"Admiral Kuznetsov", "Liaoning", "Nimitz": who is worth what
In terms of the degree of compliance of the ship's combat effectiveness with its intended purpose, our aircraft carrier is inferior to the "American" in local conflicts by about 14 percent, in a large-scale war - by about 10 percent. At the same time "Kuznetsov" surpasses the Chinese "Liaoning" by the same indicators by 10 and 6 percent, respectively.
Aircraft carriers are the backbone of the American fleet. Should have taken its rightful place in the Soviet Navy. Did not happen. However, they can become, and in the near future, in 15-20 years the core of the surface forces of the PLA Navy. Therefore, a comparison of such ships is very important for assessing the combat capabilities of the fleets as a whole.
In addition, the aircraft carriers reflect the highest achievements in the field of not only shipbuilding, but also aviation. Therefore, a comparative analysis is also important for assessing the technological level of states in the respective industries.
Weighing
The method of comparison is known to regular readers ("Sea battle with the shadow:" Moscow "against" Ticonderoga "). It begins with the selection of the ships to be compared. One of them, of course, should be our only aircraft carrier (more precisely, a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser) of project 1143.5 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" or simply "Kuznetsov". The main competitor of Russia in the seas and oceans was and remains the United States, therefore it is quite correct to choose for comparison the main type of the American aircraft carrier - "Nimitz". One could stop at this, but today it is actively developing water areas, starting to build up the naval confrontation with the United States and China. Therefore, it is advisable to take for comparison also the Chinese "Liaoning", aka the former Soviet "Varyag".
The next step is to analyze the tasks for which the aircraft carriers are intended. Ships of this class in different states, despite their versatility, have specific features. Some are designed primarily for solving anti-submarine defense (ASW) tasks, such as the British Invincible type, others are focused on the air defense of ship formations at sea, this directly relates to Kuznetsov, and still others are truly universal. An example of the latter is just the American ones.
Aircraft carriers also differ in size with the corresponding differences between air groups and combat capabilities. The number of aircraft of various classes varies within wide limits: from 8-12 for light aircraft carriers with a predominantly anti-submarine designation to 90-95 for heavy universal ones. At the same time, the specificity of the fleets is such that not everyone needs giants. Ships of this class are built in relation to specific tasks that follow from the concept of the combat employment of the forces of the fleets. Therefore, comparing aircraft carriers of different countries as ships colliding in battle against each other is incorrect, because they will operate as part of heterogeneous groups. And even if it happens that aircraft carriers find themselves in opposing groups, they will solve different problems. Some will act as the main striking force, while others will provide for the actions of the formation that solves the main tasks. Therefore, it makes sense to compare aircraft carriers of different countries only according to the degree to which their capabilities correspond to what is required of them.
Battle plan
Analysis of the tasks shows that the nomenclature of those for all aircraft carriers is approximately the same, but the value of each is strictly individual and in accordance with the assessment methodology it should be assigned a “weighting factor”.
According to the experience of the post-war years, aircraft carriers are actively used in armed conflicts and local wars of various scales. And they will be one of the main components of the groupings of the opposing fleets with the beginning of hostilities between them. Accordingly, when comparing, it is necessary to consider two options for the conditions of use: in a local conflict against a naval weak enemy and in a large-scale war.
In the general case, all three types of aircraft carriers will participate in solving the following main tasks, for which we will begin to compare them: the destruction of aircraft carrier strike and multipurpose enemy groups, the defeat of large groups of surface ships (KUG and KPUG), the fight against submarines, the repulsion of air strikes attacks, fire impact on ground objects.
In a local war against a weak enemy, it is possible to estimate (taking into account the probability of engaging carrier-based aircraft) the weight coefficients of the significance of the tasks as follows: defeat of groups of surface ships and boats - 0, 1, destruction of submarines - 0, 05, repelling an enemy air attack - 0, 3, strikes against ground targets - 0, 55. The proportions are derived from the analysis of the use of aircraft carriers in the wars of the late 20th - early 21st centuries and apply equally to both Russian and American and Chinese ships. The task of destroying the enemy aircraft carrier forces in this case, obviously, is not worth it.
