In the previous part, intelligence materials were considered (RM) NKVD for 1940, which differed little from the information of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. Consideration of RMs was started, which were received at the beginning of 1941. It was shown that the RM on license plates included up to 80% of the misinformation.
The following abbreviations will be used in the article: an - artillery regiment, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, cd (kbr, kp) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), RO - the intelligence department of the headquarters, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, td (TBR, TP, TB) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).
Concentration of German divisions at the border
Below is a graph of the concentration of German divisions at the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian border.
It can be seen from the figure that by 22.6.41 the dependences of the actual number of divisions and similar information according to intelligence data should have intersected. This is the reason for the accidental coincidence of data from the RM and actual data by the beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the nature of these dependencies from May 40 to June 41. There are no coincidences in the nature of the dependencies during the entire period. However, the crossing does not occur due to the increase in the number of divisions on the evening of June 22 in the report of the RU, in which the number of formations is being increased in every possible way for safety reasons …
In earlier reports of the RO ZAPOVO in Moscow, they found mention of two SS armored divisions, which no one saw, but two people allegedly heard about it. No one saw either servicemen from these divisions, or equipment from there. Even after a month-long attempt to locate them, they were not found. But when compiling a summary on the evening of June 22, this unverified information came in handy. At the same time, RU is well aware that such SS divisions simply do not exist. In the Bulletin of RU dated 26.4.41 regarding the presence of 18 SS divisions in the armed forces of Germany, there is a postscript "". Motorized, not armored.
The Bulletin issued on June 15 mentions the same number of SS divisions "". There is no mention anywhere that some of these divisions are tank divisions. It is well known that SS tank divisions did not exist before the war … But, as they say, the salvation of the drowning is the work of the drowning themselves. The RU management secured itself by using the method of increasing the number of connections. There are other examples of the above.
In the previous report of the RU, it was said about the presence of 9 German divisions in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. In fact, they were not there, but the intelligence "saw" something. In a summary on June 22, RU increased this number to 13-15 divisions. If there are no troops, then there is no transport of troops and equipment, and the reconnaissance "saw" an increase in the nonexistent German grouping by almost 50% …
In Romania, according to the previous report, there were up to 27 German divisions (including up to 10 TD and MD), and in the report dated June 22, the number of divisions in the German grouping increased by 30%! At the same time, without wasting little time, the number of TD and MD was increased by exactly half. No one was embarrassed by the fact that the fifteen TD and MD in Romania indicated in the RM make up almost half of the mobile troops of Germany, which the German command allocated for the war with the Soviet Union. This is due to the fact that in intelligence, no one knew how much TD and MD was actually allocated for the war with the USSR.
PM analysis from different intelligence agencies
To make sure of the reliability of the data coming from our intelligence services, let us analyze some RMs that were prepared before the start of the war. A detailed analysis of the presence or absence of motorized and tank troops near the border will not be carried out in this unit, since separate units will be devoted to these troops in the future.
Special message of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (9.4.41):
[quote] At the beginning of February 1941 … the 26th ap and 64th motorized mechanized regiment arrived in Lublin from Warsaw, the 23rd ap. [/quote]
The 23rd AP was part of the 23rd Infantry Division, which was in East Prussia during this period. Therefore, the artillery regiment could not be at a distance of more than 350 km from the southernmost point on the border of East Prussia. Since this regiment was seen in the cities of Holm and Lublin, this can only be a planned operation to misinform our intelligence.
26th ap from the 26th infantry division, which from July 1940 to May 1941 was in Belgium. Nobody will send a divisional artillery regiment for 1.5 thousand km from the place of permanent deployment of the division.
The 64th subdivision was previously part of the 16th subdivision. During the formation of the 16th TD, the 64th regiment was reorganized into the 64th rifle regiment, which became part of the division. The division was formed on the territory of the 6th Military District (Germany). From December 40th to March 1941, the division will be in Romania, and in April it will have to fight in the Balkans. Intelligence correctly identified this regiment as motorized, but only individual servicemen of this regiment or a group of soldiers with false insignia on their shoulder straps could arrive in the city of Lublin from Warsaw. Under any of these options, intelligence data is misinformation.
Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (14.4.41):
[quote] In the Suwalki area on April 5-6 this year. in the area of Sheplyshki, Punsk, Krasnopol, Seyny, Giby and Kaleta (30-40 km from the border), up to two mechanized divisions arrived …
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General Maslennikov. [/Quote]
There is a lot of other information in the message, which is difficult to double-check, but information about two MDs is easy to verify. The first German md (20th) 10.4.41 began to arrive from France to the territory of East Prussia and on April 16 went to Poland. Where exactly - there is no information. The 20th MD did not fully arrive in East Prussia. The anti-tank battalion, reconnaissance battalion, reserve battalion and some other units were still in Germany in mid-April. It was not possible to find information on the location of two motorized and artillery regiments on 14.4.41. The next motorized division will arrive at the Eastern border only in the month of May. Therefore, we can say that RM on arrival before two md are not correct.
24.4.
41, a special message was received from our intelligence officer to the head of the RU: [quote] Germany now has 265 divisions … In Poland and East Prussia, up to 85 divisions, of which up to 60 infantry divisions, 8 TD, 12 MD, 1-2 parachute, 1-2 cavalry … "There are notes:" He has incorrect information about tank, mountain divisions and paratroopers. Digit 40 motor div. deserves interest, but it needs to be supported by other data. The distribution by theaters and reserves is not entirely correct. Golikov. 04.24.41 g. [/Quote]
According to the special report, there are up to 85 German divisions in Poland and East Prussia, including 20 TD and MD. The head of the RU was interested in information about 40 md, but in fact there were fourteen such formations in Germany and there was also a separate md. And what information was provided in the RM RU during this period?
RU summary (26.4.41):
[quote] As a result of taking into account and comparing the data received, the total distribution of the German armed forces along the borders and fronts at 25.4 is presented in the following form: In the border zone with the USSR:
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) is 95-100 divisions (excluding cavalry units), of which:
a) in the East Prussian direction (against the PribOVO) 21-22 divisions, of which: 17-18 infantry divisions, 3 md, one etc.….
b) On the Warsaw direction (against the Western Military District) - 28 divisions, of which: 23 infantry divisions, 1 MD and 4 TD. In addition, one motorized division.
c) In the Lublin-Krakow region (against KOVO) - 29-32 divisions, of which: 22-25 infantry divisions, 3 md, 4 td …
d) In the area of Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 pd …
e) On the Uzhgorod direction (against KOVO) - the total number of German troops in the Carpathian Ukraine region is 3, of which 2 infantry divisions and one state rifle division.
f) In the Moldavian direction (against the ODVO) - 8-9 divisions, of which: 7-8 infantry divisions and gsd …
The total strength of the German army as of 04/25/41 is 286-296 divisions … According to available data, from April 1, the German command began to form up to 40 divisions, which requires additional verification … [/quote]
The summary lists the German divisions, which are in the number 286-296: 199-207 infantry division, 15 GRD, 20 MD, 22 TD, 4 motorized cavalry, 8-10 parachute, 18 SS divisions (of which 10 MD).
Information on the number of divisions is overestimated: by the total number of formations - by 34-38%, by TD - by 10%, by MD (including MD SS) - by 53%, by CD - 4 times, by parachute divisions - by 4 Five times.
According to RU, as of 25.4.41, there were 77-81 divisions near the border (excluding German divisions on the territory of Romania), of which 16 TD and MD.
In fact, during this period, there were 53 divisions near the border, including two TD and one MD. Are the intelligence data on TD and MD reliable if the error in determining their number is more than 5 times? They are not. Which units did the reconnaissance consider to be tank and motorized? We'll figure this out later. The situation is even worse in RM with the number of cd and cp.
On pd, the coincidence of information is much higher. If we consider only the territory of East Prussia and Poland, then the difference in intelligence data from the actual number of divisions is only 19-22%. With regard to the German troops in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine, everything is much worse - there is sheer misinformation …
Special messages of the NKVD of the USSR and the RU of the General Staff of the spacecraft
Consider now the information that came from the intelligence of the border troops.
Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (21.4.41 g.):
[quote] From April 1 to April 19, 1941, border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the General Government …
In total, these areas arrived: … formations of 3 md, 6 infantry divisions, up to 21 pp, 2 mn, 7 kp and 9-10 ap, up to 7 tb and 4 sapper battalions, a battalion of motorcyclists, 2 companies of scooters …
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria. [/Quote]
The message is about the border strip. Let's take care of the calculations. Arrived 3 md and 6 pd - a total of 9 divisions.
21 pp / 3 + 1 up = 7 pp. A total of 16 divisions. We assume that 7 tank battalions, 2 MP and two APs will make up two more divisions. In total, it turns out that the Germans brought up to 18 divisions to the border.
Let's look at the reports of RU and determine how many divisions have arrived according to the data of army intelligence officers. Special message RU (4.4.41): [quote] As a result of the analysis of all the data received, a general strengthening of the Eastern German Front against the USSR from the Baltic Sea to Slovakia for February and March by 6 pd and 3 td is obtained … Total: 72-73 divisions [/quote]
On April 1, at the border (to Slovakia), according to RU, there were 72-73 German divisions. Special message RU (26.4.41): [quote] The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) [at 25.4.41 - Approx. auth.] - 95-100 divisions …, of which:
… e) On the Uzhgorod direction … three divisions …;
f) On the Moldavian direction … 8-9 divisions … [/quote]
Without Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania, the number of German troops will be 84-88 divisions. Subtracting from the indicated number the number of divisions available on April 1, we get the arrival of 12-15 divisions. According to the border guards, a larger number of troops (by three divisions) arrived in a shorter period (by six days). Therefore, it cannot be said that the intelligence of the border troops provided the RM more accurate in comparison with the similar information of the RU.
It is not known how many divisions actually arrived from 1 to 19 April. It is only known that 16 divisions arrived in the whole of April. Therefore, it is not possible to check how reliable the RM RU is. We can only conclude that the intelligence information of the border troops is somewhat overestimated in relation to similar data of the RU.
Special message of the NKVD of the USSR:
[quote] During the period from April 20 to May 19 this year. an increase in the number of German troops near the border with the USSR was expressed:
In Klaipeda region: at 6 pd, 2 td and 2 md, … one cbr …
In the Suwalki area: for one PD, one CD and one MD …
In the Ostrolenka district: for five pd, two tp, … one mp …
In the region of Biala Podlaska: one AK, four front-line and one other …
In the Kholm area: for one AK, one md …
In the district of Grubieshov: two front lines and one etc. …
In the Tomashov district: two front lines …
In the Yaroslav-Sanok district: for one AK, six front lines, one TP … [/quote]
35 divisions arrived at the border (of which 4 TD and 4 MD), one CBR, three TP and one MP. Three TP and one MP will be counted for one conditional etc. Then it turns out that from April 20 to May 19, 1941, there was an increase in the German grouping at the border by 36 divisions.
Adding the data of the previous NKVD summary, we find that from April 1 to May 19, 1941, the German grouping in the border area increased by 18 + 36 = 54 divisions.
According to RU, the German group from April 1 to May 15 increased by 42-46 divisions.
In fact, from April 1 to May 31, 46 divisions arrived at the border. From the indicated number, it is known that 10 divisions arrived after May 15th. Then, until May 15 (inclusive), no more than 36 divisions.
As a result of such complex calculations, we can say that the Republic of Uzbekistan overestimated the number of arrived divisions by 17-28%. At the same time, it was shown that the intelligence of the border troops overestimated the number of troops that arrived in relation to the similar information of the RU.
