The cause of the catastrophe in the summer of 1941 could be treason
The war is not over until the last soldier who died on the battlefield is buried and intelligible answers to many questions are received, including the reasons for the unsuccessful entry into the war of the Red Army. It is too easy to blame everything on the "tyrant Stalin", who, apparently, was so uninterested in staying in power that he did not listen to those who called to bring the troops to combat readiness, wanted to deliver a preemptive strike, etc.
Today there is an opportunity to rely on documents and historical sources, which were not usually mentioned during the years of perestroika and the following decades. In addition, liberal "researchers" ruled the ball - as a rule, without a special historical, and even more so military education.
What should the leader of the country have done to prepare for the war? What is the role of the People's Commissar of Defense K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov? What is the content of the documents - from "the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the armed forces" to specific directives to the commanders of border units on the protection of sections of the state border? Was the country's military-political leadership warned of a possible enemy attack? We will try to figure it out without emotion, relying only on documents.
"The enemy has his people with us"
Any military man knows that the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff, and specifically his chief, are responsible for preparing the Armed Forces for war, therefore statements that Stalin or, for example, intelligence, are to blame for everything, do not correspond to reality. “Our intelligence service, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly, and it failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitlerite high command in relation to the troops stationed in Poland. Our intelligence service was unable to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union, Zhukov said at the 19th plenum of the party.
“Why did the commanders of the units that did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the“red packets”, receive the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a version of the "plan for border battles" of the executed conspirator Tukhachevsky?"
When the marshal was presented with numerous reports about Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR, four times the Hero of the Soviet Union was not just amazed, but shocked. After all, he was shown exactly the messages on which he was indicated as the addressee and signed. By the way, precisely because of this, he was forced, already in the first, 1969 edition of the version of "Memories and Reflections", to admit that "on March 20, 1941, the head of the intelligence department, Lieutenant General F. Golikov, presented to the leadership a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for possible directions of strikes by fascist German troops in an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the "Barbarossa" plan by the Hitlerite command …
Nevertheless, Zhukov stated in his memoirs that the conclusions from the information presented in the report essentially removed all their significance. It is not clear what he had in mind at the same time, because, based on the first conclusion, it was clear that Germany would not attack the USSR if Hess, who was in England at that time, did not achieve a favorable result in the negotiations (as history has shown, the Anglo-Saxons, judging by everything, they kept their word - they did not open a second front until 1944). And the second conclusion is obvious: the war began on June 22, and not in the spring of 1941.
The list of information presented to Stalin included 57 reports from Soviet intelligence officers about Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. In total, from January 1 to June 21, 1941, the Center received 267 reports, which detailed the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR. At the direction of the head of the GRU, 129 of them were brought to the attention of the political and military leadership of the USSR. Military intelligence almost daily reported to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov about the growing threat from Germany. The supposed dates of the aggression against the USSR were also named.
However, the term passed, but there was no attack. Along with the "correct date" (in our case, June 22, 1941), much was reported that did not correspond to reality. In any state preparing for war, the hour of H, in order to avoid information leakage, is called even to its command in a few days. The final decision is made only by the head of state. The date of the attack on France was postponed by Hitler 37 times.
In recent years, it has become a popular belief in historical literature that less than a day before Beria's invasion, the NKGB left a resolution on one of the foreign intelligence reports: “Recently, many workers succumb to insolent provocations and sow panic. For systematic disinformation to erase secret employees in the dust of the camp as wanting to embroil us with Germany. The rest should be strictly warned. However, authors citing such documents cannot confirm their existence.
It should be admitted that a certain circle of persons through whom information got to Stalin on the table existed. However, the system excluded the creation of any information filter.
As the analysis of the situation shows, the head of state, who highly valued intelligence, had no mistrust of intelligence. There was a desire to double-check the information received, which is simply necessary when making management decisions. No intelligence service in the world has complete information about the enemy, and mistakes are costly.
We must not forget about betrayal. Before the war, many scouts went over to the enemies. These are illegal residents Ignacy Reisse (Natan Poretsky), Walter Krivitsky (Samuil Ginzburg), Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbin). Among the defectors was the head of the NKVD of the Far Eastern Territory Genrikh Lyushkov.