In a large-scale war, the weighting factors are distributed differently and differ in relation to the ships of the countries in question. For Kuznetsov, the values can be estimated as follows: the destruction of aircraft carrier strike and multipurpose enemy groups - 0, 15, surface ships - 0, 15, submarines - 0, 25, repelling an air attack - 0, 35, work on ground targets - 0, 1.
For Nimitz, the coefficients are distributed differently: the destruction of enemy aircraft carriers - 0.05 (the main geopolitical opponents of the United States - Russia and China each have one aircraft carrier with limited strike capabilities, which determines the minimum significance of this task for the "American"), the defeat of groups of surface ships - 0, 3, submarines - 0, 05, repelling an air attack - 0, 15, work on ground targets - 0, 45.
The distribution of the significance of the tasks for the "Liaoning" can be done only with a great approximation, since the tasks of this ship are not formulated in the open press. It is known that this is essentially an experimental ship, the operation of which will allow in the future to create its own aircraft carriers, optimized for the specific tasks of the Chinese fleet. However, the peculiarities of the composition of the ship's air group, as well as the specifics of the theater of operations, give grounds to assume that the destruction of aircraft carrier strike and multipurpose enemy groups for the Liaoning may have a value of 0, 2, groups of surface ships - 0, 3, submarines - 0, 05, repelling an air attack - 0, 4, work on ground targets - 0, 05.
Impact force
The main striking force of the compared ships is the air group. Own air defense and anti-aircraft weapons are designed for self-defense and therefore do not affect the assessment of operational and tactical capabilities to solve the above tasks.
The most important indicators for any aircraft carrier are the possible duration of active hostilities until the moment of restocking and the available daily aviation resource. The experience of military operations in the course of local wars and calculations show that the American "Nimitz", when conducting intensive hostilities with its air group, already after seven or eight days needs to replenish its material and technical means, primarily fuel and ammunition. During this time, it will be able to perform up to a thousand sorties, including up to 600 with Super Hornet multirole fighters. The aircraft carrier has 40 positions for aircraft preparation. This means that the maximum composition of simultaneously used boards is 40 units.
The Russian aircraft carrier, as calculations based on open data show, can operate at full voltage with its air group for five to six days, having completed up to 350 sorties during this time, including up to 150 Su-33 and MiG-29K / KUB aircraft. The number of positions for their preparation limits the maximum composition of the group to 16 units.
An assessment of the operational capabilities of the Chinese Liaoning may be based on the fact that its capabilities to support the activities of the air group are comparable to those of the Kuznetsov. Accordingly, the air group should be able to perform the same 350 sorties, but over a longer period of time (up to seven days). Of these, 200 will be fighters. The maximum number of aircraft in a group is 16 aircraft.
Opportunities of rivals
The task of fighting enemy aircraft carriers can be solved during a naval battle lasting up to a day. In it, the parties will use all available potential, since the aircraft carrier group is an extremely powerful and well-protected enemy.
Kuznetsov will be able to perform up to 50 Su-33 and MiG-29K / KUB sorties per day. Only the latter can strike the aircraft carrier, since the standard Su-33s are currently not ready to use the Moskit anti-ship missiles (although tests were carried out). With the deduction of at least four positions for the use of helicopters and air defense fighters in the defense system of the formation, up to 12 vehicles can be simultaneously involved in the strike. Of these, at least four must be in the airspace clearance group. There remain eight MiG-29K / KUB, each of which carries no more than four Kh-35 anti-ship missiles (air-to-air missiles are placed on the rest of the hardpoints). Total - 32 anti-ship missiles. With a radar field depth of 800-900 kilometers (including shore-based AWACS aircraft), Nimitz will be able to counter our airstrike with two to four air combat patrol (AFP) forces, and four or six more from the deck duty position. Of these, our fighters, the airspace clearance groups will be linked by the battle of four to six aircraft. As a result, the strike group will approach the task execution line in pairs, evading attacks from enemy fighters with the loss of two or three vehicles. As a result, the probability of at least one missile breaking through to an aircraft carrier will not exceed 0.5–0.8. That is, the possibility of its incapacitation is a maximum of 0.03–0.05. Our aircraft carrier will be able to deliver two such strikes. The total probability of the "American" being put out of action will not exceed 0, 06-0, 09.
The Chinese aircraft carrier will have approximately the same result.
