“It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines. The Americans gave them the derogatory nickname “roaring cows”. The pursuit of Soviet engineers for other characteristics of the boats (speed, immersion depth, weapon power) did not save the situation. The plane, helicopter, or torpedo were still faster. And the boat, being discovered, turned into "game", not having time to become a "hunter".
“The problem of noise reduction of Soviet submarines in the eighties began to be solved. True, they still remained 3-4 times noisier than American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines.
Such statements are constantly found in Russian magazines and books dedicated to domestic nuclear submarines (NPS). This information was taken not from any official sources, but from American and English articles. That is why the terrible noise of Soviet / Russian nuclear submarines is one of the myths of the United States.
It should be noted that not only Soviet shipbuilders faced noise problems, and if we managed to immediately create a combat nuclear submarine capable of serving, then the Americans had more serious problems with their firstborn. The Nautilus had many "childhood diseases" that are so characteristic of all experimental machines. Its engine produced such a level of noise that sonars - the main means of navigating underwater - were practically deafened. As a result, during a campaign in the North Seas in the area of about. Svalbard, sonar "overlooked" a drifting ice floe, which damaged the only periscope. In the future, the Americans launched a struggle to reduce noise. To achieve this, they abandoned double-hull boats, switching to one-and-a-half and single-hull boats, sacrificing important characteristics of submarines: survivability, immersion depth, speed. In our country, they built two-hull. But were the Soviet designers wrong, and the double-hull nuclear submarines so noisy that their combat use would become meaningless?
It would, of course, be good to take data on the noise of domestic and foreign nuclear submarines and compare them. But, it is impossible to do this, because official information on this issue is still considered secret (suffice it to recall the Iowa battleships, for which the real characteristics were disclosed only after 50 years). There is no information at all on American boats (and if it does appear, then it should be treated with the same caution as information about booking a LC Iowa). On domestic nuclear submarines, sometimes there are scattered data. But what is this information? Here are four examples from different articles:
1) When designing the first Soviet nuclear submarine, a set of measures was created to ensure acoustic secrecy … … However, it was not possible to create shock absorbers for the main turbines. As a result, the underwater noise of the nuclear submarine pr. 627 at higher speeds increased to 110 decibels.
2) The SSGN of the 670th project had a very low level of acoustic signature for that time (among the Soviet nuclear-powered ships of the second generation, this submarine was considered the quietest). Its noise at full speed in the ultrasonic frequency range was less than 80, in the infrasonic - 100, in the sound - 110 decibels.
3) When creating a third-generation nuclear submarine, it was possible to achieve a noise reduction in comparison with boats of the previous generation by 12 decibels, or 3, 4 times.
4) Since the 70s of the last century, nuclear submarines have reduced their noise levels by an average of 1 dB in two years. In the last 19 years alone - from 1990 to the present - the average noise level of US nuclear submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.
In principle, it is impossible to draw any sane and logical conclusion on these data about the noise level. Therefore, there is only one way left for us - to analyze the real facts of the service. Here are the most famous cases from the service of domestic nuclear submarines.
1) During an autonomous campaign in the South China Sea in 1968, the K-10 submarine from the first generation of Soviet nuclear missile carriers (project 675) received an order to intercept a US Navy aircraft carrier compound. The aircraft carrier Enterprise covered the Long Beach missile cruiser, frigates and support ships. At the calculated point, Captain 1st Rank R. V. Mazin brought the submarine through the defensive lines of the American order right under the bottom of the Enterprise. Hiding behind the noise of the propellers of a gigantic ship, the submarine accompanied the strike force for thirteen hours. During this time, training torpedo attacks were worked out on all the pennants of the order and acoustic profiles were taken (characteristic noises of various ships). After that, the K-10 successfully abandoned the warrant and at a distance worked out a training missile attack. In the event of a real war, the entire compound would be destroyed by choice: conventional torpedoes or a nuclear strike. It is interesting to note that American experts rated the 675 project extremely low. It was these submarines that they christened "Roaring Cows". And it was they who could not be detected by the ships of the US aircraft carrier formation. The boats of the 675th project were used not only to track surface ships, but sometimes "spoiled life" and the American nuclear-powered ships on duty. So, K-135 in 1967 for 5, 5 hours carried out continuous tracking of SSBN "Patrick Henry", remaining undetected itself.
