ship missiles began to be developed, which a little later will become de facto symbols of the Western fleets. So, in 1971, the development of such missiles as the American anti-ship missile "Harpoon" and the French "Exoset" began. Both were later used in hostilities, but they were not the only examples.
NATO's surprise was all the more strong because during the Second World War, the Allies had already suffered losses from high-precision anti-ship weapons, and even developed effective protection measures - jamming, interfering with the radio command guidance of German guided bombs.
In the Soviet Union, anti-ship missile development programs developed to unprecedented heights. In the face of the enemy's presence of a powerful aircraft carrier fleet and the absence of one from its own Navy, the USSR found a way out in long-range and high-speed missiles with a powerful warhead, in some cases a nuclear one.
The speed of the rockets grew, at first they passed one "sound", then two. Homing systems, software algorithms were improved, the size and range of flight grew …
In principle, the apogee of those works can be observed today on board the cruisers of Project 1164, where huge launchers for anti-ship missiles occupy a significant part of the ship.
Nevertheless, there has been a certain turn in the combat use of anti-ship missiles.
In 1973, during the next Arab-Israeli war, both Syrians and Egyptians, trying to use P-15 anti-ship missiles against Israeli boats, suffered severe defeats and suffered losses without causing any harm to the Israelis. The latter, in addition to the vicious tactics of the Arabs, managed, using electronic warfare systems, to “divert” all missiles directed in their direction.
But then we see one curious detail - the Israelis widely used not only anti-ship missiles, but also 76-mm guns. Moreover, the Arabs had nothing to answer this - their missile boats did not have comparable weapons, and they could not fight after the exhaustion of the missiles.
This was a new trend. The rockets, as it turned out, can simply be diverted to the side. And cannons, as it also turned out, are quite significant weapons even in the nuclear missile era.
Let's venture to suggest that those two battles won by the Israelis "dry" became a kind of turning point.
It was after them that the whole world rushed to improve the jamming systems. And it was after them that the USSR again began to "invest" in the development of naval artillery, with a caliber of more than 76 mm, which was ordered to be stopped under Khrushchev.
Subsequent events in world military history were very indicative.
In 1980, during Operation Pearl, the Iranians melted almost the entire Iraqi fleet using the Harpoon anti-ship missile system and Maverick air missile launchers. The parties did not use interference and had losses in the ship composition (however, the interference against Iranian aviation, apparently, would not have worked).
In 1982, during the Falklands Conflict, Argentine Exocet missiles were unable to hit ships covered by jamming, but did hit those that were not protected. Both during the destruction of Sheffield, and during the defeat of the Atlantic Conveyor, it was confirmed that electronic warfare and jamming systems are reliable protection against anti-ship missiles, but non-use of interference means the death of the ship.
In 1986, during the battle in the Gulf of Sidra, the Americans destroyed a Libyan boat and a Soviet-built small missile ship using the Harpoon anti-ship missiles launched from the Yorktown cruiser and A-6 deck attack aircraft. The Libyans did not use interference. Another specific phenomenon in this battle was the use of anti-ship missiles at ranges significantly less than the maximum.
In 1987, the Iranians seriously damaged the American frigate Stark with two Exocet anti-ship missiles launched from the Mirage aircraft. The frigate did not use jamming complexes.
In 1988, during the American Operation Praying Mantis against Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf, both the Iranians and the Americans used anti-ship missiles against each other's surface ships. The fact of using missiles at a range less than the maximum was repeated. All Iranian attacks against American destroyers were neutralized using jamming complexes. The Iranians did not have those on their ships, and suffered losses from American missiles. New was the massive use of SM-1 anti-aircraft missiles against surface ships. These missiles turned out to be more effective than anti-ship missiles at short ranges typical of the Persian Gulf. It was again confirmed that it is almost impossible to hit a ship covered by jamming with an anti-ship missile. This, in an amusing way, repeated the struggle of the Anglo-Americans with German guided bombs during the Second World War.
Later, the Americans will generally refuse to install the Harpoon anti-ship missile system on newly built ships, "entrusting" the task of hitting surface targets with anti-aircraft missiles.
In 2008, during the conflict in South Ossetia, the Russian Black Sea Fleet's Mirage MRK destroyed allegedly one Georgian boat using anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles. The Georgians did not have electronic warfare systems.
Let's outline the clearly emerging trends. Here they are:
- Anti-ship missiles are almost always effectively neutralized by jamming complexes; But in the absence of such, missile attacks are fatal.
- Anti-ship missiles are used at significantly shorter ranges than the theoretical maximum. Typical distance is measured in tens of kilometers.
- Anti-aircraft missiles are often a more effective means of dealing with ships than anti-ship missiles.
