Among the reasons for the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, many historians, including very respectable ones, name the unsuccessful choice of the main base for the Russian Pacific Fleet. Namely - Port Arthur. They say that it is located unsuccessfully, and in itself is inconvenient, and in general … But how did it happen that our ancestors chose the Chinese Lushun from the many ports in Southeast Asia, did they really have no other choice?
The idea of acquiring an “ice-free port” in the Far East came from the Russian government long before the events described. The Petropavlovsk, Novo-Arkhangelsk and Okhotsk existing at that time were completely unsatisfactory in terms of basing a sufficiently large ship detachment, and we had no other way to defend the Far Eastern borders. In the second half of the 19th century, after the inclusion of Primorye and Priamurye in the Russian Empire, where there were several fairly convenient harbors, the situation improved somewhat, but it cannot be said that it radically. The point is this: despite all the advantages of the Golden Horn Bay, where Vladivostok was founded, it was freezing and could not provide a year-round basing of the Siberian Flotilla. Worse yet, there was no free access to the ocean. I did not make a reservation, although the Sea of Japan connects as many as four straits with the World Ocean, but two of them, the Tatarsky and Laperuzov, are quite difficult in navigational terms, and the Sangar and Tsushima are easy to block, which happened during the Russo-Japanese war. As for the actions of the famous Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, one must understand that they became possible only because the main forces of the Japanese fleet were occupied by the blockade of Russian ships in Port Arthur. As soon as the Russian fortress fell, the rapid raids of the invisible squadron on the trade routes of Japan immediately stopped. And if the entire first squadron was based in Vladivostok, as some … "researchers" suggest, it would only make it easier for the Japanese to blockade. Moreover, the main ports and trade routes of the island empire were (and still are) on its southern coast.
The first attempt to get an ice-free port was made by Admiral Likhachev in 1861, who sent a clipper "Posadnik" to the shores of the island (more precisely, the archipelago, because there are still two islands) Tsushima. After agreeing with the local daimyo about the lease of the port of Imodaki, the admiral ordered the construction of a coal station there. To say that the central Japanese government, represented by the shogunate Togukawa, was not enthusiastic about the actions of the Russian sailors and their vassal, is to say nothing. In addition, this kind of creativity amazed our "sworn friends" - the British to the extreme. They immediately began to protest and sent their ships there. The indignation of the "enlightened sailors" can easily be understood, they themselves were going to seize Tsushima, but here it is … The fact that the Russian consul in Hakodat Gorshkevich also did not have the slightest idea about the admiral's initiative added special piquancy to these events. In general, it all ended in an international scandal. The coal station was closed, the ships were recalled, the port was returned to the Japanese. True, as a result of this incident, the British also failed to lay their paws on the Tsushima Islands, which, from a certain point of view, cannot but be called a plus. Soon the so-called Meiji Revolution began in Japan. The country began to modernize, and it became clear that it was necessary to look for another object for expansion.
After that, Russia drew attention to Korea. The country of morning freshness at that time was in vassal dependence on the decrepit Qing empire. On the other hand, the Japanese looked at her wealth with lust. And, of course, the European powers, especially Great Britain, did not lag behind them. In 1885, the story of Tsushima repeated itself. We (as well as China and Japan) did not allow the British to occupy the port of Hamilton, but we ourselves did not receive anything but moral satisfaction. By that time, it was becoming clearer that our main enemy in the Far East would be the ever stronger Japan, and after the latter's victory over China in the war of 1894-1895, it became clear that it was impossible to continue living like this. The Russian fleet needs a base. The sailors quickly formulated their requirements, which included:
1) Non-freezing harbor.
2) Proximity to the proposed theater of operations.
3) Spacious and deep bay.
4) Favorable natural position for coastal and land defense.
5) Availability of communication routes and means of communication.
There was no port ideally suited to all these requirements. Nevertheless, the Russian ships dispersed to the Far Eastern ports in order to determine the most profitable option for the deployment of a naval base. Based on the results of these surveys, our admirals offered to take:
Tyrtov S. P. - Qiao-Chao (Qingdao).
Makarov S. O. - Fusan.
Chikhachev N. M. - Port of Shestakov.
F. V. Dubasov - Mozampo.
Giltenbrandt J. O. - Kargodo island.