Help from the NKVD of the USSR (after 24.5.41):
[quote] On the Soviet-German border: In April - May of this year. the concentration of German troops continued near the Soviet-German border. During this period, a concentration was established on the territory of East Prussia and the Polish General Government: … 68-70 pd, 6-8 pd, 10 cd and 5 td …
Along the Soviet-Romanian border: In April-May of this year. in Romania, up to 12-18 divisions of German troops were concentrated, of which: 7 md and up to 2 td …
The greatest concentration of German troops is noted in the area of Dorokhoi, Redeutsi, Botosani. On May 21-24, up to 6 md, 1 td and 2 pd were located in this area …
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General Maslennikov. [/Quote]
In accordance with the above Reference, the intelligence of the border troops found on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian borders up to 101-111 German divisions. This number does not include the border area of Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, as well as the German group in the Danzig - Poznan - Thorn area. The exact release date of the certificate has not been specified. The help contains the latest date ""
According to RU, as of 31.5.41, there were 120-122 German divisions near our border. If from the specified number of formations subtract 14 divisions that RU "saw" in territories that are not considered in the NKVD document, then we get the number 106-108 … We can say that the intelligence information of the border troops and the RU is comparable.
In fact, as of 31.5.41, the border had 83 German divisions. It can be seen that the intelligence services of various departments provide not entirely correct information. The myth that the intelligence of the NKVD border troops provided more accurate information than the RC of the General Staff of the spacecraft does not stand up to criticism …
It can be concluded that, according to the intelligence of the border troops, the number of German divisions:
- in the summer - in the fall of 1940, coincided with the number of troops according to RU estimates;
- in April 1941, it exceeded the same amount, which was given in the RM RU;
- in April - May 1941, according to the upper estimate (111 divisions), the data also exceeded the number of divisions in the RM RU.
Let's go back to the NKVD Reference: "". Nine German divisions are concentrated in the indicated area according to the information of the border guards. These include a strong mobile group of 7 TD and MD.
In fact, there were only up to 1-2 German infantry divisions in this area. Information about the presence of a powerful tank-motorized grouping also passes through the information of RU. This can only be due to the deliberate misinformation of our intelligence by the German command, on whose instructions it was necessary to overestimate the size of the grouping in the southern direction.
P. A. Sudoplatov:
[quote] We overestimated the grouping of German troops opposing us in the southwest, as a result of which the Southern Front was forced to withdraw in early July. Despite the very serious network of agents we had in Romania, mythical information on the significantly superior forces of the Germans and Romanians in the South, consisting of 40 infantry divisions and 13 td and md.
The incorrect assessment by our intelligence of the situation in Bessarabia, as the People's Commissar of State Security of Moldova, later the head of the special department of the Southern Front, Sazykin, self-critically told me, at the critical moment of the beginning of the war led to the low efficiency of the actions of the front forces, despite the fact that the enemy, as it turned out, did not have superior forces. Undoubtedly this had an adverse effect on the development of events in the entire South-West direction … [/quote]
Information about license plates in RM NKVD
Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (2.6.41):
The 35th Infantry Division was in Belgium until 25.3.41 and arrived in East Prussia on 9.4.41. The reliability of the information is acceptable: Belgium is confused with Bulgaria and the division was discovered 16 days after its arrival.
Help from the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (9.6.41):
The 257th Infantry Division was not part of the 17th AK. From January to May 1941, she was part of the 34th AK, and then became part of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps.
Help from the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (10.6.41):
The 559th subdivision was disbanded in July 1940 and will be deployed again only on 15.12.41. Disinformation is reflected in the RM.
Special message of the NKGB BSSR (19.6.41):
[quote] “June 12 and 13 this year. at st. Terespol [2 km to the border near the city of Brest - approx. ed.] a military train was unloaded, a group of German soldiers on shoulder straps had numbers 411 and 643, four battalions in full combat gear, soldiers had numbers 44 and 46 on their shoulder straps … "[/quote]
The numbers on the shoulder straps "411" could correspond only to the 411th pp, since The 411th Infantry Division did not exist. The 411th Infantry Division was part of the 122nd Infantry Division, which from April 1941 was on the territory of East Prussia. Therefore, the servicemen of the 411th regiment could not unload several hundred kilometers from their place of deployment …
The 643rd subdivision was disbanded on August 21, 1940, and the 643rd subdivision never existed.
The 44th subdivision was part of the 11th subdivision, which from 10.3.41 was in East Prussia.
