The birth of such a milestone modern combat helicopter as the Mi-28 is inextricably linked with the history of the birth of its competitor, the Ka-50. The fact is that for the first time in the history of domestic helicopter engineering, when creating a new combat vehicle, a competition was organized between two design bureaus: Mil and Kamov, in order to select the best option for the army on a competitive basis. The terms of reference for the executors from the Ministry of Defense were issued simultaneously, and almost simultaneously, in 1982, both vehicles took off. The presented samples reflected the difference in approaches to solving the problem of creating a new, promising combat helicopter.
KB im. M. L. Mil decided to take an evolutionary path, relying on the experience of the well-developed scheme on the Mi-24. The single-rotor scheme, tandem arrangement of crew members, the long-accepted nomenclature of weapons used from this helicopter (not to be confused with the weapon system, this is another, more voluminous concept) reduced the degree of technical risk and increased the degree of its "recognition" for a potential consumer and customer (these, unfortunately, are still different concepts).
Aerodynamically and in terms of operational properties, each helicopter scheme has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The traditional single-rotor design was used on the Mi-28A. This scheme has been worked out constructively. In it, for many years of operation of helicopters around the world, all technical nuances have been "licked". There is vast experience in the combat use and statistics of the enemy's combat fire effect from all types of weapons on the carrier system, and the designers have a good idea of what and how to protect in it in order to achieve the required degree of combat stability. The experience of the combat use of the legendary predecessor of the Mi-28, the Mi-24 helicopter around the world, and above all in Afghanistan, made it possible to create a good system for ensuring combat survivability on the new helicopter. I was greatly impressed by watching a then secret (now declassified) film, where various elements of the helicopter's structure are fired at from different caliber weapons at the test site. In addition, there are constructively implemented many solutions that increase the combat survivability of the device. What is it worth, for example. so-called "progressive destruction system". This is when the suspension of the seats, the chassis arrangement, the fastening of the cockpit are made in such a way as to ensure the survival of the crew members during an impact with a vertical speed of about 13 meters per second! In addition, the engines, transmission elements, including the main gearbox, are located so that in an accident they do not crush the crew. This, of course, is great, and modern practice has already shown that these innovations work. There have already been several cases when the crew survived after a helicopter crash. True, it happened twice that, after landing, the surviving pilot, who early tried to get out of his cockpit, was killed by the remnants of the blades that continued to rotate for some time. An extreme case is Igor Butenko on August 2, 2015.
The tandem arrangement of crew members is accepted on combat (attack) helicopters all over the world, since it allows to reduce the potential area of destruction of the device by the enemy. But! This makes it difficult for crew members to interact in battle, especially when there is intense radio traffic in the air, which is typical of a complicated combat situation.
The single-screw circuit is more resistant to falling into the vortex ring mode. This is such a mode when, in the absence of a forward speed, the pilot, if he decides to transfer the car to a vertical descent, then, when a certain speed of this very vertical descent is reached, the air flow thrown by the main rotor begins to be sucked in by it from above, and there is a loss of controllability and an increase in the speed of the vertical decline up to catastrophic. So, this parameter of vertical descent for a single-rotor circuit is about 4 meters per second. This is in the piggy bank of this scheme with a plus sign. But its disadvantages is a pronounced dislike for the right crosswind during takeoff and landing at a speed of more than 5 meters per second. Such is the aerodynamics of the tail rotor, which, with these parameters, falls into the supercritical angles of attack of the blade elements and loses its thrust. And then - the unbalanced reactive moment from the rotation of the main rotor, which was previously suppressed by the tail rotor, begins to madly rotate the car to the left, which in most cases ends with the overturning of the helicopter …
In addition, the presented version of the Mi-28A raised questions such as:
- Why is its speed even lower than that of the Mi 24?
- And why - the same aircraft weapons?
- And where are the bombs for use from a helicopter?
- And where is the second control for the navigator?
- No, the fact that the maneuverability is higher is good! The available overload is greater, the height of the static and dynamic ceiling is higher, the car is "softer" in terms of tactile sensations - it's all great. But why can't we use it while in operation? Has the design bureau imposed bans and restrictions due to the fact that it has not yet solved the problem of an off-design increase in the oil temperature in the main and intermediate gearboxes?
And the weapons complex does not work as we would like.