It is interesting that all these ports, except for the one proposed by Tyrtov (who will soon take the post of manager of the Ministry of the Sea) Kiao-Chao, are located in Korea, with the only difference that Fuzan, Mozampo and Kargodo are located in the south of the peninsula, and Shestakov's Port is located on its northeast coast. From the point of view of the strategic position, the most advantageous were undoubtedly the ports in the south of Korea. If we placed a base there, it would be easy to control the Tsushima Strait from it, or, as it was also called, the Far Eastern Bosphorus. That is, at least three points of the above requirements would have been met. But, unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the last two items on the list. It would hardly be possible to build a sufficiently reliable defense near the Japanese bases in a short time, let alone stretch the railway across the whole of Korea … this time? If you remember, it was just that the concession for logging in the area of the Yalu River made the Japanese angry. So what can we say about the railway stretching across the whole of Korea with all its attributes. That is, workers, administration and military guards (there are no fewer robbers in Korea than in Manchuria). Of course, the author of the article remembers that at that time we had a very close relationship with the Korean king, and for some time he even hid in our embassy from his ill-wishers. Our officers trained the Korean army, our diplomats defended the interests of the king in front of foreign states, but, unfortunately, that's all. There was no significant economic penetration into Korea. And it is unlikely that our businessmen could compete there on equal terms with the Japanese, Europeans and Americans. The railway under construction, of course, could correct this situation and … cause even more conflicts with all interested parties. In other words, only to bring the beginning of the war closer, and in an even less favorable military-political situation.
As for Port Shestakov, the situation with it is somewhat different. Firstly, it is close enough to Vladivostok, and the railway can be extended to it much faster. Secondly, for the same reason, it is easier to fortify or provide assistance in the event of an enemy attack. Thirdly, it is located in the very north of Korea, in the least wealthy part of it, and it would be much easier for our sworn friends to come to terms with the presence of those Russians. But, unfortunately, there is only one advantage over the Vladivostok we already have: Port Shestakov does not freeze. Otherwise, it has the same fatal flaw. The fleet located in it will be easily blocked within the Sea of Japan and, accordingly, will not be able to exert the slightest influence on the course of the military conflict. Again, on the northern coast of Japan there are no ports and settlements that are critical for its economy. Interception of coastal steamers, fishing vessels and shelling of unprotected sections of the coast will, of course, be unpleasant, but not at all fatal for the island empire. Thus, one can agree with the Russian government, which did not seize the port in Korea and limited its expansion to China.
Among the ports proposed by the admirals in China, there was only one - Qiao-Chao. I must say that the future German colony, located on the southern tip of Shandong, had a lot of advantages. There is a convenient bay of Chiaozhou, the entrance to which was covered by a fortress built later, and close rich deposits of coal and iron, and a very advantageous strategic position. When the Russian government abandoned its occupation, the Germans immediately did it, and not by accident. However, Kiao-chao had one drawback that completely crossed out her merits. Due to its geographic location, it was completely impossible to connect it with the Chinese Eastern Railway in an acceptable timeframe. In addition, it is not very convenient to defend Manchuria from the shores of Shandong. So the rejection of the future Qingdao seems to the author of this article to be quite justified. If we have already undertaken to master Manchuria, then we must master it. Moreover, there were enough rich deposits of coal and other wealth.
And here the idea arose to occupy Port Arthur, which had not previously been considered as a naval base. And by the way, why was it not considered? What qualities did he lack? Let's recall the requirements put forward. The first point is the ice-free harbor. There is. The second point is the proximity to the proposed theater of operations. There is also. The third is a spacious and deep bay. Here it is worse. The inner raid is shallow and cannot be said to be spacious. The fourth is a natural position favorable for coastal and land defense. Here's how to say. The western coast of the Liaodong Peninsula is rocky and not very suitable for landing, but in the east there is a wonderful Talienwan raid, potentially dangerous from the point of view of landing. Well, the fifth point. Availability of communication routes and means of communication. What is not, that is not. But if you look at it without bias, the last point is the easiest to fix. In principle, Port Arthur was not the only port that was easy enough to connect with the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was done. The fourth point on closer examination is also not critical. No matter how convenient the Talienvan raid is for the landing, the Japanese landed there only after they approached there on dry land. And the narrow Jingzhou Isthmus is very convenient for land defense. Another thing is that they did not bother to strengthen it properly, and General Fock, who commanded his defense, could not (or did not want) to organize a solid defense in his existing positions. In general, if you look at it with an open mind, then there is only one drawback. It is an inconvenient and shallow harbor, which is only accessible at high tide. Of course, since the base is, first of all, a naval base, this drawback completely negates all other advantages, but … is it really unavoidable? And if you think it over, you can't help but admit that it can be corrected. Actually, the Chinese who owned it were fully aware of the harbor's inconveniences, for which they began work on its expansion and deepening. And I must say that we have achieved some success in this field. The dimensions and depth of the inner raid were significantly increased by them, which, in general, made it possible for our rather rather large First Pacific Squadron to be based in Port Arthur. As for the exit to the outer raid, if desired, it could also be deepened. Moreover, it was quite possible to make another exit from the internal raid. And such work began, although, unfortunately, it was never completed.
