In 2018, Russia will have another election. However, the low level of electoral activity of Russians in elections is a constant at the present stage in the development of civil society institutions. The percentage of citizens who have active suffrage and who used it during the single voting day is no more than 46, 25% of the total number of citizens who have active suffrage. At the same time, there is a paradox in Russian society based on a mismatch between attitudes towards the importance of elections in a democratic society and the real level of participation in the electoral process. An illustration of this statement is the results of a poll conducted by the Levada Center, before the single voting day on September 14, 2014: 63% of citizens consider the popular elections of deputies and governors to be a necessary political process, but the actual turnout at polling stations was less than 50%.
"All to the polls!" The best information is comparative. Let's take a look at the posters before 1991 and those that came up after.
The elections of the State Duma deputies in 2016, unlike the previous elections in 2011, did not become either scandalous or sensational in terms of the results, or the opportunity to radically change the socio-economic situation in Russia. But they demonstrated a new model of voters' behavior that has become a reality for Russia, that is, a model of electoral behavior. We will call it the “model of electoral impotence”.
A deliberate refusal to exercise an active electoral right by the electorate and a low voter turnout are currently a common European trend, and the Russian Federation is no exception. This state of affairs may be associated with various reasons, but we will turn to one aspect: the implementation of pre-election PR strategies by the main parties over the past 20 years.
The types and types of PR strategies used by parties during electoral periods have undergone significant changes based on the actual political situation. In the strategies of the KPRF and LDPR parties in the 1990s, one can see an emphasis on the social type, an appeal to various categories of citizens, to social problems. In 2000, the same parties at different times relied on both the image of the leader and the mass character of the campaign material. However, as a result, they failed to exceed their own rating of the 1990s. On the other hand, the United Russia party, assembled piece by piece from the warring blocs of the late 1990s, surprisingly quickly became the party of power, and is still holding its positions today. Taking into account this fact, we can conclude that the chosen pre-election PR-strategy of the party is victorious. The basis of this strategy is the administrative resource, but this does not mean that it is the only means of achieving a leading position by the party. On the one hand, the imperceptible, on the other - continuous PR campaign of United Russia operates not only within the electoral periods, but goes far beyond them, which causes a significant cumulative effect. Since the beginning of 2000, the All-Russian party "United Russia" has evolved within the framework of two strategic approaches.2003 - a social approach, solving social problems (Chechen war), 2007 - the electorate votes for the president, not for the party ("image strategy"), 2011 - again the image strategy dominates ("reliability and stability"). It is noteworthy that, despite the expansion of means and forms of PR-influence, United Russia highlights the most significant aspects of its work and partially ignores the opportunities for campaigning provided by the state, and also ignores pre-election communication with other election participants.
If we turn to a cross-analysis of the presidential elections in the Russian Federation, the evolution of strategies in general terms will take the following form.
Evolution of pre-election presidential PR strategies in the Russian Federation
(1991-2012)
Election year B. N. Yeltsin
1991 Social (image of the "savior")
1996 Social (activation of the youth electorate)
Vladimir Putin
2000 Image (image "hero", "savior")
2004 Socio-economic
D. A. Medvedev
2008 Weak social (basis - continuity)
Vladimir Putin
2012 Image ("a person who knows what to do")
As a result of the analysis, we summarize that in the electoral periods of 1991-2012, there was a general evolution of presidential PR strategies from a dominant social strategy to a combination of all elements of all types of strategies based on the image strategy. There is a single line of succession in the presidential elections of the twenty years under study. The system of transferring power from the incumbent president to his successor (Yeltsin - Putin, Putin - Medvedev) and support for the approved candidacy by the electorate have become widespread in the election system of the Russian Federation.
Victory presidential campaigns, as a rule, used an image strategy based on the personality of the candidate and the attitude of the electorate towards him. Policy statements and other rational characteristics had little influence on the decisions made by voters, which is revealed by the analysis of promises during the election campaign and the results of real political activity. However, the evolution of individual strategic elements is clearly visible here as well. In 1996, it is difficult to say that Boris Yeltsin won thanks to the formed image - a "screen"; in this campaign the emphasis was placed on raising an inactive electorate and grouping the electorate core of young people. Thus, in the absence of a direct appeal to the candidate's image, but within the framework of the image strategy, all three incumbent presidents demonstrate the dynamics of PR support points - support (social groups and their interests).
