The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, gsd (gsbr) - mountain rifle division (brigade), GSh - General base, ZAPOVO - Western special VO, CA - Red Army, KOVO - Kiev special VO, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), mk - motorized body, pd (pbr, nn) - infantry division (brigade, regiment), PribOVO - Baltic special VO, RM - intelligence materials, RO - intelligence department of VO, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, TGr - tank group, td (TP) - tank division (regiment).
In the previous part it was shown that the RM about the German mobile troops did not correspond to reality. At the end of May, the intelligence "for sure" knew about the 21 armored and motorized divisions concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland. In fact, in the indicated territories at that time there were about four td. The distorted picture of the distribution of enemy mobile groupings near our border was obliged to influence the actions and decisions of the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union on the eve of the war. In the previous article, a link was placed where you can see the German maps of the Wehrmacht ground forces (files # 799-844).
The opinion of a person who considers himself an expert
We will first consider the opinion of the "expert" in order to clarify some questions.
Note that [the author] always writes "posted on the border", although if asked, he does not even know the depth of the border zone in the USSR. Now ask the author a question: 400 km is to be counted on the border with the USSR, or are these parts located deep in the rear:
At the same time, ask him how long it will take a tank division to move to the border if it is at a depth of 200-400 km from our border.
To refute it, it is enough to carefully read the memoirs of F. I.
Earlier in the article, it was said three times about which territories were considered by RU under the term. I will consider this issue again in detail.
Our intelligence in 1940 considered East Prussia and the former Poland as the territories on which the group intended for the attack on the USSR was concentrated.
For example, the summary of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (future RU) from 20.6.40 is called:.
In the summary of RU No. 8 it is said about the same:.
In the report of RU No. 1 in February 1941, other terms are used: and.
In the report of RU No. 4 in April 1941, a similar term is used:.
RU calmly uses the term meaning territory East Prussia and the General Government.
However, the use of the term in RM is incorrect, since the presence of German troops in an area larger than the territory of the General Government is being considered. The figure shows that the General Government does not include some territories of former Poland, which came to be called South Prussia, West Prussia and Reichsgau Warteland. There was also a decrease in the territory of the General Government in the southern part.
This discrepancy was eliminated in the RU report dated 5.5.41. In the report of May 15, the territories on which the German grouping against the USSR is concentrated were finally determined:
German Armed Forces on our border distributed: in East Prussia …; on the Warsaw direction against the Western Military District …; in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO …; in the area of Danzig, Poznan, Thorn …; in Slovakia …; in the Carpathian Ukraine …; in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja …
The document re-uses the term when referring to large areas. The author also uses this term in the article. The distance from our border to the western borders of the above territories in some areas exceeds the value of 400 km indicated by the "expert". We are faced with human misunderstanding of the text of post-war memoirs.
In principle, one cannot refer to the memoirs of the former head of the RU, General Golikov, since even in the early 60s he was sure that the pre-war RM were reliable. This also applies to the report of RU from 31.5.41, which in some part was repeated in report No. 5 of 15 June.
In the early 60s, General Golikov was sure that the information about the presence of 286-296 divisions in the German armed forces, incl. 20-25 MD, 8-10 paratroopers and airborne troops, 15 mountain and 16 SS divisions, was correct.
In fact, on 22.6.41, the German armed forces had up to 209, 2 divisions, incl. up to 15, 2 MD (including 4, 5 MD SS), one parachute and airborne divisions, 6 guards, one SS police division.
The former head of the RU believed that the Republic of Moldova about the presence of 27 md and so on at our western border on June 1 is reliable. In fact, there were only 4 td near the border. Intelligence made a mistake 6, 8 times, but the former head of the RU even after the war does not suspect about it. General Golikov wrote that the overwhelming majority of the numbers of the German divisions concentrated on the border were known. Earlier in the article, based on documentary data, it was shown that the established numbers of most of the divisions were German disinformation.
How long will it take for a tank division to cover a distance of 200-400 km?
The “expert” himself does not know the answer to this question. He can only use information from the 70-80s about the mobility of the TD of the Soviet Army. It should be noted that the German command tried not to redeploy tanks to such a distance on their own. The wheeled vehicles of these divisions moved along the roads, and the tracked vehicles (for the most part) were transported by rail. One of the few 3rd TD moved under its own power from the border of the former Poland. It took the division about 4 days to arrive at the concentration area.
