In the first days of the war, Soviet naval aviation did not suffer such heavy losses as army aviation and retained the ability to conduct operations both at sea and on land. She was capable of retaliating bombing strikes on Memel, Pillau, Danzig and Gdynia, and on June 25, 1941 struck airfields in Finland, which gave the government of this country a formal reason to declare war on the USSR. As soon as Finland entered the war, Soviet naval aviation attacked naval and land targets in the Kotka, Turku and Tampere areas, and at the same time its aircraft participated in mining Finnish and German waters and operations against enemy caravans.
Project
But as the situation on land deteriorated, the operations of naval aviation in the Baltic had to be curtailed, as it was required to throw all forces to support the land front. And since naval aviation acted against the advancing German forces no worse than the army, the range of its tasks expanded. At the end of July 1941, there was even an idea to use naval bombers for raids on Berlin.
The project was bold, risky, but feasible. He was born at the Main Naval Headquarters of the USSR Navy after the first German air raids on Moscow on July 21, 1941, and the initiators were the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov and the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Rear Admiral Vladimir Alafuzov.
The project was supposed to involve bombers (long-range bomber with afterburner) equipped with additional fuel tanks in the raid on Berlin.
These aircraft entered serial production in 1940 and had a range of 2,700 kilometers at a maximum speed of 445 km / h. The combat load of the aircraft could consist of 1000 kg of bombs (normal), or 2500 kg (maximum), or 1-2 torpedoes. The defensive armament consisted of two 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns and one 12.7 mm UBT machine gun. Of course, these aircraft could only achieve maximum speed and flight range under ideal conditions, but in practice their characteristics were more modest. There were serious concerns about whether the bombers would be able to reach Berlin and return to their airfields.
But it was decided to take a risk, and the Cahul airfield on the island of Saaremaa, the westernmost land point at that time controlled by the Red Army, was designated as the launch site for the aircraft, only 900 km from Berlin.
From the calculations, it turned out that bombers flying in a straight line at an optimal altitude with a cruising speed would take more than 6 hours to overcome the entire route. Moreover, the bomb load of each of them could not exceed 750 kg. Start, formation of battle formation, bombing and landing had to be done in a short time. In the event of their extension due to some unforeseen circumstances, the fuel supply would only be enough for 20-30 additional minutes of flight, which would inevitably end either with a plane crash into the sea or a forced landing in the occupied territory. To mitigate the risks, 15 of the most experienced crews were assigned to the operation.
Of course, the bombing strike by Soviet aviation on the capital of the Third Reich in the most difficult time for the Soviet Union pursued not so much military as political goals. Therefore, the preparation was under the direct supervision of Joseph Stalin - from the end of June the chairman of the USSR State Defense Committee, from July - the people's commissar of defense, and from August 8 the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces. Only after he had approved the plan of the operation could it be possible to begin preparations for its implementation.
The training was comprehensive and carried out in the strictest secrecy. It was led by the Commander of the Naval Aviation, Lieutenant General Semyon Zhavoronkov. First, the 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force was relocated to Cahul. At the same time, transports with bombs and fuel went there from Tallinn and Kronstadt. To disguise the delivery of such valuable goods, minesweepers were involved for their transport, which, during the transition, imitated combat trawling in order to lull the enemy's vigilance.
Test flights
On the night of 2 to 3 August, the aircraft made their first test flights with a full supply of fuel and a load of 500 kg of bombs. The flight route led in the direction of Swinemünde, and its purpose was to find out the conditions for the launch of bombers from a small field airfield, reconnoitre the German air defense system and gain experience in long-range flight over the sea in war conditions.
The next test flight took place on the night of August 5-6, already in the direction of Berlin, but it was still of a reconnaissance nature - it was required to reconnoitre the Berlin air defense system, and the planes flew without a bomb load. Both flights ended successfully, and during the second flight it turned out that the Berlin air defense system extends within a radius of 100 km from the German capital, and in addition to anti-aircraft artillery, it also has a large number of searchlights with a glow range of up to 6000 m.
The test flights confirmed the theoretical calculations, and all that was left was to wait for favorable weather for the first combat flight.