The 46th Infantry Division was part of the 30th Infantry Division, which was in France until May 1941, and in June will be redeployed to East Prussia.
In principle, the numbers on the shoulder straps "44" and "46" could be servicemen of separate units from the 44th and 46th Infantry Divisions. But the 46th Infantry Division during this period was in Romania and there were no parts of it on the territory of Poland. The 44th Infantry Division was deployed at the beginning of June in the city of Kielce and on June 16, 1941, it was already concentrated at the border opposite the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.
Why lead 4 battalions to Brest and unload 2 km from it, then to lead these battalions along the border at a distance of about 150 km? Therefore, the unloading of infantry battalions far away from the place of concentration is an unlikely event. It turns out that the servicemen of the four regiments could not disembark at the station. Terespol in June 1941, and intelligence "saw" four battalions …
Continuation of special message
The 241st ap was part of the 161st infantry division, which from July 1940 was deployed in East Prussia. By the beginning of the war, the 161st Infantry Division will be located on the Suvalka ledge.
501st subdivision from the 290th subdivision, which has been located in East Prussia since March 1941. The division was stationed near the indicated settlements.
The 475th subdivision of the 255th subdivision, which has been in Poland since March 1941. The division will meet the beginning of the war at Brest.
Again, we see about 50% misinformation and up to 50% reliable information.
Special message of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (2.6.41):
[quote] "Against the Belarusian military district in the Biala Podlaska metro station … the 313rd and 314th pp …" [/]
The 313rd subdivision of the 246th subdivision, which has been in Germany since 1940, and in France since March. The division will be redeployed to the Eastern Front only in February 1942.
314th subdivision from the 162nd subdivision, which has been in East Prussia since July 1940.
One fake regiment and one real regiment. 50% of the information was confirmed and 50% is disinformation …
P. A. Sudoplatov:
[Quote] The heads of the foreign intelligence of the KGB and the GRU General Staff in 1960-1980 also voluntarily and involuntarily joined in the distortion of the real picture of the leadership of Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, Timoshenko … the timing of the attack, the scouts "reported accurately"and the dictator Stalin … criminally ignored the reliable RM about the German attack … We did not reveal the disinformation actions of the enemy's intelligence and his satellites on the eve of the outbreak of war … [/quote]
Enemy units against ODVO troops
In the first parts, we examined in detail the information on three VOs (PribOVO, KOVO and ZAPOVO), which came from the RO of districts and RU, and also compared this data with information on the maps that are posted on the websites of the RF Ministry of Defense and Memory of the People. RM data do not contradict the information on the maps, which was shown. Then the RM was not considered about the enemy troops concentrated against the ODVO. The figure shows a graph of the increase in the number of troops on the Soviet-Romanian border according to RU data.
The situation with the concentration of German troops against the ODVO is similar to the situation for the three previously considered VOs: since the beginning of June, there has been no increase in the number of German troops near the border. As if on purpose the German leadership shows that for the defense against spacecraft the troops have been delivered in the proper volume and further increase in the size of the group is not required. The change in the number of troops near the border has stabilized, but in fact, during this period, the most intensive movement of troops occurs, which our intelligence could not accurately identify. The figure below shows a diagram of the deployment of enemy troops on the eve of the war against the troops of the ODVO.
Everything is the same as in other districts: on 17.6.41, about 12 Romanian and German divisions were concentrated at the border and at a distance of 13 … 20 … 35 km from it. Up to 12 divisions are concentrated at a distance of 25 … 38 … 72 km from the border. According to RU, up to 17 German divisions are deployed on the territory of Moldova and Northern Dobrudja. In the central part of Romania, there are 10 more German divisions, including 4 TD and MD.
