In historical and mainly near-historical publications and discussions of recent times, the opinion is quite widespread that the USSR was an ally of Germany since August 23, 1939, which manifested itself primarily in the joint seizure of Poland with Germany. The following text is intended to demonstrate to the readers that a review of the details of the Polish campaign does not provide a basis for such conclusions.
First of all, it should be noted that, contrary to the common misconception, the USSR did not bind itself with any official obligations to enter the war with Poland. Of course, nothing of the kind was spelled out either in the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR, and even more so in the treaty itself. Nevertheless, already on September 3, 1939, Ribbentrop sent the German Ambassador to the USSR F. W. for its part, it occupied this territory”, adding that it“would be in Soviet interests as well”[1]. Similar veiled requests from Germany for the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland took place later [2]. Molotov replied to Schulenburg on September 5 that “at the right time” the USSR “will absolutely need to start concrete actions” [3], but the Soviet Union was in no hurry to go over to actions. There were two reasons for this. The first on September 7 was beautifully formulated by Stalin: “The war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (rich and poor in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.). For the redivision of the world, for domination over the world! We are not averse to them having a good fight and weakening each other”[4]. Germany later adhered to approximately the same line of behavior during the "Winter War". Moreover, the Reich at that time, to the best of its ability, trying not to anger the USSR, supported Finland. So, at the very beginning of the war, Berlin sent the Finns a batch of 20 anti-aircraft guns [5]. At the same time, Germany allowed the delivery of 50 Fiat G. 50 fighters from Italy to Finland in transit through its territory [6]. However, after the USSR, which became aware of these deliveries, declared an official protest to the Reich on December 9, Germany was forced to stop transit through its territory [7], so only two cars managed to get to Finland in this way. And yet, even after that, the Germans found a rather original way of providing assistance to Finland: at the end of 1939, Goering's negotiations with Swedish representatives led to the fact that Germany began to sell its weapons to Sweden, and Sweden was obliged to sell the same amount of weapons from its stocks to Finland. [eight].
The second reason why the USSR preferred not to speed up the outbreak of hostilities against Poland was conveyed to the German leadership when, during a conversation with Schulenburg on September 9, Molotov “announced that the Soviet government intended to take advantage of the further advance of German troops and declare that Poland was falling apart and that as a result of this, the Soviet Union must come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians who are "threatened" by Germany. This pretext will make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible in the eyes of the masses and give the Soviet Union the opportunity not to look like an aggressor”[9]. By the way, the further fate of this Soviet pretext for an attack on Poland illustrates well how ready the USSR was to make concessions to Germany.
On September 15, Ribbentrop sent a telegram to Schulenburg, in which he spoke about the Soviet Union's intention to present its invasion of Poland as an act of protecting kindred peoples from the German threat: “Indicating a motive of this kind of action is impossible. It is in direct opposition to the real German ambitions, which are limited exclusively to the well-known zones of German influence. He also contradicts the agreements reached in Moscow, and, finally, contrary to the desire expressed by both sides to have friendly relations, he will present both states to the whole world as enemies”[10]. However, when Schulenburg conveyed this statement of his boss to Molotov, he replied that although the pretext planned by the Soviet leadership contained "a note that hurt the feelings of the Germans," the USSR saw no other reason for bringing troops into Poland [11].
Thus, we see that the USSR, based on the above considerations, did not intend to invade Poland until the moment when it exhausted its possibilities to resist Germany. During another conversation with Schulenburg on September 14, Molotov said that for the USSR "it would be extremely important not to start acting before the fall of the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw" [12]. And it is quite likely that in the event of effective defensive actions of the Polish army against Germany, and even more so in the case of real, and not formal entry into the war of England and France, the Soviet Union would have abandoned the idea of annexing Western Ukraine and Belarus altogether. However, the allies de facto did not provide Poland with any assistance at all, and alone it was not able to provide any tangible resistance to the Wehrmacht.