The bombing of Berlin
The first bombardment of Berlin by Soviet aviation was carried out at night from 7 to 8 August 1941. The operation involved 15 aircraft. The operation was commanded by the commander of the 1st MTAP Colonel Yevgeny Preobrazhensky. The squadrons were commanded by captains Andrey Efremov, Vasily Grechishnikov and Mikhail Plotkin, and the navigator of the group was the flagship navigator of the regiment, Captain Peter Khokhlov.
The takeoff took place in difficult meteorological conditions, but the flight went well. The appearance of unidentified aircraft from the northeast course at an altitude of 7000 m was a complete surprise for the Germans. Confused German anti-aircraft gunners mistook the unknown aircraft for their own, which for unknown reasons lost their course and deviated from the established air corridors. The anti-aircraft artillery did not open fire, but only tried to find out the identification data and the purpose of the flight of the aliens with conventional light signals, even offering them to land at nearby airfields. Signals remained unanswered, which plunged the German anti-aircraft gunners into even greater confusion, because of which they did not dare to open fire or announce an air raid. The cities remained lit, which helped Khokhlov navigate.
Berlin was also brightly lit.
Although at the same time an air war with England was already in full swing, British bombers rarely appeared in the skies over the German capital, and the blackout took effect only after the air raid was announced.
And perhaps no one expected the appearance of Soviet aircraft over Berlin during the widespread successes in the east.
Thus, the Soviet bombers, without encountering resistance, went to the center of Berlin and there dropped their deadly cargo. Only the explosions of the bombs forced the Germans to declare an air raid. Beams from dozens of searchlights and volleys of anti-aircraft guns hit the sky. But this reaction was belated. The Soviet crews did not observe the results of the bombing, but turned on the return course home. On the way back, the German air defense still tried to illuminate them from searchlights and fire them from anti-aircraft guns, but the height of 7000 meters provided the Soviet aircraft with a relatively safe flight.
All the crews happily returned to the Cahul airfield.
The first Soviet air raid on Berlin caused a real shock in the German command and the Nazi elite. Initially, Goebbels' propaganda tried to attribute the bombing of Berlin on the night of August 7-8 to British aircraft and even reported on 6 British aircraft shot down. Only when the British command in a special message expressed bewilderment from the German report, since due to bad weather no British aircraft bombed Berlin that night, the Hitlerite leadership had to swallow the bitter pill and admit the fact of the Soviet air raid on Berlin. Of course, the Germans quickly drew conclusions from this fact and took measures to strengthen the air defense of Berlin.
In the meantime, after a successful first operation, the Soviet pilots began to plan the next. But this time the conditions of the game have changed. Over the waters of the Baltic Sea, flights took place, as a rule, without incident, but already when crossing the coastline, the aircraft came under heavy anti-aircraft fire, and German fighters flew towards them. The darkened cities no longer helped in navigation, and the reinforced air defense of Berlin forced them to be extremely vigilant and take new tactical maneuvers over the target. They also had to strengthen the air defense of the Moonsund Islands, as the Germans tried to destroy the airfields from which Soviet aircraft bombed Berlin.
In such altered, extremely difficult conditions, the Baltic Fleet naval aviation conducted nine more raids on the German capital.
The second Soviet air raid on the night of August 8-9 did not go as well as the first. After 12 planes took off for Berlin, several of the planes had mechanical problems and had to turn back long before they were within range of alternate targets. While crossing the coastline in the Stettin area, Soviet bombers encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire; some crews were forced to drop bombs on Stettin and turn back. Only five bombers flew to Berlin, where they were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire. One of the planes exploded over the city for an unknown reason.
On August 10, army long-range aviation from airfields near Leningrad joined in the bombing of Berlin. The last raid on Berlin took place on the night of September 4-5. Further attempts to bomb Berlin had to be abandoned, as the loss of Tallinn and the deterioration of the aircraft made flights from the Moonzund Islands impossible.
During the raids, 17 aircraft and 7 crews were lost, with two aircraft and one crew killed while attempting to take off with a 1,000-kilogram and two 500-kilogram bombs on external suspensions. In total, between August 8 and September 5, 1941, Baltic pilots carried out 10 bombings of Berlin, dropping 311 bombs weighing 500 kg each on the city. The military damage caused was insignificant, but the moral and political benefit was enormous, since in the most difficult time for itself, the Soviet state demonstrated the desire and ability to wage war.