7.6.41 The division continues its march along the indicated route Schwiebus-Tirshtiegel to the Pinne area …
8.6.41 … The division continues through Posen-Wreshen to the new quartering area …
9.6.41 The division continues its march from the old to the new quartering area through Konin-Kolo-Krosniewice-Kutno-Lowicz …
10.6.41 The division rests for one day and in the evening at 18.00 march from the exit point of the convoy through Warsaw to the Minsk-Mazovetsky, Kalushin area …
11.6.41 According to the directive of the "442nd headquarters" on the movement of troops, the last units of the division should pass Warsaw on 11.6.41 at 6:00 …
12.06.41 The division reaches its new location, moving through Siedlce, Luków …
The movement of German tanks over long distances in peacetime was fraught with their failure. For example, tanks of the 16th TD were transported by rail. Below in the diary (probably) we are talking about the march of tanks from the railway station to the concentration areas.
21.6.41 … the 16th TD reports that during the march, about 200 track rollers failed, which must be replaced even before the start of the operation. An inquiry to the head of the logistics department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces revealed that there were no tracked rollers either in the warehouse of tank spare parts or in the arsenal of the ground forces in Magdeburg, tk. all the supplies went to replenish the formations that participated in the Balkan campaign …
22.6.41 … The 16th TD is alarming, some of the Pz-III tanks of which are out of order due to defects in tracked rollers …
In wartime, it was easier: rollers could be removed from damaged vehicles.
Why did the Germans overestimate the number of mobile units?
Readers ask the question: "Why did the German command need to overestimate the number of divisions of mobile troops at the border?" This question is logically followed by another: "Was the overestimation of the number of mobile units at the border obliged to alert the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR?"
The facts were presented: it happened. There are no answers to the above questions in the works of historians either. Therefore, the author will present only his opinion. So why did they do this?
In the previous part, all the locations of the mobile units and units that were mentioned in the RM were considered. The specified document was included in the report of the RU from 31.5.41. What follows from the previously presented material?
1) The presence of fictitious motorized and tank regiments near the locations of large headquarters could be required to mask these headquarters.
For example, from 17.2.41 in the city of Allenstein, the headquarters of the 4th TGr was deployed, and from the spring of 1941 the headquarters of the 41st MK appeared there. In the headquarters of the TGr and MK, many officers wear the uniform of the tank troops. This is not necessarily a black tank uniform. It can also be a gray-green uniform with the colors of the tank troops.
The headquarters of the 4th TGr and the headquarters of the MK in Allenstein were not detected by our intelligence. But a mythical TP was discovered there, and the intelligence double-checked and confirmed this information. How could reconnaissance find TP where there were no tanks?
Sources may have learned about the TP from rumors, or they may have seen many servicemen in tank uniforms. In any case, these rumors could only have been based on German disinformation to cover up the location of the headquarters.
Fictitious units of mobile troops could cover large headquarters, which had many vehicles. For example, the headquarters of the non-existent 6th MD could cover the headquarters of the 6th field army, tk. they were in the same locality.
Two md in the city of Zamoć, in addition to the disinformation role, could additionally cover the headquarters of the 48th mk stationed in the city. The headquarters of the 48th MK was stationed in Zamoć until the evening of June 19 inclusive and was also not detected until the start of the war. By the beginning of the war, he relocated closer to the border.
According to the RO of the KOVO headquarters, both MDs were in Zamoć until June 21 inclusive. It is possible that the German command was afraid of the attention of our intelligence to the mythical MD in this city and therefore there were no actual formations in it.
2) It should be noted that the reconnaissance "definitely" knew about the multitude of motorized divisions and regiments, which at that time were not near the border. How much MD was discovered by intelligence?
On 31.5.41, reconnaissance discovered nine MDs, of which the "exact" numbers of seven are known: 6th, 8th, 17th, 37th, 58th, 175th and 215th. Information about the presence of the eighth MD (161st) needed to be clarified. All of these eight MD numbers did not exist in the German armed forces. Therefore, this is an example of the disinformation of the German command. Why did the Germans show non-existent MD?
On 6.9.40, the headquarters of the United Wehrmacht Command sent to the Abwehr a manual on measures to disinformation the Soviet military command, in which there is an interesting text:
To what extent are individual authentic data, for example, about the numbering of regiments, the number of garrisons, etc. can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes, the Main Command of the Ground Forces decides …
The main command of the ground forces determined for the Abwehr what information about the numbers of the regiments and, possibly, about the divisions should be disclosed to our intelligence.