2) In 1979, during the next aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 (Project 671) carried out combat duty in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The hike lasted 6 months. Participant of the expedition A. N. Shporko reported that the Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very covertly: if the US Navy discovered them for a short time, they could not correctly classify, let alone organize pursuit and practice conditional destruction. Subsequently, these conclusions were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, the tracking of the US Navy ships was carried out at the range of the use of weapons and, if ordered, they would be sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%.
3) In March 1984, the United States and South Korea held their regular annual naval exercises Team Spirit. In Moscow and Pyongyang, they closely followed the exercises. To monitor the American carrier strike group, consisting of the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier and seven US warships, the nuclear torpedo submarine K-314 (Project 671, this is the second generation of nuclear submarines, also reproached for noise) and six warships were sent. Four days later, K-314 was able to locate an aircraft carrier strike group of the US Navy. The aircraft carrier was monitored for the next 7 days, then after the discovery of the Soviet nuclear submarine, the aircraft carrier entered the territorial waters of South Korea. "K-314" remained outside the territorial waters.
Having lost hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier, the submarine under the command of Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Evseenko continued the search. The Soviet submarine headed for the alleged location of the aircraft carrier, but it was not there. The American side kept radio silence.
On March 21st, a Soviet submarine detected strange noises. To clarify the situation, the boat surfaced to periscope depth. The clock was early eleven. According to Vladimir Evseenko, several American ships were seen approaching. It was decided to dive, but it was too late. The aircraft carrier, unnoticed by the crew of the submarine, with its navigation lights turned off, was moving at a speed of about 30 km / h. K-314 was in front of the Kitty Hawk. There was a blow, followed by another. At first, the team decided that the wheelhouse was damaged, but when checked, no water was found in the compartments. As it turned out, in the first collision, the stabilizer was bent, in the second, the propeller was damaged. A huge tug "Mashuk" was sent to her aid. The boat was towed to Chazhma Bay, 50 km east of Vladivostok, where it was to undergo repairs.
The clash was also unexpected for the Americans. According to them, after the impact, they saw a receding silhouette of a submarine without navigation lights. Two American SH-3H anti-submarine helicopters were raised. Having escorted the Soviet submarine, they did not find any visible serious damage to it. However, upon impact, the submarine's propeller was disabled, and she began to lose speed. The propeller also damaged the hull of the aircraft carrier. It turned out that its bottom was proportional to 40 m. Fortunately, no one was injured in this incident. Kitty Hawk was forced to go for repairs at the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines before returning to San Diego. When inspecting the aircraft carrier, a fragment of the K-314 propeller was found stuck in the hull, as well as pieces of the submarine's sound-absorbing coating. The exercise was curtailed, and the incident caused quite a stir: the American press actively discussed how the submarine was able to swim unnoticed at such a close distance to an aircraft carrier group of the US Navy conducting exercises, including with an anti-submarine orientation.
4) In the winter of 1996, 150 miles from the Hebrides. On February 29, the Russian Embassy in London turned to the command of the British Navy with a request to provide assistance to a member of the crew of submarine 671RTM (code "Pike", second generation +), who underwent an operation on board to remove appendicitis, followed by peritonitis (its treatment is possible only under conditions hospital). Soon the patient was redirected to the shore by helicopter Lynx from the destroyer Glasgow. However, the British media were not so much touched by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and the UK, as they expressed bewilderment that during the negotiations in London, in the North Atlantic, in the area where the Russian submarine was located, NATO anti-submarine maneuvers (by the way, EM "Glasgow" also participated in them). But the nuclear-powered ship was only spotted after he himself surfaced to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to the Times, the Russian submarine has demonstrated its secretiveness while tracking anti-submarine forces on an active search. It is noteworthy that the British, in an official statement made to the media, initially attributed the Pike to the more modern (quieter) Project 971, and only later admitted that they could not notice, according to their own statements, the noisy Soviet boat, project 671RTM.