By the time the Soviet troops entered Poland, both the military and the civilian Polish authorities had lost any threads of governing the country, and the army was scattered groups of troops of varying degrees of combat capability that had no connection either with the command or with each other. By September 17, the Germans entered the line Osovets - Bialystok - Belsk - Kamenets-Litovsk - Brest-Litovsk - Wlodawa - Lublin - Vladimir-Volynsky - Zamosc - Lvov - Sambor, thereby occupying about half of Poland's territory, having occupied Krakow, Lodz, Gdansk, Lublin, Brest, Katowice, Torun. Warsaw has been under siege since September 14. On September 1, President I. Moscitsky left the city, and on September 5 - the government [13]. On September 9-11, the Polish leadership negotiated with France on granting asylum, on September 16 - with Romania on transit, and finally, on September 17, left the country [14]. However, the decision to evacuate, apparently, was made even earlier, since on September 8, the US Ambassador to Poland, accompanying the Polish government, sent a message to the State Department, which, in particular, said that “the Polish government is leaving Poland … and through Romania … goes to France”[15]. Commander-in-Chief E. Rydz-Smigly held out in Warsaw the longest, but he also left the city on the night of September 7, moving to Brest. However, Rydz-Smigly did not stay long there either: on September 10, the headquarters was moved to Vladimir-Volynsky, on the 13th - to Mlynov, and on the 15th - to Kolomyia near the Romanian border [16]. Of course, the commander-in-chief could not normally lead the troops under such conditions, and this only exacerbated the chaos that arose as a result of the rapid advance of the Germans and confusion at the front. This was superimposed on the emerging communication problems. So, the headquarters in Brest had a connection with only one of the Polish armies - "Lublin" [17]. Describing the situation at the headquarters at that moment, the deputy chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Yaklich, reported to the chief of staff Stakhevych: “We have been constantly searching for troops and expelling officers to restore communications all day … There is a big booth with the internal organization in the Brest fortress, which I myself must liquidate. Constant air raids. In Brest there was an escape in all directions”[18]. However, not only the leadership left the country: on September 16, the evacuation of Polish aviation to the Romanian airfields began [19]. The most efficient ships of the Polish fleet: the destroyers Blyskawica, Grom and Burza were redeployed to British ports as early as August 30, 1939. Initially, it was assumed that they would act as raiders along German communications, disrupting commercial shipping in Germany [20], however, the Polish ships did not achieve any success in this matter, and their absence in the ports of Poland negatively affected the combat capability of the Polish fleet. On the other hand, it was the British base that saved these destroyers from the fate of the rest of the Polish fleet and allowed them to continue fighting the Germans as part of the KVMS after the defeat of Poland. During his only major counteroffensive on the river. Bzure, which began on September 9, Polish troops in the armies "Poznan" and "Help" by September 12 had lost the initiative, and on September 14 were surrounded by German troops [21]. And although individual units of the encircled armies continued to resist until September 21, they could no longer influence the outcome of the war. In the face of Poland's apparent inability to defend its western borders, on September 10, the General Staff issued a directive, according to which the main task of the army was to "pull all troops in the direction of Eastern Poland and ensure a connection with Romania" [22]. It is characteristic that this directive became the last combined arms order of the commander-in-chief, however, not all units received it due to the same communication problems. After the issuance of this order, Rydz-Smigly himself, as mentioned above, left Brest and moved just in the direction indicated in the directive - closer to Romania.
Thus, due to the effective actions of the Germans, the disorganization of the army and the inability of the leadership to organize the defense of the state, by September 17, the defeat of Poland was completely inevitable.
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Photo No. 2
It is significant that even the English and French general staffs, in a report prepared on September 22, noted that the USSR began an invasion of Poland only when its final defeat became obvious [23].
The reader may wonder: did the Soviet leadership have the opportunity to wait for the complete collapse of Poland? The fall of Warsaw, the final defeat of even the remnants of the army, and possibly the complete occupation of the entire Polish territory by the Wehrmacht with the subsequent return of Western Ukraine and Belarus to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Soviet-German agreements? Unfortunately, the USSR did not have such an opportunity. If Germany really occupied the eastern regions of Poland, the likelihood that she would return them to the Soviet Union was extremely small. Until mid-September 1939, the Reich leadership discussed the possibility of creating puppet governments in the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus [24]. In the diary of the chief of staff of the OKH F. Halder in the entry of September 12, there is the following passage: “The commander-in-chief arrived from a meeting with the Fuhrer. Perhaps the Russians will not interfere in anything. The Fuhrer wants to create the state of Ukraine”[25]. It was precisely with the prospect of the emergence of new territorial entities in eastern Poland that Germany tried to intimidate the leadership of the USSR in order to speed up the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. So, on September 15, Ribbentrop asked Schulenburg to “immediately convey to Herr Molotov” that “if the Russian intervention is not launched, the question will inevitably arise as to whether a political vacuum would be created in the region east of the German zone of influence. Since we, for our part, do not intend to take any political or administrative actions in these areas that stand apart from the necessary military operations, without such intervention from the Soviet Union [in Eastern Poland] conditions may arise for the formation of new states "[26].