Krivitsky handed over to the British over 100 employees, agents, trusted connections and contacts around the world, primarily in England. Meanwhile, the entire intelligence network of the USSR foreign intelligence (that is, the NKVD-NKGB) by the beginning of the war numbered just over 600 people. When the British counterintelligence report on the Krivitsky poll reached Moscow, the Lubyanka was shocked.
In such cases, double and triple checks are introduced both for the employees who remain to work abroad and for the information received from them. Special care was required. Indeed, according to the provisions of international law of that time, general mobilization was tantamount to a declaration of war.
For some reason, it is believed that German intelligence did not operate on the territory of the USSR and that it was possible, without fear of publicity, to move troops to the likely theater of operations. Trying to strengthen the border districts, Stalin authorized the advance of some armies in mid-May 1941. But as soon as the transfer of troops began, which took place with maximum secrecy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany immediately announced a note of protest to the leadership of the USSR demanding to explain why the 16th Army from the Trans-Baikal District would be redeployed by rail to the west. The nature of information leaks before the war and at the beginning of it was such that Zhukov also mentions it. In the midst of the tragic summer, on August 19, 1941, for a month now, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov, presented Stalin with a very interesting report: “I believe that the enemy knows very well the entire system of our defense, the entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces. and our coming opportunities. Apparently, among our very large workers who are in close contact with the general situation, the enemy has his own people."
It should be admitted that the Soviet leadership did everything to save the country and its peoples from a terrible blow. But it was impossible to prevent Germany from attacking the USSR, and the timing of the attack did not play a significant role - it would have taken place anyway.
Measures taken
What was done by the top military-political leadership to directly prepare the country to repel the German invasion? It is necessary to distinguish between the political and military components of the country's preparation for war.
From the point of view of the first, the actions of Stalin and Molotov do not raise questions. After the failure of negotiations with the countries of Western democracies to create an alliance against Hitler, Stalin managed to gain time to prepare the country for war. The conclusion of the famous non-aggression pact with Germany, so cursed today by the liberals and democrats, made it possible to turn Germany's aggressive aspirations by 180 degrees, and the USSR received a much-needed respite for more than a year.
As a result of the annexation of the Western Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, the restoration of hegemony in the Baltics and the transfer of the state border with Finland, the military-strategic position of the country has significantly improved. The resources of the state increased, the line of contact with a potential enemy was pushed back hundreds of kilometers. The Nazis were deprived of the opportunity to include in their advanced groupings three hundred thousand well-armed soldiers of the armies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to create a dozen SS divisions from Ukrainian nationalists and Baltic Nazis and use them in the first strike.
Realizing the inevitability of a military clash with Germany, the USSR in the period from 1935 to 1941 carried out the following main measures to increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces:
-the transfer of the Red Army (1935-1939) to a personnel basis;
- the introduction of universal conscription (1939);
-creation and deployment of serial production of a new generation of weapons and military equipment (1939-1941);
-strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941 from 98 divisions to 324;
-preparation of the Western theater of operations for war (airfields, fortified areas, roads).
In April-June 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including the call in April-May of hundreds of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts, directives: areas with the installation of field troops in them in the absence of service, b) on the creation of command posts, c) on the covert transfer of troops from May 13 to the western districts, d) on bringing into combat readiness and covertly moving from June 12 towards the border of the divisions of the second operational echelon, as well as the reserves of the western districts, e) on bringing the troops of the western districts to combat readiness from June 18, 1941, f) on the occupation of command posts by the formed front-line directorates.
Immediately after the emergence of the Soviet-German border in 1939, fortification work was sharply intensified. First of all, in the Kiev and Western, and then in the Baltic districts. The construction of the second, westernmost line of fortifications began, usually referred to in historical literature as the Molotov line. There were supposed to be 5807 structures. By the beginning of the war, 880 were active, and 4927 were under construction. There were 3279 structures on the Stalin Line, built between 1928 and 1939, with another 538 remaining unfinished. Subsequently, Khrushchev invented a version that, on Stalin's orders, the fortified areas on the old border were blown up (option - they were completely removed from weapons). Unfortunately, for opportunistic reasons of this stupidity, some marshals played along, especially Zhukov, forced to explain why the Nazis, having so easily overcome the Molotov line, simply jumped over the Stalin line, including in the most powerful of the districts - Kiev. After all, until mid-January 1941, they were commanded by Zhukov himself, and then by his promoted Kirponos.