5) In one of the SF training grounds near the Kola Bay, on May 23, 1981, the Soviet nuclear submarine K-211 (SSBN 667-BDR) collided with the American Sturgeon-class submarine. An American submarine rammed the aft part of the K-211 with its wheelhouse, while it was practicing elements of combat training. The American submarine did not surface in the area of the collision. However, a few days later an American nuclear submarine appeared in the area of the British Navy base Holy-Lough with pronounced damage to the cabin. Our submarine surfaced and came to the base on its own. Here the submarine was awaited by a commission, which consisted of specialists from industry, navy, designer and science. The K-211 was docked, and there, during the inspection, holes were found in two aft tanks of the main ballast, damage to the horizontal stabilizer and the right propeller blades. In the damaged tanks, countersunk bolts were found, pieces of plexus and metal from the cabin of a US Navy submarine. Moreover, the commission for individual details was able to establish that the Soviet submarine collided precisely with the American submarine of the Sturgeon class. The huge SSBN pr 667, like all SSBNs, was not intended for sharp maneuvers that the American nuclear submarine could not dodge, so the only explanation for this incident is that the Sturgeon did not see and did not even suspect that it was in the immediate vicinity of K- 211. It should be noted that the Sturgeon-class submarines were intended specifically to combat submarines and carried the appropriate modern search equipment.
It should be noted that submarine collisions are not uncommon. The last for the domestic and American nuclear submarines was a collision near Kildin Island, in Russian territorial waters, on February 11, 1992, the K-276 nuclear submarine (entered service in 1982), under the command of Captain Second Rank I. Lokt, collided with the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge ("Los Angeles"), which was tracking the ships of the Russian Navy in the exercise area, missed the Russian nuclear submarine. As a result of the collision, the cabin was damaged at the "Crab". The position of the American nuclear submarine turned out to be more difficult, it barely managed to reach the base, after which it was decided not to repair the boat, but to withdraw it from the fleet.
6) Perhaps the most striking fragment in the biography of the Project 671RTM ships was their participation in the large operations Aport and Atrina, conducted by the 33rd Division in the Atlantic and significantly shaken the United States' confidence in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine missions.
On May 29, 1985, three Project 671RTM submarines (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the K-488 submarine (Project 671RT), left Zapadnaya Litsa on May 29, 1985. Later they were joined by the nuclear submarine of project 671 - K-147. Of course, the exit of an entire compound of nuclear submarines into the ocean for US naval intelligence could not go unnoticed. An intensive search began, but they did not bring the expected results. At the same time, the secretly operating Soviet nuclear-powered ships themselves watched the missile submarines of the US Navy in the area of their combat patrols (for example, the K-324 nuclear submarine had three sonar contacts with the US nuclear submarine, with a total duration of 28 hours. And the K-147 is equipped with the latest tracking system for The nuclear submarine on the wake, using the specified system and acoustic means, carried out a six-day (!!!) tracking of the American SSBN "Simon Bolivar." In addition, the submarines studied the tactics of American anti-submarine aviation. -488 On July 1, Operation Aport ended.