Moreover, the analysis of both the fighting in the Persian Gulf zone and the exercises there, led the Americans to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion, namely: "Before an attack carried out in a zone of intensive shipping, the target must be identified visually."
If the conclusion about the interference is self-evident, then the following should be analyzed in more detail.
The specificity of the anti-ship missile is that the target acquisition by its homing head (GOS) can be performed in different ways. Aircraft missiles, in theory, can lock onto a target either on a carrier or on a course. But target acquisition on a carrier requires a high-altitude flight, or a short-range launch. Flying at high altitude is fraught with an unpleasant meeting with an anti-aircraft missile, respectively, when an air-based anti-ship missile strikes, it is necessary to attack the target from not only a low altitude, but also from a short distance. Hence - the need for the implementation of the so-called "Breakthrough to the goal."
When using an anti-ship missile with a seeker that captures the target on the course, that is, after launch, there is another problem - when firing at long distances, the target can go beyond the view sector of the seeker of the rocket. This again requires a reduction in the launch distance.
Naturally, options with target acquisition on a carrier can be considered practically only in relation to aircraft missiles, it is irrational to have such weapons on ships, and for a ship-based anti-ship missile system, target acquisition on a course is practically no alternative.
From all of the above, a simple conclusion can be drawn - when firing at long distances, the rocket needs continuous target designation. Or - to close the distance. It is difficult to ensure continuous target designation, even when the enemy does not apply any countermeasures, and often it is impossible.
And, naturally, the problem is the missile's inability to identify the target. Having "hooked" its seeker to the very first radio-contrast target, the rocket will go only at it, it will not be able to distinguish a cruise liner or tanker under a neutral flag from an enemy warship. And this is already fraught with political complications, up to and including the involvement of "neutrals" in the war on the side of the enemy, which is apparently unacceptable.
A kind of exception to this are the huge Soviet supersonic missiles P-500 "Basalt", P-700 "Granit" and P-1000 "Vulkan", which have both radar and their own jamming stations, and sophisticated target attack algorithms, including, presumably, recognition algorithms. But - the trouble - they are huge and monstrously expensive, in addition, a modern warship will detect a working radar of such a rocket from a great distance, and the rocket itself has a considerable EPR. Moreover, when flying at low altitude, due to the Prandtl-Glauert effect, a huge high-speed rocket collects a real water reflector from the air, which increases its RCS and visibility in the radar range by a factor of several, compared to small subsonic missiles (however, they this effect is also present, just much less pronounced).
Such missiles are, in a sense, a dead end - a modern warship can still detect and shoot them down, and it is simply a pity to spend them on a slightly less modern one because of the huge price. And the size limits the tactical applicability. So, in order to guarantee "break through" air defense orders from ships equipped with the AEGIS system, a volley of dozens of such missiles will be required. And this means that, for example, the Pacific Fleet will have to "defuse" almost all of its ammunition towards the enemy, which will put the further participation of ships and attack submarines in hostilities "into question." The Navy understands that such missiles have no future, and it is not in vain that the modernization of the Project 949 nuclear submarine and the Admiral Nakhimov TAVKR implies their replacement with other weapons.
Another exception is the newest American anti-ship missile LRASM. Unlike Soviet monsters, this missile is much less visible in the radar range, and its "intelligence" is incomparably higher. So, during the tests, the missiles coped with the autonomous plotting of a course to the attacked targets without reference points pre-installed in the on-board computer, that is, the rocket during the flight independently planned a combat operation and carried it out. The missile is “embedded” in the ability to independently search for a target in the intended area of its location, high maneuverability, the ability to recognize assigned targets, the ability to fly for a long time, the ability to evade sources of radar radiation, the ability to receive data in flight and a huge range of up to 930 kilometers.
All this makes it an extremely dangerous weapon. Currently, the Russian Navy has practically no ships capable of repelling the attack of such a missile, perhaps this is within the power of the new frigates of Project 22350, provided that the Polyment-Redut air defense system has reached the required level of combat readiness, and the calculations - the required level of training. But even in this case, the frigates will not be enough, because their series with a high degree of probability will be limited to four ships. The Americans are already re-equipping the 28th Air Wing of the Air Force Strategic Aviation Command with these missiles, in any case, training on simulators for the crews of B-1B Lancer aircraft that will use this weapon have been taking place this summer. Thus, the Americans are creating an analogue of the Soviet Naval Missile Aviation, only in the Air Force system.
However, like any superweapon, the LRASM has a flaw - the price.
The first 23 pre-production missiles will cost the Pentagon $ 86.5 million, $ 3.76 million per missile. The second lot - 50 serial missiles, will cost $ 172 million, or approximately 3.44 million per missile. At the same time, back in 2016, it was expected that the price of one rocket would be about $ 3 million.
