"Curtain" will not solve the problem

Table of contents:

"Curtain" will not solve the problem
"Curtain" will not solve the problem

Video: "Curtain" will not solve the problem

Video:
Video: Warbringers: Jaina 2024, April
Anonim
"Curtain" will not solve the problem
"Curtain" will not solve the problem

The required survivability of armored vehicles in modern conditions can only be ensured by the complex use of various means of protection

The video of the disruption of a missile attack by an infantry fighting vehicle BMP-3 in a desert area caused increased activity in the blogosphere and a kind of euphoria in this regard. The footage shows how an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) in the immediate vicinity of the target soars up sharply. According to primary sources, this is a fragment of a demonstration test in the United Arab Emirates. The BMP-3M target from the ATGM "Competition" is protected by the Shtora complex of electronic optical countermeasures (KOEP) to high-precision weapons (WTO).

Interest in Shtora was also fueled by reports of the use of Russian T-90 tanks with this protection system in Syria. Earlier it was reported that ISIS fighters have a significant number of anti-tank weapons, including the American TOW guided complexes.

As a result, some publications referring to this video may suggest that the problem of protecting tanks from being hit by modern anti-tank weapons (PTS) has been solved, but this does not fully correspond to reality. To understand the essence of the problem - a little about "Shtora".

About "Curtain"

The "Shtora" complex is a means of active protection of armored vehicles from the destruction of the WTO, in which a laser is used to aim at the target. These are "Dragon", TOW, "Milan", "Maverick", "Helfire" guided missiles, "Copperhead" corrected artillery shells, and other ground and air-based military equipment. The complex was put into service in 1989.

Sensitive sensors "Curtains" detect the source of laser radiation, warn the crew of the vehicle and at the same time issue a command for the automatic use of means of jamming enemy weapons control systems - aerosol grenades and infrared searchlights. Three seconds later, the grenades create an aerosol curtain 55‒70 meters from the tank to counteract laser radiation and "cover" the target from enemy artillery gunners. An infrared searchlight from a distance of 2.5 kilometers "blinds" the rocket and changes its flight trajectory.

The complex provides all-round protection against several guided missiles in the vertical sector from -5 to +25 degrees. The high (0, 54‒0, 9) probability of the “Blind” disrupting the guidance of guided missiles and corrected projectiles at the target reduces the probability of its hitting by 3–5 and 1.5 times, respectively. The reaction time of the complex after detecting an attacking target does not exceed 20 seconds. Along with protection "Shtora" can be used to detect enemy firing points.

The essence of the problem

The existing problem of the protection of armored vehicles lies in the variety of effective anti-tank weapons (PTS) and the tactics of their use. It can be seen as another example of the eternal confrontation between the "sword" and "shield", when the improvement of one of them does not solve the problem as a whole.

Today, the development of anti-tank weapons is at a level where even powerful armor protection can be overcome with relatively cheap means. The increase in the thickness of the armor has exhausted itself and will not solve the existing problem in terms of tactical, operational and economic indicators: the former will reduce the combat capabilities of armored vehicles, and the latter will be ruinous for its owners.

The problem of protecting armored vehicles is further exacerbated by the use of effective means of detection in the visible, thermal and radar ranges, along with the WTO. In modern conditions, they have become a basic condition, without which the defeat of tanks and other equipment is unlikely.

Ways to solve the problem

Today, various unguided and guided weapons with high armor penetration are used to defeat armored vehicles. At the same time, the cost of one unit of any of them is lower than the cost of the targeted target, while the total number of vehicles in the army and on the battlefield can exceed the total number of enemy armored vehicles several times. The presence of armored vehicles does not guarantee victory in a situation where the probability of hitting tanks on the battlefield is very high. There are several ways to solve the problem of effective protection of equipment on the battlefield.

First of all, this is a decrease in the unmasking features of combat vehicles in the optical, thermal and radar ranges. According to the leading developer in this area, JSC Research Institute of Steel, the use of camouflage means reduces the likelihood of equipment being hit by ammunition with radio (thermal) target sensors from 0.85 (0.7‒0.8) to 0.2 (0.04 ‒0.01), losses from air strikes (reconnaissance and strike complexes) - by 50-70 (70-80)%, and the total losses of a tank division in battle - by 80%.

Reducing the probability of detecting armored vehicles is possible by optimizing its shapes, using camouflage paint, aerosols, and means based on new physical principles. So, camouflage kits such as "Cape" and "Blackthorn" made of absorbing materials reduce the likelihood of detecting a tank in the infrared range by 30%, and the likelihood of its capture by infrared homing heads - two to three times. At present, the reduction in visibility is the main path and the "distant frontier" in the development of the protection of armored vehicles. Ignoring this direction can lead to the senselessness of using armored vehicles due to the low combat effectiveness.

Image
Image

T-90MS in a protective set "Cape". Photo: wikipedia.org

The second direction is the use of tactical techniques on the battlefield and active defense complexes (KAZ). Among the latter, special attention is paid to the creation of new and improvement of existing KAZ of the Shtora and Arena types, the prototype of which is the Shater complex. The first one solves the set task by violating the PTS guidance system, the second - destroying (violating the flight path) of the attacking ammunition when approaching the target with a beam of damaging elements.

By the way, the first KAZ in the world was the Drozd, which was adopted by the Soviet army and was serially installed on T-55 tanks in the 1980s. The ideology and technical solutions of the Drozd are still relevant today, which is confirmed by the acquisition by the United States of Ukrainian tanks with this KAZ to study its potential. At the same time, the United States also received documentation on the Ukrainian KAZ "Zaslon", the prototype of which is the "Rain" Soviet design of the 70s.

But almost continuous work was not implemented in the serial use of such developments to protect domestic equipment. The reason for this was conceptual uncertainty in connection with the possibility of destruction by elements of the KAZ of their own infantry and lightly armored vehicles. It should be noted that such a disadvantage is typical for foreign KAZ type MUSS (USA), AMAP ADS (Germany), Trophy (Israel) and others.

The third direction is equipping armored vehicles with various protective screens and dynamic protection systems (ERA). The former are quite effective against existing HEAT shells and anti-tank hand grenades. The latter, in the form of box-shaped elements with a small amount of explosive (explosive) inside, are widespread today and serve to protect tanks from cumulative and armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles. When shells hit the DZ, they detonate and counteract the damaging ammunition with an oncoming explosion. This principle is used in the "Relikt", "Contact-V" and other similar complexes.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that these means are ineffective or ineffective for protection against small arms, armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of small caliber. To protect against them, DZ complexes can be used in combination with other means, including those based on new physical principles.

Another direction involves reducing the consequences of the armored action on the crew and the internal equipment of armored vehicles - the destruction of the crew and internal equipment by fragments of armor and a projectile behind the armor, explosion products of an explosive charge or a cumulative jet that arise when using armor-piercing and cumulative artillery shells and cluster warheads.

The days of "passive" and even multi-layer armor are gone forever. In modern conditions, only an integrated approach, taking into account the main factors affecting the protection and survivability of tanks and other armored targets, can provide them with the required combat survivability.

Recommended: