The history of Russian-Polish relations has been burdened with a load of problems for a long time. They have not disappeared today. They also existed after the revolutionary events of October 1917. In the very first days after the Bolsheviks came to power, Polish political leaders established close ties with the Entente to prepare the newly formed Polish Army for intervention, hoping that participation in it would be generously paid.
The documents of the Supreme Council of the Entente testify to these aggressive plans of Poland. Thanks to the financial assistance of this military alliance, primarily from France, the 2nd Army Corps of Haller's army was formed on the territory of Russia after the revolution. It consisted of Polish detachments stationed in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, the 4th division of General Zheligovsky, which was being formed in southern Russia, and the 5th Siberian division of Colonel Plague. All of them were subordinate to the high command of the Entente and took part in the intervention.
In the north of Russia, Polish formations took part in hostilities on the Dvina, Onega front, in the area of the Arkhangelsk railway. The 4th division of Zheligovsky took part in hostilities in the region of Tiraspol, Kanev, Belyaevka, in the occupation of Odessa, together with a French landing. The 5th Siberian division was stationed in the region of Novonikolaevsk, Krasnoyarsk, where it guarded the territory of the Trans-Siberian railway, covered the retreat of Kolchak's troops, and participated in battles against the Red Army in the region of Ufa and Zlatoust. In addition, according to the combat schedule of the Polish troops, on March 10, 1919, three Polish companies were in Baku.
For the maintenance and armament of the interventionists (Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Romanians), as well as Kolchak's army in Siberia and the White Guards in Ukraine, only France provided in 1919-1920. loans totaling 660 million 863 thousand francs, and on April 23, 1919, concluded a financial agreement with Poland in the amount of 1 billion 100 million francs. These funds were intended only for the maintenance of the Polish army, the supply of weapons and other military equipment to it. In addition, in April-June 1919, as a result of persistent requests from Poland, the 1st and 3rd corps of Haller's army, which had been formed in France since June 1917, were redeployed to Poland. The cost of this share was 350 million francs. With the help of this army, the Entente intended to create a solid barrier against the Red Army after the revolution, to use it in the struggle against "external Bolshevism."
After the redeployment of Haller's army and its merger with the emerging Polish national army, Poland stepped up its activities to implement its plan to annex the "eastern lands". In July 1919, Eastern Galicia, 74% of the population of which were Ukrainians, was occupied by the Polish army.
Poland began seizing Belarusian and Lithuanian lands in the same year. The Polish army is occupying Vilna, advancing towards Minsk, in connection with which a member of the Polish National Committee (PNA) in Paris E. Pilz appealed to the French Foreign Ministry on April 28, 1919 with a request to achieve the withdrawal of German troops from Grodno and Suwalki, where, as in the Baltic States, they were retained by the Entente to contain the advance of the Red Army.
Marshal Foch, commander-in-chief of the Entente forces, in a letter to the chairman of the Paris Peace Conference, writes that the Entente cannot agree with Germany's decision to urgently withdraw its troops from Latvia and Lithuania after the conclusion of an armistice with the Red Army, and explains this as follows: “In the Baltic provinces, the withdrawal of German troops can be envisaged only when the local contingents are able to provide their own means of defense against Bolshevism … It is necessary that the Allied Powers immediately provide the Baltic provinces with the assistance they need to strengthen their forces … On the eastern front, the Poles have advanced beyond Vilna, and at the same time have sufficient means to firmly resist the Red Army. Therefore, Foch concludes, he considers it possible to withdraw German troops from a number of areas on which the PNK insists.
After the capture of Minsk, Pilsudski in September 1919 said that only his desire to follow the policy of the Entente, and especially France, prevented him from ordering the troops to move towards Kovno. Since the end of 1919, the Polish government has been taking steps to develop new concepts for the change of power in our country.
In a conversation with the French representative in Warsaw, Pralon, Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland Skrzynski outlined three possible ways to achieve this goal: with the help of Germany, through direct intervention of one of the Entente countries, or through the creation of a Russian-Polish alliance. Rejecting the idea of restoring the old order in Russia with the intervention of Germany, recognizing that no great allied power is in a position to effectively intervene in Russian affairs, he proposed a Russian-Polish solution to this problem. On October 17-18, 1919, an emergency secret meeting of the commissions for foreign and military affairs of the Polish Sejm took place, in connection with the growing discontent of the socialists, Poland's participation in the intervention. In reporting this, Pralon expressed the opinion that the government of this country would seek from the Entente to clarify its policy towards Soviet Russia, approve cooperation with the Russian counter-revolution, using the Entente's fear of German influence in Russia and the desire of the Polish socialists to make peace with the Bolsheviks.
On January 18, 1920, the Polish Deputy Minister of War, General Sosnkowski, in a letter to the head of the French military mission in Poland, General Henri, writes that Poland considers the Bolsheviks to be the only obstacle and enemy in eastern Europe, and that it is necessary to decide finally and urgently whether a war against Bolshevism is necessary to calm the whole world. whether victory is necessary in the interests of the entire Entente. Sosnkowski asked to give Poland the opportunity to become the world's "appeasement" and to support their aggression against Russia with money and other help.