It is easy to guess that such missiles cannot be fired at any detected target. Yes, and "Harpoons" have now risen in price - 1.2 million dollars for "Block II".
Well, again, it is worthwhile to understand that a reception will be found for this scrap too, within the framework of the eternal competition of sword and shield.
Thus, while PR specialists of defense companies are leading the public into admiration for the parameters of new missiles, in practice, the combination of the effectiveness of electronic warfare, passive interference, air defense of ships, and economic realities (anti-ship missiles are expensive) leads to the fact that the applicability of these weapons in some cases simply turns out to be questionable.
This is especially clear if we ignore the huge cruisers and destroyers, and look at light frigates and corvettes, which are the main types of warships in the world - few ships have more than eight anti-ship missiles in their arsenal. Even if we discard all the problems that accompany their use in reality, and assume that each missile hits the target, then what to do after they are used up? At the Baltic Fleet exercises, project 20380 corvettes were moored side by side to the floating crane, and they were replaced with transport and launch containers right at sea. But a little further from the coast, this cannot be done, and in general, it is not a fact that this will work out in a combat situation. And of course, restrictions on the range of missile use, target designation, and indiscriminate action for small ships with light missiles (the same Uran missile launch vehicle) operate in a much more "acute" form - they are simply insurmountable.
All of the above leads us to a simple conclusion - since the missiles generally do not fly more than a few tens of kilometers (out of connection with the maximum flight range achieved during the tests), since they are shot down and retracted by means of electronic warfare and interference, since they create a colossal risk of destroying neutral goals, sometimes with huge human sacrifices, then … it is worth doing without them! Just like the relatively new US Navy destroyers, they don't have any anti-ship missiles at all.
This conclusion is rather difficult to accept, but it may be so.
In fact, this does not mean that you need to take and abandon missiles. Nevertheless, they allow you to "start" a battle at a very decent distance, with a massive launch at one target, the electronic warfare systems, most likely, will not be able to deflect the volley, the passive jamming systems have a limited ammunition load, and, in general, even modern missiles can be drowned. combat ships, if the tactics and density of the salvo are at the required level. But this is not a panacea, and not a super-weapon. And it will often fail. Sometimes it simply cannot be applied. You have to be ready for this.
What, then, should be the main means of fire with which some ships can fight others?
In the US Navy, these are anti-aircraft missiles now, but in other fleets they do not think about it, relying on anti-aircraft missiles.
Let's dare to assume that in the future these will be guns. Like before.
Currently, naval experts in most countries are confident that the range of 57-130 mm calibers fully covers the needs of the fleets for naval artillery. Almost everywhere, ideas about the revival of large (at least 152 mm) calibers meet with sharp rejection.
However, let's think a little.
During the battles for Kvito-Kanavale in 1988, Soviet military advisers drew attention to the new South African shells - when falling on a target, they glowed in the dark and were visually observed. At the same time, the range from which the South African troops fired at the Angolans and their Soviet instructors exceeded 50 kilometers, and the accuracy of hits, in principle, did not differ from conventional artillery systems.
A little later it became known that the South Africans used active-rocket shells against Angola, which were fired from ordinary 155-mm howitzers. Created by the tragic genius of artillery Gerald Bull, these shells showed that an ordinary, not modernized cannon could well reach a firing range comparable to a rocket weapon if using special ammunition.
Another interesting historical example is the reactivation of American battleships in the 1980s. Their guns had a chance to shoot in a combat situation only at ground targets, from which many military history enthusiasts concluded that they were returned to service to shoot along the coast.
In practice, battleships trained intensively in firing cannons specifically against naval targets, and in the event of a war with the USSR, it was planned to form ship strike groups around them, which would act against the Soviet Navy in areas with a low level of air threat, for example, in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, there were projects for the creation of 406-mm active-rocket projectiles with ramjet engines, which, in the fall on the target, would reach hypersonic speed. The authors of the projects were confident that the range of a 406-mm gun with such ammunition would reach about 400 kilometers. The Navy, however, did not invest so much in outdated ships.
It is worth noting that the old Soviet light cruisers of Project 68-bis, when performing tasks for the direct tracking of the US and NATO ship groupings, were perceived by the latter as an extremely serious threat for a very long time. The cruiser, for all its obsolescence, nothing would have hurt to open heavy fire on the aircraft carrier, making flights from its deck impossible, and then, before its sinking, inflict huge losses on the light destroyers of the escort. The cannons were simply incomparably more effective in performing such a task than any type of missile, especially if you remember about several towers capable of firing at several targets at the same time. The same British, whose ships were much more "flimsy" than the Americans, considered cruiser 68-bis as a very serious threat, in fact, they were such a threat. It is also worth noting that the 152-mm caliber already allowed, in theory, the use of nuclear weapons, which were available, and if the ship was retrofitted accordingly. This makes us take a completely different look at the potential of Soviet light cruisers. However, now this is no longer relevant.