In addition, these works did not have to be done. Since we are renting the entire Liaodong Peninsula, it was possible to arrange a base in Talienwan itself. Well, why not? The raid there is gorgeous. On the Dagushan and Vhodnoy-Vostochny capes, as well as on the San Shan Tao islands, it was possible to arrange batteries that would keep the entire adjacent water area under fire, including the trading port of Dalniy. By the way, a few words about him. It is believed that the construction of this port was almost a direct sabotage from the all-powerful Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte. Allegedly, a scoundrel, he took and built the wrong port next to Port Arthur, which was used by the insidious enemies. Actually, this is not entirely true. More precisely, not at all. The construction of the commercial port was one of the conditions on which the rest of the interested players agreed to recognize the occupation of Port Arthur. In principle, they can be understood. If Port Arthur becomes a naval base, the way to it for commercial ships will be closed. And now what to lose profit? Well, the fact that the Ministry of Finance built the port it needed faster than the military department's fortress is a question not so much for the financiers as for the military. When they (the military) were pecked by a fried chicken, they erected more fortifications in six months than in the previous five years. And the fact that the commercial port turned out to be defenseless, by the way, too. Dealing with defense is not the business of the Ministry of Finance, for this there is a department. So all that can be blamed on Sergei Yulievich is that he forgot the saying: hurry slowly. There was no need to rush in this matter. Dalny would have waited, which many quite rightly called "Superfluous".
In general, there were not so many options, but still more than one. But as a result, they chose the most budgetary one. In principle, the government can be understood. Port Arthur already has some kind of port, dock, workshops, fortifications, batteries. Why not use it all? The fact that the miser pays twice, as usual, was forgotten. The economy ate a large dock for battleships, fortifications capable of withstanding the shelling of large-caliber guns (it was decided that the besiegers would not have more than six-inch ones). The outer edges of the fortress and its garrison were also significantly reduced. The first project envisaged the construction of fortifications on the line of the Wolf Hills about eight versts from the Old Town. However, this plan was not adopted and a new one was drawn up. The line of forts was supposed to go along it four and a half versts from the outskirts of the city and go along the line Dagushan - Dragons ridge - Panlunshan - Uglovaya mountain - High mountain - White Wolf height. This line of land defense met the requirements of covering the core of the fortress from bombardment, but had a length of about 70 km and required a 70,000th garrison and 528 land weapons, not counting coastal and reserve weapons. Unfortunately, this was found to be excessive. The interdepartmental meeting convened on this occasion did not approve the project and expressed a wish that the garrison of Kwantun should not exceed the number of bayonets and sabers available there, namely 11,300 people, so that "organizing the protection of the peninsula would not be too expensive and politically dangerous." For this purpose, Colonel Velichko, the "genius" of the Russian fortification, was sent to Port Arthur. The professor of the Nikolaev Academy was also a practicing military engineer and was distinguished by a pathological tendency to shorten the line of fortification bypasses of fortresses (Vladivostok, Port Arthur) to the detriment of their defenses, designing the construction of forts in lower places due to the dominant heights that he left unoccupied (to the great joy of the enemy). This played a fatal role in the history of the Port Arthur fortress and created an incredible number of problems in Vladivostok, where the dominant heights had to be occupied by field fortifications already during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Thus, the directive of the military department was fulfilled, and money was saved.
All this, of course, had a negative effect during the defense of Port Arthur, but it is not directly related to the choice of a naval base. If the government had chosen any other port, it would hardly have got rid of the habit of saving where it is not needed.
In conclusion, one cannot fail to note one more circumstance. As it often happened in our history, there were some "sworn friends" - the British. In November 1897, Pavlov, the Russian envoy to China, telegraphed anxiously about the activation of the British squadron in the northern part of the Yellow Sea. One of her cruisers went to Port Arthur to make sure there were no Russian ships there. The penetration of the British into Manchuria, which the Russian government considered to be a zone of its interests, was least of all in line with our plans. So the fate of Port Arthur was sealed. After many diplomatic maneuvers and direct pressure on the Chinese government, an agreement was obtained for the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula by the Russian Empire. Honestly, the author of this article has a rather cool attitude to conspiracy theories about the English woman who is always spoiling us. But it should be noted that not a single important event in the world could do without the inhabitants of Foggy Albion. Were their actions a provocation to force us to occupy a militarily disadvantageous base? I do not think. But to stir up the conflict with Japan, which recently, thanks to our intervention, lost the fruits of the victory over China, including Port Arthur? As the saying goes, highly likely.
In general, if we talk about the reasons for our defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, then I would not consider such an unfortunate choice of a naval base. Port Arthur had its merits, but its demerits could well be corrected. But the short-sightedness shown by our government, the habit of economizing to the detriment of business and the lack of coordination between the actions of various departments, were undoubtedly among the reasons for the defeat.
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