Some time ago, the media reported with references to unnamed sources that the Rubezh mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK), created for the Strategic Missile Forces, had successfully passed almost all flight design and state tests into the new state armament program for 2018-2027. allegedly did not hit. What is the reason for this and what connection can this decision have (if it ever took place) with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)? It should be noted right away that there is very little information on "Frontier", and the author's constructions are largely of an evaluative nature.
First of all, it's worth noting that an unnamed source in journalism can mean anything from a very high-profile source to rumors. So any "unnamed" information that does not receive any support by facts or confirmation in the officialdom should be treated with skepticism. The wording of the refusal itself sounds strange. They say that they chose between the Avangard and Rubezh aeroballistic hypersonic combat equipment (AGBO), and they considered that the first was more needed, and there was only money for one complex. Against the background of the already well-known (but also by nothing, in general, not officially confirmed) postponement of the program of the Barguzin Strategic Missile Forces military railway complex, it seems, sounds convincing. But it's not that simple.
"Barguzin" from the very beginning had a lot of ill-wishers inside the Strategic Missile Forces. More precisely, not so - within the command and military-scientific structures of the Strategic Missile Forces, there are several prevailing points of view on the development of troops and the required combat missile systems and everything else. And about the revival of the BZHRK and "science", and "industrialists", and the troops themselves had two points of view from the very beginning - that we need it and what we don’t need, we can do without it. Fortunately, the increased combat properties of the Yars PGRK, including the survivability, and the ability to carry MIRVs (RGCHIN) and the increased throw weight and capabilities of the missile defense penetration system (KSP ABM), and sharply increased combat patrol areas, allow really do without "rocket trains". Moreover, the BZHRK was supposed to be created on the basis of a decently converted one (there is no other way, and mine missiles differ from mobile ones, and "train" missiles even more require alterations), but unified with mobile and mine versions, the same "Yars" (or "Yarsa-S", rather). So the warheads and the missile defense system were the same. So the opponents of the BZHRK referred to the fact that why should they produce a variety, they say, the rocket is almost the same, this reduces costs, but the costs of deploying the BZHRK grouping will be substantial, including due to the creation of solid support for them on the railways (although specially fortified tracks and other things with the "Barguzin" are not needed, because the ICBM in it does not weigh 105 tons, but about 50, and the car, of course, is also much lighter than the one used in the BZHRK "Molodets").
Therefore, there was a solid opposition to the BZHRK (and including the developer himself, in the person of MIT, the same Y. Solomonov did not hide his skeptical opinion on this issue at one time), and, despite the completion of the initial stages of ROC and the transition to throw tests, it managed to win a temporary victory and achieve the postponement of the issue with the BZHRK, no, not forever, but for several years, so to speak, in a storehouse. Or, say, with the activation of the program earlier, in case of withdrawal from the START-3 Treaty and the transition to the development of strategic nuclear forces according to a long-established development program in the absence of contractual restrictions (programs should be for any case). The facts indicate that the program was probably really postponed to a later date - there was no information about new launches.
But there was no confrontation between Avangard and Rubezh, as between BZHRK and PGRK. And it couldn't be. Here it is necessary to clarify the picture.
Well, first of all, the Avangard 15Y71 AGBO does not exist by itself, but as part of a combat missile system with a 15A35-71 missile. The equipment, as officially reported, is already entering the series, which means that it is installed on the 15A35 (UR-100NUTTH) ICBMs of the 3rd generation, turning the obsolete missile into one of the most terrible weapons in the arsenal of our strategic nuclear forces. Yes, and such "dry" missiles (unloaded and unencapsulated, that is, stored without loss of properties, in the right conditions, almost forever) were purchased from Ukraine for a reason - so they will come in handy. Now they will become "special forces units of the Strategic Missile Forces" thanks to "Vanguard" - it must be understood that for now, the use of AGBO is needed for anything, but not for breaking through the useless, mythical, in fact, US missile defense (which has not yet mastered the interception of the most primitive ICBMs)), because Even with the breakthrough of the "ideal missile defense", as it would be in the dreams of the Pentagon generals and stories to the Senate subcommittees, modern unguided and non-maneuvering warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs, with the latest complex of means of overcoming missile defense systems, perfectly cope. "Vanguard" is needed for other, still very specific tasks, including even non-nuclear performance, if required.
And also, probably, the same AGBO, but not 1 piece per ICBM, will be used on the heavy Sarmat ICBM, say, up to 3 pieces per missile. However, no one knows for sure the weight and dimensions of the product, all estimates are made based on the throw weight of the old 15A35 ICBM, and the known data on the throw weight of the Sarmat, not forgetting, nevertheless, that the throw weight is not synonymous with the missile payload, it is more her. But, judging by the fact that mentions of "Avangard-R" or "Vanguard-Rubezh" slipped in open sources (because of the latter, many confused these two complexes for a long time, which was convenient within the framework of the cover legend), however, AGBO probably, in a different, reduced size and weight version, it should have been applied at the "Frontier". And here we need to figure out what the "Rubezh" is, and why could it be "pushed back" from deployment?