The first attempt to return large cannons to a ship in the modern era is the Zumwalt-class destroyer program. These huge ships from the very beginning of one of the tasks had fire support for the amphibious assault, for which they received two ultra-modern 155-mm cannons.
The American military-industrial complex, however, played a cruel joke with the Navy, driving the cost of shells for the new system to seven figures, which made the idea meaningless. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the Zumvalta cannon successfully fired at 109 kilometers, which is three times the range of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system achieved in real battles. The gun fired, however, at a ground target, but if it were a homing anti-ship projectile, nothing would have prevented shooting at the surface. The shells, thus, have reached a completely "missile" range.
Let's make a daring guess.
Even if an artillery shell costs a million dollars, like a shell for the "Zumwalt" AGS, it is still more profitable than an anti-ship missile, and here's why.
The anti-ship missile system is detected by the radar in advance, and makes it possible to resort to electronic warfare and passive interference. The projectile flies much faster, and leaves almost no time for reaction. Most modern ships are not capable of detecting an artillery shell, and certainly cannot shoot it down. And most importantly, the crew understands that their ship is fired upon only after the first explosion - and they simply may not have time to put into effect the same passive interference, because for this you need to know that a rocket or a projectile is coming at you! But with a projectile, this is impossible. Now at least. Well, the speed of the projectile is such that the ship will simply not have time to get away from the ejected cloud of passive interference, the projectile will have no difference what it aims at, it will still hit the ship too.
There cannot be many anti-ship missiles on a ship. The exception is the super-expensive LRASM on cruisers and destroyers with UVP, but there the order of prices per shot is completely different. There can be hundreds of shells on a ship, at least dozens.
Placing anti-ship missiles in large numbers makes the ship large. The artillery ship is much more compact.
The rocket ship needs complex and very expensive upgrades. The artillery ship needs to load new shells into the cellar and no more.
And if you make a shell three times cheaper? At five?
In fact, if you think about it, it turns out that guided and homing missiles are a much more promising thing than the continuous and extremely expensive improvement of large, heavy and expensive guided missiles. This, as already mentioned, will not cancel rockets, but it will squeeze their niche great.
And it seems that the West has realized this.
More recently, a consortium of BAE Systems and Leonardo has brought to the market a family of ammunition for 76-127 mm naval guns and 155 mm land howitzers. It's about the ammunition family Vulcano.
Consider, for example, only one of the ammunition in the family - the 127-mm marine projectile. Like everyone else, it is sub-caliber, with improved aerodynamics. Due to aerodynamics, its flight range is 90 kilometers. The trajectory is corrected according to the data of satellite and inertial navigation systems. And in the final segment, the projectile searches for the target using an infrared homing system.
This solution is still imperfect, it is not universal and has a number of conceptual flaws. However, such a projectile in any case significantly increases the combat potential of any ship on which it is loaded. And most importantly, this is a truly massive solution, for the use of these ammunition, ships practically do not need any modifications. This is the beginning of the artillery renaissance.
Technologies that allow “inexpensively” packing a homing system into a projectile, and a larger projectile - a jet engine will undoubtedly change the nature of battles at sea. After all, the caliber of 127 millimeters allows in the future to make a decent artillery active-rocket projectile, which means that the cannon will become a launcher, and the projectiles will merge in their development with missiles, but you can take more shells on board than missiles and with their replenishment at sea is not a problem.
When creating new ships, it is possible to "rebalance" the ship's weapon systems - instead of many launchers for anti-ship missiles, which take up a lot of space and require an increase in displacement, you can simply load more guided or homing shells into the ship, increasing the artillery cellars, and reduce the launcher of offensive weapons by quantity, or used for something else, such as anti-aircraft missiles or anti-submarine weapons. The alternative is to reduce the size of ships, making them cheaper and more widespread, more inconspicuous.
Such innovations could be very appropriate for a country that will soon have to rebuild its fleet from scratch. For a country that has excellent 130mm cannons and an excellent artillery school in general. And if a long-range homing projectile can be created in a caliber of 130 mm, then, when approaching a caliber of 200 mm, it is possible to create an already active-reactive projectile with a powerful warhead. And to achieve decisive advantages in any type of battle, except for the battle with aircraft. Moreover, it is not very expensive, compared to the creation of purely rocket ships-monsters.
Probably, it is not worth saying that Russia will sleep through all these opportunities again.
But watching the beginning artillery renaissance at least from the side will be very interesting. Naturally, until all these innovations hit us.