As for the Soviet plans to enter the war, they remain the subject of fierce controversy. But it is impossible to argue with the fact that there is not a single Soviet official document, in contrast to the famous Barbarossa plan, which would testify to the preparation of the USSR for offensive actions.
On the basis of the intelligence received, Marshal Shaposhnikov developed and presented to the country's political leadership "Considerations on the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941." dated September 18, 1940.
Today it is the only known official document of this nature, it was signed and approved by Stalin. The plan was purely defensive. The main task was to repel and contain the enemy, especially his first strike, and in the event of a wedge in our defenses, to knock him out with joint counterattacks from mechanized corps and rifle troops. As the main principle at this stage, an active defense was envisaged in combination with actions to pin down the enemy. And only then, when conditions favorable to this were created, and they unambiguously meant the concentration of the main forces of the western grouping of the Red Army troops, the transition of our troops to a decisive counteroffensive. Sound logic of the General Staff, if we take into account the geographical peculiarity of the main theater of operations: after all, it was about the defense of Russia from an invasion from the West, and in the conditions of the Russian Plain dominating in this direction, it is simply impossible to do otherwise.
All other proposals for the deployment of troops, drawn up by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others, to which the Rezuns-Suvorovs and their Russian liberal colleagues are so fond of referring, are not documents of military command from a legal point of view, since they have never been reported to the political leadership and, accordingly, have not were approved in accordance with the established procedure. Without going into the analysis of "Considerations …", we note that the main idea of the document, from which all the subordinate directives were supposed to be typeset, is to concentrate the main efforts on covering the main direction of the enemy's probable strike - Minsk - Moscow (the ZapVO strips in full accordance with the received intelligence) … The key difference between the only official state document and the papers developed by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others is that, according to the vision of the General Staff (Zhukov and Timoshenko), the Germans should have dealt the main blow in the south (Kiev district) and in the north (Baltic district), and to counter these actions, it was envisaged to inflict a counterstrike (which led to the catastrophe of the summer of 1941).
How could it happen that the official plan to enter the war provided for steps that completely coincided with the intelligence data, and the actual preparation was carried out for other reasons? Why did the General Staff of the Red Army, without informing the political leadership of the country, carry out military planning according to another document? On what basis did Tymoshenko and Zhukov choose the option of an immediate counter-frontal counterattack as the main method of defense of the country, or, in strictly military language, repelling aggression by strategic (front-line) offensive operations? After all, this was not provided for by the official defense plan. Why did the commanders of the units that did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the "red packets", receive the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a version of the "plan for border battles" executed back in 1937 by the conspirator Tukhachevsky and his entourage?
The concept of border battles is a variant of hostilities in which the main priority was given to an immediate counter-frontal counterattack, that is, supposedly repulsing aggression by strategic (front-line) offensive operations, including in a preventive form. Then it was called invasion operations. The concept provided for the priority of attack by flank groupings with a shift in the center of gravity to aviation and tank (mechanized) units. In this case, the main grouping of ground forces is deployed with a static front "narrow band" with a minimum linear density, moreover, with large gaps between operational and strategic echelons. And their defenses, above all stability in the event of a sudden impact, are minimal. Some Soviet generals spoke about the flawedness of this "strategy" of repelling aggression back in the 1930s and argued their position. The maneuvers and teachings of that period proved the same. First of all, the fact that the application of such a concept in the opening of a war is fraught with a catastrophic defeat. Why did this "strategy" work in 1941?
The country's political leadership has done a huge amount of work to prepare the country for war. However, if liberal "historians" are trying to reduce everything to a miscalculation in determining the timing of the attack on the USSR, thereby diverting attention from who and why brought Hitler to power, armed, arranged Munich and pushed Germany to the borders of the Soviet Union, and also contributed to the creation of the situation in which the border districts found themselves at the time of the enemy's attack, then we will touch on this topic, relying on historical facts.
