The experience of fighting in Syria, as well as the IDF's failure against Hezbollah, raises the question of the effectiveness of existing models of armored vehicles (BTT) in urban combat and when the enemy uses elements of "gallery defense" (defense using underground communications).
Before the BTT, mutually exclusive tasks arise, which the same CAA is forced to solve, bringing outdated ZSU 23-4 "Shilka" and 2S3 self-propelled guns "Akatsia" of 152 mm caliber to direct fire. A main battle tank with a gun caliber of 100-122 mm is incapable of repelling a massive counterattack by enemy infantry at a short distance, riddling a reinforced concrete structure in seconds in which a sniper or an ATGM crew is seen, or bringing down this building with one shell.
The main battle tank itself turns out to be prey in urban combat, its protection is insufficient. But the security of Shilka and Akatsia is even worse. What can we say about infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, which were completely unable to support the infantry in such conditions!
The vulnerability of the BTT can be leveled tactically - by letting the infantry in front of it. Here, the BTT will only have to suppress the identified firing points, being outside the zone of destruction of the enemy's anti-tank weapons. But this should be extremely well-trained and motivated infantry, insensitive to their own losses. In addition, modern anti-tank weapons provide such a range of destruction that, in fact, the infantry will be separated from the armored vehicles with the corresponding consequences.
Another option for solving the problem is to create an infantry support combat vehicle. The Wehrmacht assault guns have already been such a machine in history, until they turned into a means of fighting tanks.
What requirements in modern conditions could be imposed on an infantry support combat vehicle?
1. Protection at the level of the main battle tank, and preferably higher.
2. The presence of a 152 mm low ballistics gun with a high elevation angle. Smaller caliber does not ensure the solution of combat missions in urban combat conditions, does not ensure the rapid destruction of reinforced concrete structures, the destruction of the exit points of galleries to the surface, pillboxes. Here you need a high-explosive projectile of high power, the ability to hit the target with both flat and mounted fire.
3. Combining the barrel of a 152-mm low ballistics gun with an ATGM launcher. In theory, this combination looks attractive, but in practice, the American Sheridan / Shileila program has failed. It is necessary to study the reasons for this failure and find out whether old flaws in the system can be eliminated at the new technological level.
4. The presence of a small-caliber automatic weapon, paired with the main one, performing the role of sighting and belaying in case of a sudden appearance of the enemy, when the main weapon is unloaded. The 30-mm 2A42 cannon is quite suitable for these purposes: it is capable of penetrating a standard reinforced concrete panel and hitting a sniper, an ATGM calculation, promptly destroying enemy vehicles, and hitting lightly armored objects such as armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. She only lacks remotely activated ammunition to combat infantry.
5. It is desirable to have an AGS in a remotely controlled installation as an anti-storm agent.
6. It is desirable to have a remotely controlled coaxial installation of large-caliber machine guns, caliber 12, 7-14, 5 mm as an anti-assault weapon and a means of combating enemy UAVs and aircraft.
In principle, an infantry support combat vehicle can be made on the basis of outdated main tanks, paying increased attention to reactive armor and jamming.
The question remains open as to how generally such a machine fits into the modern concepts of the BTT and its use. But on the other hand, it may not be worth creating a tank support combat vehicle. Perhaps another machine, more in demand in a real battle, will successfully play its role?
