What's wrong with the "newest" PMK project 12700?

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What's wrong with the "newest" PMK project 12700?
What's wrong with the "newest" PMK project 12700?

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Despite the bravura assurances of a number of officials about the allegedly successful solution of tasks by the old minesweepers of the Navy, their absolute obsolescence and limited combat capabilities are clear to all objective observers and specialists.

The issues of the state of the minesweepers of the Navy's combat strength and the causes of the PMO crisis are discussed in the article "What's wrong with our minesweepers?"

The naval command “hoped” for a way out of the “PMO crisis” by building a series of new mine action ships (PMK) of Project 12700. Alas, there was no reason (in the existing form of Project 12700) for this and there is no.

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The current state of mine (mine) warfare

Speaking about the new PMC, models and “technologies” of the PMO, it is necessary to outline the modern conditions for solving the PMO problems.

"Fine processing" of the physical fields of targets and the appearance of "mine-defenders"

The key problem of modern mine action is the emergence in the 90s of the last century of highly sensitive multichannel proximity fuses (NV) with "fine" digital processing of target signals. The ability to configure such NVs in the "mine defender" mode (for triggering from physical fields (FP) of mine-action unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), primarily acoustic, discrete components (DS) of noise, called into question the entire "classical" concept of mine action (with hydroacoustic stations (GAS) mine detecting and working ahead of the course of the minesweeper-finder of mines (TSCHIM) remotely controlled NPA (TNLA) for additional reconnaissance and destruction of mines).

Taking into account the sharply increased "intelligence" of NV mines (and, accordingly, the high likelihood of undermining specialized TNLA PMO), the question of the cost of modern anti-mine weapons and the possibility of their effective use in the event of a massive setting of mines arose.

It should be emphasized that this technical revolution of non-contact mine systems abroad took place a long time ago, in the 90s - early 2000s (and even in the third world countries in the 2000s, mines with fuses with "fine processing" appeared in service).

A clear confirmation of this is the information about the Pakistani bottom mine, which was put into service at the very beginning of the 2000s.

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Bottom mine of the Pakistani Navy, development of the early 2000s.

We, on the other hand, were catastrophically lagging behind in this matter and are still lagging behind.

Example: "new" (in quotation marks) proximity fuses for mines APM, which retained the old analog signal processing (from the late 50s - early 60s).

What's wrong with the "newest" PMK project 12700?
What's wrong with the "newest" PMK project 12700?

APM channels actuation diagram (presentation by KMPO "Gidropribor")

The reasons for this are set out in the article (2008) by S. G. Proshkin (former general director of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor", a major domestic mine specialist) and B. G. Kalminsky:

The effective use of broadband signals, methods and algorithms of digital processing became possible only in the last decade, when performance / power consumption-optimized means of digital processing in real time appeared on the world market … at the same time, insufficient attention is paid to this issue in the domestic electronics industry … Thus, one of the most modern domestic signal processors 1892VM3T (Multicor), although it has a performance comparable to the best foreign samples, has a significantly higher power consumption … This circumstance leads to the limited use of domestic digital processing components in the onboard MPO equipment.… If the onboard equipment based on the ADSP-BF533 processor provides… operability for 1 year, then the equipment based on the 1892ВМ3Т processor will not operate even for one month.

Of course, new things are beginning to be hammered in, but this process is not easy and lengthy (especially if the "experts" and "specialists" of the Navy are actively helping him, who believe that "everything is fine with us").

Stealthy mines

The appearance in the mid-80s of the last century in the armament of the navies of foreign countries of subtle mines sharply increased the requirements for hydroacoustic stations (GAS) mine detection and positioning accuracy of detected targets (mine-like objects).

It should be noted that in the navies of foreign states (in contrast to the navy of the Russian Federation), stealth mines have long become a typical target in the development of PMO calculations.

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Mock-ups of inconspicuous bottom mines (standard equipment of the NATO Navy)

The problem of subtle bottom mines is especially acute on weak (with a weak bearing capacity) and "clogged" false targets on soils.