On June 15, 1941, the intelligence service of the NKVD border troops of the USSR, which was already playing a strategic role at that time, provided irrefutable documentary evidence that the process of moving the Wehrmacht troops to the initial positions for the attack was resumed from 4:00 on June 18, 1941. On the same day, Stalin checked for the last time the accuracy of his understanding of the situation and the reliability of the information he received.
"Odessa OVO met the Germans and Romanians in the fortified areas so that their offensive was stopped already on the first day"
Stalin summoned the commander of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev and Beria, to whom the border troops were subordinate, and ordered the aviation forces of the Western Special Military District to organize a thorough aerial reconnaissance for the final establishment and documentary confirmation of the aggressive preparations of the Wehrmacht for an attack, and the border guards were to provide assistance to the aviators. All this is clearly confirmed by the entries in the journal of Stalin's visits. On the night of June 17-18, Zhigarev and Beria were in his office. On June 18, during daylight hours, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator, flew from south to north along the entire border line in the ZAPOVO strip. Every 30-50 kilometers, they put the car down and wrote another report right on the wing, which was immediately taken away by the silently appearing border guards. This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation Georgy Zakharov (before the war, he commanded the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division of the Western Special Military District with the rank of colonel). Together with him on that flight was the navigator of the 43rd Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. From a bird's eye view, they made out everything, plotted it on maps and reported in writing. They clearly recorded that an avalanche-like movement of the Wehrmacht armada towards the border line began.
Not lead, but be
At the same time, Stalin was informed about the testimony of the defectors who began to cross the border. Their stream grew. Since the publication of "Memories and Reflections", an obscure "tradition" has developed in Russian historical literature to assert that only one defected to our side on the night before the attack, and even that they allegedly did not believe him and was shot. However, even according to the data cited in open sources, there is every reason to talk about at least 24 defectors. By the way, no one shot them. And the decision was made.
On June 18, 1941, Stalin gave the order to bring the troops of the first strategic echelon into full combat readiness. The General Staff transmitted the directive to the troops, but it was actually not implemented in those border districts that were hit by the enemy's main blow.
In the text of the directive number 1, which entered the military districts on the night of June 22, it was written: "Be in full combat readiness." Let's pay attention: not "lead", but "be". This means that the order to bring the troops into combat readiness was given in advance.
Until now, the fact of putting on alert other districts, for example, Odessa, which met the Germans and Romanians in the fortified areas in such a way that their offensive was stopped on the first day, is still hushed up.
Subsequently, at the trial, the former commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov, and his chief of staff confirmed that on June 18 there was a directive of the General Staff, but they did nothing to fulfill it. This was confirmed by the chief of communications of the district through which she went. But the directive itself could not be found. It was probably destroyed in preparation for the XX Congress. However, the latest pre-war orders, for example, of the Baltic region, clearly indicate that its command was carrying out a special order from Moscow. And in the Kiev district the same thing. The fleets reported on being put on alert already on June 19. According to the directive of the General Staff.
In fact, Stalin correctly determined not only the date, but also the direction of the main attack: it will be delivered in the KOVO strip in order to occupy Ukraine. Zhukov's testimony is that Stalin thought that way. Is this why the General Staff concentrated there the most powerful grouping of troops, including tank corps? Making sure that the war was about to begin, Stalin gave the order to notify the commanders of the western military districts about the impending sudden attack by Germany and the need, in connection with this, to bring the troops entrusted to combat readiness.
The commanders of the military districts and fleets were warned about this by a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov, on June 18 and reported on the measures taken. The headquarters of the Baltic OVO took the following measures in pursuance of the directive from Moscow:
Directive of the headquarters of the special military district
June 18, 1941
In order to bring the theater of military operations of the district into combat readiness as quickly as possible, I ORDER:
…4. To the commander of the 8th and 11th armies:
a) to determine on the sector of each army the points of organization of field depots, AT mines, explosives and anti-personnel obstacles for the installation of certain obstacles provided for by the plan. To concentrate the specified property in organized warehouses by 21.6.41;
b) for setting minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where to allocate them and the plan of their work. All this through the nadzhs of the border divisions;
c) to start procurement of improvised materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for the device of crossings across the rivers Viliya, Nevyazha, Dubissa. Crossing points should be established in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.
