In connection with the transition on the western front to trench warfare and the lack of the prospect of a quick defeat of the enemy on this front, the German high command, after some internal struggle, finally chose the eastern front as the main theater of war for 1915.
After the withdrawal of the Russian troops, in mid-December 1914, approximately the following situation was created on the eastern front. Before the fortified positions of the Germans along the river. Angerapu and the Mazury Lakes, the 10th Russian army, which had 15 infantry, stopped. divisions against 8 German. On the left bank of the river. Vistula after stubborn battles 1st, 2nd and 5th Russian armies (33 infantry divisions) took up positions for pp. Bzura and Ravkoy. The 9th German Army (25 infantry divisions) was located opposite this sector of the Russian front. Further south, between pp. Pilica and Vistula, the 4th and 9th Russian armies (17 infantry divisions) were located, with the 4th Austrian army (17 divisions) in front of them. 4th Army provided the left flank of the northwestern front. The Russian armies in Galicia (3rd, 8th and 11th), after repelling the Austrian offensive, consolidated their positions, against which there were 31 infantry. enemy division. Thus, against 103 Russian divisions on the entire front (including the reserve of the high command), the Germans had 83 divisions (including Austrian ones). "The experience of Tannenberg and the battles in the Masurian Lakes have shown," says Ludendorff in his memoirs, "that a major and rapid success can be achieved only if the enemy is attacked from two sides." “Now the opportunity has arisen,” he continues, “to concentrate a strong group of three army corps between the Neman and the road Insterburg, Gumbinen and strike, enveloping in the direction of Tilsit, Vladislavov and Kalwaria. Another group, which included the 11th Reserve Corps, to which 2 more infantry and 4 cavalry divisions were assigned, was directed between the Spirding lakes and the border through Byala to Raigorod, to Augustow and further south … Both shock groups had to surround the enemy (i.e., the 10th Russian army), and the earlier if the encirclement, the better for us … The prerequisite was the strong retention of the long front line Wloclawsk, Mlawa, Johanisburg, Osovets "{1}. At the same time, the German command also planned a strike from the south, in the Carpathians. "We are planning a new strike in East Prussia. If the Hungarian railways in peacetime were better built, strategically such a strike would be desirable in the Carpathians" {2}.
To strike from East Prussia with the aim of covering both flanks of the 10th Russian army, the German command transferred large forces from the left bank of the r. Vistula (diagram 1).
Scheme 1. Position of the sides by February 15, 1915
The Russian main command, under pressure from the Entente, again set the troops the task of capturing East Prussia. The main blow was planned to be delivered from the front of Pultusk, Ostrolenka in the direction of Soldau, Ortelsburg, that is, to the flank of the 10th German army. For this purpose, a new, 12th Army of General Plehve was formed. The operation was supposed to begin after the full concentration of the 12th Army, around 28 February. The purpose of this operation: "to cause a regrouping of German forces in East Prussia, in the hope that with such a grouping it will be possible to detect the desire of the Germans in some areas, where it will be possible to direct our efforts to break through the enemy location and further development, success in this direction. "{3}.
The Russian high command, having adopted a plan to strike at East Prussia, assigned subordinate importance to the operations of the southwestern front. But the commander-in-chief of this front, General Ivanov, influencing the General Headquarters, achieved a decision to simultaneously strike in the direction of Hungary. Consequently, in February 1915 g.the supreme command of the Russian army outlined two plans - an offensive into East Prussia and into Hungary - which were to be carried out in parallel. This led to the theme that the efforts of the Russian army were aimed in two directions, which caused a dispersion of forces along diverging lines of operations.
The German command was aware of the plan of the Russian Headquarters. Taking advantage of the speed of regrouping, it decided to warn its enemy and planned to launch a counterattack in order to deeply cover the Russian front from both flanks - from the north and from the Carpathians - and seize the initiative in its own hands..
In February 1915, the Germans launched an offensive operation against the 10th Russian army, as a result of which they not only thwarted the attack prepared by the Russian command into East Prussia, but pushed the 10th army out of this area, while encircling the 20th Russian corps and captivating its remnants.
In connection with the created situation, the Prasnysh operation, which unfolded in the Mlavsky direction, immediately after the February operation in East Prussia, acquires special significance.
