Continuation, beginning - Part I
"Bulava" rocket stubbornly unwilling to fly, became famous throughout the world for several invariably unsuccessful launch attempts.
The main developer of new weapons for nuclear submarines, it seems, is ready to admit that nothing came of it. The chief developer of the sea-based Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile, general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, Academician Yuri Solomonov, made a remarkable statement. According to him, it is necessary to push up quite a bit, and the long-suffering Bulava will still fly. True, not from a submarine, here Solomonov has not been very successful with her for a long time. It can come out much better from the ground … In short, the academician formulated the sensation as follows: "Interspecies unification, in general, when the Bulava missile is taken and used, say, as part of ground-based complexes, this task is in principle realizable." You just need to sweat a little more, they say. “What to adapt, I cannot say, this is classified information,” the general designer revealed the secret. - But an insignificant part of the structural elements, in value terms - this is no more than 10 percent, will need to be adapted to the conditions of ground operation.
academician Yuri Solomonov
For these lengthy explanations of the chief designer, I would like to give him advice: maybe it is worth changing the name? And suddenly it will help, because, as the hero of the famous cartoon used to say, you call the ship that way and the ship will float.
Russian corrupt officials have discovered a new type of corruption deals called "Elite Secret Corruption" in the army.
The deputies of the State Duma found a "secret" loophole in the planned budget, which is not checked by parliament (about 30% for defense are secret). Members of the Russian leadership are in a position to "impose" on the Russian government the ability to determine the purchase, pay for it from the budget and determine where the "rollback" will take place. Conclusion for observation: it is desirable to sell abroad, negotiating directly with merchants. Projects of this kind today can only be supported by that part of the elite that is interested in legitimizing their capital in the West. Or it provides itself with Western guarantees of its political future after the change of the top leadership.
This is approximately how the situation with the purchase of the Mistral of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and basement boats is developing. There are many schemes according to which budgets are "cut". For example, in October, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced a tender for the construction of a helicopter carrier. What is surprising is not that the tender was announced, but that, without waiting for the results of the auction, the Russian government has already announced who will be the winner in this tender.
The strengthening of the pro-Western lobby in the Russian elite should be associated with the process of “cashing in the image of Russia”. Under the guise of a propaganda machine, some of the elite corrupt officials (and their powerful backers) are in a hurry to turn the high ratings of the military-industrial complex - the country through loans into hard currency. But this money does not go to the development of the country, but to the offshore pocket. In addition, last year, an agreement was signed with the French company Thales to transfer the license for the production of Catherine thermal imaging cameras for T-90 tanks. A trial batch of these devices was purchased in 2008. This year the Vologda Optical and Mechanical Plant will start producing licensed thermal imagers in the amount of 20-30 units per month. And finally, the Russian Defense Ministry has begun negotiations on the acquisition of the latest French equipment for the "infantryman of the future" Felin. However, according to the statement of Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, only eight sets will be purchased in order to "compare with our equipment."
As former President V. Putin said, regardless of who is now the President of the Russian Federation, everything will be early "as planned" France is a country famous for the use of corruption schemes in arms sales abroad. Somehow I don't want to believe in the disinterestedness of the Mistral lobbyists, especially against the backdrop of more and more corruption scandals in Russia. State Duma deputies, mayors of major cities, ministerial assistants, admirals are involved in corruption schemes in the field of state defense orders. Today it turns out that Russia is ready to support French and German shipbuilding in times of crisis, to develop Israel's aviation industry, forgetting about its own shipbuilding and aviation industry. It's a shame to hear that Russia is ready to buy Israeli weapons to the detriment of its own defense industry.
The current chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Nikolai Makarov, defined the tasks as follows: "We are working on the issue of purchasing a trial batch of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles." This will only be done "if our industry is not able to release in the near future those drones that we need." Officials from the Ministry of Defense want to earn big money against the background of not the best situation in our military-industrial complex.