Since the fall of 1940, the German MDs became essentially weakened PDs on cars (without one regiment and one artillery battalion). The division had up to 37 armored cars and had no tanks. Such a connection can be quickly transferred to the place of breaking through the defense and cannot be used to break through the enemy's defense, because they did not have the tanks and structures to support them. These divisions, without TD, also could not be used in breakthroughs to great depths. This is probably why the German command was not afraid to show the mythical motorized divisionssincethey should not have caused concern among the command of the spacecraft.
The problem turned out to be that the Germans did not know that our intelligence could not find out about the transformation of MD into. According to our intelligence, the German MD consisted of three regiments, had 70 armored cars, 96 tanks, 24 assault guns of 75 or 105 mm caliber, 72 guns on a tank chassis of 37 and 47 mm caliber.
On 22.6.41 in one of the documents of the RU all eight familiar MD numbers appear. Almost all of them remained in the same areas in which they were "discovered" by intelligence on May 31.
3) The situation with the TD is completely different. Intelligence is aware of the presence of such divisions, but their numbers are unknown or distorted. In the report of the RU on May 31, the headquarters of the 8th TD is located immediately in Warsaw (against ZAPOVO) and in Lancut (against KOVO). At this time, the 8th TD was stationed in the vicinity of the city of Prague. On the evening of June 22, RU believed that the 8th TD was concentrated against KOVO. In fact, the 8th TD fought as part of the 4th TGr against the troops of the PribOVO.
According to the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated May 31, there were twelve etc. against the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO (up to Slovakia).
Against the PribOVO, which will be hit by two TGRs, reconnaissance did not find a single full-fledged TD. In East Prussia, there are only four tank regiments and 6 tank battalions. These tank units are conditionally combined into two TDs, which do not have motorized infantry brigades, artillery regiments and support units. Our general staff officers were obliged to understand that these are not full-fledged etc. At the same time, in East Prussia, from the fall of 1940 to 22.6.41, two TDs (1st and 6th) were stationed, which for 9 months were not detected by our intelligence. This characterizes the work of our intelligence as poorly provided with knowledgeable agents.
The headquarters of the TD, the headquarters of the tank brigade, six tank battalions and 4 tank battalions were found against the ZAPOVO. The indicated tank units were counted for four TD. Of these, only two can be considered complete: one near Warsaw (170 km to our border) and one in the Dombrovo region (105 km). And no hints about the concentration in the future of shock groups on the Suvalka ledge or in the Brest region. The only TD, which was actually concentrated against the ZAPOVO in the area of the city of Poznan, was not found by intelligence.
The instruction of the United Wehrmacht Command to the Abwehr leadership also related to the southern direction and tank forces:
To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively low …
To exaggerate the state and level of armament of formations, especially tank divisions …
In accordance with these instructions, the German command could conduct an imitation of the presence of TD in the southern part of the General Government, far from the real directions of the TGR strikes. Five full-fledged TDs were discovered by our intelligence in the cities of Novy Sacz, Tarnow, Lezajsk, Lancut and between the cities of Lublin and Holm.
It can be seen from the figure that four TD are located opposite the top of the ledge, where in fact there were no enemy mobile strike groups. It turns out that the information about the presence of four TD in this area was beneficial to the German command, tk. suited their purposes. Therefore, the presence of this information in the RM could only be misinformation …
Another td is located in the Lublin area - Holm. Probably, she was supposed to cover the deployment of formations of the 1st TGr (14th TD, 25th MD and MD SS "Adolf Hitler"). The same role could be played by two non-existent MD in Zamoć to cover the deployment of the headquarters and units of the 1st TGr, 1st and 13th TD.
4) After the "discovery" of the mythical motorized and tank divisions, our intelligence was obliged to organize observation of the locations of these formations or some of them. Observing the places of dislocation of these dummies, it was impossible to detect the fact that real joints were moving towards the boundary.
How many German divisions were transported to the border in June 1941?
According to the author, one of the reasons for the concealment of the RM for June 1941 is that intelligence was unable to accurately determine the number of German formations that were redeployed to our border.
On 27.5.41 at the western border (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) there were up to 86 German divisions. By the morning of June 22, 123, 3 divisions were located in the same territory. Thus, from May 28 until the start of the war, the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland was transported 37, 3 divisions, of which 30, 8 were motorized and tank.
In accordance with the report of RU from 31.5.41 (actually on May 27 or later), there were 120-122 German divisions near our border, including fourteen TD and thirteen MD.