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Although, as can be seen from this instruction, Germany, of course, denied its participation in the possible creation of "independent" states in Eastern Poland, presumably, the Soviet leadership did not harbor illusions on this score. However, even despite the timely intervention of the USSR in the German-Polish war, certain problems due to the fact that the German troops managed to occupy part of Western Ukraine by September 17, nevertheless arose: on September 18, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the OKW Operations Directorate V. duties of the USSR military attaché in Germany to Belyakov on a map on which Lviv was located west of the demarcation line between the USSR and Germany, that is, it was part of the future territory of the Reich, which was a violation of the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact regarding the division of spheres of influence in Poland. After making claims from the USSR, the Germans declared that all Soviet-German agreements remained in force, and the German military attaché Kestring, trying to explain such a drawing of the border, referred to the fact that it was a personal initiative of Warlimont [27], but it seems unlikely that the latter drew maps on the basis of some of his own considerations, contrary to the instructions of the leadership of the Reich. It is significant that the need for a Soviet invasion of Poland was also recognized in the West. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, declared in a radio speech on October 1 that “Russia is pursuing a cold policy of self-interest. We would prefer the Russian armies to stand in their current positions as friends and allies of Poland, rather than as invaders. But to protect Russia from the Nazi threat, it was clearly necessary that the Russian armies were on this line. In any case, this line exists and, therefore, the Eastern Front was created, which Nazi Germany would not dare to attack”[28]. The position of the allies on the issue of the entry of the Red Army into Poland is generally interesting. After the USSR on September 17 declared its neutrality towards France and England [29], these countries also decided not to aggravate relations with Moscow. On September 18, at a meeting of the British government, it was decided not to even protest against the actions of the Soviet Union, since England undertook obligations to defend Poland only from Germany [30]. On September 23, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. P. Beria informed the People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov that “the resident of the NKVD of the USSR in London reported that on September 20 of this year. d. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England sent a telegram to all the British embassies and press attaché, in which it indicates that England not only does not intend to declare war on the Soviet Union now, but must remain in the best possible terms”[31]. And on October 17, the British announced that London wants to see an ethnographic Poland of modest size and there can be no question of returning Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to it [32]. Thus, the allies, in fact, legitimized the actions of the Soviet Union on the territory of Poland. And although the motive for such flexibility of England and France was primarily their unwillingness to provoke a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, the very fact that the Allies chose this line of behavior suggests that they understood how tense relations between the Soviet Union remained. and the Reich, and that the August agreements are just a tactical maneuver. In addition to political obeisances, Britain also tried to establish trade relations with the USSR: on October 11, at the Soviet-British negotiations, it was decided to resume supplies of Soviet timber to Britain, which were suspended due to the fact that after the start of the war, England began to detain Soviet ships with cargo for Germany. In turn, the British pledged to end this practice [33].
Summing up the interim results, we can note that at the beginning of September the Soviet Union not only was not eager to help Germany in any way in the fight against the Polish Army, but also deliberately delayed the start of the "liberation campaign" until the moment when complete defeat Poland became quite obviousand further delay with the introduction of Soviet troops could have ended with the fact that Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in one form or another would fall under the influence of Germany.