The aim of the Prasnysh operation on the part of the Germans was to firmly hold the line Wloclavsk, Mlawa, Ioganisburg, Osovets. "As soon as the deployment of the army group is completed, it will be necessary to think about how to first move the flank of the army group to the Skrva river, so that in this way it will be against the flank of a possible offensive of the Russian army and be able to adhere to the left flank of the 9th army at the mouth r. Bzury "{4}, - said in the directive to General Galvits, who led the actions in the Mlavsky direction. General Galwitz believed that only an offensive starting more precisely than the left flank of his group could prevent the Russians from transferring forces to support the 10th Army from the Masurian Lakes. Proceeding from this, he decides to continue the offensive, which had begun even earlier, on his right flank in the direction of Drobin, Ratsiyazh and after the arrival of the 1st rez. corps (from the 9th Army) to strike in the direction of Prasnysh and to the east. Thus, the Germans set the task of firmly holding the Wloclawsk, Johannisburg line by active actions, attracting significant Russian forces in order to prevent the transfer of forces to support the 10th Army. The Russian command set itself the task of concentrating the 12th and 1st armies on the Lomzha, Prasnysh, Plock line and advancing on Soldau and further to the northwest. But, as we already know, the idea of a deep invasion of East Prussia, conceived by the Russian command, was thwarted by the German offensive from East Prussia and the defeat of the 10th Russian army.
The Russian command, represented by the commander of the 1st Army, General Litvinov, sets a more limited task - to cover the approaches to Warsaw from the Wilenberg and Thorn sides with an offensive in the northwestern direction, without waiting for the final concentration of the 12th Army. On February 15, General Litvinov issues a directive, according to which the main blow is delivered on the left flank of the army, where he is concentrating significant forces. In the area of Prasnysh and to the west, the weak parts of the 1st Turkestan corps and the cavalry of General Khimets remain.
By the beginning of the Prasnysh operation, the Germans had the following forces: the army group of General Galvits as part of the corps of Generals Tsastrov, Dikhgut, 1st Res. corps, 1st guard. divisions, units of the 20th arm. corps, landsturm and 2 cavalry divisions, that is, a total of 4 corps and 2 cavalry divisions. Army Group Galvits had strong heavy artillery. On the side of the Russians at the initial stage in the Prasnysh operation, the troops of the 1st Army took part: 1st Turkestan, 27th and 19th arm. corps, the cavalry corps of General Oranovsky, the cavalry group of General Erdeli and other cavalry units - a total of 3 corps and 9½ cavalry divisions. Thus, at the beginning of the operation, the Germans had superiority in the infantry. If we consider that the Russian armies had a large shortage of personnel, experienced "shell hunger" and had a small number of artillery, then the advantage was clearly on the side of the Germans.
Directly on the Mlavsky (Prasnyshsky) direction, there were 2 German corps (Tsastrov's corps and the 1st res. Corps), parts of the 20th corps and landsturmen units, or only 2½ corps; the Russians have the Turkestan corps and the 63rd infantry. division (from the 27th Army Corps), that is, the Germans had a double superiority.
At the end of the operation, the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps took part on the side of the Russians (the latter belonged to the 12th army), which changed the balance of forces of the sides in the Prasnysh direction and gave some superiority to the Russian army (5 army corps against 4 German ones) …
The area of operation is a hilly plain sloping from north to south. It is cut by the tributaries of the Vistula and Narew rivers. The valleys of these rivers are 1-3 km wide and are swampy in places. Of the rivers, the river deserves attention. Orzhits with a swampy valley up to 1 km wide; from Horzhele the width of the valley reaches 5-6 km: the river splits into branches and presents a serious obstacle to the crossing. Orzhitsa tributary, r. Hungarian, flows through Prasnysh. Left tributary of the Vengerka, r. Ant crossed the positions of both sides. Both rivers have valleys up to 1-2 km wide. The rest of the rivers are insignificant; they all flow from north to south, that is, almost parallel to the paths of the sides' offensive.
The hills are not high, their slopes are mostly flat, the tops could often serve as good observation points. The soil in the area of operations is loam with an admixture of podzol. During muddy roads, such soil quickly turns into mud, which sticks to the feet and wheels and makes it extremely difficult to move. The area is rich in paths, but all dirt roads were in poor condition. Consequently, the area was convenient for the actions of all types of troops. However, by the time of the fighting there was a thaw, which significantly influenced the course of the battle.
Scheme 2. Battles from 18 to 25 February 1915
PROGRESS OF MILITARY ACTIONS
The Prasnysh operation can be divided into three stages:
The first stage (from 15 to 21 February) - battles in the Rationzh area. Drobin (on the left flank of the 1st Russian army).