In turn, "Nimitz" is capable of using up to 34 fighters to strike our compound. Including up to 8 airspace clearing vehicles and 16 in a strike group with numerous support. This will make it possible, even with the counteraction of Russian naval fighters, to provide an approach to the task line of strike groups of one or two flights with a salvo of 16-32 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. In this case, the probability of our aircraft carrier being put out of action in one strike reaches 0.15–0.2, and in a day - up to 0.3–0.35. The Nimitz’s capabilities to defeat a Chinese aircraft carrier, given the less effective naval air defense systems, increase to 0, 35–0, 5.
Gong
The task of combating groups of surface ships will be one of the main ones in the course of an operation to gain superiority at sea in a designated operationally important area. Its duration is from three to four to six to eight days. In local conflicts, groups of missile boats will be the targets of naval (deck) aviation strikes. In a large-scale war, the main efforts will be focused on defeating groups of large surface ships: KUG of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and URO corvettes, landing squads (DESO), convoys (KON), KPUG and APUG (aircraft carrying search and strike groups).
In local conflicts, judging from experience, the task of countering 2–5 KUGs with two or three missile boats in each can become important. To defeat any such group, it is enough to select two or three pairs of attack aircraft with anti-ship missiles and NURS. In total, solving the problem will require up to 30 sorties, which is quite achievable not only for Nimitz, but also for Russian and Chinese aircraft carriers, for which this will not exceed 15-20 percent of the total available resource. And the probability of destroying enemy boats will be close to guaranteed - 0, 9 or more.
When solving the problems of combating ship groups in a large-scale war in the area of responsibility of the Northern Fleet, up to 14 different ship groups will operate, including 4-5 KUG from cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes URO, 1-2 DESO, 2-3 KON, 3 –4 KPUG and APUG. To defeat each of them, our aircraft carrier will be able to select a group in the composition, similar to that shown in the calculations of the strike on the AUG. Such a group can, with a probability of 0, 3–0, 5, defeat the KUG, 0, 4–0, 6 - DESO with the US Marine Expeditionary Battalion, 0, 6–0, 7 - KPUG, 0, 4–0, 6 - APUG or destroy up to a quarter of the ships in the middle convoy. Taking into account the possible resource allocated for solving this problem, two or three groups can be subjected to attacks by carrier-based aircraft. The expected efficiency of solving this problem by "Kuznetsov" can be estimated at 0, 07–0, 1.
In the area of responsibility of the PLA Navy, the number of ship groups can be up to 20 (including the Japanese fleet). However, this task is also more important for the Chinese aircraft carrier. Assuming that its carrier-based fighters can carry anti-ship weapons similar to ours, let us estimate the expected effectiveness of the Liaoning at 0, 12–0, 14.
An American aircraft carrier in a war against Russia or China will have to solve the problem of defeating a group of surface ships consisting of 6-8 KUGs (including 2-3 KUGs with cruisers and destroyers), 5-6 KPUGs (including 2-3 KPUGs with frigates and large anti-submarine ships) and 4-5 small coastal KOH. For strikes against these forces, the Nimitz will be able to deliver up to 10 strikes in groups of 8-12 (against small ship groups) to 32 vehicles (against large groups with powerful air defense). Without going into the details of the calculation, let us estimate the effectiveness of such actions at 0, 2–0, 23.
It is advisable to determine the capabilities of an aircraft carrier to combat submarines by the criterion of the probability of their destruction before reaching the position of a short-range anti-ship missile salvo against ships of the order's core. This indicator depends on many factors, but the most important of them is the number of helicopters and PLO aircraft simultaneously in the alert zones, as well as the ability of their search engines to detect submarines. Our and the American (in the strike version - without PLO aircraft) aircraft carriers have approximately the same capabilities here. Taking into account the whole complex of factors, the probability of disruption of the submarine's exit to the line of attack of short-range anti-ship missiles can be estimated at 0, 2–0, 4, depending on the hydroacoustic conditions and the type of submarine. For the Chinese Liaoning, which has only six PLO helicopters, this figure does not exceed 0.05–0.07.
The capabilities of aircraft carriers to solve air defense missions can be assessed by the share of disrupted enemy air strikes against ships of their formation and other covered objects in the total number of such attacks.