And now let's move on to actually examining the details of the interaction between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. So, on September 17, Soviet troops with the forces of the Ukrainian (under the command of the commander of the 1st rank S. K. Timoshenko) and the Belorussian (under the command of the commander of the 2nd rank M. P. Kovalev) fronts invaded the eastern regions of Poland. By the way, it is interesting that, although the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was only a pretext for the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland, the population of these territories was really mostly treated by Soviet troops as liberators. In the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front to the front troops on the goals of the Red Army's entry into the territory of Western Belarus on September 16, it was emphasized that “our revolutionary duty and obligation to provide urgent assistance and support to our brothers Belarusians and Ukrainians in order to save them from the threat of ruin and beating from outside enemies … We go not as conquerors, but as liberators of our brothers Belarusians, Ukrainians and working people of Poland”[34]. Directive Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov BOVO Military Council of September 14 instructed "to avoid bombing open cities and towns not occupied by large enemy forces", and also not to allow "any requisitions and unauthorized procurement of food and fodder in occupied areas" [35]. In the directive of the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar of the 1st rank L. Z. Mehlis, it was recalled “of the strictest responsibility for looting under the laws of wartime. Commissars, political instructors and commanders, in whose units at least one shameful fact will be admitted, will be severely punished, up to giving the court a Military Tribunal”[36]. The fact that this order was not an empty threat is perfectly evidenced by the fact that during the war and after its end, the Military Tribunal passed several dozen war crimes convictions, which, unfortunately, did take place during the Polish campaign. [37]. Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army V. Stakhevich noted: “Soviet soldiers do not shoot at ours, they demonstrate their location in every possible way” [38]. It was partly due to this attitude of the Red Army that the Polish troops very often did not resist it, surrendering. It was with this result that most of the clashes between units of the Red Army and the Polish Army ended. An excellent illustration of this fact is the ratio of the soldiers and officers of the Polish troops who died in battles with the Red Army and were taken prisoner: if the former number only 3,500 people, then the latter - 452,500 [39]. The Polish population was also quite loyal to the Red Army: “As the documents of, for example, the 87th Infantry Division testify,“in all the settlements where units of our division passed, the working population greeted them with great joy, as genuine liberators from the oppression of the Polish nobles. and capitalists as deliverers from poverty and hunger. " We see the same in the materials of the 45th Rifle Division: “The population is happy everywhere and meets the Red Army as a liberator. Sidorenko, a peasant from the village of Ostrozhets, said: “Soviet power would sooner be established, otherwise the Polish gentlemen sat on our necks for 20 years, sucking the last blood out of us, and now the time has finally come when the Red Army liberated us. Thank you comrade. Stalin for the liberation of Polish landowners and capitalists from bondage”[40]. Moreover, the dislike of the Belarusian and Ukrainian population for the "Polish landowners and capitalists" was expressed not only in a benevolent attitude towards the Soviet troops, but also in open anti-Polish uprisings in September 1939 [41]. On September 21, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, 1st Rank Army Commander G. I. Kulik reported to Stalin: “In connection with the great national oppression of the Ukrainians by the Poles, the latter's patience is overflowing and, in some cases, there is a fight between the Ukrainians and the Poles, up to the threat of slaughtering the Poles. An urgent appeal of the government to the population is necessary, as this can turn into a large political factor”[42]. And Mekhlis, in his report on September 20, pointed out such an interesting fact: “Polish officers … are afraid of the Ukrainian peasants and population like fire, who became more active with the arrival of the Red Army and dealt with Polish officers. It got to the point that in Burshtyn Polish officers, sent by the corps to school and guarded by a minor guard, asked to increase the number of soldiers guarding them as prisoners in order to avoid a possible reprisal of the population”[43]. Thus, the RKKA performed in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, in a sense, and peacekeeping functions. However, even after the annexation of these regions to the USSR, their Belarusian and Ukrainian populations did not change their attitude towards the Poles, although this began to manifest itself in a slightly different form. So, for example, during the eviction from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus of the siege and forest guards in February 1940, the local population of these regions accepted this decision of the Soviet government with great enthusiasm. Beria's special message to Stalin on this matter says that “the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR reacts positively to the eviction of the siege and forest guards. In a number of cases, local residents assisted operational groups of the NKVD in the detention of escaped siege groups”[44]. About the same, but in a little more detail, is also said in the report of the Drohobych regional troika of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR about the same events: “The eviction of the besiegers and forest guard workers by the bulk of the peasants of the region. it was approved with pleasure and supported in every possible way, which is most eloquently evidenced by the fact that