Let's determine the number of transported German connections in the RM in June. Will help in this summary RU from 22.6.41. In the summary of RU No. 1 at 20-00 on 22.6.41, it is said about the number of German divisions brought up to the front (or to the border):
1. As a result of the hostilities on 22.6, the data available on 20.6 on the following enemy grouping, located directly on the border with the USSR, was actually confirmed …
2. The general increase in the density of the direct concentration of German troops in front of the front is emphasized …
From the above fragment of the document, it can be seen that, according to intelligence data for June 20 and 21, 13 divisions additionally arrived on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. Another 9-11 divisions were redeployed to Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania. The RU summary also states:
[As of June 22nd. - Approx. Auth.] the total number of enemy groupings is determined by:
a) on the northwestern front - 29 divisions …;
b) 31 divisions on the western front in the Warsaw region …;
c) on the southwestern front (up to Slovakia) - 48 divisions …
In addition, in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania - 33-35 divisions …
Below are data on the number of German divisions according to intelligence data at different times.
The table shows that until June 19 (inclusive), 5-7 divisions arrived on the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland, incl. two motorized and two tank. It turns out that reconnaissance did not detect a redeployment to the border over 22 md and so on. Our reconnaissance made a mistake in the number of redeployed divisions 5 times, and in the number of motorized and tank divisions in 6, 5 times.
Until June 19, the average speed of delivery of German divisions to the border was 0.26 … 0.37 divisions per day. Let me remind you that the speed of concentration of German divisions from May 15 to May 31, according to reconnaissance data, was a close value - 0.3 divisions / day. At such a rate of delivery of German troops to the border, talking about the expectation of war by the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR on June 22 is actually frivolous … It is also frivolous to talk about the presence of a certain directive of the General Staff of June 18 …
On 22 June 1941, RU began to urgently increase the number of German divisions near the border. It is very likely that this increase is fictitious. Why? See for yourself. Two SS TDs appear against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO troops. Accurate data on the presence of these divisions did not pass through any intelligence report, including the RM RO of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO headquarters for June 21.
But, since the tanks from the Suwalki salient are advancing, according to data from two VOs, the RU specialists turned the unverified information in the summary into verified information about the presence of two SS TDs.
They also came up with or fell for the bait of German disinformation in RU, increasing the enemy's grouping against KOVO by 11 PD. Of these, five are again positioned against the top of the ledge, where these troops could not have been. There were 48 divisions in the southern part of former Poland, and in fact there were 37 of them at that time. It is clearly evident that 11 divisions were simply assigned.
At the same time, the number of MD and so on, concentrated against KOVO, did not change from May 31 to June 22. The same thing happens in the Warsaw direction. The grouping of mobile troops increased by only one mythical SS armored division on the Suwalki ledge …
According to intelligence, after May 31 and June 19, the German group against the PribOVO increased by five divisions, incl. by 2 ppm and 2 td.
According to the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, on the evening of June 19, there was:
- in East Prussia (against PribOVO) - 38 divisions, incl. up to 5.5 td and 4.5 ppm;
- in the Warsaw direction (against the ZAPOVO) - 41, 3 divisions, incl. 6 td and 5, 3 ppm;
- in the southern part of former Poland (against KOVO) - 35 divisions, incl. 5, 5 td and 1, 5 ppm.
Later, some of the divisions were somewhat redistributed across the border area.
The greatest contribution of German disinformation can be seen in the RM on the situation on the southern flank of our border. On the territory of Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania, 9-11 German divisions arrived on June 20 and 21.
It should be noted that, in accordance with the RU summary: - [available. - Approx. ed.], which include 2 TD and 2 MD. The distance from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border is about 200 km. In East Prussia and the former Poland, a German group intended for an attack on the USSR is considered at a distance of up to 500 … 600 km from the Soviet-German border. Logically, the German grouping in the central part of Romania should be considered as possible troops that can be used for the war with the USSR. The grouping of troops was located in the central part of Romania, not so far from our border.
Intelligence report No. 3 RU at 22-00 24.6. 1941:
The total enemy grouping in front of our Southern Front is 15 German divisions, of which 6 are infantry, 7 motorized, 2 tank … In the Bucharest, Ploiesti area [180 km to the border. - Approx. bus], Pitesti [268 km. - Approx. auth.], front-line reserves of 15 German divisions are assumed …
On June 22, according to intelligence, in the south (in Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania) there is a huge German grouping in the amount of 46-50 divisions, incl. 15 md and so on.
In fact, in Romania on June 22, there are only 7 German infantry divisions, while in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine there are no German divisions. Below are the fragments of the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, which confirm the above.