Speaking of foreign purchases of "drones", we need to look further. If we stutter about this, it means that we are actually abandoning GLONASS, since the Israeli UAVs operate on the GPS system. Owners of personal cars are “recommended” to buy only GLONASS successors. But how can you explain to them why GPS receivers cost $ 400, and the Russian system costs more than $ 1200? Thus, the officials of the Ministry of Defense are ready to refuse to fulfill the decision of the State Duma on the need to purchase Russian weapons. The first major foreign military purchase was the acquisition by the Russian military department of the Israeli company Israel Aerospace Industries of 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of 3 different types. These are light portable systems, Bird-Eye 400 mini-UAVs, tactical I-View MK150 and Searcher Mk II medium-weight UAVs. Their total cost is $ 53 million, deliveries will begin in 2010, negotiations are underway to purchase the second batch.
At the same time, Israeli drones are completely unsuitable for Russia. The reason is airfield based. An Israeli drone is generally operated in the same way as a conventional aircraft. He takes off from the airfield for reconnaissance and returns to the airfield. It is suitable for tiny Israel with consistently good weather.
Any domestic unmanned complex is organized in a completely different way - like a mobile missile system, and the drone itself is operated similarly to a rocket. A domestic drone, as a rule, is stored and transported in a container of a transport and launcher, starts from this installation in any place where it is delivered, and returns to the launch site with landing on an unequipped site. It is clear that Russia does not have such a dense network of airfields to operate unmanned aerial vehicles anywhere in its vast territory, and even with very diverse, by no means Middle Eastern, weather conditions.
With such actions by the Russian leadership, the country actually abandons its defense capability, abandons environmentally unloaded industries, advanced, export competitive, economically extremely profitable industries. Russia may gradually turn into a backward third world country, ineffective, with dirty industries, with a raw material economy, purchasing finished products abroad and, thus, supporting Western economies by exporting production and financial resources.
In this regard, I would like to remind you that, finding itself in approximately a similar situation, Japan has decided not to equip its armed forces with only Western weapons and military equipment, but to create at least some of them on its own. Although the resulting tanks and airplanes, with equal performance characteristics, were more expensive than their Western counterparts, the money “did not leave” the country, and the national scientific institutes and defense industry enterprises managed to stay afloat and retain highly qualified personnel. India and China have been following the same path for more than a year now - they are striving not to purchase equipment in finished form abroad, but either to enter licensed production, or to create joint samples of weapons and military equipment, or simply copy them and start production at their own enterprises. …
Purchase of Mistral class helicopter carriers.
Until now, all attempts to sell these ships on the world market have been unsuccessful. France, having built 2 ships for its Navy, was forced to stop building them, and put this ship up as a tender for a competition in Australia, when Australia decided to choose the type of ship for its amphibious forces. Canberra firmly insisted that both ships be built at Australian shipyards, while Paris was second only to one ship overseas - the second was to be built in France. The main reason for the refusal of the Australian fleet from the Mistral in favor of its Spanish competitor was the unresolved disagreements over the place of construction of the two ships. Secondly, the Australians rated the Mistral as "too complex a ship with certain problems with seaworthiness and too expensive." The Mistral does not carry any unique technology or unique weapons that Russia could not independently produce.
Technical characteristics of the Mistral-class amphibious assault helicopter carrier.
It has a standard displacement of 156, 5 thousand tons, full - 21, 3 thousand tons. With a filled dock - 32.3 thousand tons. Its length is 199 meters, width - 32 meters, draft - 6, 2 meters. Full speed - 18, 8 knots. The cruising range is up to 19.8 thousand miles.
The ship's helicopter group includes 16 vehicles (8 amphibious and 8 combat assault helicopters). 6 helicopters can be accommodated on the take-off deck at the same time.
In addition, the ship is capable of carrying four landing boats or two hovercraft, up to 13 main battle tanks or up to 70 vehicles, as well as up to 470 airborne troops (900 for a short time). A command center with an area of 850 square meters is equipped on board the Mistral. m, which can work up to 200 people. It is well equipped and allows the Mistral to be used to control various types and scales of operations of inter-service groupings of troops (forces), including those carried out in an autonomous mode; actions of a squadron, flotilla or fleet.
In addition, the ship has a hospital with 69 beds (their number can be increased, but not significantly), two operating rooms and an X-ray room. In Mistral, the most interesting is the power unit. The French have always been strong in creating fuel efficient engines. A distinctive feature of the propulsion system is the absence of bulky propeller shafts, since two propellers are located in special swivel nacelles - the range of rotation is 360 degrees. This design of the main propellers makes the ship more maneuverable, which is especially important when moving near the coast.
