In the previous part, we examined intelligence materials (RM) on German troops in 1938 and early 1940. RM at the indicated time significantly differed from the real data. With such a significant difference in the data, the presence in the Republic of Moldova of the exact names of infantry units and formations can only be due to the fact that the German command used fictitious formations of servicemen with fake insignia on their shoulder straps. After 3-4 parts, you will be shown that the exact data on the tank and motorized troops of Germany were completely absent in the RM. The German command concealed the name and presence of these troops on the border, making it possible to know more about the infantry units.
Lacking sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not find out before the start of the war that in the middle of the summer of 1940 the final decision was made to start the war with the Soviet Union in 1941. The leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft did not know about this decision and hoped to avoid war by any means. Since the summer of 1940 in the West, a grandiose activity was launched to prepare for the landing on the territory of England. However, it was only a grandiose hoax … An understanding of the scope and elaboration of measures to prepare for Operation Sea Lion can be obtained by reading the chapters of Halder's diary from July to August 1940.
In this part, materials from the books by B. Müller-Hillebrand "The Land Army of Germany 1933-1945" will be used. and O. P. Kurylev “Army of the Third Reich 1933-1945. Illustrated Atlas ". The following abbreviations are used in the article: A - army, AK - army corps, IN - military district, CA - Red Army, cd (kp) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), RO - intelligence department, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, td (TP) - tank division (regiment).
Did the ZAPOVO intelligence work without errors?
In the comments to the articles of the series "An Unexpected War …" by the author Vik and to two parts of the article about intelligence, the writer O. Yu. Kozinkin wrote that RM RO ZAPOVO had more accurate information than RM RU. As the only argument, he cites a quote from the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 4th A, General L. M. Sandalova:
At the end of the first week of June, the headquarters of our 4th A, located in Kobrin, received information from the VO headquarters that by June 5, more than 40 German divisions and that 15 pd, 5 td, 2 md and 2 cd are focused on the Brest direction …
General L. M. Sandalov writes about the report of the RO of the headquarters of the ZapOVO dated 4.6.41. According to the data of the RO against the troops of the VO, there is a constant number of divisions from May 1941 until the start of the war - 30 … On this difference in the number of divisions, Oleg Yuryevich builds his version and was even going to write a book about betrayal in RU. It is strange that a writer who has been dealing with the events on the eve of the war for more than 10 years and who has written 10 books does not know about crossing the borders of the areas of responsibility of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO intelligence services. That is why the RM RO of the ZapOVO headquarters included in their summary some of the formations that the RU and the General Staff considered concentrated in front of the PribOVO. The question of the boundaries of the zones of responsibility is spelled out in the RM and therefore is a fact. This was discussed in more detail earlier. Why didn't RU put the RO and the command of the military in their place? Probably, there were circumstances. The author will devote more time in the article to RM RO ZAPOVO in order to understand the amount of disinformation in these materials. We will begin our consideration with the summary dated 19.9.40. Later, we will analyze other RMs of the ZAPOVO.
Special message Head of RO ZAPOVO to the head of RO of the General Staff of SC on 19.9.40:
According to intelligence data as of 15.9.40, it is noted: In Rembert's headquarters 27 armored division, according to other sources, this is the headquarters of the infantry division. Data is being verified …
The information contains a lot of incomprehensible things. If you saw on the shoulder straps the number " 27", Then we saw the division headquarters officer close enough. The question arises: "In what form did the scout see the officer or officers of the 27th armored division?"
As work clothes, tankmen were provided with black or gray uniforms, which in the future began to be used for all occasions. The picture on the left shows the jackets of a tanker in black and gray colors, and for comparison, on the right, the casual jacket of an infantry lieutenant is shown.
Knowing what the uniform of tankers looks like, it is almost impossible to confuse it with the uniform of the officers of the headquarters of the infantry division. The atlas also contains another form of clothing for tankers.
In the German army, belonging to a particular branch of the army or service was designated by the military color - the waffenfarbe. The edging of shoulder straps, gaps on the buttonholes, edges of caps and some types of uniforms, as well as other colored details of the uniform were made in its color. White is infantry and pink is tank. If the divisional headquarters officer was in one of the uniforms shown in the last figure, then the waffenfarbe could be confused.