7) In March-June 1987, they carried out a close-scale operation "Atrina", in which five submarines of project 671RTM took part - K-244 (under the command of the captain of the second rank V. Alikov), K-255 (under the command of the captain of the second rank B. Yu. Muratov), K-298 (under the command of the captain of the second rank Popkov), K-299 (under the command of the captain of the second rank N. I. Klyuev) and K-524 (under the command of the captain of the second rank A. F. Smelkov) … Although the Americans learned about the withdrawal of nuclear submarines from Zapadnaya Litsa, they lost ships in the North Atlantic. The "spearfishing" began again, to which practically all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic Fleet were attracted - coastal and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States naval forces in the Atlantic), 3 powerful ship search group and 3 newest ships of the "Stolworth" type (hydroacoustic observation ships), which used powerful underwater explosions to form a hydroacoustic pulse. The ships of the British fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of the commanders of domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so great that it seemed impossible to swim up for air pumping and a radio communication session. For Americans, those who failed in 1985 needed to get their faces back. Despite the fact that all possible anti-submarine forces of the US Navy and its allies were pulled into the area, the nuclear submarines managed to unnoticed reach the Sargasso Sea region, where the Soviet "veil" was finally discovered. The Americans managed to establish the first short contacts with submarines only eight days after Operation Atrina began. Project 671RTM nuclear submarines were mistaken for strategic missile submarines, which only increased the concern of the US naval command and the country's political leadership (it should be recalled that these events fell on the peak of the Cold War, which could turn into "Hot"). During the return to the base to detach from the anti-submarine weapons of the American Navy, the submarine commanders were allowed to use secret means of hydroacoustic countermeasures, until that moment the Soviet nuclear submarines were successfully hiding from the anti-submarine forces solely due to the characteristics of the submarines themselves.
The success of Operations Atrina and Aport confirmed the assumption that the US naval forces, with the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union, will not be able to organize any effective countermeasures to them.
As we can see from the available facts, the American anti-submarine forces were not able to ensure the detection of Soviet nuclear submarines, including the first generations, and to protect their navies from sudden attacks from the depths. And all the statements that “It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines” have no basis.
Now let's look at the myth that high speeds, maneuverability and diving depth do not provide any advantages. And again we turn to the known facts:
1) In September-December 1971, the Soviet nuclear submarine of Project 661 (number K-162) made its first voyage to full autonomy with a combat route from the Greenland Sea to the Brazilian Trench. the head of which was the aircraft carrier "Saratoga". The submarine was able to spot the cover ships and tried to drive away. Under normal conditions, a submarine sniping would mean a disruption of a combat mission, but not in this case. K-162 developed a speed of over 44 knots in a submerged position. Attempts to drive off the K-162, or break away at speed were unsuccessful. The Saratoga had no chances with a maximum travel of 35 knots. In the course of many hours of chase, the Soviet submarine worked out training torpedo attacks and several times came out to an advantageous angle for launching Amethyst missiles. But the most interesting thing is that the submarine was maneuvering so quickly that the Americans were sure that they were being pursued by a "wolf pack" - a group of submarines. What does it mean? This suggests that the appearance of the boat in the new square was so unexpected for the Americans, or rather unexpected, that they considered it a contact with the new submarine. Consequently, in the event of hostilities, the Americans would search for and strike to defeat in a completely different square. Thus, it is almost impossible not to evade the attack, nor to destroy the submarine in the presence of a high speed of the submarine.
2) In the early 1980s. one of the USSR nuclear submarines, which operated in the North Atlantic, set a kind of record, for 22 hours it watched the nuclear-powered ship of the "potential enemy", being in the aft sector of the tracking object. Despite all the attempts of the commander of the NATO submarine to change the situation, it was not possible to throw the enemy "off the tail": the tracking was stopped only after the commander of the Soviet submarine received the appropriate orders from the shore. This incident happened with the project 705 nuclear submarine - perhaps the most controversial and striking ship in the history of Soviet submarine building. This project deserves a separate article. Project 705 nuclear submarines had a maximum speed, which is comparable to the speed of universal and anti-submarine torpedoes of "potential opponents", but most importantly, due to the peculiarities of the power plant (no special transition to increased parameters of the main power plant was required with an increase in speed, as was the case on submarines with water-powered reactors), were able to develop full speed in minutes, having practically "airplane" acceleration characteristics. Significant speed made it possible for a short time to enter the "shadow" sector of a submarine or surface ship, even if the "Alpha" was previously detected by the enemy's hydroacoustics. According to the recollections of Rear Admiral Bogatyrev, who was in the past the commander of K-123 (project 705K), the submarine could turn "on a patch", which is especially important during active tracking of the "enemy" and its submarines one after another. "Alpha" did not allow other submarines to enter the course aft corners (that is, in the area of hydroacoustic shadow), which are especially favorable for tracking and delivering sudden torpedo strikes.