Subordinate the 30th and 4th pontoon regiments to the military council of the 11th army. The shelves should be in full readiness for building bridges across the river. Neman. A number of exercises to check the conditions for building bridges with these regiments, having achieved the minimum deadlines;
d) the commander of the troops of the 8th and 11th armies - with the aim of destroying the most important bridges in the strip: the state border and the rear line of Siauliai, Kaunas, r. Neman to foresee these bridges, to determine the number of explosives, demolition teams for each of them, and to concentrate all means for demolition in the nearest points from them. The plan for destroying the bridges is to be approved by the military council of the army.
Completion date - 21.6.41.
… 7. To the commander of the armies and the chief of the ABTV district:
Create separate tank platoons at the expense of each autobath, using for this purpose the installation of containers on trucks, the number of separate platoons created is 4.
Deadline for completion - 23.6.41. These separate platoons in the amount of the mobile reserve to keep: Telshai, Siauliai, Keidany, Ionov at the disposal of the commanders of the armies …
e) to select from the number of parts of the district (except for mechanized and aviation) gas tanks and transfer them by 50 percent. in 3 and 12 microns. Completion date - 21.6.41;
f) take all measures to provide each machine and tractor with spare parts, and through the head of the OST with accessories for refueling machines (funnels, buckets).
Commander of the PribOVO Troops Colonel-General Kuznetsov
Member of the Military Council Corps Commissar Dibrov
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Klenov."
Extract from the order of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District
June 19, 1941
1. Supervise the equipment of the defense strip. Emphasis on the preparation of positions on the main strip of the UR, the work on which should be strengthened.
2. In the foreground, finish the work. But the position of the foreground should be taken only in case of violation of the state border by the enemy.
To ensure quick occupation of positions both in the foreground and (in) the main defensive zone, the corresponding units must be completely in combat readiness.
In the area behind their positions, check the reliability and speed of communication with the border units.
3. Pay special attention so that there is no provocation and panic in our units, to strengthen combat readiness control. Do everything without noise, firmly, calmly. Each commander and political worker has a sober understanding of the situation.
4. Minefields should be installed according to the plan of the army commander where they should be according to the plan of defensive construction. Pay attention to complete secrecy for the enemy and security for their units. Blockages and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles should be created according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.
5. Headquarters, corps and divisions - at their command posts, which provide anti-tank equipment by the decision of the appropriate commander.
6. Our retractable units must go to their areas of shelter. Take into account the increasing cases of flights of the state border by German planes.
7. Continue to aggressively replenish units with ammunition and other supplies.
To persistently put together units on the march and on the spot.
Commander of the PribOVO Troops Colonel-General Kuznetsov
Head of the Department of Political Propaganda Ryabchiy
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Klenov."
Measures taken by the headquarters of the 8th army of the PribOVO in pursuance of the directive of the district headquarters, dated June 18:
Order of the Chief of Staff of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District
June 18, 1941
To transfer the operational group of the army headquarters to the command post Bubiai by the morning of June 19.
Prepare the site of the new checkpoint immediately. Departure secretly, by separate cars.
Organize communication with the corps from the new command post during the first half of the day on June 19.
Chief of Staff of the 8th Army, Major General Larionov."
As for the Navy, there is a legend that the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, on his own initiative, put the fleets on alert on the eve of the war. Everything is much more prosaic. The fleets were subordinate in operational management to the commands of the military districts and carried out their directive on bringing them to combat readiness, and not the order of Kuznetsov. The commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, reported to the leadership as follows:
Report from the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the commander of the Leningrad and Baltic special military districts, to the head of the border troops:
June 20, 1941
Parts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from 19.6.41 were put on alert according to plan No. 2, command post deployed, patrol service at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irbensky Strait was strengthened.
The commander of the KBF Vice-Admiral Tributs."