The second stage (from 17 to 24 February) - the capture of the city of Prasnysh by the Germans.
The third stage (from February 25 to March 3) is the re-capture of the city of Prasnysh by the Russians.
The first and second stages coincide in time, but they took place on different, extreme, flanks of the 1st Russian army.
Already starting from February 10, the German corps of General Dichgut and the 1st Guards. res. the division was advancing in the direction of Drobin, Rationzh. Standing on the Russian left flank, Erdeli's cavalry and the 1st Cavalry Corps retreated to the river. Skrve to the southeast. Apart from the 1st Turkestan corps, which were already operating here, the 27th and 19th armies were sent here. housing.
On February 17, General Litvinov issued a directive, which prescribed: the 1st Turkestan corps to continue the fulfillment of the previous mission, that is, to restrain the enemy in the Mlavsky direction; To the 19th Army and 1st Cavalry Corps - to continue the offensive on the Glinojeck, Ratsionzh front; units of the 27th arm. corps to facilitate this offensive. Thus, the private offensive of the Germans attracted almost all the forces of the 1st Russian army, weakening the Prasnysh direction, where already on February 17, 2 German army corps began to advance (1 res. Corps and the corps of General Tsastrov).
On this front, the fighting went on with varying success: Russian troops partially pressed the Germans, then the latter forced General Erdeli's cavalry to withdraw, and in the end the fighting took on a protracted nature.
On February 17, the offensive of the left flank of General Galvitz's group began. 1st res. the corps, pushing forward the forward detachments, concentrated at Horzhel. To the right of it acted the corps of General Tsastrov.
On February 17 and 18, the Germans advanced slightly on this flank. Their bypassing group under the command of General Shtaabs reached the river. Orzhits, however, could not capture the crossing to the east of Unicorozhets, which was defended by the Russians. On February 18, General Galvits decided to strike with the forces of the 1st res. corps to the west of Prasnysh and crush the flank of the 1st Turkestan corps, located in Tsekhanov. However, the commander-in-chief of the German eastern front considered the strike east of Prasnysh more valid for its capture and issued a directive to go over to the offensive bypassing Prasnysh.
Fulfilling this directive, General Galvits on February 18 ordered the 1st cut. the corps with its main forces the next day to advance east of Prasnysh in such a way as to attack the 1st Turkestan corps of the Russians on the right flank and rear on 20 February. At the time of the operation, 1st cut. the corps was subordinate to the right-flank division from the corps of General Tsastrov (division of General Vernitsa); she had to bypass Prasnysh from the west (diagram 2).
At this time, the thaw began, the roads became impassable. As a result, the 1st cut. the division reached the Schl in advance units, and the 36th cut. division - only up to Ednorozhets.
February 20 1st res. the corps bypassed Prasnysh from the east and southeast and, without encountering significant resistance from the Russian troops, formed a front to the west.
To parry the detour, the commander of the 1st Turkestan corps sent 2 battalions to Shchuki, up to 5 battalions to Golyany, and 2 militia squads to the Makov region. However, the commander of the 1st Army, General Litvinov, still believed that his left flank was the main direction, and did not take decisive measures to eliminate the German strike in the Prasnysh direction. Meanwhile, the concentration of the troops of the 12th Russian army continued, and by February 20, the 2nd Siberian corps, having completed the transfer by rail, gathered in the Ostrov area. The 1st Siberian Corps by this time was on the march to Serotsk.
On February 21, the 1st German cut. the corps was tasked with capturing the town of Prasnysh in order to then strike in the rear of the 1st Turkestan corps in the direction of Tsekhanov. 1st cut. the division attacked a fortified position east and south-east of Prasnysh.
As a result of the battle, the Russian units were driven back from the forward positions. 36th cut. the division, heading for a bypass south of Prasnysh, met strong resistance from the Russian troops and only in the evening was able to push back the 63rd Infantry's right flank. division defending the town of Prasnysh. As a result, with the onset of darkness from the left flank of the 1st Turkestan corps, about 2 infantry regiments were transferred to Stara Ves (25 km south of Prasnysh) to intercept the roads leading from Prasnysh.