Belonging to the division headquarters and its number was quite simple to determine: there was a letter on the shoulder straps D and below in Arabic numerals, the division number (in our case, 27). But this is simply impossible! The formation of the 27th TD will only begin on 1.10.42, and an officer with such insignia simply could not exist … If he or they were not dressed up by order from above …
The 27th Infantry Division was in France until September, and in September it arrived in Germany (in the city of Grafenwehr). On November 1, 1940, it began to be reorganized into the 17th TD, which will be completed only in March 1941. It turns out that the staff officers of neither the 27th TD, nor the 27th Infantry Division could be in Rembertow. There could only be mummers with the insignia of the 27th division … There will be even more oddities in the summary further.
Continuation Special messages:
On 4.9.40, arrived in Warsaw: 222 pp (at 25.8 he was in Gumbinen) and 202 pp (at 25.8 he was in Grubieszow). The data is being verified.
RM are confirmed, since both PPs were part of the 75th Infantry Division, which from July 1940 to 22.6.41 was in Poland.
Confirmed data on the dislocation in Sokolov 71 pp and two pp of unidentified numbering (apparently, these are pp stationed on 25.8. in Sokolov under Nos. 100, 104, 661. The data is reliable).
At the indicated time, the 71st paragraph did not exist. There was a 71st md from the 29th md. Unless, of course, our scout saw servicemen from this regiment, and not mummers. The strange thing is that the 29th MD was located in the south of France until 1941. The RM states that "", but in fact are disinformation thrown by the German command.
The 100th PP did not exist in the Wehrmacht.
The 104th Infantry Division was part of the 33rd Infantry Division, which was in Germany and France from September 1939 to October 1940, and returned to Germany in October 1940. From 11.11.40, it will be reorganized into the 15th td.
The 661st Infantry Division was part of the 393rd Infantry Division, which began its formation in March 1940 in Warsaw. In July 1940, the division was celebrated in Germany (6th Military District), where it was disbanded (661st PP including). In Poland, there was only one battalion of the PP, which became known as the 974th Infantry Battalion. In September, no one could walk with the insignia of the 661st pp.
Confirmed data on the deployment in Lodz: 431 and 212 pd, as well as the departure of 182 pd to the east. In addition, the presence of 511 and 513 pp is noted …
Let's start with the fact that the 431st PD never existed. Could it be a misprint: 431st pp? It could have been, but the formation of the 431st pp will begin only on 15.10.40.
The 212nd subdivision was part of the 79th subdivision, which was in Germany from the fall of 1939 to May 1940. Then she moves to the city of Langres (France) and will stay there until January 1941. Consequently, the 212nd point could not be at the border.
Formation of the 182nd Infantry Division will begin in the West on 27.8.42. It turns out that only a group of mummers could walk in the East.
The 511th subdivision was part of the 293rd subdivision, formed on 8.2.40 in Germany in the city of Brandenburg. After formation, the division will leave for the West. Its units will begin to arrive in Poland only on 25.2.41.
All the data that, according to the intelligence, turned out to be disinformation!
Installedthat the headquarters of the 17th Infantry Division is deployed in the Hungarians, it includes the 28th Infantry Regiment, the headquarters of which is deployed in Medzna … The Artpolk of the 17th Infantry Division is deployed in Lokhov. Shelf number is not set. Data is being verified …
The 17th Infantry Division takes part in the war in Poland in September, and moves to Germany in October. Since January 1940 she has been in Germany, Luxembourg and France. Only 1.6.41 will arrive in Poland.
The 17th subdivision never included the 28th subdivision. The 28th subdivision was part of the 8th subdivision, which during this period is located in the city of Rouen (France). Misinformation again …
According to the data of the 1st department, it was established that in Warsaw on Hitler's Square … the headquarters of 8 A is deployed, the army commander is General Blaskowitz. (Information is reliable).