a large number of rural assets (3285 people) participated in the operation”[45]. Thus, at least by part of the population, the rejection of Western Ukraine and Belarus from Poland was really perceived as liberation. But let us return to the consideration of the peculiarities of Soviet-German interaction, which began with the fact that at 2 am on September 17, Stalin summoned Schulenburg, announced the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland and asked “that German planes, starting from today, not fly east of the line Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk - Lemberg [Lvov]. Soviet planes will start bombarding the area east of Lemberg today”[46]. The request of the German military attache, Lieutenant-General Kestring, to postpone the hostilities of the Soviet aviation, so that the German command could take measures to prevent eventual incidents related to the bombing of the areas occupied by the Wehrmacht, remained unsatisfied. As a result, some German units were hit by Soviet aviation [47]. And in the future, the most striking episodes of Soviet-German relations were not joint actions to destroy the remnants of the Polish troops, as the Allies should have, but similar excesses that led to casualties on both sides. The most notable such incident was the clash between Soviet and German troops in Lvov. On the night of September 19, a combined detachment of the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade approached the city. The reconnaissance battalion of the 24th brigade was brought into the city. However, at 8.30 am, units of the 2nd German Mountain Rifle Division stormed the city, while the Soviet battalion was also attacked, despite the fact that initially it did not show any aggression. The brigade commander even sent an armored vehicle with a piece of undershirt on a stick towards the Germans, but the Germans did not stop firing. Then the tanks and armored vehicles of the brigade returned fire. As a result of the ensuing battle, Soviet troops lost 2 armored vehicles and 1 tank, 3 people killed and 4 wounded. The losses of the Germans amounted to 3 anti-tank guns, 3 people killed and 9 wounded. Soon the shooting was stopped and a representative of the German division was sent to the Soviet troops. As a result of negotiations, the incident was resolved [48]. However, despite the relatively peaceful resolution of this conflict, the question arose of what to do with Lviv. On the morning of September 20, the German leadership, through Kestring, sent to Moscow a proposal to take the city by joint efforts, and then transfer it to the USSR, but, having received a refusal, it was forced to give an order to withdraw its troops. The German command perceived this decision as "a day of humiliation for the German political leadership" [49]. In order to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents on September 21, at the negotiations between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov with Kestring and representatives of the German command, Colonel G. Aschenbrenner and Lieutenant Colonel G. Krebs, a protocol was drawn up regulating the advance of Soviet troops to the demarcation line and the withdrawal of Wehrmacht units from the Soviet territory they occupied.
Ҥ 1. Units of the Red Army remain on the line reached by 20 o'clock on September 20, 1939, and continue their movement westward again at dawn on September 23, 1939.
§ 2. Units of the German army, starting from September 22, are withdrawn in such a way that, making every day a transition of about 20 kilometers, they complete their withdrawal to the western bank of the river. The Vistula near Warsaw by the evening of October 3 and at Demblin by the evening of October 2; to the western bank of the river. Pissa by the evening of September 27, p. Narew, near Ostrolenok, by the evening of September 29, and at Pultusk by the evening of October 1; to the western bank of the river. San, near Przemysl, by the evening of September 26 and on the western bank of the river. San, near Sanhok and further south, by the evening of 28 September.
§ 3. The movement of the troops of both armies must be organized in such a way that there is a distance between the forward units of the columns of the Red Army and the tail of the columns of the German army, on average up to 25 kilometers.
Both sides organize their movement in such a way that units of the Red Army go to the eastern bank of the river by the evening of September 28. Pissa; by the evening of September 30 to the eastern bank of the river. Narew at Ostrolenok and by the evening of October 2 at Pultusk; to the eastern bank of the river. Vistula near Warsaw by the evening of October 4 and at Demblin by the evening of October 3; to the eastern bank of the river. Sun near Przemysl by the evening of September 27 and on the eastern bank of the river. Sun at Sanhok and further south by the evening of September 29.
§ 4. All questions that may arise during the transfer by the German army and the reception by the Red Army of regions, points, cities, etc., are resolved by representatives of both sides on the spot, for which special delegates are assigned by the command on each main highway of movement of both armies.
In order to avoid possible provocations, sabotage from Polish bands, etc., the German command takes the necessary measures in the cities and places that are transferred to the units of the Red Army, to their safety, and special attention is paid to the fact that cities, towns and important military defensive and economic structures (bridges, airfields, barracks, warehouses, railway junctions, stations, telegraph, telephone, power stations, rolling stock, etc.), both in them and on the way to them, would be protected from damage and destruction before transferring them to representatives of the Red Army.
§ 5. When German representatives appeal to the Red Army Command for assistance in the destruction of Polish units or bands standing in the way of the movement of small units of German troops, the Red Army Command (column leaders), if necessary, allocate the necessary forces to ensure the destruction obstacles lying in the path of movement.