The Polish high command sharply reacted negatively to the partial lifting by the Entente of the economic blockade of the Soviet Republic. It proved that the Bolsheviks were not threatened in the future with a fall as a result of internal upheavals, since "the Russian masses are not capable of insurrectionary actions and, in the end, for the most part, they accepted the real order of things," that the renewal of economic ties with Russia would strengthen its position. will weaken anti-government tendencies in the country, revive hope for the future, and under the guise of trade ties, Bolshevik propaganda will be facilitated and strengthened.
Knowing the warlike plans of Poland, General Henri proposed, in order to strengthen the anti-Bolshevik barrier, to create a unified command and push this barrier to the Dnieper. In solving such a problem, he believed, Poland, either as a buffer state, or as a representative of the Entente, in organizing the Russian borders can provide an invaluable service. The defeat of the Russian white armies entails great dangers for her and Europe. The Entente, according to General Henri, must help Poland with all the means in its power so that Poland can solve the difficulties of administrative and military training of organized Belarusian and Ukrainian units, which will be instructed to push the temporary boundaries of Bolshevism to the Dnieper.
After receiving this letter, Marshal Foch advises the French Minister of War, who was also the chairman of the Paris Peace Conference, to study these issues at the Supreme Council of the Entente in order to "restore order in Russia." In January 1920, in secret information for Marshal Foch about the possibility of a Soviet-Polish conflict and the ability of the Polish Army to resist the Red Army, the offensive plan developed by the Polish command in the Dvin-Dnieper region was criticized from a military and political point of view. There was a warning that the advance of Polish troops to the Dnieper could inflame the national feelings of the Russians and contribute to the growth of the influence of the communists. In this regard, Poland was asked to direct efforts to improve its defensive position. The certificate noted, in particular, that the rural population of these regions, who had been in Soviet Russia for two years, became the owner of the land and would not enthusiastically accept the return to the country under the protection of Polish bayonets of large landowners, mainly Poles. Poland is trying to return to the borders of 1772 and restore its power in Western Ukraine under the guise of a long occupation. She has already attracted Petliura, who is very popular in these areas, to her side. No doubt she is trying to use her influence to create a local Ukrainian government, once again linked to Poland. All these measures, it was indicated in the certificate, have a far-reaching political orientation.
Back in October 1919, Colonel Georges, sent by Marshal Foch on a special mission to Warsaw, warned about the need to contain Poland on a dangerous path, where Polish excessive ambitions push it to confront Russia.
The Entente and, above all, France were interested in strengthening the Polish state, which could become an obstacle to the creation of a Russian-German bloc. But they feared the inclusion of territories with a non-Polish population in its composition. This is evidenced by the reaction to the letter addressed to the Paris Peace Conference by Professor Tomashivsky, the Ukrainian delegate from Galicia to this conference. In it, he argued the absurdity of Poland's return to the borders of 1772, emphasized how dangerous it was for Europe, and expressed regret at the conference's intention to transfer Eastern Galicia to Poland. He recalled that at a time when the Ukrainians had a choice between Poland and Russia, they chose Russia. In the certificate for Foch, a conclusion was given to this letter that France sees Poland only as a homogeneous state, without including any territories of other countries in its composition.
Meanwhile, in connection with the liquidation of the Western Front after the signing of the Polish-German peace agreement, the Polish high command was able to concentrate its forces on the Eastern Front. In March 1920, Piłsudski issues top secret orders on the reorganization of the Polish army of the Eastern Front, preparing it for offensive operations.
At the same time, Marshal Foch is sending further instructions to General Henri, demanding to speed up the elaboration of the French plan for the defense of Poland, with instructions to submit it to the Polish government in the form of proposals. Finally, on April 17, 1920, Henri informs him of the dispatch of a defense plan to Foch, drawn up by him according to the instructions of the marshal. In a cover letter, he writes about the transfer of this plan to the Polish high command and warns that Poland is preparing only for offensive operations.
Ten days before the start of the Soviet-Polish war, General Henri urgently informs Marshal Foch about an important conversation with Pilsudski, during which he said that the time had come for making a final decision, but he did not feel completely free, since military and political issues were resolved eastern problems are closely related, and therefore he must know the point of view of France and the Entente. Pilsudski came to the conclusion that the Polish Army had some advantage over the Red Army, and therefore he was confident of victory. To implement it, Pilsudski developed four possible offensive options, which he detailed in a letter to the French general. Henri agreed with Pilsudski's opinion regarding the state of both armies, only noting the fact that if the operations are active and prolonged, difficulties may arise that will require assistance from the Entente.
The day after the conversation with Henri Pilsudski, he signed an order on the start of the Polish army's offensive in the direction of Kiev under his direct command on April 25, 1920. On the eve of the offensive, a military-political agreement between Pilsudski and Petliura is signed. As a result of the joint offensive on June 6, 1920, Kiev was taken.