The headquarters of the 8th A did not exist since the fall of 1939. General Blaskowitz is during this period in the reserve of the High Command. Only in October he will be appointed commander of the 1st A, which is stationed in France. Again it is said that the data is reliable, but in fact is disinformation …
According to the 1st branch, the headquarters of the 3rd AK is marked in Insterburg (according to previously available data, the headquarters of the 12th AK is stationed there). Information about 3 AK is coming in for the first time and requires verification. In Tilsit, 206 landwehr subdivisions were stationed, which includes 13, 212 and 312 subdivisions. This division is currently being disbanded. Data on 206 lpd are coming in for the first time and require verification.
The 206th Infantry Division has not been a Landwehr for more than a year. It consisted of the 301st, 312th and 413th paragraphs. The 312th PP from the RM coincided with the actual number of the regiment from the division. Disbanding information is not correct. The personnel of the division were disbanded on leave in July 1940.
What did our intelligence find? Either mummers with insignia of the 206th subdivision, 13th, 212nd or 312nd subdivisions, which is a reconnaissance mistake! Or I saw groups of vacationers, the presence of which is not a fact of presence full-fledged pn or whole pd! And in this case it is a gross mistake of our intelligence …
During the period under review, the city of Insterburg was located on the territory of East Prussia. The 3rd AK and its headquarters were deployed only in Poland and were never observed in East Prussia. In September 1940, the 12th AK was just beginning to arrive from France to Poland and was not in East Prussia either.
It is interesting that the spy and radio intelligence OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12th AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) through June 1941, inclusive. It turns out that the German command not only played with our intelligence game "", but also had fun "" by confusing radio intelligence. Therefore, the radio networks of army groups, tank groups and motorized corps were not detected by radio intelligence. There will be a separate material on this topic in 2-3 parts.
Confirmed data on dislocation in Konigsberg 1, 24, 224, 361 and 368 pp.
The 1st subdivision is part of the 1st subdivision, and the 24th subdivision is part of the 21st subdivision. Divisions arrive in East Prussia from 13.9.40 and 12.9.40 respectively. RM are confirmed.
The 224th PP never existed in the Wehrmacht. Maybe it was a group of military men from the 24th regiment with the added number "2" on the shoulder straps walking around?
The 361st pp will be formed only on 1.4.42 and will become part of the 90th African light division. Therefore, it also could not be in Konigsberg.
The 368th subdivision of the 207th subdivision, which will be redeployed to Germany in the fall of 1939, will participate in the war in the West. On July 10, 1940, he will return to Germany and in March 1941 will be reorganized into three security divisions there.
RM, which are again confirmed to be true only for two regiments (1st and 24th regiments), and for the other three are disinformation.
Confirmed data on the deployment of the headquarters of 20 AK in Danzig …
The 20th AK will begin its formation in November 1940 in Germany. He can get to Danzig only after January 1941. Pay attention to the scale of disinformation by the German command of our intelligence!
In Rastenburg, in the barracks on Hindenburg-Strasse, there are 23 and 45 points (23 points at 25.8 were noted in Lykk, and 45 points - at 1.1.40 - in the village of Zboyno). In Sejny there are 413 points (at 26.6 it was in Myshinets), 212 points are also marked there. The data are coming in for the first time, they need to be checked …
The 23rd Infantry Regiment is part of the 11th Infantry Division, which is deployed in the West and will arrive in East Prussia only on 10.3.41. In no way could this regiment be located on 25.8.40 in the city of Lykk.
The 45th subdivision (21st subdivision) and the 413th subdivision could be located on the territory of East Prussia.
The 212nd MP did not exist. It cannot be the 212nd subdivision of the 79th subdivision, since it is already indicated above in the special message.
There are four warships in the port of Gdynia, including one aircraft carrier, two ships are named: "Schleisen" and "Schleiswik-Malstein" …
The carrier information is erroneous.
The data in the RM about numbered AK, divisions and regiments were confirmed by 20%, and 80% are disinformation. Such "accurate" and detailed information on the numbers of regiments, divisions, corps and the 8th A could be supplied to our reconnaissance only by the German command using groups of mummers. You were shown that RM RO ZAPOVO also include a huge amount of disinformation.