To all these questions, Mil Design Bureau, which for a long time was a monopoly in the domestic helicopter industry of combat "land" helicopters, either referred to the contents of the TK signed by the military, or answered with the thesis that "you will fight on what we, the Design Bureau, will be able to do" …
In a different way, the porridge was cooked in the KB. Kamov. For a long time they worked there with a coaxial scheme of helicopters intended for use in the national economy, and if for military purposes, then sea-based, with search and rescue missions, as well as anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare. Participation in the tender for a ground combat helicopter was a novelty for them. The Kamovites decided to go all-in. The novelty of their car was incredible. Single combat vehicle with unprecedented range guided missiles and ejection seat! Amazing maneuverability, thrust-to-weight ratio - all this should have made an impression on the military!
The use of the coaxial design promised great benefits. The design of the supporting system, although more complex than the single-rotor, was well enough developed by them by that time. At the same time, the aerodynamic advantage of using this scheme was that the engine power was not spent on the drive of the tail rotor with its transmission, and these losses amount to no less than 20%! The helicopter is more compact. In the armament system, the Kamovites used their main trump card - the Vikhr guided weapon system with a range of guided missiles of up to 10 km. Even now none of our foreign opponents has such a range. A well-balanced 30-mm cannon (the same as on the Mi-28), located "under the arm", as the pilots use their slang, hits more accurately than a competitor, since it is located near the center of mass. The level of automation, according to the design bureau, allows one crew member to solve all combat missions. The issues of combat survivability were also well worked out, plus a system unprecedented on helicopters was added - the ejection system. By the way, it is still not on any helicopter in the world, except for the Ka-50 and the Ka-52, which appeared later.
The coaxial scheme is not afraid of crosswinds at all. The biggest nuisance that can happen if the limits for this parameter are exceeded - the helicopter will turn against the wind. Like a weather vane.
When questions arose during the tests, the company behaved according to the principle: "Say what you need, and we will do it!"
Comparative tests of both machines, carried out in the 80s and early 90s. were not over yet, but it was already becoming clear that in a number of parameters the Mi-28 had no advantages, and in some it was lagging behind. Under these conditions, the General Designer of the Design Bureau named after V. I. M. L. Mil, at that time - Weinberg M. V., decided to withdraw the Mi-28 from the competition. As he later explained his decision to me, using chess terminology: "I can afford to lose one game, but I know that I will win the tournament. We will put forward a proposal for a round-the-clock machine, and then we'll see who wins." Unfortunately, he didn't manage to look …
Mark Vladimirovich, an outstanding designer, a man of the broadest engineering erudition and remarkable mental qualities, died in 1997.
Thus, at that stage, the competition was won by the Ka-50. In 1995, this helicopter was officially adopted by the Russian, by that time, army. The machine spun briskly at all the air shows taking place at that time, writing out aerobatics. Impressed the audience. Participated in the tender for a combat helicopter in Turkey. A mock-up version of a helicopter called Erdogan was even built - apparently in order to please the pride of the then Prime Minister of Turkey. True, this did not help. The Americans simply did not allow a NATO member country to purchase a Russian combat helicopter. But participation in a foreign tender has enriched the manufacturing firm with the necessary valuable experience. And above all - in terms of PR. Here the general designer of the company Mikheev S. V. quite succeeded. Just what is the creation of the feature film "Black Shark", after which, with the light hand of the designer, this name was firmly fixed in the minds of the population, not even dedicated to the helicopter theme …
However, the helicopter did not go into mass production and saturation of army aviation units. The reason for this is that the so-called. "dashing nineties". The period of the life of our country, which there is neither desire nor meaning to describe. Poverty and destruction, in a word. Therefore, only a few machines settled in the Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Army Aviation Flight Personnel in Torzhok to master this new complex aviation complex. Best of all, the new machine was mastered by the then head of the Center, Major General B. A. Vorobyov. He worked miracles on this helicopter! I represented him at all the salons, demonstrating such a complex of aerobatics figures, from which the audience was breathtaking! And the specialists too. But the Ka-50 continued to be a "salon machine". It could become a fully combat helicopter after the experience of using it in a real armed conflict. And soon such a case presented itself. In August 1999, the second Chechen campaign broke out. I proposed to our commander of the army aviation, Colonel-General V. E. Pavlov. use a BEG in the composition of two Ka-50 and one Ka-29 VPNTSU in Chechnya. He approved this proposal, and the work began to boil. It took a whole year to resolve all technical and organizational issues, and only on December 26, 2000. the group ended up at the Grozny-Severny airport. January 2, 2001 a historic aviation event took place. For the first time in world practice, from a coaxial helicopter, a combat effect was made by means of destruction against the enemy! For this, the pilot was awarded the title of Hero of Russia. The group, having completed their program, returned in due time to the base. And we began to generalize the experience gained and think about what to do next. The fact is that by that time, comprehension had begun not only on the positive aspects associated with the operation of a coaxial combat helicopter, but also on the shortcomings.