From the presented scheme and the number of troops (according to intelligence data), it cannot be concluded that the war will begin precisely at dawn on June 22. It can start on June 18 or, for example, on July 1 …
Our reconnaissance so "detailed and accurately" reported on the enemy troops that, probably, in the opinion of the SC leadership, the reconnaissance was obliged to detect the beginning of the advance of the invasion group to the border in the shortest possible time. For the full advancement of such a grouping, it took up to two days, and during this time (according to the leadership of the spacecraft) it was possible to calmly bring the border troops to combat readiness, partially move the troops to the border and disperse the aviation … But, unfortunately, everything went according to the scenario conceived by the German command …
Our planes over the territory of the enemy
Currently, a blank spot in the history of reconnaissance is the issue of reconnaissance flights by aircraft of the Air Force KA in 1941. It is known that border aviation planes flew along the border up to twice daily. The border guards collected information about the movements of troops on the German side and transmitted it at numerous field landing sites to the border commanders responsible for reconnaissance. Further, the RM were generalized in the border districts and sent to the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops.
And there is very little information about the reconnaissance flights of the spacecraft air force. This information is found only in memoirs. For example, F. Dolgushin (122 iap, 11 garden):
[quote] On Friday, June 20, we flew, reconnoitred … On Friday, Pavlov flew in, Kopets flew in, and the division commander, Colonel Ganichev, on his plane. They gathered us at the headquarters, I report that I saw a group of about forty planes. It was us at dawn, in the morning we flew with Serezha … We filmed with two thousand, we examined everything, and now they reported - there were so many planes, of this type. Increase by so much, the entire Suwalki airfield is completely clogged.
And later we see a passenger car, which is heading to our parking lot … Kopec, Lieutenant General, asks, “What is your name? Will you let me fly the plane? Don't worry, Sergei, I won't break … "Then flew: the commander, the regiment commander, and our Colonel Nikolayev … We flew off, taxied. I go up, and Kopets goes out. “The plane is really good. Everything that you reported is accurate. We could not count the planes with accuracy, but I didn't want to hang out there a lot … [/quote]
Consider German reports of Soviet aircraft flying along the border and abroad. The reports do not mention regular flights of border aircraft along the border and flights of passenger aircraft. Probably, regular (planned) flights were not recorded by German observers. In the messages below, sometimes flights of our aircraft across the border or their return are not recorded. From this, it can be assumed that some of the flights abroad could not have been recorded by German observers.
Many border flights, as can be seen from the materials, could be associated with a loss of orientation by the pilots in the air. However, the rather numerous violations of the border in May 1941, when the German attack was expected, may indicate that some of the flights could be reconnaissance. Below in the messages in brackets is the distance from the border towards the enemy. The author could not find some of the settlements …
15.1.41 at 11-37 in the area of Wola-Ranizowska (65 km) a plane flew from East to West. With some delay he returned to the East. A little later, an aircraft appeared again in the Ranizow area (36 km) with a flight direction to the West. The very high altitude made it impossible to determine the nationality of the aircraft.
4.4.41 in the morning at high altitude an aircraft of unknown nationality flew north-west-west of 12 km Sokal. The further flight was made to the southeast. Reconnaissance and air defense have been notified.
11.4.41 message about crossing the border by air. At about 12-00 at an altitude of 3000 m, another Russian plane flew along the border. No border violation has been established.
On 04.15.41 an unknown plane was flying at high altitude from south to north near Sokal.
19.4.41 two planes at 6-50 and at 7-10 (I-16 Rata) of Russian nationality were found over Malkin (Poland). A large Soviet star is visible on the underside of the bearing planes. At 11-40 another plane of Russian origin flew from the East over Malkinia to the West. At 7-20 a plane of unknown nationality flew 200 m above Ostrowec.
On April 17, 1941 at 10-45 4 Russian monoplane at an altitude of about 1000 m flew over the German-Russian border along the Schwiddern (Poland) - Szczuczyn (USSR) road, as well as over the Schwiddern area and flew back to the east.
04.24.41 at 12-55 a Russian airliner 15 km from Lotzen (58 km) passed at an altitude of 200-250 m above the marching column of the headquarters company.
On 9.5.41 at 23-00 from Russia the plane crossed the border near Rabedy and went 3-4 km to the German side. It was possible to observe it before Szerwin. In Laski and Mahonow, only the sound of motors was heard. Height 500 m. Navigation lights …
10.5.41 at 7-30 saw 3 Russian aircraft over the border (22 km northeast of Sokolov. To the border in this direction less than 22 km. It turns out over the Soviet territory). Flight altitude is about 1500 m.