The second component of PR planning during the period of electoral communication, which we identified earlier, is the determination of a PR campaign model based on an assessment of the resource potential. Analyzing the electoral process in the Russian Federation from 1991 to 2012, it is possible to identify the following models used: market model (“Democratic choice of Russia”), administrative-command model (“United Russia”), organizational-party model (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, LDPR), complex model (presidential campaign of Boris Yeltsin). The most pronounced and stable model in the dynamics of its components from 2003 to 2011 at the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation is demonstrated by the United Russia party during three electoral periods. Having won the elections to the State Duma in 2003 through the active use of the media, the correct construction and use of the image of the main leader of the party, with the wide involvement of the administrative resource, during the next two elections (2007 and 2011), United Russia only adjusted its strategy, aimed primarily at maintaining the parliamentary status of its party.
Electoral models in the PR strategy of the United Russia party (2003 - 2011)
Election year Campaign model Leader's image Basic ideology
2003 Organizational-party model with market elements
The image of the leader V. Putin - the image of the "Savior", is built using the method of adjustment
Centrism
2007 Administrative-command model, "soft" method
The image of the leader V. Putin is the image of the "Leader", "the father of the people"
State position, opposing yourself to more radical parties
2011 Administrative-command model, "hard" method
Image of leaders: D. Medvedev is a responsive statesman, V. Putin personifies strong power
Conservative modernism
In general, we can say that the evolution of the party's pre-election strategy was situational - the party's programs were changed, the image was adjusted, but at the same time the basic principles of building the 2003 election campaign were preserved. Its main resource is real power. This model is characterized by high pre-election activity. The success of the party is achieved due to its interest in the victory of the power vertical, in carrying out propaganda events, with the support of these events with financial resources.
The third component of planning a PR campaign and forming a PR strategy is the strategy of information interaction. It can be noted that if the increase in the efficiency of mediatized electoral communication in stable democracies was associated with a change in communication technologies, then in transitional systems there are almost no institutional barriers to the pre-election communication impact. Weak political parties and undeveloped structures of civil society are unable to provide a regime of equal access to the media for competitors during election campaigns. The danger of monopolization of the main channels of mass information by the elites who have come to power is quite real. It is obvious that this kind of influence of the media on the mass consciousness is carried out in a non-competitive environment. As foreign and domestic studies, including regional ones, show, in the long term, such a media policy undermines voters' confidence in the messages of mass communication channels even more than negative political advertising in stable democracies.
We also note that there is a cumulative effect in the informational influence on the mass political consciousness: the influence of the media becomes more noticeable if it is multi-channel and long-lasting. Sociological research data of all-Russian and regional election campaigns in 1999-2003. allow us to say that, on the whole, about two-thirds of the respondents recorded this or that influence of the media on their electoral behavior, and 10 - 20% recognized it as decisive. Based on these and a number of other trends in Russian electoral practice, it seems possible to conclude that the most convincing theoretical PR-models that rely on studies of the effects of mediatized mass communication look the most convincing when explaining electoral behavior. Moreover, media technologies have come to be regarded today as one of the main mechanisms for the reproduction of the existing socio-political system. Since the influence of the media has a cumulative effect, their long-term and multi-channel influence determines not only the corresponding vector of the electorate's activity, but also the legitimization of the existing political order as a whole. And this, in turn, is associated with the trust or distrust of voters in relation to the media. Research shows that the formation of media effects during the election campaigns in the Russian Federation is influenced by a number of features. First, there is a significant degree of monopolization of the Russian media. Secondly, the high level of public confidence (in the mass) in the information reported through official channels. According to research by VTsIOM (2013), in terms of the level of public confidence, two sources of information are leading: television (60% of respondents trust information received through this channel) and the Internet (22%). Thirdly, the dominant in coverage state electronic media remain for voters almost the only channel of pre-election information, which, given the level of public confidence in them, gives a significant advantage to candidates and parties "in power", especially when using the resources of the administrative-command model communications. Fourthly, in the activities of the Russian media there is a clear bias towards manipulation, in the extreme case, informing, and there is no motivation of the electorate to raise consciousness and competence, to form a “potential for inclusion” - the conditions for conscious and active electoral action.