On February 21, General Litvinov received the following telegram from the front commander, General Ruzsky: “The 1st Army was tasked with keeping the Vyshegrod, Plonsk, Tsekhanov, Prasnysh line at all costs. front, to the 1st army is the Mlavskoe direction. The task assigned to the first army can be performed defensively or offensively. With a defensive method of action, trained fortifications on the indicated line should be occupied, and on the main, that is, on the Mlavskoe direction, there should be a strong In the case of solving the current task by an offensive, it is obvious that it is necessary to attack precisely on the main direction, that is, on Mlavskoye. In the direction of Ratsionzh, Drobin, the 19th and 27th corps were ordered to advance. and is impractical because it does not correspond to the main task of the front and the joint actions of the 1st Army with the 12th Army … In view of all the above, I propose to regroup the forces of the 1st Army in accordance with the just expressed main tasks of the front and the first army … and finish regroup as soon as possible {5}.
Thus, only when Prasnysh was already bypassed and, in fact, surrounded, when the offensive of the German troops reached full development, General Litvinov had to abandon (and then under pressure from above) his plan and act in accordance with the prevailing situation.
By February 22, the situation was as follows: the division of General Vernitsa entered the Mlawa highway, Prasnysh near Grudusk and east of it; 36th cut. By the end of the day, the division occupied Volya Verzhbovsk and thus cut off the Russian units defending in Prasnysh from the retreat route to Tsekhanov. Then the commander of the 1st Turkestan corps decided to temporarily bend the right flank of his positions south of Volya Verzhbovsk to cover the routes from Tsekhanov.
The next day, 23 February, General Wernitz's division advanced with its left flank and came into contact with the 1st cut. the building at Wola Berzbowska. The ring closed around Prasnysh. On the same day, the Germans attacked Prasnysh and captured the southern outskirts of the city and the barracks located in its eastern part. Garrison of Prasnysh - 63rd Infantry. division - stubbornly defended. However, due to the superiority in forces on the side of the Germans, on the morning of February 24, Prasnysh was taken.
One of the participants in the Prasnysh battles describes this moment as follows: "On February 24, at about 10 o'clock, the drama of the Prasnysh garrison ended. Having lost more than half of the staff from the fire, he could not resist the fresh forces brought by Galvits …" {6}. Meanwhile, 2 Russian corps were in a hurry to the place of the battle, to Prasnysh: the 2nd Siberian from the east and the 1st Siberian from the south. By February 20, the corps had completed the transfer by rail and concentrated in the Ostrov and Serotsk area. However, the actions of these corps were not coordinated. This was the result of the 2nd Siberian Corps being subordinated to the commander of the 12th Army, and the 1st Siberian Corps to the commander of the 1st Army. On February 21, the 2nd Siberian corps made a march from the Island to Ostrolenka, and the 1st Siberian corps settled down for the night 6-8 km south-west of Serotsk. The next day, the 2nd Siberian Corps reached the area 6-8 km west of Ostrolenka, and the 1st Siberian Corps reached the Pultusk area. Here they spent the night. On February 23, the 2nd Siberian corps approached Krasnoselts, and the 1st Siberian corps - to Makov, and its forward units entered into contact with the troops of the 1st Turkestan corps. When forcing the river. Orzhits, which was a significant obstacle as a result of the thaw, units of the 2nd Siberian corps met resistance from the enemy. The 1st Siberian Corps, slowly and cautiously advancing to the north, advanced only 6-8 km on February 23 with very little German resistance. By the end of the day, units of the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps were located about 18 km from Prasnysh.
At 22:00 on February 23, the commander of the 2nd Siberian corps received a directive from the commander of the 12th Army, General Plehve, which stated: attack to the flank and rear. " At the same time, it was indicated: "it is necessary to capture the messages of the enemy retreating to the north and northeast" {7}.
Scheme 3. Battles from 25 to 28 February 1915
In accordance with this directive, the commander of the 2nd Siberian corps sets the task of the right-flank 5th Siberian division to advance on the Shlya, Bartniki front in order to get out of the way of the enemy's communications. The 4th Siberian Division was ordered to advance along the crossing at Podosye in the general direction to the Bartniki, Prasnysh front, to attack the enemy in the eastern and southern directions, aiming, together with the 1st Siberian Corps, to cover the enemy, cutting off his retreat. The 1st Siberian Corps, advancing from Makov to Prasnysh, did not receive any specific mission.
The commander of the 1st Army until the last moment kept his main forces (27th and 19th Army Corps, 1st Cavalry Corps) on his left flank. And only on February 24, General Litvinov wrote in his directive: "I demand that tomorrow, February 25, the 1st Siberian corps take Prasnysh, and the 1st Turk. Corps - the Khoinovo region." On February 25, General Litvinov issues a new directive, according to which the 3rd Kav. the corps is withdrawn from the battle on the left flank of the army and concentrates on the Mlavsky direction. The next day, he withdraws from the battle on the left flank and the 19th arm. frame.