However, it is unclear how the abortion HED will be restored to work in the event of their failure without using a dock. And a ship without movement is no longer a ship, but a simple target. The only advantage of the French ship is the cruising range.
Mistral is designed to transport troops and cargo, landings, and can be used as a command ship. Currently, the French Navy has two ships of this type - "Mistral L.9013 and Tonnerre L.9014" These are the largest ships after the aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle".
The technical characteristics of the Juan Carlos I class amphibious assault helicopter carrier or, as the Australians believe, the Canberra-class DVKD and the similar Adelaide are planned to be built for the Australian Navy by 2013 and 2015. In fact, this is a helicopter landing dock, a distinctive feature of which is a continuous flight deck with a bow springboard to ensure takeoff of aircraft with short takeoff and vertical landing. In addition to twelve helicopters, it also provides the basing of up to six tactical fighters - in our case it could be the MiG-29K. in dry dock.
It has a length of 230, 82 m, a maximum width of 32 m, a maximum displacement of 27,563 tons and a draft of 6 m. The ship develops a maximum speed of 21 knots (39 km / h) and provides transportation of equipment and personnel over a distance of 9000 nautical miles. (16,000 km) at a speed of 15 knots (28 km / h). The ship's crew consists of 243 permanent personnel.
The ship can also transport up to 902 paratroopers with equipment and up to 46 Leopard main battle tanks indoors.
Therefore, it would be more profitable for Russia to acquire the Spanish landing helicopter dock Juan Carlos I
In the Russian-French Mistral deal, only the benefit for France is clearly visible. Sarkozy is using the Mistral deal as bait to forge broader business ties with Russia. With this deal, Sarkozy wants to secure guarantees for business contacts between French and Russian business. For example, GDF Suez will receive a 9% stake in Nord Stream. President Sarkozy confirmed that negotiations are underway to sell four Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia. "Mistral" is a helicopter carrier, which we will create for Russia without military equipment, "if they are sold, they will be deprived of electronic and computer systems. It is not clear how it is possible to sell Mistral without modern technologies, why is it needed at all.
Official Moscow has identified this condition as one of the key parameters of the deal under discussion. In addition, for France it is, first of all, a huge sales market, and the sale of the Mistrals will save the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire on the Atlantic coast from bankruptcy. If such a contract is signed, the French industry will be provided with work for several years. The French Navy command especially emphasized the fact that thanks to the optimization of costs for various items, the introduction of innovative engineering solutions and the sectional construction of ships of this type, not only the construction time of the series was reduced, but also the total cost of the program was reduced by almost 30%.
In Western shipbuilding, there has long been a tendency to use civilian technologies in military shipbuilding, this allows you to reduce the cost of building ships and use unified equipment on warships and civilian ships. But, all this unification does not in the best way affect the survivability of the ship; Although Russian ships may be more expensive, since such a deep unification of equipment with the civilian fleet is not used (and rightly so), they only benefit from this in terms of reliability, survivability and other important characteristics. Unfortunately, these requirements are mutually exclusive: if you want cheaper and easier - get one, if you want to ensure combat stability - get another. Warships are built for warfare, not for pleasure trips along the great barrier reef or the Caribbean. Only this has now begun to be forgotten. And this is especially the case for Western companies, for which the issue of low prices comes first.
Alleged troubles of Russia. As part of the Russian Navy, the Mistral-class amphibious assault docking ship, if purchased from France, will be used only as a command ship; the military department considers the amphibious function of the ship to be secondary, inherent in universal ships. The Russians are forced to buy this ship. The 450 million euros that we have to pay for the purchase of the lead ship and about the same amount that we have to pay for the license to produce each subsequent ship gives us a total of almost a billion euros, which we actually have to give to France.