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An example of a sonar picture of a "clogged" bottom

The possibility of using stealth mines by the enemy puts extremely stringent requirements not only on the mine detection system, but also on the accuracy of determining the coordinates of each target (with an error of no more than 1 m).

Very high requirements are imposed on hydroacoustic mine detecting stations.

Moreover, only a secondary battery equipped with a powerful specialized mine detection system, high-precision means of navigation and mine action control, and a complex of means of destruction (underwater vehicles and non-contact trawling means) is capable of effectively combating the mine threat.

Against this background, AUVs play a predominantly auxiliary role, although in a number of conditions, for example, in the presence of ice, they can come out on top.

Working in conditions of serious mine danger requires specialized ships that have not only reduced physical fields and a modern anti-mine complex, but also specially trained crews. It is possible to build a "universal ship", but it is not possible to prepare a "universal crew" well for all tasks.

Mine action cost and mine threat quantitative parameters

Obviously, one of the key requirements for the anti-mine forces of the Navy is the ability to solve problems in conditions of massive use of mines by the enemy. This is true not only for world wars, but also for local ones. For example, during the mine blockade ("mine blockade") by US aircraft of the ports of Vietnam, US aircraft delivered more than 12 thousand mines!

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Mines in the bomb bay of a bomber

This factor requires a significant limitation of the cost of destroying one mine to ensure the required number of anti-mine weapons in the Navy. This factor is extremely important, but it is often "forgotten" not only by many lobbyists of domestic and foreign enterprises, but also … by the Navy itself.

Project 12700

The history of the PMK project 12700 is very similar to the "zigzags" with the history of the large landing craft "Ivan Gren", and taking into account all these twists and turns (the project changed 8 chief designers!), not bad.

The key problems of the 12700 project are not design and construction problems (although there is something to be improved here as well), but a consequence of the long-outdated concept and models of the use of secondary armaments from the Russian Navy.

Almost all previous PMKs of the Navy had either steel low-magnetic hulls or wooden ones. Massive composite hulls for secondary armament were not used in the USSR. However, for the promising PMK of the Navy, their use was practically uncontested: low-magnetic steel did not meet the requirements for physical fields, and the era of the tree was leaving.

As the main complex, it was planned to install an integrated system of mine detection GAS, which includes a towed aerial (towed body, BT) and an antenna on a self-propelled underwater vehicle (SPA, this abbreviation is adopted in the domestic documentation for the complex). The same SPA was supposed to solve the problem of classifying and destroying discovered mines.

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SPA ISPUM (photo: forums.balancer.ru)

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Towed body (BT) ISPUM. (photo: forums.balancer.ru)

The point of using a mine detection GAS antenna at a SPA is to provide a guaranteed search in difficult hydrological conditions.

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The idea of a complex with an antenna GAS MI on STA was apparently borrowed from Western SPA with GAS Double Eagle

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SPA Double Eagle with GAS MI

But in the West, it was implemented differently: a SPA with an expensive mine detecting GAS was precisely a search tool, and the "hammers" for destroying mines were much simpler RAR-104 devices (today massively supplemented by small TNPA PMO).

For example, on the 450-ton minesweepers of the "Tripartit" type that visited IMDS-2009, there were two RAP-104 “destroyers” and one “seeker” TNLA Double Eagle.

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SPA Double Eagle with GAS MI and two "hammers" - TNPA RAR-104 on the TSCHIM French Navy, IMDS-2009

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SPA Double Eagle Mk-III and small ROV PMO SeaFox

On the general structure and application model of the ISPUM complex, you can cite the 2012 report of one of its co-executors: JSC Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant:

An object detected by the GAS is subject to identification (identification) with the subsequent destruction of the target. This operation is the responsibility of cable-operated self-propelled underwater vehicles (SPA).

In the overwhelming majority of the currently existing devices, the propulsion-steering complex scheme consists of propellers, a hydraulic pump station that feeds the propulsion hydraulic motors, and propulsion control equipment.

The task of ensuring the fulfillment of the requirements for the speed of movement of the SPA is reduced to increasing the efficiency of the power plant of the apparatus by using electric motors in propeller-driven units.