Number of troops with known numbers
A similar situation is with formations with known numbers, which are not confirmed constantly in the RM. For example, the intelligence report you already know:
The error in determining the numbers of the headquarters of the armies is 100%, and the headquarters of the corps - 71 … 86%. In terms of the number of PDs, the error is 56 … 59%. The number of divisions with known numbers even exceeds their actual number.
The numbers for 88% of the regiments are known from the infantry regiments. Amazing accuracy! All the more clearly visible are the reconnaissance errors in determining the number of tank troops: there are no coincidences! Once again, one can be convinced that the intelligence knows only what the German command shows it … Almost the same is in the following intelligence report:
In East Prussia and the former Poland … on 08.25.40 it was established: 174 pp (of which 154 with fixed numbering), which is 58 pd. 45 divisions (out of 58) points of deployment of their headquarters have been established, a 28 divisions - numbering.
11 mountain rifle regiments with fixed numbering, which is up to 4 mountain rifle divisions. 6-7 tank divisions. 2-3 motorized divisions …
12 AK headquarters, of which nine - with fixed numbering … The revealed forces are combined into four armies, of which established the location of three army headquarters - Warsaw, Radom and Krakow, the fourth army headquarters is supposed to be in Konigsberg …
Again, a huge number of infantry regiments with well-known numbers. There are 58 divisions, of which 28 are known! Only pd was only 16 … Mountain rifle regiments, tank and motorized divisions was not at all … Intelligence counted 12 AK headquarters, 9 of them with assigned numbers! Only there was five AK headquarters and two corps headquarters reduced staff … Reconnaissance counted 3-4 army headquarters, and there was only one - 18th A … In intelligence, no one even had any doubts about the information provided for analysis to the General Staff, and it turned out to be disinformation to a large extent …
Intelligence Directorate and General Staff of the Spacecraft
RU and the General Staff work in a single link: intelligence receives information and double-checks it. The General Staff analyzes the Republic of Moldova and determines the number of German troops at the border, with which Germany can start a war with the USSR. The General Staff is also obliged to determine the directions of the enemy's main attacks.
We saw major intelligence errors in overstating the number of German formations at the border starting in the spring of 1940. The situation will not change until the start of the war. Sufficiently detailed misinformation about the deployment of German troops was supposed to create the illusion of omniscience among the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. Intelligence failed to find out about the presence and deployment of large headquarters of the enemy's mobile forces near the border. All these major intelligence blunders led to sad events at the beginning of the war.
Summary RU 11.9.40: … The total number of divisions in the German army on 10.9.1940 up to 208-228 pd (including up to 8 motorized) and 15-17 so on. Of this number of divisions, more than one third (up to 85) infantry divisions and more than half (up to 9) TD are concentrated in the East and Southeast … According to Muller-Hillebrand's data, the total number of ground divisions was:
Therefore, information about "" is a mistake in the work of intelligence, which overestimated the number of divisions by 33 … 46%. The figure below shows the actual number of ground divisions in Germany and information on the number of divisions coming from reconnaissance. It can be seen that the information in the RM is significantly overestimated.
And what mistakes were made by the General Staff of the Spacecraft? We come to consider one of the major mistakes of the General Staff (in the opinion of the author), which led to the same consequences as mistakes in the work of intelligence.
Note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov on the fundamentals of the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 on September 18, 1940:
… Currently, Germany has deployed 205-226 TD (including up to 8 md) and 15-17 TD, and in total - up to 243 divisions, 20,000 fields guns of all calibers, 10,000 tanks and from 14,200 to 15,000 aircraft …
Of the indicated number of divisions, up to 85 infantry and up to 9 tank divisions are concentrated in the East and South-East. The current military situation in Western Europe allows the Germans to transfer most of their forces against our West. borders. With the still unfinished war with England, it can presumably be considered that up to 50 divisions will be left in the occupied countries and regions by Germany and up to 20 divisions in the interior of the country.