So, for example, this aerodynamic scheme, although it has advantages over a single-rotor in terms of crosswind restrictions during takeoff and landing, but has much lower parameters for stalling into a vortex ring. The boundary of her stall starts from two (!) Meters per second. For this reason, in 1984, a catastrophe occurred in which the tester, E. Laryushin, died. And in 1998, the head of the Center, "Chkalov of Army Aviation", as we called him, General B. A. Vorobyov, died on this machine. The immediate cause of this catastrophe was the collision of the blades of the lower and upper propellers. Officially, in the conclusion of the investigation, they wrote down "Getting into flight modes not previously investigated." Well, what was really there, I personally find it difficult to say …
No one still knows what will happen if the coaxial carrier system is bombarded from below. Answering this question to opponents, the general designer Mikheev S. V. stated that he would conduct such an experiment. However, this has not been done so far … The experience gained made it possible to conclude that, in principle, one pilot will be able to perform tasks for stationary, previously reconnoitered targets. He will also be able to conduct an air battle, using the Ka-50's large thrust-to-weight ratio. But to close over the battlefield with an intense enemy fire confrontation, to look for and find mobile targets, navigate, bind to auxiliary landmarks for re-entry and at the same time pilot the helicopter at an extremely low altitude, while working with the armament complex - it seemed difficult … Therefore, In the report to the Chief of the General Staff on the results of the "Chechen expedition", along with positive aspects, it was noted that it was proposed to focus financial, organizational and other efforts on the creation of a two-seater vehicle. On this report there was a resolution of the NSH: "I agree".
And at this time in the KB them. M. L. Mily, work was in full swing on the creation of an all-weather round-the-clock version of the helicopter called the Mi-28N. A similar work was carried out in the design bureau im. Kamov, above the Ka-52 helicopter, already two-seater. Moreover, the Kamov team was ahead of the competitors for a year and a half. They had already managed to carry out the stage of LTH (flight performance) of state tests at a time when the Milians were still far from its end.
At that time, I served as the chief of combat training of the army aviation of the Army Aviation Directorate under the leadership of Colonel-General V. E. Pavlov. With the permission of the commander, using my official position with might and main, I tested new, promising helicopters, which by that time had not even been submitted for state tests. But we needed to know what they are. Therefore, not trusting the technical descriptions, and even more so - advertising materials, he personally communicated with the equipment in the air, making up his own opinion about it, which he then reported to the commander. This made it possible to avoid many mistakes when adopting a particular model, to oppose both supporters and opponents from the respective opposing mills of both design bureaus. Many times I was convinced that in this respect trusting the opinion of outsiders is the same as making a choice of a bride from a photograph and from the words of a professional matchmaker. Everyone lied! Persistently, selflessly!
So, I fly on the Mi-28A provided to me for review. I notice some kind of shaking at a speed of about 220 km / h, which increases with increasing speed. After landing, they explain to me that, they say, they were in a hurry to imagine the car, and did not have time to bring the plane of rotation of the blades into synchronicity, i.e. "reduce the cone". However, this drawback manifested itself in the future on other machines and was then "treated" for a long time.