The SPA searches for a target when moving together with the carrier, for which it is necessary to take the SPA to the heading angle and a distance of 100 to 150 m from the bow of the ship, transfer control from the portable control panel to the main control panel and deepen the SPA to a predetermined depth to ensure the operation of the hydroacoustic navigation systems.

After that, you should bring the SPA at maximum speed to the starting point - the point of the beginning of the search for the hydroacoustic module (GAM) and search for and aim the SPA at the underwater object according to the GAM data.

The further operating mode of the SPA is associated with the solution of a tactical task on the ship: the search for the next underwater object or the completion of work.

The improvement of the performance characteristics of SPA ISPUM from Mayevka was planned to be achieved by abandoning the hydraulic drive of the propellers with the transition to electric motors. The technical decision is correct, but the price turned out to be much higher than Mayevka.

As a result, despite the very large displacement (under 1000 tons), on the 12700 project in the ISPUM complex, we received only one extremely expensive seeker-destroyer (in fact, a piece of a sonar complex weighing a ton), which, due to its physical fields, will blow up at the very first "Mine defender".

The published results of measurements of the physical fields of underwater vehicles, even with low drive power, show the full possibility of implementing the "mine defender" mode even in simple modern proximity fuses for mines.

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Results of measurements of the acoustic field of the AUV in real conditions

Moreover, the possibility of detonation on the "mine defenders" was indicated by competent domestic experts as the main drawback of the previous Mayevka complex!

There is nothing surprising here: this is a common serious drawback of all "heavy" SPA PMOs. As a matter of fact, this caused the emergence of "small" TNLA - "disposable".

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Small TNLA-destroyer as a combat load on a heavy TNLA Double Eagle, to exclude its detonation on "defender mines"

If you do not go into details, then for the modernization of Mayevka, a number of solutions were worked out to eliminate this drawback, but SPA ISPUM has the same drawback! Undoubtedly, the specialists reported about the problem to the leadership of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", but they, knowing full well about it,took an unprincipled position of concealing this deficiency.

As a result in the current form ISPUM and PMK project 12700 - "ship to the first mine" with a modern proximity fuse.

"French complex PMO" on the project 12700

For the first time, the possibility of installing French PMO systems on domestic PMKs was announced in an interview with A. Zakharov following the results of Euronaval 2012.

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Project 12700 variant with fully French PMO armament

The author is not a staunch supporter of the “only domestic” principle. There is a sense in purchasing certain types of weapons and military equipment abroad. However, it must be something that we do not have, and really worthy examples. And such purchases should by no means become a "stranglehold" for domestic developments.

The situation with the "French systems" turned out to be the opposite. Instead of purchasing effective Western mine action systems, ESA products were purchased, which, at a high cost, had extremely low combat effectiveness. The choice of the ECA firm for cooperation was made without serious justification and analysis of the effectiveness of their proposals. Obviously, completely different factors were decisive in this.

A number of statements in the Russian media:

… anti-mine "drones" of domestic development of the "Diamant" complex (replacement for the French unmanned system) …

… the search and destruction of mines will now be taken up by light unmanned boats made of carbon fiber - carriers of special underwater robots …

… thanks to the plastic body and low-noise engine, these devices are "uninteresting" to sea mines …

… the boats themselves, using an onboard sonar station, magnetometers and other onboard equipment, easily detect mines …

… as Izvestia was told in the Main Command of the Navy, the tests of the Diamant have already been completed, the appearance of such systems in the Navy's arsenal means that the domestic mine-sweeping forces have reached a fundamentally new level …

The statements given by the author are not only absolutely incompetent and have no basis, they are also obviously deliberately “biased”.

Real situation:

1. Allegedly "domestic" complex "Diamand" - this is the French complex DIAMAND, installed in addition (and not instead of) to ISPUM.

2. Tests of the complex have shown its extremely low efficiency.

3. Unmanned boat (BEC) Inspector, a modification of which Mk2 appeared in 2008, ESA, despite an active advertising campaign, could not sell to anyone except the Russian Navy. The "peculiarities" of the contract were such that in the process of its "execution" and the delivery of boats to the Russian Federation, they "grew significantly" (in weight and length) and simply did not "fit" into the PMK of Project 12700.

