In the mid-eighties of the twentieth century, some materials of the US Department of the Navy, which had been in departmental storage for many years, were transferred to the collection of the US National Archives and became available. Among them, of particular interest are documents from the ministry's intelligence service related to the prehistory of the American intervention, among which the memorandum "Notes on the situation in Russia and how it affects the interests of the allies" stands out. This document is marked "confidential" and is dated October 31, 1917, new style, i.e. a week before the October Revolution.
The naval intelligence memorandum proposed starting an armed Allied intervention in Russia in order to prevent it from withdrawing from the war against Germany, as well as to strengthen the position of the Provisional Government in the face of the growing revolutionary movement. Like most intelligence material, this document is anonymous. It bears the stamp "Office of Maritime Intelligence", but unlike the regular reports of residents, coded with the letters "x", "y", "z", etc., the author of the memorandum is designated as a "reliable and authoritative source." Judging by the text of the memorandum, it was one of the residents of the American intelligence service in Petrograd.
The document is divided into parts, written, apparently, in two steps, united by a common introduction. The first part refers to the beginning of September, that is, to the time of General Kornilov's mutiny. The author of the memorandum admired this "bold, courageous and patriotic" speech, believing that it "should be supported by all well-wishers of Russia and the allied cause." In Kornilov, he saw a strong personality, capable, if successful, of providing "strong" power, to do what the Provisional Government was unable to do. In any case, the American representatives in Petrograd had high hopes for Kornilov's victory. The Ambassador of the United States D. Francis just in those days in a private letter expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that "the Provisional Government showed weakness, failing to restore discipline in the army and giving too much will to the ultra-socialist sentiments, whose supporters are called" Bolsheviks. " sent an official telegram to Washington, he reported that the US military and naval attaché believed that Kornilov would take over the situation after "useless resistance, if any."
The memorandum noted that Kornilov's speech and everything that it means for the United States will make it possible to put forward a demand for the provision of military assistance to Russia, even if it refuses it. "We must decisively and without delay present an ultimatum," the memorandum read, "so that the Kerensky government would agree to military assistance to the allies in order to maintain government power in the country's cities, and then to strengthen the front."
Military aid meant an armed intervention in Russia, the plans of which provided for the dispatch of a military contingent to the North and an expeditionary force to the Far East. In the North, the Americans were going to land with the French and British, and in the Far East with the Japanese. The latter were to "take charge" of the Siberian Railway, but under the control and management of the Americans. Ideally, the author of the memo would like to see units of the US Army along the entire length of the railway connecting Siberia with Moscow and Petrograd. He expressed the hope that the Allied troops would become a "bulwark of law, power and government", around them would unite "the best elements of the Russian people" - officers, Cossacks and "bourgeois" (putting this word in quotation marks, the author explained what he meant by "average class "), as well as the" thinking, honest part of the peasantry, soldiers and workers ", from which, of course, the revolutionary-minded masses were excluded.
The author of the memorandum made it clear what kind of government and what law the uninvited guardians of Russia's welfare were going to support. Noting the growing inflation, the leaping prices for basic necessities and the lack of the latter, he complained that the peasants and workers did not know anything about finance at all, but they had heard about the confiscation of all wealth, property and land, the destruction of all banks, since they were capitalist. Obvious dissatisfaction was also expressed by the actions of the masses for the abolition of all debts of both the tsarist and the Provisional government. These speeches directly threatened the interests of the United States, since American corporations owned property in Russia. The New York National City Bank, which began operating in Petrograd in 1915 and opened its branch there in early 1917, participated in providing loans and placing trade orders for many tens of millions of dollars. The United States was the first of the allies to declare the recognition of the Provisional Government. This decision was taken at the same cabinet meeting as the decision on the entry of the United States into the First World War. As Maritime Minister J. Daniels noted, the American administration tried to show its interest in the "new Russian democratic regime."
The United States provided financial assistance to the Provisional Government, and this gave them, as the Americans believed, a legal basis to interfere in Russian affairs. No wonder, in response to the discontent expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government M. I. Tereshchenko regarding the clearly pro-Kornilov position of the US embassy during the mutiny, Francis said that under normal conditions such a protest would have been possible, but since Russia is asking for and receiving substantial assistance, a "special situation" has been created. Therefore, the topic of the state of finances, attitude to the activities of banks and debts, raised in the memorandum, had a very definite underlying reason. The motto of all American discourse has been to uphold the "sacred right" of private property.
Although the author of the memorandum stated that the "best elements of the Russian people" would support the intervention, those who were classified as "worst" constituted the vast majority and could not be counted on for their support. Realizing this, the author proposed to send troops into Russia "without delay" by organizing the arrival of the naval and ground forces suddenly and secretly, overnight. The memorandum listed exactly what should have started the intervention: to seize the railways and telegraph, food supplies, warehouses with shoes and clothes, to stop telephone and telegraph communications. When seizing seaports, commandeer icebreakers, avoid damage to naval vessels, etc.