Thus, of the above 243 divisions up to 173 divisions, - of which up to 140 infantry, 15-17 tank, 8 motorized, 5 light and 3 airborne … will be directed against our borders …
In the presented document, the specialists of the General Staff made a mistake on the basis of an erroneous assessment of the RU of the total number of divisions in Germany. General Staff specialists named excessively overestimated number of divisions that will be allocated for the war with the USSR … This number will be adjusted upward in new documents, but will never be reached before the start of the war, since the German command decided to conduct hostilities fewer troops! This number appears not once in the Note: … The following deployment and grouping of its forces can be expected:
- to the north of the mouth of the San River, the Germans can have up to 123 infantry and up to 10 tank divisions and most of their aviation on the Memel-Sedlec front;
- south of the mouth of the river. San - up to 50 infantry and 5 tank divisions, with their main grouping in the area of Kholm, Tomashev, Lublin … (up to 188 divisions in total. - Author.) -120 infantry divisions, the bulk of their tanks and aircraft, leaving 50-60 infantry divisions for operations in the north, some tanks and aircraft [in total up to 160-180 divisions. - Auth.]. The main, the most politically advantageous for Germany, and, therefore, the most probable is the 1st variant of its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the r. San …
Continuation of the concentration of German troops in the East
After the arrival of the headquarters of the 18th A to the East at the end of July 1940, he began to perform the functions of command of all troops in the East. During this period, the headquarters of the 18th A was subordinate to the OKH. From that moment on, the headquarters of the Eastern Group began to play a supporting role. It is possible that later he began to play the role of a screen that covered the command of Army Group "B". 20.9.40 The command of Army Group "B" arrived in East Prussia and assumed command of all the troops in the East.
According to the data of Mueller-Hillebrand in the East, as of 7.10.40, there were three armies, ten AK, two corps of reduced strength and 30 divisions. Two more divisions were in the city of Vienna. The headquarters of the armies were located in the following settlements: the 18th in Bydgoszcz, the 12th in Krakow and the 4th in Warsaw.
The 18th A included the 1st, 16th and 26th AK, and the 4th A included the 12th, 30th, 44th AK and the headquarters of the reduced corps z.b. V. XXXV. The 12th A was represented by the 3rd, 9th, 14th, 17th AK and the headquarters of the reduced corps z.b. V. XXXIV.
In addition to the listed headquarters, the 40th Motorized Corps was subordinate to Army Group B, which on 15.9.40 began its reorganization from the 40th AK. In the source, the location of the headquarters of the 40th MK is the territory of Poland. There is one more inconsistency with the data of Mueller-Hillebrand: the location of the 2nd TD (from 9.40 to 2.41) and the 9th TD (from 9.40 to 11.40), included in the 40th MK, is also indicated on the territory of Poland …
According to the author's estimates, there were 30 … 31 divisions on the territory of East Prussia and Poland. Subsequently, until 21.12.40, there was no increase in the grouping of German troops in the East. However, the intelligence service over the next three months failed to understand that the number of its troops “discovered” near the border was greatly overestimated …
According to Müller-Hillebrand, by 7.10.40 there was a further increase in the German grouping in the East.
Graph of changes in the number of German troops at the border
In the materials of the article, the number of German troops at the Soviet-German border was considered and will be considered in accordance with data from the Republic of Moldova and their actual number. The visual material makes it possible to better understand the problem with the number of troops in the Republic of Moldova.
A lengthy work was carried out to check the location of the enemy divisions and errors were revealed in the calculation of the number of divisions by the author. The figure presented at the end of the message is an illustration of the mistakes in the work of our intelligence in assessing the number of German divisions with enough “ accurate »Knowledge of the names of pp and pd. I would like to note that the graph is more of an illustrated material, and not a reference manual …
When constructing the graphs, the following inaccuracies were identified in the previously presented material of the article:
- The 251st Infantry Division arrived at the eastern border not in July 1940, but in May 1941;
- the 62nd front line arrived in Poland on 20.6.40;
- The 292nd Infantry Division arrived in Poland in July 1940;
- The 13th Infantry Division went to Poland not in September 1940, but on August 30;
- 1st CD was dropped from consideration of the troops that were redeployed to the East in September 1940.