4. BEC Inspector has not just extremely low performance characteristics. Big problems with seaworthiness (for at least a partial solution of which the developer placed ballast tanks in the forepeak) of the Inspector led to the fact that a number of officials had serious doubts about the possibility of using onboard BECs for solving special problems!

5. The search speed of the BEC Inspector is extremely low (several times less than that of any other BEC PMO), and high-frequency SSS used for advertising purposes (for "beautiful pictures") do not provide reliable detection of mines, for example, on algae-overgrown soil.

6. Initially planned for delivery disposable destroyers K-Ster (unlike, for example, the German Sea Fox) are extremely expensive, very difficult to operate and do not provide application at subzero temperatures (!). Instead of them, the "civilian" survey TNLA SeaScan were installed, which are generally incapable of solving combat missions.

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Small ROV SeaScan on MTSH "Alexander Obukhov" project 12700 (photo: forums.balancer.ru)

The reasons for all this lie not only in the “specific situation” around this contract, but also in the fact that the former employees of the Central Research Institute of Shipwreck, who were absolutely incompetent in the subject and have long become the objects of sharp jokes, were involved in the work by its executor from the Russian side.

The very structure and ideology of building the DIAMAND complex with BEC Inspektor2 was focused on "advertising demonstration", and not on the actual solution of PMO problems, and has a number of fundamental errors that limit the capabilities of the Diamand complex to extremely simple conditions.

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BEC Inspektor2 has strong slamming even at low wavelength

DIAMAND's special Triton automatic target classification software provides a satisfactory ability to work only on simple mines recently laid on the sand. Triton and DIAMAND are not guaranteed to work in any difficult conditions.

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Triton program operation

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ROV SeaScan next to the mine mockup (with additional corner reflectors installed by ECA)

Domestic BEC for PMK project 12700

To replace the BEC Inspector, a domestic BEC was developed.

An undoubted and huge plus of this development is the implementation of a domestic noise-immune high-speed data exchange channel, which is extremely important for work on the subject of robotic complexes (RTK) of the Navy.

However, our BEC has limited performance characteristics due to the initial shortcomings of the BL-680 boat (on the basis of which it was made), in fact, it is simply unsuitable for an effective solution to the PMO problem.

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Domestic BEC for project 12700 (photo: forums.balancer.ru)

A seaworthy conning tower (and BEC) of reduced weight (with a payload of at least BL-680) and a "free stern" with a reliable marine engine designed for professional work at sea is required.

In addition, there are questions about the very concept of the BEC seeker.

Or a single "expensive high-speed" BEC (with an expensive search complex) or "a group (" comb ") of low-speed boats"? Everything went according to the first option, but the destruction of such a boat on a mine is obviously not guaranteed!

Accordingly, it is necessary to provide (“cover”) the BEC-seeker with the operation of the means of non-contact trawling and masking of the physical fields of the BEC. We need a BEC-"non-contact trawl" (BEC-NT)! It is also extremely necessary to ensure the use of SPA ISPUM (destruction of "mine defenders" - having a reduced anti-puff resistance).

Those. the most priority for us is the BEC-NT (including as an airborne one, for the 12700 project).

What is characteristic is (the need to suppress NV mines with special interference, "Mine jamming"), the French specialists of the ECA firm know and understand (while deliberately hiding it from us):

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"Mine jamming" in the materials of the ECA conference

However, they regard the Russian Navy as "aborigines" who can easily sell shiny beads for a high price. The fact that, at the same time (with "French systems"), the effectiveness of the solution of the Russian Navy's PMO tasks will be extremely low - "the problems of the Russian Navy itself."

New non-contact trawls

A partial solution to the problem of “fine” digital processing in the non-contact equipment of mines and the appearance of “defenders” in the West was the “renaissance” of non-contact trawls, in a new look - in a self-propelled version (BEC-NT) or towed by helicopters.