In practice, it was about the introduction of an occupation regime. Primary importance was attached to the occupation of Vologda, Yaroslavl and Arkhangelsk as strategic points controlling important communications. To organize the management of the occupied territories, it was proposed to mobilize and summon to Russia to serve in the expeditionary forces of all citizens of the allied countries who speak Russian, and in order to intimidate the population, it was recommended to exaggerate the number of forces at the disposal of the Americans if possible. It was pointed out the need to ensure the safety of the bridges on the path of the advance of the allied forces, so that they would not be blown up by the Bolsheviks. This, the only mention of the opponents of the intervention in the entire document, speaks for itself. In the eyes of American representatives, from Francis to the anonymous author of the memorandum, the main threat to US interests came precisely from the Bolsheviks.
The reason for the emergence of the American plan for an armed intervention in Russia was the Kornilov revolt. However, the latter was defeated not as a result of a clash with the forces of the Provisional Government loyal to Kerensky, but primarily due to the growing influence of the Bolsheviks, who organized scattered forces to defeat the rebellion. The predictions of the American representatives about the inevitable victory of Kornilov turned out to be untenable. Francis had to telegraph to Washington that the military and naval attaches were "extremely disappointed with Kornilov's failure." In approximately the same terms, this is stated in the memorandum, the concluding part of which refers to the period when the Kornilov rebellion had already been defeated.
The disappointment of the American representatives deepened with the growth of revolutionary sentiment in the country, further growing dissatisfaction with the war and the spread of sentiments among the soldiers on the front for withdrawal from it. The inability of the Provisional Government to cope with the revolutionary movement and strengthen the position at the front caused undisguised irritation on the part of US representatives. In this regard, in the final part of the memorandum it was emphasized that the only hope of the allies and "true Russian patriots" was the victory of Kornilov, and after he was defeated, Russia was "unable to save itself from destruction, defeat and horrors."
The failure of the Kornilov revolt reduced the chances of an Allied intervention in Russia, whose government, as noted in the memorandum, could now refuse to agree to this. Indeed, there were good reasons for such a judgment, for Kerensky himself, in an interview with the Associated Press on the very day that the memorandum is dated, that is, October 31, gave a negative answer to the question of the possibility of sending American troops to Russia. Kerensky admitted that his government was in a precarious position, but declared that intervention was practically impracticable. He accused the allies of insufficient assistance to Russia, whose forces were depleted, which caused the outrage of the American press, which demanded that the Provisional Government adhere to allied obligations.
Describing the attitude of American public opinion towards Kerensky after the failure of the Kornilov revolt, the American historian K. Lash notes that the United States is "fed up" with him. Indeed, neither in the United States itself, nor among the American representatives in Petrograd, Kerensky was not quoted highly. But since it was his government that was seen as the only support for the struggle at that time, above all, with the growing influence of the Bolsheviks, the American ruling circles continued to provide him with all kinds of support. At the same time, in order to prevent a socialist revolution in Russia, some high-ranking US officials were even ready to agree with Russia's withdrawal from the war, although in general the American administration did not share this approach. The memorandum categorically stated that if Russia refuses to participate in the war, allied intervention will become inevitable.
In the first part of the memorandum, drawn up even before the defeat of Kornilov, it was noted that the "main argument" in negotiations with the Provisional Government on intervention should be formulated as follows: peace, we occupy Siberia and take over the situation at the front. " However, then this attitude was tightened, and the question was posed more ultimately: the intervention will follow regardless of whether or not consent is obtained from Russia. In addition, the emphasis was shifted in justifying the need to send foreign troops: from the question of Russia's possible withdrawal from the war, it was shifted to the need to prevent the further development of revolutionary changes in the country.
This is evidenced by the list of objectives of the intervention given in the final (later in time) part of the memorandum. The main focus was now on protecting the principle of private property. The occupation of the territory was necessary, according to the first point, to guarantee payment or recognition by the government and the people of their debts to the allied powers. The second point of the memorandum called for the use of force to instill in the "ignorant, inclined, in favor of the confiscation of property, the masses," the understanding that if there are no laws in Russia now, then in other countries these laws are "still valid", and those who do not want to to carry them out, make them obey. The next paragraph expressed the hope that the intervention would erase from the minds of the masses "the idea that they are the" vanguard of world civilization and progress ", tarnish the idea that the socialist revolution is a step forward in the development of society.
Justifying the urgent need to send foreign troops to Russia, the author of the memorandum honestly stated that intervention was needed to protect the life and property of the middle and upper classes. They, according to him, supported the bourgeois revolution in a spontaneous "impulse to freedom", in other words, they were not those who participated in the struggle of the proletarian masses and the poor peasants under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Concern was also shown for those who remained faithful to the "traditions of the old Russian army."