The ship for Russia will be built according to civilian standards - without weapons and radars. But if it makes sense to buy a series, then you need to buy the first ready-made one. The initial official position of Russia is as follows: we buy one ship, build three others on the territory of our country. Building large ships also means jobs and support for the military-industrial complex. For Russian shipbuilders, this is also an additional opportunity to master new European technologies. But during the negotiations, Russia backed down from the planned plan. French President Sarkozy has proposed that only two ships can be built in Russia. “Two and two was a reasonable agreement,” he said, implying that two Mistrals would leave the stocks in France and two more in Russia.
The Mistral will be built by STX France and DCNS. The naval specialists roared with laughter at the phrase of the chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov “According to the Ministry of Defense, the Mistral consumes 2 - 3 times less fuel than our landing ships! Have the French made a global breakthrough in ship power? Do they have a power plant efficiency 2 - 3 times higher than that of ships of all other countries? It becomes clear what "competent" specialists are in our beloved Ministry of Defense!
Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov believes that Russia can purchase one French helicopter carrier plus technologies for its production. “We do not have ships of this class. Our large landing ships are about 3-4 times smaller than the Mistral. This is not only an amphibious assault ship - its versatility is obvious: it is a helicopter carrier, a command ship, an amphibious assault ship, and a hospital. and just a transport ship, and it is very easy to give any new function to it in the shortest possible time. In addition, as part of the Navy, Mistral will be engaged in the transportation of people and cargo, fighting submarines and rescuing people in emergencies, "said the military leader in interview with "Russia Today" TV company. The Russian Navy intends to use the Mistral, if purchased from France, as a command ship. The people are laughing! Buying the Mistral as a command ship (and even more so four ships in the end), as an auxiliary fleet is taxpayers' money down the drain! In this case, the amphibious function of the ship is regarded as secondary. The fact is that Russian ships carry out a landing in any situation in any conditions with a direct approach to the coastline and on their own, Mistral - exclusively for the transfer of equipment. These ships are used in essence as transports for the delivery of amphibious assault vehicles, while they themselves are not (amphibious assault vehicles).
Why is Russia buying helicopter carriers? Much more important are the motives - why and why Russia buys helicopter carriers, and why France, a NATO member, does not just agree to such a deal, but practically pushes Russia to buy. It is pointless to buy a heavy (21,000 tonnes displacement) amphibious assault helicopter carrier in France. Such a large landing ship is needed to carry out amphibious landings in countries far from Russia. And then to cover such a large ship you need an escort - a cruiser, a couple of destroyers, and even an aircraft carrier (which is not in Russia). In the event of a major war, this "Mistral" as part of the Russian Navy turns into just a big target. It has long been clear to everyone that it will take a long time to throw out its marines to the distant shores of the Russian Federation, in all fleets only in a marine brigade.
A serious drawback of these ships is their weak armament, which does not provide reliable self-defense against any serious threats (anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, combat swimmers-saboteurs), but this drawback can be corrected by re-equipping with domestic ship weapon systems. The Mistral cannot independently carry out a landing with heavy equipment on an unequipped coast, only with the help of tank landing pontoons. Since the 50s, this procedure has been long and complicated: filling the docking chamber with water and removing the pontoons from it takes several hours. They cannot deliver all the equipment to the water's edge at once. Several flights need to be made. The entire landing process takes a very long time. During this procedure, the Mistral with a full docking chamber is quite vulnerable. However, paratroopers are delivered to the shore by helicopters quickly. But … without heavy weapons and armored vehicles. The main thing "Mistral" does not fit into the concept of combat employment of the Russian marines today. Having received such a ship, our fleet will not be able to use it to carry out those amphibious operations that have been practiced for decades, or at least will not receive significant assistance from it for carrying out such operations. The Mistral helicopter carrier is not suitable for amphibious operations and will be difficult to adapt to Russian equipment. This ship assumes NATO equipment ", without modern equipment. The product is bought in the complete set:" empty box + chassis ", but after all, our shipbuilders can weld an empty hull. It is difficult to imagine a situation when the French will make a hull, and we will install our equipment on it It is difficult to fit Russian weapons, electrical equipment and other technological components to the hull of a completely alien project that has certain dimensional characteristics.