The Barbarossa plan said:
Within the framework of this general task, the armies, as well as the TGR, in accordance with the detailed instructions of the headquarters of Army Group South, carry out the following tasks:
11th Army to cover the territory of Romania, vital for the conduct of a real war by Germany, from the invasion of Russian troops. To ensure the success of Army Group South's offensive, the army must, demonstrating the deployment of large forces, pinning down the opposing enemy, and in the future, as the offensive develops in other directions, in cooperation with aviation, to prevent the organized withdrawal of the Russians beyond the river. Dnieper, pursuing their retreating troops on their heels …
Let me also remind you of the order of the OKW to the Abwehr:
Thus, our intelligence unwittingly provided the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR with German misinformation about the presence of a huge grouping of German troops alone, concentrated against the KOVO and ODVO.
For example, the strength of the grouping concentrated against the KOVO and ODVO troops as of May 31 was 72-73 German divisions, incl. 26 md and so on. At the same time, according to reconnaissance data, in the direction of the main attacks on the PribOVO and ZAPOVO there was a weaker grouping in the amount of 59-60 divisions, incl. 10 ppm, etc.
The SC command had the impression that the main strikes would be delivered in the southern direction: from the southern part of the General Government and from Romania to the flank of the KOVO and along the OdVO. After all, it was there that up to 55% of the German divisions and up to 72% of MD, etc. were concentrated. In addition, there were Hungarian and Romanian divisions, which, according to intelligence, included tank and motorized units of up to 3.5 divisions. It turns out that in the southern direction there could be up to 8-9 German motorized corps out of 10-12 available in Germany.
Misinformation about the presence of a huge number of German divisions in the southern direction came on the eve of the war. Valentine (16.6.41):.
On June 17, the RO of the ODVO headquarters prepared a scheme according to which there were up to 16 German divisions against the troops of the district, of which information about one TD needed to be clarified. However, in the reports of the RU on May 31 and June 22, it is said about the presence of two etc. in this area as verified information. We saw the same when examining two SS armored divisions on the Suwalki ledge. Part of the German divisions were stationed against the KOVO and therefore is not shown in the diagram.
The deployment of enemy troops near the border on June 21 can be seen on the fragments of the map of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. A logical question arises:
Below is a fairly impressive grouping of Hungarian troops of up to 6 divisions. This number includes tank and motorized units with a total number of up to 2, 5 divisions. When calculating the number of divisions, it is assumed that one division is equal to two brigades.
On June 22, according to RU, in the southern grouping (the southern part of the General Government, Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania) there were up to 94-98 German divisions, of which up to 26 were motorized and tank formations. As part of the enemy force grouping against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO there were 60 divisions, of which 14-15 were motorized and tank divisions.
Thus, against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, according to intelligence, there were 40-43% of the enemy troops concentrated near our border, and up to 35-37% of the MD, etc. We see that the German command has fulfilled its task of misinforming the command of the spacecraft and the government of the Soviet Union …
What conclusion can be drawn about the transport of German troops that RU discovered?
After the release of the RU report from 31.5.41 to June 19 inclusive, according to intelligence data, 5-7 German divisions arrived on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, including two MD and two others.
In the report of the RU on June 22, they found an increase in German troops at the border by 22-24 divisions. However, the information about the appearance of 22-24 divisions does not correspond to reality: it is a lie or the result of German disinformation. RU added the indicated 22-24 mythical divisions in the following areas:
- on the Suvalkinsky ledge - two armored divisions of the SS;
- 2 divisions in Slovakia and 2-4 divisions in the Carpathian Ukraine;
- 5 divisions arrived in Romania;
- 11 infantry divisions arrived in the southern part of former Poland and brought the number of German divisions in the area to 48.
Thus, all our intelligence services were unable to detect the redeployment of a significant number of German divisions in June 1941, most of which were motorized and tank divisions …
And according to the memoirs of the military leaders of all ranks who survived the war, JV Stalin is to blame for everything. Let each reader judge for himself.
Even after the start of the war, the command of the spacecraft was forced to fear a huge mythical enemy grouping in the south.
Intelligence report No. 4 RU at 22-00 on 25.6.41:
On the front of the offensive from the Baltic Sea to Romania, the enemy brought into action 88-90 divisions, of which 72-73 are directly in battles …
This number does not include the southern flank (Slovakia and Hungary), where general grouping of 46 divisions (German) I haven't shown myself yet …
A significant mythical German grouping in Romania remained until the first days of July. It has only slightly decreased in volume. Until the beginning of July, our command even expected the landing of large assault forces in the Crimea or in the rear of the Southern Front. The figure below does not show the grouping of German troops in the central part of Romania, in the Slovaks and in Hungary.