The rest of the memorandum is devoted to the impact of the intervention on Russia's attitude to participation in the war, preventing its withdrawal from the war with Germany and making peace with the latter. On this issue, the author of the memorandum took an equally adamant position: to force Russia to behave as the allied powers need, and if she does not want to, then to punish it approximately. This part of the memorandum stated that the current weakness of Russia, and its inability to resist, as well as the uncertain situation with Germany, make it desirable to start an Allied intervention immediately, because now it is possible with less risk than later. If Russia nevertheless tries to get out of the war, then the allied forces, having occupied the territory in the North and the Far East, will not allow it to do so. They will prevent Germany from enjoying the fruits of the peace agreement and keep the Russian army at the front.
The words of the memorandum that revolutionary Russia should understand that it "will have to turn around in a hot frying pan" and "instead of one war, wage three at once" sounded like an open threat: with Germany, its allies and a civil one. As time has shown, these threats represented a well-thought-out plan of real action, put forward at the initiative of the naval department, whose representatives for many years sought the right to a decisive voice in foreign policy decisions.
The memorandum of US naval intelligence, to which the naval attaché in Petrograd apparently had a hand in one way or another, was probably familiar to the heads of the diplomatic service. The above-mentioned telegrams from Francis about the reaction of the military and naval attaché to the Kornilov revolt are indirect confirmation of this. There is no doubt that the diplomatic service fully admitted the intervention in Russia proposed by naval intelligence. This is evidenced by Francis's telegram to Secretary of State Lansing, sent immediately after the drafting of the memorandum, in which he asked Washington's opinion on the possibility of the United States sending "two divisions or more" to Russia via Vladivostok or Sweden, if it was possible to obtain the consent of the Russian government, or even get him to make such a request.
On November 1, 2017, the US Treasury Secretary W. McAdoo informed the Russian ambassador to Washington B. A. Bakhmetyev that the Kerensky government will receive 175 million dollars by the end of 1917. However, Francis, who had constantly applied for loans earlier, came to the conclusion that the introduction of American troops could be more profitable than material support, for it would give an impetus to the organization of "sensible Russians", that is, opponents of the Bolsheviks.
This position practically coincided with the proposals of the US naval intelligence, and most likely, it was even prompted by it. But the day after Francis sent a request to Washington to send American troops, on November 7, 1917, the well-known armed uprising took place in Petrograd.
Under these conditions, Francis's demarche to support the Kerensky government by sending American troops to help him lost its significance. However, plans for military intervention were by no means buried. Soon after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Entente powers organized an armed intervention in Soviet Russia, in which the United States also took an active part. In principle, the issue of American intervention was already settled in December 1917, a little over a month after the overthrow of the Kerensky government, although the final sanction followed only eight months later, in July 1918.
Then, in August, American troops landed in Russia exactly in those areas in the North and Far East, which were designated by the memorandum of naval intelligence. The decision to intervene was preceded by a lengthy debate at the top of Washington. In the course of this discussion, supporters of the intervention operated with the same arguments contained in the memorandum. And although there are no documents yet confirming the direct factual continuity between the memorandum of October 31, 1917 and the subsequent decision in 1918 to start an intervention, there is a certain logical connection between the two.
Subsequently, when analyzing the origin of the American armed intervention in Soviet Russia, researchers explained it by different reasons. Disputes about the motives and nature of the intervention have taken a significant place in the historiography of the United States. Despite various interpretations, most of its representatives directly or indirectly justify sending troops to Russia, although, as one of them rightly noted, there are a lot of conflicting assessments in the American literature.
In interpreting the nature of the American intervention in Soviet Russia, the researchers based mainly on material relating to the period after the October armed uprising in Petrograd. The October 31, 1917 Memorandum not only sheds additional light on the origins of the US armed intervention in Soviet Russia, but also allows a broader look at the nature of American politics.
Assessing the significance of the memorandum as a political document, it should be emphasized that the proposals put forward by it did not contain any new ideas. He relied on a tradition already established by that time in US foreign policy. At the end of the XIX - beginning of the XX century. intervention in the protection of property and the maintenance of order pleasing to them, covered by the slogan of freedom and democracy, firmly entered the arsenal of American politics (this principle has not changed today). The implementation of this course took place with the increasing role of the naval department, a clear example of which was the American intervention in Mexico that preceded the dispatch of troops to Russia. Twice, in 1914 and 1916, the United States sent armed forces to this country to prevent the dangerous development of the revolution that broke out there (1910-1917). The naval ministry was actively involved in organizing and planning these actions, whose efforts in April 1914 provoked an incident that caused a direct military intervention in Mexico. Informing the leaders of the Congress on the eve of the invasion of this country, President W. Wilson called it a "peaceful blockade."