The development of a combat missile system with small-sized ICBMs of increased accuracy began somewhere in the mid-2000s at MIT. The relatively small weight and dimensions of the product made it possible to use a smaller and lighter chassis, which increases the cross-country ability and the survivability of the complex. Instead of the standard MZKT chassis with a 16x16 wheel arrangement, at the initial stage, it was supposed to use the MZKT-79292 with a 10x10 wheel arrangement, and then it turned out that this chassis was not enough and they took the MZKT-79291 12x12 chassis as a basis. When the throwing launches of the product began is unknown. The first real launch took place from Plesetsk in September 2011. and was declared unsuccessful - the rocket fell 8 km from the launch point. It is possible, however, that the launch was a throw one, and the failure was announced for cover. Then there was another launch from Plesetsk in May 2012. at a completely intercontinental distance - to the Kamchatka Kura, in this launch, as reported, there was a mock-up of a monoblock warhead.
But then all subsequent launches were carried out from Kapustin Yar, which already says a lot - this point is not observed by the enemy's technical means, and when they want to experience something that Uncle Sam does not need to see, for example, the features of the start or breeding of combat blocks, or a maneuvering BB, or a new KSP ABM - then it flies from KapYar and usually to Sary-Shagan, along the "southern short" or "internal" route. This is how the launches for testing advanced combat equipment or KSP missile defense systems usually took place. But they demanded, as a rule, the use of special carriers capable of partially simulating flight conditions at a very short distance, in particular, entering the atmosphere at a much greater range - we are talking about such carriers as the K-65MR, and the Topol-E, which replaced it. (alteration of old ICBMs "Topol").
And "Rubezh" flew from KapYar first to the Kura, in the same 2012. flew just as successfully to Sary-Shagan. Then there was another launch there in the summer of 2013. and also successful. Then the launches were postponed for a long time, and already in March 2015. the 5th launch of "Rubezh" took place, also along the "southern short" route, it was also successful and it was already a valid test - on the basis of it, a conclusion was issued with a recommendation to accept the "Rubezh" DBK into service. There was vague information that in all launches, except for the first successful one, they experienced an already split reentry vehicle. Moreover, rumors circulated in the media that "Rubezh" would have maneuvering BB as a standard vehicle, but it seems that this is not the case, at least not at the initial stage. It looks more like it has standard warheads for our new light ICBMs and SLBMs - that is, Yars and Bulava, which include up to 6 medium-power APs. Such a short missile test cycle may generally indicate that the design used a lot of what was worked out on previous missiles, that is, stages, combat equipment, and so on. There are probably two steps.
And now, after a successful test launch, although more launches were expected in 2016-2017. - there was not a single one yet. As we can see, the matter stalled even before the new GPV, although there was information about preparations for the deployment of "Rubezh" in two missile divisions in the west and east of the Russian Federation.
What's the matter? Here you should pay attention to the range shown by this small-sized and light (about less than 40t) rocket. The longest range was shown in the second launch and it is slightly more than 6000 km. And the rest of the launches - at a range of about 2000-2500 km. "Short" launches are generally a serious test for a rocket, no matter how difficult it is to launch at maximum distance. The absence of a launch to check this very maximum range, as usual "to the remote waters of the Pacific Ocean," coupled with very "short" launches, convinced the Americans that the "Rubezh" was not an ICBM, but an MRBM. And since then, he has regularly appeared in American accusations against the Russian Federation for violating the INF Treaty.
The Americans accuse ours, as you know, that the Iskander-M OTRK includes the 9M728 ground-based missile launchers, and now the 9M729 missile launchers, one of which looks like a slightly shortened version of the 3M14 Caliber naval missile launcher (with ranges, as you know, about 2.5-3.5 thousand km in non-nuclear and nuclear versions), and the second - as its full copy. Of course, if you see an animal that looks like a cat, behaves like a cat and is the size of a cat, then you should assume that this is a cat. But the Americans are unable to prove the identity of these missiles - there is little external similarity, and officially, on land, these missiles were not launched on the "forbidden" ranges of more than 500 km under the INF Treaty. That is, not caught - not a thief. Likewise, the Americans accuse us with Rubezh. They say that this is your MRBM, but at 6000 km it flew with a reduced load in order to "fit" into the START-3 Treaty.
It would seem, live and rejoice - the Russians, in your opinion, the MRBM, which does not threaten the United States (and they do not care about Europe), are taken into account as an ICBM, depriving themselves of part of their positions on carriers in the Treaty, which is not so critical for the Russian Federation, which has a large supply places by media - we have less of them than is limited by the Agreement. It is much worse that they, it turns out, and the charges will be forced to count in the Treaty, in fact, non-strategic. But they, however, itch, the desire to hurt Russia and accuse her is stronger than logic.