The rest of the commanders of the fleets also reported. However, despite this, the readiness of the fleets was not in mode No. 1, as Kuznetsov later claimed. For example, since 1943, the "Notes of a Participant in the Defense of Sevastopol" Captain 1st Rank A. K. Evseev have been classified, from which it follows that full combat readiness No. 1 in the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol …
Demonstration execution
All reports on the execution of the directive were to be received by June 22nd. What happened in reality?
For some unknown reason, the troops were not preparing for the implementation of an active defense plan in accordance with the only document approved at the government level, but for a counter-offensive, working out the corresponding tasks. By the way, at the beginning of September 1940, in KOVO, and Zhukov was the commander there at that time, the 6th army of the district underwent exercises according to the scenario of an immediate (including preventive) oncoming head-on strike in the South-West direction, and even from the bridgehead of the Lvov ledge, which in fact was an army prototype of the future scenario for entering the war, that is, the plan of May 15, 1941, executed by Vasilevsky. Having received a directive dated 06/18/41 (four days before the war) on bringing the troops to combat readiness and deploying front-line command posts by 0 o'clock on June 22, the commanders of the three districts that received the main enemy blow (Army Group South, Center and "North"), they did not fulfill it. The main groupings of troops were concentrated in the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, which, according to the plan of the General Staff, were supposed to strike the flank of the attacking German armies and, developing a counter offensive, knock out onto Polish territory, but as a result they themselves were defeated.
One of the most powerful border districts in all, renamed the Western Front, collapsed in fact in four days. And the front commander, General Pavlov, went to death with the wording for "creating the enemy the opportunity to break through the front of the Red Army." The reprisals were primarily demanded by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense in the person of Tymoshenko, and not at all Beria, to whom this is attributed. The accusation against Pavlov and others was initially based on the famous Art. 58 of the Criminal Code of the USSR (which had an analogue in the Criminal Code of the BSSR). However, during the trial, the charge was re-qualified to Art. 193 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, that is, for military crimes. And a harsh sentence was passed under this article. Stalin did not at all want a repeat of 1937, because he had to fight, and not shoot at his own people. But he clearly demonstrated that he can easily do without the notorious 58th article. It was more than clear to him that anything could happen in a war. And therefore, everyone was given a chance to correct their previous mistakes by a selfless struggle against the hated enemy. Many have proven that they can.
After June 22, 1941, it seemed far from the most important to find out who was responsible for the fact that, despite a direct order to bring the districts to combat readiness four days before the war, this was not done. Stalin was more concerned with the problem of loss of command and control by the General Staff and the inability of the command of the military districts (especially the Western Special), which had the latest weapons and military equipment at that time, to organize resistance to the enemy. It was necessary to change the system of governing the country, to organize the front and rear (this is the main reason for the creation of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command, which made it possible to close the state and military administration on themselves).
After the war, Stalin returned to investigating the tragic circumstances of the summer of 1941 and created a commission that found out who, apart from Pavlov and his staff, was guilty of the tragedy. Apparently, there were good reasons to assume that the tragedy of the summer of 1941 was not just an unfortunate coincidence. If you call a spade a spade, then Stalin suspected treason and had grounds on this score.
At that time, no one wrote "about the miscalculations of the top military-political leadership", because everyone remembered how the case was, and waited for the results of the investigation, and the death of the leader turned out to be a life-saver for many. Therefore, the topic developed after the 20th Party Congress, when Khrushchev, accusing his predecessor of all possible mistakes, mentioned, among other things, the criminal arrogance of the head of state and inattention to intelligence reports. This line was continued by Zhukov, who was in charge of the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to him on the border and was forced to explain the fact of the rapid defeat of the border groupings of the Red Army.
History should be written by those who are not afraid to call things by their proper names and, accordingly, are able to draw lessons from the past. With a sharp deterioration in the international situation, when a hybrid war strategy is being actively developed (in which a huge role is assigned to the "fifth column" and the use of miscalculations of the top military-political leadership), it is necessary to take a closer look at the actions of the Soviet government to prepare the country in a special period (including repression). One must have the courage to call a spade a spade.