But already on June 26, in a personal letter to General Henri, Marshal Foch writes that the Polish front, which was broken by Budyonny at the mouth of the Pripyat, is bursting along its entire length, since it is fragile everywhere, and again insists on defensive measures, which he repeatedly stated in his instructions. starting on June 18, 1919.
On June 30, General Buat (Chief of the General Staff of the French Army) sends Foch a note under the heading "Poland is in danger." In this note, he pointed out that the Polish command, underestimating the strength of the Bolshevik army, relying on Petliura's help, launched an offensive in Ukraine, between the Dniester and the Dnieper on a 400 km front, but less than two months later the Poles were pushed back to their former positions. The result of the offensive was negative. The Polish army was exhausted and lacked ammunition and equipment. The Soviet government has repeatedly expressed its will to continue the war against Poland until the final military and political victory. General Bute was confident that if the Polish army continued to resist, it would exhaust itself, and as a result, due to the lack of reserves, its front would be broken. Then the very existence of Poland will be at stake, and the interests of the Entente in Eastern Europe will be seriously compromised. The French general proposed an immediate retreat from territories with a mixed population supporting the Russians and the Communists as the only means of salvation, which they saw as a serious danger to the rear of the Polish army. Bute suggested that the Supreme Council of the Entente send Marshal Foch to Warsaw to jointly develop a defense plan, appoint a military adviser, and also work out a plan for the immediate supply of the Polish army with a wide variety of assistance to achieve an advantage over the Red Army. The French were extremely critical of the state of the Polish armed forces. They were convinced that the Polish army was not capable of stopping the Red Army. Therefore, an armistice should be concluded immediately, otherwise, if the Red Army is able to secure supplies, it will be in Warsaw on August 15, and no Polish military force will be able or willing to try to stop it. And regarding the information provided by the Poles, an employee of the French military mission wrote the following: "What the newspapers say about the bravery of the Polish troops is a lie and an arch-lie, and the information from the communiqué about the battles is nothing more than throwing dust in the eyes." As they say, comments are superfluous.
A fierce campaign against Pilsudski began in the newspapers, exposing his military incapacity, his political frivolity, when he, alone, without the approval of his ministry, embarked on a "Ukrainian adventure" in April. In connection with the threatening situation for the Polish army, France and England began to discuss issues of providing urgent military assistance to Poland, as well as the transportation of military equipment to Poland, which was hampered by the difficult political situation in Danzig, where port workers were on strike, refusing to unload ships, in connection with which Rozwadovsky, the chief of staff of the Polish army, even offered to occupy Danzig by allied forces. On July 24, 1920, the chief of staff of the Entente Military Committee, General Weygand, left for Warsaw as the head of the Franco-British mission to "save the Polish army."
If, in the words of French Prime Minister Millerand, "the latest offensives of the Polish troops and the territorial ambitions of Poland have inflamed the national feelings of all Russians," then in August 1920 the Red Army's offensive against Warsaw led to the same results. Thanks to the gross mistakes of Tukhachevsky, as well as the decisive measures of the Entente to provide assistance to the Polish Army, it managed to defeat the Red Army operating in the Warsaw direction.
On August 20, 1920, Marshal Foch sent a telegram to Weygand about the need to foresee the future occupation of the neighboring territories by Poland. That on the whole coincided with the wishes of Pilsudski, who openly expressed his intention to continue the aggressive policy in the East; Knowing about the disagreements in the Entente countries in determining their positions in relation to Soviet Russia, Pilsudski was convinced that Poland should act alone, relying on France, and that, being at the head of all small states bordering on Russia, it was he, Pilsudski, who should decide the eastern problem to their advantage. On the territory of Poland, with the consent of Pilsudski, the chairman of the Russian Political Committee in Warsaw, Savinkov, continued to actively engage in the formation of the White Guard army, hoping to send it to the Polish front under Polish command by November 1, 1920. At the same time, negotiations between Wrangel's representatives and the Entente, with Ukrainian nationalists and Poland were under way. Wrangel proposes to create a unified Polish-Russian front under French command to "deliver a decisive blow to the Soviet authorities," as he believed that the conclusion of a Soviet-Polish peace would make the "Bolshevik danger inevitable." In response to this proposal, the French Foreign Minister stated that France was extremely interested in taking advantage of modern events in order to finally end Soviet Russia.
Rozvadovsky, fearing the defeat of the Wrangel army, expresses to his French mentors in October 1920 his desire to achieve a military alliance between the Ukrainian troops of General Pavlenko and the White Guard 3rd Russian Army of General Peremykin, which was achieved on November 5, 1920. On November 18 (i.e., two days after the liquidation of the Wrangel southern front), as a result of joint energetic measures of France, Poland and the White Guard, this military alliance took shape in a military-political agreement between representatives of Petliura and Savinkov. And a few days after the final defeat, the remnants of the White Guard troops found refuge in Poland, which was also provided for by the agreement and met the plans for preparing Pilsudski and Savinkov for a new military campaign against Soviet Russia.