The Russian Federation officially denies all accusations, putting forward reciprocal ones to the United States. In the creation of target missiles with characteristics similar to the IRBM, and in the creation of opportunities for the deployment of the Tomahok ballistic missile systems in Europe as part of the deployment of SM-3 Block 1B anti-missile missiles in vertical launch modules Mk-41 with 8 cells (taken from the US Navy, where these installations are also used for placing the "Tomahawks"). But even if Tomahawks are really put there, there will be very few of them, for our air defense such a number does not mean anything. In addition, nuclear "Tomahokes" have long been converted into conventional ones, and the charges for them have long been disposed of, and there is nowhere to take new ones. The Russian Federation also accuses the United States of creating long-range strike UAVs, which is assessed from the point of view of the INF Treaty as a violation (although there were no such devices at the time of its signing), although not a single drone carries any nuclear charges.
The parties accuse each other, but no one wants to be the first to withdraw from the Treaty. The Americans, on the contrary, recently announced that they want to "return nuclear-equipped nuclear missile systems to the ships of the Kyrgyz Republic" and "put on the Trident-2 SLBM" BB of especially low power ", and this, they say, will force the Russian Federation" to return to the INF Treaty. " Logicians in such a statement are like a chicken, and assessments of reality and their capabilities are like a chicken crossing the road. The United States now has no sea-based nuclear missile systems (SLCMs), and even if the nuclear Tomahawk is recreated or when a new SLCM is created under the NGLAW program, this will not help, there are simply no nuclear charges for them in the arsenal and there is nowhere to take. At the beginning of last September, there were 3822 warheads left (now there are fewer, the process of "strengthening America's nuclear power" cannot be stopped by a cheerful tweet from Uncle Donald), of which less than 2000 W76-1 and several more than 300 W88 on the Trident-2 SLBM, a little less 500 W87 on the Minuteman-3 ICBM, less than 600 W80-1 on the AGM-86B airborne KR, the rest is the remnants of the unfinished B-83 bombs and about half a thousand B-61 bombs, which are planned to be converted into 350-600 B-61- 12. The Americans will be able to produce new charges for a very long time, only in the 2030s. Well, it's not very clear, even if these statements were not pure bluff, then how would these measures "force" us to correct the "violations", are they real or not?
Russia is also in no hurry to get out of the Treaty - we are still satisfied with being there, but we also don’t give a damn about the accusations, and we clearly do not intend to saw the winged Iskanders, because there is no evidence. Therefore, probably, "Rubezh" and slowed down so as not to give another reason for accusations. Although the "Rubezh" formally has nothing to show either - according to the range shown, it fits into the ICBM, and it cannot be ruled out that it can fly even further with an even lower payload.
And it's not a fact that this rocket was created as a potential MRBM, rather, everything is somewhat more cunning here. It can also be an ICBM, especially when equipped with aeroballistic hypersonic combat equipment - say, a missile in ballistics works out at 6+ thousand km, and then a hypersonic gliding and maneuvering apparatus slides towards the target in the upper layers of the atmosphere, a smaller version of the Avangard, say, thousands more three kilometers - here's the intercontinental range. And the "Rubezh" would have solved the continental nuclear missions for "long medium" range, which are not very convenient to carry out with conventional ICBMs.
But after all, AGBO for the "Rubezh", if it was in development, was hardly tested - if so, then why deploy the complex as an ICBM, since it is not yet quite such? To annoy Americans? Wouldn't it be better to wait? Let the "Rubezh", which, if desired, can be launched into a series very quickly and deployed in small quantities, will remain in reserve for now. For example, until Trump writes several more tweets from the flop and withdraws from the INF Treaty himself, telling how this will increase nuclear missile power and what smart missiles he has. By that time, perhaps, the chassis from the MZKT will be replaced by a chassis created according to the Platform-O design and development project from KamAZ - it is more promising, and from the point of view of maneuverability with all steerable wheels will give a lot of points ahead of the Minsk chassis, and the cab for everyone. " The platforms are "armored, which is also a plus."
Although, judging by the development of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States, which are sliding down almost as fast as the American nuclear arsenal, even faster, many treaties between the two superpowers may cease to exist soon enough. Or maybe the mind, nevertheless, will be enough not to take such rash steps with agreements on strategic stability. Although, as the practice of previous American steps shows, both with the ABM Treaty and with the "hypersonic call" in the form of a "rapid global strike" - the Americans did worse only for themselves, and Russia got an advantage. So it will be with the INF. Yes, and other rash steps would be better for the Americans not to take.
We are talking, of course, about the military confrontation in Syria - Stormy Daniels, of course, is a prominent lady and has outstanding dignity, but not the beautiful Elena, and Trump is never a young Paris, not just wars, but even armed incidents because of her between superpowers to arrange.