"Kuznetsov", having this task as one of the main in its designation, can ensure the interception of an enemy air force by 12-14 groups of two or three pairs in four to five days of the operation. During this time, in the area of responsibility of the Northern Fleet, one can expect actions against surface forces at sea up to 20-25 groups of tactical and carrier-based aviation, ranging in size from flight to squadron. The probability of failure to complete the mission of each of them as a result of interception by our group of naval fighters can be estimated from 0, 2–0, 3 to 0, 6–0, 8. In general, the share of reflected strikes against naval targets by the Russian aircraft carrier will be 0, 3–0, 4.
The "Liaoning" indicator is about the same. This is due to the fact that with the expected vigorous activity in the probable theater of operations of the Japanese Air Force, one should expect the allocation of a larger resource of the deck aviation of China for solving air defense problems.
For the American aircraft carrier, the main thing in this situation will be to repel long-range anti-ship missile attacks and naval missile-carrying aviation (MRA). He will be able to solve this problem mainly by means of airborne forces and fighters from the position of duty on deck in readiness number 1, up to six to eight vehicles in total. This is due to the fact that long-range anti-ship missiles, having a supersonic speed and a launch range of about 300-500 kilometers, reach the task completion line in a time that allows only BVP aircraft to be put into battle. And to counter the MRA, which has a missile launch line of 300-350 kilometers from the main order, even with a depth of the AUG radar field of 800-900 kilometers, only 30-40 minutes remain. Taking into account the need for fighters to intercept at least 400-450 kilometers from the aircraft carrier, only vehicles on deck in readiness number 1 can be put into action. These forces really only weaken the blow, destroying 15-20 percent of air targets, which should be considered as an assessment of the effectiveness of an American aircraft carrier in solving air defense problems.
It remains to compare the possibilities for the destruction of ground targets. In a large-scale war, "Kuznetsov", taking into account the allocated resource, will destroy no more than two or three point objects to a depth of 600 kilometers from the coast, which corresponds to approximately 0.05–0.07 of the total operational requirements. In a local war, the possibilities are significantly higher due to the allocation of a much larger resource. Calculations give an indicator of 0, 2–0, 25. The Chinese aircraft carrier has approximately the same capabilities. "Nimitz" is capable of hitting at a distance of up to 800 kilometers from the coast up to 25-40 ground targets, depending on their type and protection, which is up to 0.35-0.45 of what is required in a limited operationally important area in a large-scale war. In the local area, this indicator can reach 0.45–0.55.
Referee's decision
The analysis performed allows us to derive an integral comparative index of three ships. For a Russian aircraft carrier, it is 0, 3 for local conflicts, and 0, 25 for a large-scale war. For an "American" - 0, 35 and 0, 28, respectively. The Chinese "Liaoning" has 0, 27 and 0, 21. The low match rates of our and Chinese aircraft carriers in comparison with the American ones are due to the fact that the latter is more versatile and this allows it to more effectively solve the entire range of tasks. "Kuznetsov" and "Liaoning", being focused on the tasks of providing air defense, in practice will have to be involved in a significantly larger range of tasks, which reduces their indicators of compliance with their combat mission.
"Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov": over 50 aircraft. Including 12 Su-33 fighters, 14 multi-purpose MiG-29K / KUB, about 20 Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters, three Ka-31 AWACS helicopters and four Ka-27 search and rescue helicopters.
Length - 306.5 meters
Width - 72 meters
Displacement - 61 400 tons
Nimitz: 48-60 Super Hornet F-18 multipurpose fighters, up to 12 Viking S-3 anti-submarine aircraft, four Hawkeye AWACS and Prowler EW EA-6A aircraft each (or replacement vehicles based on F-18), four KA-6A tankers, 12 Sea King helicopters and four search and rescue.
Length - 332.8 meters
Width - 78 meters
Displacement - 106,300 tons
"Liaoning": 24 multirole J-15 fighters (unlicensed copy of the Su-33 with Chinese avionics), four Z-18J AWACS helicopters, six Z-18F anti-submarine aircraft and two Z-9C search and rescue helicopters. In total - 36 cars. In terms of their performance characteristics, Chinese helicopters - AWACS and anti-submarine - are close to Russian counterparts - Ka-31 and Ka-27, respectively.
Length - 304.5 meters
Width - 75 meters
Displacement - 59,500 tons