Thus, under the influence of the enemy, General Litvinov was forced to change his original grouping. But it was too late. 1st cav. Until the end of the battle, the corps could not take part in hostilities in the Prasnysh direction.
General Galvits, having intelligence information about the approach of the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps. On February 25, he decided to go on the defensive. The defense of Prasnysh was built as follows (diagram 3): the 36th cut was defended from the south. division, adjacent to the division of General Vernitz; from the east - 9th lundv. brigade and half of the 3rd infantry. divisions; the 1st cut was in reserve. division.
On February 25, units of the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps went over to the offensive. Under the pressure of the 1st Siberian corps, the 36th cut. division of the Germans, began to withdraw. During the day, the corps advanced 6 km and entered the line 8 km south of Prasnysh. The 1st Turkestan corps, with its right flank, advanced to the Zelena, Volya Verzhbovsk line.
The 2nd Siberian Corps broke the resistance of the 9th Landau with a night attack. brigade and went to the front B. Grzhibki, Frankovo, Karvach, that is, he approached Prasnysh up to 5 km.
The next day, the commander of the 2nd Siberian Corps received a directive from General Plehve "to beat the enemy, pursue him in the most persistent, merciless manner, if possible, not release him, but take or destroy, generally show extreme energy … trying not to release the units retreating from Prasnysh enemy and capture the path of his retreat from Prasnysh to the north-east and north "{8}. All this day, units of the 2nd Siberian corps fought a stubborn battle from the 9th landva. brigade by 15 o'clock, occupied the line of Dembina, Karvach, Fiyalkovo. At 16 o'clock. 30 minutes. the commander of the 2nd Siberian corps received a new directive, which indicated that "in view of the information about the withdrawal of the Germans to the north of Prasnysh, it is advisable to give your columns a more northern direction to produce deeper coverage" {9}. It was only after such an instruction that the commander of the 2nd corps decided to move the 17th regiment to Ednorozhets under the command of Colonel Tarakanov. By the end of the day on February 26, units of the 2nd Siberian corps reached the Kuskovo, Bartniki, Zavadki line, that is, they hung on the flank and threatened the rear of the 1st cut. housing. However, this advantageous position was not used due to the lack of initiative of the command, starting with the corps commander and ending with the commander of the 17th regiment, Colonel Tarakanov.
On the same day, the 1st Siberian Corps captured Dobrzhankovo (6 km southeast of Prasnysh) with a night attack, capturing a large number of prisoners (about 2000 people) and 20 guns. The 1st Turkestan corps attacked the 36th res. division and divisions of General Vernitsa in the Zelena, Laguna sector and advanced to the western approaches of Prasnysh, reaching the Golyany, Dzilin front in the evening.
On February 27, the commander of the 2nd Siberian Corps received instructions from the army commander to develop a vigorous pursuit. The corps commander gave the order, according to which Colonel Tarakanov was ordered to leave 2 battalions with artillery at Ednorozhets in order to prevent the enemy in his attempts to retreat along the Prasnysh, Ednorozhets road, and the rest of the forces immediately move through Charzhast to Lanenta on the Khorzhelevskoe highway, where to cut off the enemy's escape routes …
In view of the fact that at 15 o'clock on February 27, a directive from the army headquarters about the attack of Prasnysh followed, the commander of the 2nd Siberian corps gave an additional order, which the 17th regiment was tasked with advancing from Lanenta to Olshevets, and all other units to advance on Prasnysh …
Prasnysh's attack began at different times. At 15 o'clock. 30 minutes.units of the 1st Siberian Division (1st Siberian Corps) broke into the eastern outskirts of Prasnysh and captured many prisoners. At 10 o'clock the 4th Siberian Division (2nd Siberian Corps.) Attacked from the north, east and south into Prasnysh and also captured prisoners and trophies (1,500 prisoners and 6 machine guns). By 19 o'clock on February 27, Prasnysh was cleared of the enemy.
The next day, February 28, General Litvinov issues a directive on energetic pursuit of the defeated enemy. However, the persecution, in the proper sense of the word, was not organized. The cavalry groups attached to the Siberian corps did not receive specific tasks and, in fact, remained in the second echelon. This allowed the enemy to break away from the Russian troops and organize a systematic withdrawal in the northwest direction.