At the same time, the purpose of their use was not "just trawling" (which is absolutely ineffective against mines with "smart" fuses), but joint complex application, in a single model with TNLA PMO.

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An integrated model for the use of modern mine action equipment - underwater vehicles and non-contact trawls (Swedish Navy)

In this “symbiosis”, the role of non-contact trawls was to ensure the actuation of mines with low anti-puff resistance and “mine defenders” and (or) direct cover of TNLA PMO by physical fields of the non-contact trawl (“jamming” mode).

It should be noted that BEC-NT is not some kind of "exclusive". An example is the German “Troika” non-contact trawling system (early 1980s).

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Operation of the Troika system (German Navy)

The Soviet Navy in the late 80s received a similar "Shuttle" system.

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BEC-NT "Shuttle" (Navy of the USSR)

but Today, the Russian Navy has forgotten all this, the domestic concept of towing non-contact trawls through a minefield by a minesweeper (incl.the newest PMK project 12700) today means deliberately sending it to slaughter.

The first version of the Swedish SAM system with BEC-NT was also implemented in the 80s.

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BEC-NT SAM3 (modern look of the Swedish Navy's non-contact trawling system)

Taking into account the change in the model of using non-contact trawls, it became possible to significantly reduce their weight and size indicators and requirements for the power-to-weight ratio of carriers, incl. creation of BEC-NT, suitable for onboard deployment on ships.

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Airborne BEC-NT US Navy

Shock-trials explosion

Here, an extremely acute issue of the explosion resistance of the secondary equipment equipment arises. Carrying out special tests (shock-trials explosion) "for detonation" in the conditions of a nearby powerful underwater explosion is a system and norm for Western secondary battery systems of many warships of the main classes.

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Shock-trials explosion of Western PMK

To meet these requirements, not only a special design of systems and mechanisms is used, but also their effective depreciation. However, comparing them with our project 12700 PMK shows that we have “forgotten” about it (“they will not blow up anyway!”).

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Comparison of the design and amortization of the loader crane TSCHIM Navy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the newest PMK of the Navy of project 12700

Obviously, this is one of the critical issues of the 12700 project, which requires an emergency modernization (with the obligatory conduct after detonation tests, similar to the western secondary armament).

Questions about the innovative corpus

Here, one cannot but ignore a number of shortcomings in the project 12700 hull (advertised as "unparalleled"). Opinion about the project 12700 by a prominent specialist AG Nazarov, director of KB Albatross Marine Design.

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The photo shows a set of beams with a T-section (!), While the belts of the beams are recruited to full thickness and cut (!). All this resembles a mock-up of a steel hull made of fiberglass, but not a fiberglass hull … Such design options and set beams were used at the dawn of plastic shipbuilding, when very few people knew how to work with this material; but for 40 years such designs have not been used …

Why were the achievements of the world composite shipbuilding not applied to the Russian project? … it is obvious that in the case of "Alexandrite" we are talking either about the unjustified conservatism of the customer, and / or about the unskilled design of structures made of composites, mixed with outdated approaches and construction technologies. The question arises - where are the leading Central Research Institute and Central Design Bureau looking? In any case, the export prospects of such low-tech vessels are extremely dubious …

So it is premature to present this event as a technology record and a breakthrough. This is only the first and very timid step, but so far, unfortunately, this is a step away from the global technologies of composite shipbuilding.

In the comments to the article, a discussion unfolded … However, the publication of the Krylov State Research Center report on composite shipbuilding showed that these shortcomings are understood by domestic specialists (they were probably laid down at the very beginning of the design of Project 12700, many years ago) and must be eliminated.

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Mine divers

Groups of miner divers are an effective anti-mine agent on the western secondary armament. To ensure their use, most Western secondary armament systems have pressure chambers on board.

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Stationary pressure chamber on the PMK of the Italian Navy

Alas, our project 12700, despite its large displacement, does not have it and, obviously, will not have it.

The reason is the absolutely inadequate requirements of the Navy for their deployment. In fact, the PMK in this case will have to be turned into a “special diving vessel”.