An additional reason why the ship is not needed, Russian helicopters will not squeeze into French hangars and elevators. The experience has already been. When the Mistral came to St. Petersburg for a visit, Russian Ka-52 and Ka-27 helicopters successfully boarded its deck, but later it turned out that domestic rotary-wing aircraft did not fit into the elevator in height, so they could not be lowered into the helicopter hangar. A small embarrassment was quickly hushed up. So now we don't need the Mistral, maybe in 15-20 years we will need it, but let's hope that by that time Russia will still be able to do without it.
The Russian Navy needs a UDC with a displacement of 28,000 tons, with a springboard and an aerofinisher, suitable for basing 4-6 MiG-29Ks. More suitable would be the Spanish Juan Carlos I, which has a bow springboard to ensure takeoff of aircraft with a short takeoff and vertical landing. The French can afford to build cheap Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Russia needs an ocean-going landing ship with a good own air defense system, including that provided by carrier-based fighters. Russia is buying an absolutely useless ship that does not fit into the Navy under any sauce, without self-defense weapons, without escort ships and without the presence of the marines themselves. The only thing that Mistral can do is arrange cruises for the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense and their entourage, the Commander-in-Chief and the leadership of the Navy.
Many defense industry enterprises are not yet ready for the serial production of high-tech weapons systems. According to him, Vladislav Putilin (Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (MIC) of the Russian Federation), only 36% of strategic enterprises are financially healthy, and 25% are on the verge of bankruptcy. The Russian defense industry complex includes 948 strategic enterprises and organizations, which are subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Chapter IX of the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", which provide for special bankruptcy rules. Currently, 44 of them have been filed for bankruptcy.
According to the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 170 strategic enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex have signs of bankruptcy. Moreover, in relation to 150 strategic enterprises and organizations, the tax authorities have already issued orders to collect debts at the expense of their property, which are directed to the execution of bailiffs. Additional problems for the defense industry were created by the delay in the transfer of funds under the state defense order. As an example, we will analyze the enterprises of the aircraft industry and armored engineering.
In recent years, the defense industry has managed to incur very large debts.
In the aviation industry: RAC "MiG" - 44 billion rubles., MMP them. VV Chernyshev - 22 billion, NPK "Irkut", the company "Sukhoi" - about 30 billion. And in armored engineering - for example, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Omsk Transport Engineering Plant" produces T-80U and T-80UK tanks. The accounts payable of the enterprise is 1.5 billion rubles. In 2008, the RF Ministry of Defense and OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod signed a three-year contract for the purchase of 189 tanks (63 tanks per year). In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to purchase 261 new T-90 tanks, which are produced by OJSC NPK Uralvagonzavod. If the order for the purchase of tanks for 18 billion rubles. nevertheless, it will come true, then the plant will have a chance to pay off its debt - 61 billion rubles.
Despite the fact that in recent years Russia has managed to partially regain its lost positions in the world arms trade, the success cannot be overestimated. Indeed, the crisis phenomena in the field of military-technical cooperation are based not only and not so much on the imperfection of public administration (although this is also important), as on the problems of manufacturers of military equipment. In many military technologies, Russia is still at the level of the 1970s-1980s. The state of defense industry enterprises and their significant technological dependence on foreign suppliers remain critical.
Thus, in comparison with 1992, the production of military aircraft decreased 17 times, military helicopters - 5 times, aircraft missiles - 23, ammunition - more than 100 times. The decline in the quality of military products (MPP) is alarming. The costs of eliminating defects in the course of production, testing and operation of the MPP reach 50% of the total cost of its manufacture. While in economically developed countries this figure does not exceed 20%. The main reason is the depreciation of the main equipment, which has reached 75%, and the extremely low level of re-equipment: the rate of equipment renewal is no more than 1% per year, with a minimum required requirement of 8-10%.
In recent years, the decline in the quality of military equipment and the more frequent cases of non-compliance with the deadlines for fulfilling contractual obligations by Russian subjects of military technical cooperation, combined with an unjustified increase in the price of military equipment, began to noticeably affect relations in the field of military technical cooperation, with traditional Russian buyers of military equipment (primarily with India and China) and, as a consequence, on the volume of supplies. The defense industry enterprises do not fully cope with the fulfillment of the concluded contracts. Some foreign customers have to queue up for Russian weapons. True, it is not yet entirely clear how to keep the price of 2011 for the entire range of military equipment, which the military is going to buy from the industry, until 2020. For some reason, deflators that have been put into the budget always turn out to be less than the real growth of inflation and the rise in the cost of materials and components for the final product.