I had a chance to fly a version of the helicopter with controls in the front cockpit. It was exotic! This is still remembered at the firm. To our whining about the need for such control: they say, how to train and retrain pilots, and in battle the commander is suddenly wounded or killed, even M. V. Weinberg replied that at one time the military had given them such a TK. Apparently, they wanted to save money on the flight crew. Now, in order to make it, the whole helicopter must be redone! However, the firm tried to do such a control by creating an EDSU (electronic remote control system). These are several wires, actuators and sensors connected to each other. Of course, this is very schematically said. Well, I sit down in the front cabin and hear a heavy sigh from the tester from behind. I saw that there were two joysticks in the cockpit. One is in place of the step-gas, the other is in the area of the right armpit. No pedals. But, the tester tells me, when you switch to hover mode, the right joystick will also rotate around the axis. This is instead of pedals … Well, I will not describe how everything worked in flight, only I rejected this system, and we did not turn to it again. Subsequently, already in 2013, the Mi-28UB helicopter with full dual control in both cabins will nevertheless appear. Made by import order. So, "if you can't, but you really want to, then you can"?
I also had the opportunity to fly on the Ka-52 prototype, which existed at that time in a single copy. The car, although it was also shaking at speeds of over 270 km / h, seemed to me interesting precisely because of the location of the crew members according to the "side by side" scheme, that is, next to them. Like the Mi-8. This makes it much easier to understand each other in battle, the entire crew can see the entire set of displays on the dashboard, and in terms of visibility, if we mean the capabilities of the entire crew, the sectors are even larger. Both the one and the other company promised that the on-board radar is about to "light up" and it will be possible to use it to shoot and navigate, and everything will be very beautiful with it! Unfortunately, until now "not all issues have been resolved." As well as the promised NSCU (helmet-mounted target designation system) literally soon. So far, things have not gone beyond prototypes.
Especially the "varnishing of reality" was exacerbated in the period when Mikheev S. The. consideration of the need to finance only one project of a promising all-weather round-the-clock combat helicopter was initiated.
They say that the time is difficult, there is not enough money in the country, it is an impermissible luxury to pull two projects at once: "The calf is very small, there is not enough for everyone." At that time, I was drawing up proposals from our Department for Financing ROC and R&D in the interests of army aviation, and, like no one else, I knew that, due to the above circumstances, crumbs were really allotted to both ROCs. To my question: "Do you understand that you are opening Pandorra's box with unpredictable consequences?" that it will be clear who is whose apologist. I must say that by that time the Kamovites had a certain head start. In the safe at the then Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Mikhailov V. S. the act of carrying out the first stage of state tests of the Ka-52 rested, while the Milians with the Mi-28N by that time still had "a horse not lying around" in this regard.
Yes, there was an act. Signed. BUT! Unapproved by the commander-in-chief. In the future, he will lie there for a year and a half! This allowed the Milevites to eliminate the odds and, having consolidated all their forces, to direct the work of the commission to consider the issue "in the right direction."
In the final report of the commission, it was written about the feasibility of financing the Mi-28N project. The corresponding report on the results of the work of the commission was sent to the NSH, which imposed a resolution:
"Agree".
In addition, the reserves "tightened up," and the President of the Russian Federation issued an Instruction on the earliest possible adoption of the Mi-28N. Work in this direction has boiled with triple strength!
And what about the Ka-52?
A couple of weeks after the end of the commission's work, I was summoned to the General Staff in a certain office and asked my opinion about both helicopters. I replied that, they say, the commission was working, it made its own conclusions. No, they say, we know about it, we are interested in your opinion. Here I declare that the commission was chaired by the commander, and corporate ethics does not allow me to report officially, but as an individual, I have the opportunity to express my independent opinion.
And, after a nod of approval, he told everything that I think about this, concluding that it was necessary to have both helicopters. Since each of them has its own characteristics, which must be optimized to solve certain problems. For example, the Mi-28N is a battlefield vehicle, which must solve the tasks of engaging the enemy with fire on the "front end", and these tasks are solved in 70% of cases - in simple weather conditions during the day. But the Ka-52 should be designed to solve problems at night and in the SMU, that is, special tasks, including on the topic of anti-terror. Hearing my report, they nodded their head for the second time. A report from this department lay on the table of the NSH, which repeated, almost word for word, my proposal, and on which the NSH also wrote: "I agree." So now, when I hear TV announcers about the Ka-52 or during their reporting at MAKS they say “designed to solve anti-terror problems”, I am happy to recognize my idiom, and I think about the fact that “we plowed too…”, and more it is not known what happened with both helicopters. Anyway. Design bureaus and factories made this "iron", and we breathe our soul into it …
Then - there were testers and Torzhok, pilots of combat units and equipment. They taught these children to walk, speak their own language, frolic, be able to stand up for themselves and for others … But all this was only later …