On February 28, the 2nd Siberian corps slowly advanced behind the retreating 1st cut. corps of the Germans, the 1st Siberian corps advanced along the positions of the 1st Turkestan corps, and in some points, as a result, a mixture of units turned out. The Russian cavalry, the Khimetsa detachment and other units remained inactive at all times and were in the rear. 1st cav. the corps arrived late and did not take part in the pursuit.
Further events developed here as follows. The German troops, having managed to break away from the pursuing Russian units, retreated to Horzhel to fortified positions, where they stopped. Russian troops, approaching these positions, tried to attack them, but to no avail. There was no reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, there was no artillery preparation, the troops went on the attack unprepared - all this predetermined its failure.
On March 7, the Germans again launched an offensive against parts of the 2nd Siberian Corps from Horzhele to Edinrozhets, Prasnysh and pushed the Russian troops back almost to Prasnysh. To counter this offensive, the 23rd Army was sent. corps, which defeated the left flank of the group of General Galvits and restored the position. The German units again withdrew to Mlava and Horzhel. The fighting on this front gradually began to take on a protracted nature and by the middle of March had completely died down.
* * *
The Prasnysh operation ended with the fact that the Germans, having occupied Prasnysh, were forced to give it back two days later, losing over 6,000 prisoners and leaving 58 guns. The plans of the German command failed, they failed to defeat the Russian armies, which were concentrated in the Mlavsky direction (the 1st and 12th Russian armies), but, on the contrary, had to withdraw their troops to fortified positions to the state border themselves.
The Prasnysh operation undoubtedly had a significant impact on the entire course of hostilities on the Russian northwestern front. After the withdrawal of the 10th Russian army from East Prussia and the death of the 20th arm. corps in the Augustow forests, the victory of the Russian troops near Prasnysh to some extent contributed to the strengthening of the position of the Russian armies on this front, and on March 2, the 10th, 12th and 1st Russian armies launched a general offensive in order to push the Germans back from the line of the Bobra and Narew rivers to the limits of East Prussia. If we recall that Ludendorff's desire during the spring campaign of 1915 to firmly hold the Wloclawsk front, Mlawa was the main prerequisite for his grandiose plan to encircle the Russian armies in Poland, then the significance of the Prasnysh operation becomes clearer, since after the defeat at Prasnysh the position of the German troops on this line could no longer be called solid. Thus, the success of the Russian troops in this operation, along with other factors, upset the German plan for the spring campaign of 1915.
Assessing the actions of the parties, it should be noted that the Russian troops fought bravely, staunchly, despite extremely difficult supply conditions. The units operated in a spring thaw. Zayonchkovsky rightly notes that "… one positive fact can be noted in the actions of the western group of Russian troops - it is more and more rooted in the habit of private chiefs to respond to a blow with a counterstrike. The Prasnysh operation is a positive example in this respect" {10}.
However, the high command of the Russian troops did a poor job. The main focus was on the left flank, while the situation required an offensive on the right flank. When deciding to attack on the left flank, the commander of the 1st Russian army did not provide his right flank, as a result of which Prasnysh was captured by the enemy. There was no proper interaction between the commanders of the 1st and 12th Russian armies, there was no such interaction between the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps: they maintained an elbow connection with each other, which was not a necessity in this situation. Poor intelligence on the part of the Russians should also be noted. As a result, the enemy's blow to Prasnysh was unexpected. But reconnaissance was organized especially poorly when the 2nd and 1st Siberian corps approached Prasnysh. Despite the fact that the Russian troops had a lot of cavalry, both corps went without cavalry reconnaissance.
The pursuit of the retreating enemy was extremely poorly organized. The Russian cavalry, as a rule, was inactive.
The commander of the 2nd Siberian Corps also did the wrong thing, who, having received instructions from the army commander to pursue the enemy and to envelop him from the north, sent only one regiment bypassing, which was clearly not enough in this situation. The commander of this regiment, Colonel Tarakanov, instead of deeper and faster bypassing the retreating columns of the enemy, waited all day on February 27 in the village of Vulka (1 km north of Charzhast), when the enemy was already knocked out of Prasnysh and was retreating, thereby helping to separate the German troops from the Russians. parts.
As for the German troops, here it should be noted the lack of control of the operation, especially in the dynamics of the battle. Acting to forestall the enemy, the Germans at the same time undertook the Prasnysh operation with insufficient forces. Knowing well about the approach to Prasnysh of the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps, they hoped to preempt the Russians, bypassing the right flank of the 1st Turkestan corps, but they were mistaken in their calculations.