Shortly after American troops landed on Mexican territory, in an interview with the Saturday Evening Post, he said: "There is no people who are incapable of self-government. You just need to lead them correctly." What this formula meant in practice, Wilson explained in negotiations with the British government, saying that the United States seeks to use all possible influence to provide Mexico with a better government, in which all contracts, transactions and concessions will be better protected than before. In fact, the authors of the memorandum of naval intelligence were thinking about the same, justifying the intervention in Russia.
The Mexican and Russian revolutions took place on different and distant continents, but the attitude of the United States towards them was similar. "My policy in Russia," Wilson declared, "is very similar to my policy in Mexico." In these confessions, however, reservations were made that obscured the essence of the matter. “I think,” the president added, “that we need to give Russia and Mexico the opportunity to find a way of their own salvation … I imagine it this way: an unimaginable multitude of people are fighting among themselves (waging a civil war), it is impossible to deal with them. Therefore, you lock them all in one room, keep the door closed and say that when they agree with each other, the door will be open and they will be dealt with. " Wilson stated this in an interview with the British diplomat W. Wiseman in October 1918. By that time, the decision to intervene in Russia was not only made, but also began to be implemented. The US government was not at all limited to the role of a passive observer of the civil war in Russia, but provided active support to the counter-revolutionary forces, "opening the room" for armed intervention.
Subsequently, many wrote that Wilson made the decision to intervene in Russia, allegedly yielding to pressure from the allies and his own cabinet. As noted, this decision was indeed the result of a difficult debate. But it by no means contradicted the convictions of the head of the White House, or his practical actions. Undeniable evidence of this is contained in documents of that time, thoroughly studied by the American historian V. E. Williams, who showed that the policies of the Wilson administration were permeated through and through with anti-Sovietism. The US intervention in Russia, he said, aimed to provide direct and indirect support to the opponents of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Williams writes: "The people who made the decision to intervene viewed the Bolsheviks as dangerous, radical-minded revolutionaries who threatened American interests and the capitalist system around the world."
The contours of this relationship were clearly visible in the memorandum of October 31, 1917. And after the victory of the October Revolution, they received a logical development in the views of the then American leaders on the question of the future fate of Russia and the goals of intervention. In the US State Department memorandums of July 27 and September 4, 1918, attached to the naval intelligence dossier, the question of intervention, which had already been resolved by that time, was still linked to the question of continuing the war with Germany, in which Russia's human and material resources were to serve the interests of allies. The authors of these documents expressed growing concern about the political situation in the country, declaring the need to overthrow Soviet power and replace it with another government. Formally, this problem was tied to the issue of the war with Germany, but in fact it became the main one. In this sense, the conclusion of V. E. Williams: "The strategic goals of the war receded into the background before the strategic struggle against Bolshevism."
In a memorandum dated July 27, 1918, drawn up a few days after the US government informed the Allies of its decision to participate in the anti-Soviet intervention, it was emphasized that no relations should be maintained with the Soviet government, so as not to alienate the "constructive elements" on which the allied forces can rely. The author of the July memorandum, the head of the Russian department of the Landfield Department of State, noted that the goal of the intervention was first to establish order and then form a government, explaining that order would be established by the military, and civil rule should be formed by the Russians. However, he made a reservation that it is currently impossible to provide the organization of the government to the Russians themselves without outside guidance.
The same problem was touched upon in a new memorandum dated September 4, 1918, timed to coincide with the landing of American military contingents in Soviet Russia in August. The September memorandum "On the Situation in Russia and Allied Intervention" was attached to the naval intelligence dossier with a cover letter signed by its leader R. Welles. Who exactly prepared the document was not specified this time. In relation to the Soviet government, the new memorandum was even more hostile. It also stated that intervention was necessary for the successful conclusion of the war against Germany, although the main focus was on examining the political situation within Russia and measures to combat Soviet power.
The State Department memorandum proposed that old and well-known political leaders be assembled as soon as possible in order to organize a Provisional Committee in the rear of the allied armies from among them to counterbalance the Soviet government. At the same time, the main hope was pinned on intervention and unification with the White Guard forces, with the help of which they hoped to successfully destroy the Bolshevik forces. The memorandum suggested that the dispatch of troops to Russia be accompanied by sending there "reliable, experienced, pre-trained agents" so that they could deploy properly organized propaganda in favor of intervention, influence the minds of the people, convince them to "rely" on and trust their allies, thereby creating conditions for the political and economic reorganization of Russia.
In the study of the American historian J. Kennan on the origins of the US intervention in Soviet Russia, it is noted that by the end of 1918, due to the end of the World War and the defeat of Germany, there was no need for intervention. However, United States troops remained on Soviet soil until 1920, supporting anti-Soviet forces.