The high maneuverability and speed characteristics of the Project 705 nuclear submarine made it possible to practice effective evasion maneuvers from enemy torpedoes with a further counterattack. In particular, the submarine could circulate 180 degrees at maximum speed and start moving in the opposite direction after 42 seconds. The commanders of Project 705 nuclear submarines A. F. Zagryadskiy and A. U. Abbasov said that such a maneuver made it possible, when gradually gaining speed to maximum and simultaneously performing a turn with a change in depth, to force the enemy watching them in the noise direction finding mode to lose the target, and the Soviet nuclear submarine to go "into the tail" of the enemy "by fighter".
3) On August 4, 1984, the nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets" made an unprecedented dive in the history of world naval navigation - the arrows of its depth gauges first froze at the 1000-meter mark, and then crossed it. K-278 sailed and maneuvered at a depth of 1027m, and fired torpedoes at a depth of 1000 meters. To journalists, this seems to be a common whim of the Soviet military and designers. They do not understand why it is necessary to achieve such depths, if the Americans at that time limited themselves to 450 meters. To do this, you need to know ocean hydroacoustics. Increasing the depth reduces the detection capability in a non-linear fashion. Between the upper, strongly heated layer of ocean water and the lower, colder one, lies the so-called layer of the temperature jump. If, say, the sound source is in a cold dense layer, above which there is a warm and less dense layer, the sound is reflected from the boundary of the upper layer and propagates only in the lower cold layer. The upper layer in this case is a "zone of silence", a "shadow zone", into which the noise from the submarine propellers does not penetrate. Simple sound direction finders of a surface anti-submarine ship will not be able to find it, and the submarine can feel safe. There can be several such layers in the ocean, and each layer additionally hides a submarine. The axis of the earth's sound channel has an even greater hiding effect, below which the working depth of the K-278 was. Even the Americans admitted that it was impossible to detect nuclear submarines at a depth of 800 m or more by any means. And anti-submarine torpedoes are not designed for such a depth. Thus, the K-278 going at the working depth was invisible and invulnerable.
Do questions then arise about the importance of maximum speeds, diving depth and maneuverability for submarines?
And now we will cite the statements of officials and institutions, which for some reason domestic journalists prefer to ignore.
According to scientists from MIPT cited in the work "The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussion and Arguments" (Dolgoprudny Publishing House, 1995), even under the most favorable hydrological conditions (the probability of their occurrence in the northern seas is no more than 0.03), the nuclear submarine pr. 971 (for reference: serial construction began back in 1980) can be detected by American nuclear submarines Los Angeles with GAKAN / BQQ-5 at ranges of no more than 10 km. Under less favorable conditions (i.e. 97% of weather conditions in the northern seas), it is impossible to detect Russian nuclear submarines.
There is also a statement by the prominent American naval analyst N. Polmoran made at a hearing at the National Security Committee of the House of Representatives of the US Congress: “The appearance of Russian boats of the 3rd generation demonstrated that Soviet shipbuilders closed the noise gap much earlier than we could have imagined … According to the US Navy, at operational speeds of the order of 5-7 knots, the noise of the 3rd generation Russian submarines, recorded by the US sonar reconnaissance means, was lower than the noise of the most advanced US Navy nuclear submarines of the Improved Los Angeles type."
According to the Chief of Operations Department of the US Navy, Admiral D. Burd (Jeremi Boorda), made in 1995, American ships are not able to accompany Russian third-generation nuclear submarines at speeds of 6-9 knots.
This is probably enough to assert that the Russian “roaring cows” are able to carry out the tasks before them in the face of any opposition from the enemy.