The correct definition of the strategy of interaction with the media will allow the candidate to pursue a rational information policy with minimal financial costs.
In this aspect, a number of areas of activity can be distinguished:
- the formation of ideological dominants;
- identification of preferred channels of information communication;
- formation of its own information flow;
- overlapping the information flow of competitors;
- formation of a journalistic pool.
If we turn to the results achieved by the parties in the period under review, then we can come to a number of conclusions. Due to the special situation during the elections of the last 10 years, the United Russia party achieved the greatest informational success from the point of view of competent and effective use of PR. Was formed its own information flow, defining the image, "face" of the party in the eyes of the electorate. When presenting information, the most widespread in political PR technique of the UPP was used - a unique political proposal, which is based on the fact that most of the arguments are addressed not to reason, but to feelings (in this case, to a sense of respect and trust in the leaders and supporters of the party). The party in question has reached the highest level in establishing an information partnership, priority delivery of information to the media - the citation in the press of "United Russia" in positive tones exceeds the citation of other parties by more than two times. The main means of communication in the electoral race of "United Russia" is determined by television, which is an obvious preference from the point of view of the audience of influence. The election results of the decade are a clear manifestation of the previously described cumulative effect associated with the monopolization of the media in the state. However, by 2012, the media rating of "United Russia" is significantly decreasing, the greatest failure is noted in the field of Internet communication.
For the KPRF, the most frequently used platforms are Interfax, AiF, International Press Club, Mir Novosti, and the Central House of Journalists. However, all these are mainly private structures that do not have a state share in the authorized capital. As for the information platforms controlled by the state, the situation here is not the best: ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti took a principled position in relation to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, refusing to invite party representatives as newsmakers. For the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, there are both “friendly” media (as a rule, these include patriotic publications: the newspapers Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Zavtra, as well as part of the regional press.), And clearly hostile ones. "The main party newspaper" of the Communist Party is the newspaper "Pravda", the official magazine of the party - "Political Education". Another publication close to the communists is Sovetskaya Rossiya, which, however, calls itself an "independent people's newspaper." In addition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has its own printed publications in each regional branch of the party. Now the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has a kind of information set for campaigning: its own website, with constantly updated content; social media accounts; photo, video and printed material; promotional products; own printed editions; regular coverage in the Internet media. However, the use of these funds does not give the party the necessary results of increasing the electorate, which is fixed by the election results with approximately the same percentage of voters for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
The Liberal Democratic Party uses videos as the most effective form of campaigning. According to research by the Levada Center, the Liberal Democratic Party, along with United Russia, are the leaders in terms of views: they were seen by almost half of Russians (47% each). Also, the LDPR retains second place in terms of attractiveness and approval of video materials (27%). The party has accounts in all popular social networks in Russia (Facebook, Odnoklassniki, Vkontakte, Mail.ru, Twitter). In 2011. Under the patronage of the party, the Internet project "LDPR-tube" was created and is being successfully implemented.
Thus, over 20 years of continuous activity of political consultants in PR campaigns, one can clearly trace the dynamics of strategies and tactics chosen to promote a particular political subject.
If in the early 1990s both parties and presidential candidates tried to express their exclusivity, their difference from the existing one, the novelty of views and approaches, the image of the future, then in 2000 the main emphasis is on stability, confidence, reliability, and verification. The types and types of PR strategies used by parties in electoral periods have undergone significant changes based on plastic social, political, informational reality. In the strategies of the KPRF and LDPR parties in the 1990s, one can see an emphasis on the social type, an appeal to various categories of citizens, to social problems. In the 2000s, the United Russia party consolidated its position by conducting inter-electoral information campaigns, squeezing out competitors from the political and information field, ignoring political debates during the active electoral period, using the resources of the administrative-command model. However, despite the competent and professional use of PR technologies, which provide stable intangible capital in the form of the reputation and trust of the electorate, this resource is not unlimited. The years 2011-2013 showed a rapid drop in the ratings of United Russia and its leader Dmitry Medvedev. According to research by VTsIOM, FOM, the social center of the Civil Registry Office, under the president, the level of trust in her ranges from 39-40%, and the anti-rating reaches 44%. Let's see what will happen in Russia this time!