As a result, all weapons programs after five years turn out to be unbalanced, and the amount of lost money and, consequently, equipment not received by the troops reaches 30-50%. Comparison of sales of military equipment for export with purchases of military equipment in the interests of the RF Ministry of Defense showed that for many years the volume of sales of weapons and military equipment (AME) to foreign countries exceeded the volume of domestic purchases, and only in recent years there has been a tendency towards an increase in domestic demand.
And if in 2000-2003 Russia's military expenditures amounted to about 30-32% of the volume of military equipment exports, then in 2004-2005 they became comparable, and since 2006 they exceeded the volume of exports, amounting to 114.6% in 2006, in 2007 year - 132.6%. These data reflect not only the improvement in the economic situation in the country, observed over the past five to six years, but also a change in the state's attitude to the state of the RF Armed Forces, requiring re-equipment and modernization.
The federal budget for 2009–2011 provides for a significant increase in the volume of purchases of military equipment, despite the financial crisis. The degradation of the scientific and technical complex has led to the fact that, despite the growth of the state defense order, the production of a new generation of weapons has never been established. The current situation poses a threat to Russia's national security.
According to Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the leading Western countries spend 2–3% of GDP on R&D, including the USA - 2, 7%, and in countries such as Japan, Sweden, Israel, they reach 3, 5–4, 5% of GDP. China is increasing spending on R&D at a very high rate (1.7% of GDP). It is expected that in the next decade, the PRC will catch up with the United States in terms of spending on science. R&D spending in India is also growing rapidly. By 2012, they will reach 2% of GDP. The European Union has set a target to increase R&D spending to 3% of GDP. The share of Russia's expenditures on defense R&D is 0.6% of GDP, on civil science - 0.4%. For comparison: in the last years of the existence of the USSR, total expenditures on R&D amounted to 3, 6–4, 7% of GDP. Unfortunately, in Russia, the share of all expenditures on basic research is only 0.16% of GDP.
In developed countries, spending on basic research is 0.5–0.6% of GDP. In the countries - leaders of world science, scientific policy has two sides. On the one hand, the state directly funds scientific research, and on the other hand, through tax measures, it stimulates R&D spending in the private sector. In Russia, according to the OECD, the tax system does not encourage, but infringes on R&D spending. Russian business expenditures on R&D are 7-10 times less than in developed countries. Only three Russian companies are among the 1000 largest companies in the world in terms of R&D expenditures.
It is surprising that the satisfaction of Rosoboronexport's requests takes precedence over the needs of the RF Armed Forces. In Russia, there is an acute question: which is more important for the state - the orders of the Ministry of Defense or Rosoboronexport? It seems that Rosoboronexport's contracts are more important, since domestic prices are inferior to export prices. That is why Uralvagonzavod cannot start production of a new T-95 tank and a tank support combat vehicle (BMPT).
Autonomy remains a central element of Russian defense doctrine. One of the main goals of the implementation of the new policy for the defense industry is "to prevent the critical dependence of the defense industry on the supply of components and materials of foreign production." The aspirations of the heads of the defense industry enterprises are fully reflected: the state will assist in the acquisition of unique equipment and leasing it to the Russian defense industry. The problems of the development of the domestic electronic component base, as well as of radio electronics, special metallurgy and low-tonnage chemistry, will be solved within the framework of federal target programs and public-private partnerships.
The defense management system in Russia has already been revised six times. As a result, the level of this management has decreased from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation to the Head of the Department of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. The activities of various structures involved in the development of various types of military products are not coordinated with the Federal Law of September 26, 2002 No. 127-FZ "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)".
This law relaxed the requirements for strategic enterprises of the military-industrial complex in terms of signs of insolvency and established an extended list of measures aimed at preventing their bankruptcy. However, this law also requires a number of changes. This especially applies to the procedure for providing state guarantees for the obligations of strategic enterprises during the period of their financial recovery, limiting the rights of creditors to dispose of the debtor's property, the rights of the owner of mobilization (reserve) production facilities.