When plotting the charts, the author faced the following problem: for a significant part of the divisions, not a specific redeployment date is indicated, but only a month. Groups of divisions that did not have specific dates of arrival in the East were grouped by month in which they were marked on the eastern border.
For some of them, it was possible to establish that they arrived at the beginning or at the end of the month. For these compounds, the author assumed that the beginning of the month is the third day, and the end of the month is the 27th.
For the rest of the divisions, which did not have a date of arrival in the East, it was assumed that they arrived in the middle of the month - on the 15th. There are 9 such divisions among those who arrived in September 1940, 2 in December, 1 in January 1941, 8 in April, 16 in May and 24 in June.
This approach somewhat distorts the real data, but as an illustrative material it clearly shows errors in the work of intelligence.
For undated divisions arriving in the East in July 1940, it is assumed that they arrived at the border on 20 July. Halder's memoir states that these divisions completed redeployments by 20 July.
The above information related to the actual location of German divisions on the territory of Poland and East Prussia.
Let's talk now about information from RM. In the Intelligence Directorate Summaries in 1941, divisions in the following territories were considered as troops concentrated on our border: East Prussia, in the Warsaw direction (territory of Poland against the West KOVO), in the Uzhgorod direction (Carpathian Ukraine, against KOVO), the Danzig-Poznan-Torn region, in Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia). The indicated territories were also considered when the author calculated the number of German troops in 1940.
The difficulty was that since October 1940 German troops were discovered by intelligence in Romania, but their number in Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia is not indicated in the RM. In the RM in October 1940, it is said that there is a grouping of German troops on the eastern border of Romania, but a map with the location of the troops is not provided. Therefore, these divisions, when scheduling were not taken into account, i.e. the number of German troops near our border in the Republic of Moldova is somewhat underestimated. A similar situation exists with the German troops in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. In the RM, information about them until the spring of 1941 is almost never found.
Such a detailed analysis of data on the movement of German troops from 1940 to 22.6.41, the author met only in the series "Unexpected War …". It is not known what sources of information the author Vic used. it was not possible to establish with it. The data in the graphs do not contradict the data provided by the author Vic. There are differences only in the approach to information for the period from June 20 to June 22, 1941.
The author, as the basis for calculating the number of divisions in the specified period, used the report of the RU from 22.6.41. According to this document, it is possible to estimate the size of the German group in the same territories that were previously considered by our intelligence. The document indicates that the number of troops in the directions increased due to the approach of new divisions on June 20 and 21. When constructing the graph, the author assumed that there was no change in the number of troops from 1.6.41 to 19.6.41. The summary outlines a similar approach.
It should be noted that on June 22, intelligence should urgently explain the unexpected appearance of German troops directly at the border. Most likely, RU was trying to overestimate the number of German troops near the border in the first military intelligence report. An example of this is the increase in the number of TD on the Suwalki salient at the expense of two SS divisions, information about which appeared back in May 1941 and was not confirmed. The TD of the elite SS detachments did not exist at that time. No one saw servicemen and equipment from these divisions. An increase in the non-existent grouping of German troops on the border of Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine by 4-6 divisions was also recorded, which allegedly approached on June 20-21, 1941.
A graph with changes in the number of German troops at the border will be given in the materials in parts for the period under review. It should be noted that according to the time marks for 7.10.40 and 21.12.40, it does not contradict the data of Mueller-Hillebrand.
Annotation of the subsequent materials of the article
The next two parts will be devoted to the RM of the beginning of 1941. It is planned that the third part will be assigned to the headquarters of army groups, field armies and AK. Further material on radio intelligence will be presented. In the fifth part, we will consider mobile troops. Further, in two parts, the author will present his version of events about the unexpected start of the war for the leadership of the country and the spacecraft.
I would like to express my gratitude to the administration of the Voennoye Obozreniye website for the help and support of the author. There would be no such thing, and there would be no such material. Having started work on the material of the article, the author discovered a lot of new things and looked at the indicated problem from the other side. Without publishing the material on the site, the author would have abandoned this topic long ago.