At 11:45 a.m. from the easterly direction, an aircraft of unknown origin flew at an altitude of 1200-1500 m near Wieska over the German area (9 km) in the direction from north to south.
At 11-55, an aircraft of unknown origin from the east at an altitude of 1200 m flew over Starczewice (600 m) and Mogialnice (500 m). Further flight over the German area southward to Korczew (2.5 km). Further flight to the west.
13-50 flight of two aircraft of unknown nationality from the east over the German region at an altitude of 500 - 800 m, lasting about 1/4 hour.
19.5.41 at 15-50 two single-engine aircraft at an altitude of 1000 m flew over the border. The signs were not distinguishable. The type of aircraft could only be Russian.
21.5.41 Russian planes crossed the border between Lipsk - Sopockinie.
22.5.41 at 8:30 am an aircraft of unknown origin flew from north to south in the direction of the German border near Jablezna.
At 13-14 a twin-engine aircraft of unknown nationality flew over the German-Russian border near Okpczyn and flew east.
24.5.41 an unknown plane was observed over the German border.
25.5.41 5 Russian aircraft were observed near the Rydavka (3 km) - Macharce (23 km) road.
26.5.41 In the zone of the 4th Army at 8-30 am a plane of unknown nationality crossed the German border in a wide arc at Jablezna. At 13-40, a twin-engine aircraft of unknown nationality crossed the German-Russian border over Okpczyn and turned east.
A Russian high-speed plane (type I-16) flew over the border at 11-40 in the direction of Ostrolenka at an altitude of 2000 m. At Ostrolenka it dropped to about 200 m, and then flew over the railway station and headed east. At 11-50 at an altitude of about 1500 m, a single-engine short machine of a strange design was observed, emerging from the clouds above Rozan (15 km). 12-01 Russian fighter type I-16 at low altitude observed at Lubiewo (9 km) flying in the direction of the Komarovo camp (13 km). At 12-05 the Russian car flew east at Ugniewo (9 km). The Russian fighter returned to 12-10 Russian territory at an altitude of 50 m.
On 27 May 1941, a Russian bomber crossed the border.
On May 30, 1941, a Russian plane flew at a distance of 200-300 m near the border.
2.6.41 from Russia at Kuzawka at an altitude of 6000 - 7000 m an aircraft of unknown origin flew towards German territory in the direction of Biala Podlaska.
On 1.6.41 at 11:45 am, the plane crossed the border from the eastern direction at an altitude of 1200 m. He returned back in about 5 minutes.
At 10-15 a plane of unknown origin flew over the border at an altitude of 4000 m and flew at Wisenien Lomasy.
3.6.41 5 three-engine vehicles flew near the border at an altitude of 1000 m towards Augustow.
4.6.41 at 13-20 we heard the sound of a plane near Ostrov-Mazovetsky. At 13-47 we again heard the noise of a single plane. The sound disappeared towards the Russian territory.
5.6.41 at 11-58 Russian aircraft flight in the direction of Sarnaki (40 km).
At 12-37 a Russian single-engine plane crossed the border at an altitude of about 1500 m from the east. Was spotted 8 km south of Mikaszowka (12 km).
6.6.41 between 10-15 and 10-30 2 Russian aircraft type R5 or RZ at an altitude of 500 m flew into German territory through Komorowo - Ostrow Maz. - Ugniewo. The residence time is from 3 to 7 minutes.
At 10-30, 5 Russian planes flew along the border.
2 planes flew close to the border.
A Russian plane was flying near the border (Szczebra).
8.6.41 at 12-05 a flight of the Russian monoplane Kolno - Wincenta - Turau. At 13-05 the plane took off in the opposite direction to the border.
On 21 June 1941, along the Lipsk - Sopockinie line (north of Grodno), in the morning, a massive occupation of field positions in the border area was discovered. At 3-30, three Russian fighters flew near the border at Janowka (10 km north of Augustow).