It is proposed that the amended law stipulates the right to initiate bankruptcy of a strategic enterprise only to the government of the Russian Federation, or initiate a bankruptcy case after the strategic status has been removed from the enterprise.
An unsuccessful policy has also developed in the area of pricing for defense industry products. Now the prices for military products are approved by the customer in accordance with departmental standards based on cost calculations provided by the prime contractor of the order. Often, the approved prices for defense industry products do not correspond to the growth in tariffs of natural monopolies. As a result, prices for military products are constantly growing. Therefore, despite the annual increase in spending on the state defense order, there is not enough money for the purchase of new modern weapons.
So far, such an important problem for the defense industry as taxation has not yet found a solution. Land tax, property tax, and other types of taxes that strategic enterprises of the defense industry are obliged to pay today have become one of the main obstacles to its reform. For many years now, heads of defense enterprises have been striving to abolish the value added tax on advance payments, which are made under contracts within the framework of the state defense order, on the profits of defense enterprises.
Now it is necessary to revise the goals and objectives of the weapons complex. We need to clearly understand who we are going to fight with, what types of weapons are needed for this, and what, accordingly, the state defense order should be. If there is no sane defense order, then there will be no defense industry. Industry cannot be mothballed and left until better times. The equipment will become obsolete morally and physically, it will be taken apart, there will be no specialists. Therefore, it is much more expensive to restore what was conserved than to build a new one in a new place. Until this understanding is there, the situation will only get worse.
Also 2010 was distinguished by another sensational event. It turned out that business on orders and medals is flourishing under the auspices of the state. An unprecedented Internet service has appeared in the Russian sector of the World Wide Web: now any citizen of Russia, and even a foreigner with enough money, can order the Russian Federation's favorite award according to the Catalog of Departmental and Public Awards. Within 15-20 days, having paid a certain amount, the amateur "tzatsek" will receive by mail a departmental medal or order with a blank certificate. If desired and additional funds are available, the award will be presented in a solemn atmosphere in any prestigious institution in Moscow with appropriate speeches and a banquet. The catalog contains more than 23,000 departmental and public orders, medals, tailcoats. The price list is published at zasluga.ru. The range of prices is from 1,200 to 376,000 rubles. - According to our Constitution, Russians have the right to wear awards of both the USSR and Russia. Orders of the USSR - 22 titles, medals of the USSR - 58. Russian awards - 26 orders, 6 insignia, 21 medals. The remaining 22,827 titles of awards are from the evil one.
What is happening now with the Russian award system, you will not find analogues either in ours or in world history. The front and military awards of the USSR were devalued. Private structures have been created for the premium business. The "Catalog of departmental and public awards" was released. And it seems that this is beneficial to many. To the Russian government - because there is less budget spending. For business, because if you want to improve relations, pay for awarding the right person with a public medal or order, and the job is done. If we talk about the purely external side, then the tinsel of brilliant newfangled handicrafts somewhat overshadowed them. But the main thing is that the award loses its original meaning. It is now often received not for courage and valor, but, in fact, for money or for connections in the highest echelons of power and business.
Here are some quotes for other awards. Representatives of show business can order a departmental medal No. 021 / MO "Major General Alexander Alexandrov" from the Ministry of Defense for 4000 rubles. For those who are interested in interacting with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is useful to receive a public medal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 126 / Ministry of Internal Affairs "For Merit in Management" worth 4,000 rubles or a public order "For Merit" No. 108 / Ministry of Internal Affairs, for 3,500 rubles.
A gigantic series of departmental awards has been created, which is difficult even for a specialist to understand. In the first place are the awards of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: 32 medals, badges - 92, just signs - 22, public medals of the Ministry of Defense - 22; Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU): public medals - 9, public signs - 24; Airborne Forces: public medals - 22, public signs - 18. Air Force: public medals - 27, public signs - 19. Navy: public orders - 3, public medals - 183, public signs - 583. It is amazing, but the law enforcement and special services of Russia "do not notice" that all these catalog awards are in free circulation and can be bought throughout Russia in the stores of the Splav company, the Moscow Awards Plant, the Moscow Mint, and now on the Internet. In general, in the award system of Russia it is necessary to establish at least elementary order.