The situation is absolutely abnormal, in the event of real combat missions of minelayers divers will still have to be used, but … already without a pressure chamber (which simply "did not fit" on the secondary battery because of the huge "cart" of bureaucratic requirements for it). Alas, Russian divers in an emergency situation can count on a small and unsuccessful "emergency" pressure chamber "Kubyshka" …

Taking into account the use of minelayers' divers (and even today and in the future - and BEC), ensuring the use of AUVs, a large number of boats and boats are located on the western secondary armaments. Obviously, against this background, only one boat on board the Project 12700 PMK is "almost nothing."

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Group accommodation of boats and boats on foreign PMK

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Elaboration of group placement of boats on PMK project 12700

Multipurpose tasks

Speaking about minesweepers of the Soviet and Russian navies, it is necessary to note an essential point - the possibility of solving multi-purpose tasks by sea minesweepers of the USSR Navy project (for example, project 266M):

• anti-aircraft (air defense) and anti-boat defense (PKO) due to the presence of powerful weapons: 4 paired automatic cannons of 30 m, 25 mm caliber (30-mm gun mounts AK-230 (630) had a radar fire control system MR-104) and MANPADS (including those used from marine pedestal installations);

• solving the problems of anti-submarine defense (ASW) and anti-submarine sabotage defense (PPDO) due to good (for its time) GAS mine detection and the presence of two RBU-1200 rocket launchers with RB-12 rocket depth charges, with a powerful warhead and a range of use commensurate with with a range of GAS mine detection for submarines.

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RBU-1200 at MTShch project 266M

At the same time, RBUs were not a "spare pistol" for minesweepers, but were a real and effective tool for the water area protection forces (WAD), providing effective detection (GAS mine detection) and destruction (RBU) even of submarines lying on the ground, as well as ultra-small submarines (SMPL), i.e. targets, the detection and defeat of which for conventional means ("large" GAS and torpedoes) is difficult.

To ensure the launch of the RBU attack and to provide anti-torpedo protection, the minesweepers had an ammunition load for hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD) of the MG-34 and GIP-1 type.

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SGPD MG-34 and GIP-1 ammunition load MTShch project 266M

The capabilities of the PLO and PPDO MTSH project 266M were highly appreciated not only by the Soviet Navy, but also by the Navy of a number of foreign countries that had them as part of their Navy (including the Indian Navy, where the MTSH project 266ME is still in service).

It is obvious that these multipurpose tasks are still relevant today, especially when using PMK in the far and ocean zones. The upgraded PMK project 12700+ needs:

• radar for general detection and radar control system (radar fire control system);

• due to the significant mass and dimensions and physical fields, the placement of medium-caliber artillery is impossible, it is advisable to limit the caliber of secondary artillery 30 mm (and possibly 12, 7-14, 5 mm) with the obligatory placement of guided and unguided (for example, rocket depth charges, jamming projectiles) rocket weapons (defeat of air, sea, ground targets, submarines and saboteurs);

• means of electronic warfare.

conclusions

PMK project 12700, of course, is critically needed by the Russian Navy, but today they have a number of critical shortcomings (including for their main purpose). It is necessary to urgently modernize the project (and its complexes) with the completion of already built ships.

After the implementation of measures to eliminate design flaws and increase the combat capabilities of the ship:

• placement of BEC seekers and carriers of non-contact trawls;

• increasing the number of TNLA PMO (and ensuring their coverage with the fields of non-contact trawls);

• ensuring the solution of multipurpose tasks (air defense, PPDO, PKO, PLO);

• placement of a full-time group of minelayers with a pressure chamber;

• ensuring high explosion resistance;

and a number of other PMKs of Project 12700 may become among the best ships of their class.

At the same time, Project 12700 PMK, even in its modernized form, cannot solve the entire range of tasks of the Navy PMO and have serious limitations in the possibility of serial production (due to problems with the production of M503D diesel engines).

It is necessary to build, in addition to them, a series of raid small secondary armaments and the creation of a new project - a basic secondary armament with a reduced displacement, suitable for mass serial construction.

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