§ 6. When moving to the west of the German troops, the aviation of the German army can fly only up to the line of the rearguards of the columns of the German troops and at an altitude not higher than 500 meters, the aviation of the Red Army, when moving to the west of the columns of the Red Army, can only fly up to the line of the vanguards of the columns of the Red Army and on height not higher than 500 meters. After both armies occupied the main demarcation line along pp. Pissa, Narew, Vistula, r. From the mouth to the source of the San, the aviation of both armies does not fly over the above line”[50].
As we can see, all measures were taken to ensure that the Red Army and the Wehrmacht did not come into contact with each other in the course of operations in Poland - what kind of cooperation is that? However, it is for cooperation that they sometimes try to pass off the 4th and 5th clauses of this protocol, although, in general, there is nothing special about them. The German side only undertakes to return to the USSR intact and safe those objects that already belong to it, since they are located on the territory that departs according to a secret additional protocol to the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet obligation to provide assistance to small German units in the event that their advance is hindered by the remnants of the Polish troops, there is not at all the desire of the USSR to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, but just the unwillingness to have any contacts with it. The Soviet leadership was so eager to drive the German troops out of their territory as quickly as possible that they were even ready to escort them to the demarcation line.
However, even this protocol, which seemingly minimized the possibility of clashes between Soviet and German units, could not prevent further conflicts between them. On September 23, near Vidoml, the mounted patrol of the 8th SD reconnaissance battalion was fired upon by machine-gun fire from 6 German tanks, as a result of which 2 people were killed and 2 were wounded. With return fire, Soviet troops knocked out one tank, the crew of which was killed [51]. On September 29, in the Vokhyn area, 3 German armored vehicles opened fire on the sapper battalion of the 143rd Rifle Division [52]. On September 30, 42 km east of Lublin, the 1st battalion of the 146th infantry battalion of the 179th ran of the 44th rifle division was fired on from a German aircraft. Eight people were injured [53].
On October 1, regular negotiations took place between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, on the one hand, and Kestring, Aschenbrennr and Krebs, on the other, on the withdrawal of German and Soviet troops to the final border, which was determined by the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border signed on September 28. With regard to measures to prevent clashes between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, the new decision of the contracting parties as a whole repeated the protocol of September 21, however, in order to avoid incidents like what happened on September 30, the following paragraph appeared in the protocol: the rearguards of the columns of the Red Army units and at an altitude of no higher than 500 meters, the aircraft of the German army when moving to the east of the columns of the German army can fly only up to the line of the vanguards of the columns of the German army and at an altitude not higher than 500 meters”[54]. So, as we can see, the numerous agreements and consultations that really took place in Soviet-German relations, starting from September 17, were not at all aimed at coordinating joint actions of Soviet and German troops to combat the remnants of Polish formations, as the allies should do., but only to settle various conflicts that arose as a result of the clash of parts of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, and to prevent new conflicts. It seems quite obvious that in order to prevent the escalation of minor clashes to the size of a real conflict, any states had to act in this way. And the measures taken by the Soviet Union and Germany do not speak at all about the allied nature of their interaction. Quite the opposite, the very fact that these measures had to be taken, and the form in which they were done, perfectly demonstrate to us that the main goal of the parties was, first of all, to delimit the zones of operations of their armies, to prevent any contacts between them. The author managed to find only two examples that can really be described as cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany. First, on September 1, Assistant to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Pavlov conveyed to Molotov the request of G. Hilger that the radio station in Minsk, in its free time from broadcasting, should transmit a continuous line with interspersed call signs for urgent aeronautical experiments: "Richard Wilhelm 1. Oh", and besides, during the broadcast of its program, the word "Minsk" as often as possible. From the resolution of VM Molotov on the document, it follows that consent was given to transfer only the word "Minsk" [55]. Thus, the Luftwaffe could use the Minsk station as a radio beacon. However, this decision of the Soviet leadership is quite amenable to explanation. After all, any mistake by German pilots operating near Soviet territory could lead to all sorts of undesirable consequences: from collisions with Soviet fighters to bombing Soviet territory. Therefore, the consent of the Soviet leadership to provide the Germans with an extra reference point is again caused by the desire to prevent possible incidents. The second case is the mutual obligation of Germany and the USSR not to allow "on their territories any Polish agitation that affects the territory of another country" [56]. However, it is quite obvious that it is rather problematic to draw far-reaching conclusions about the Soviet-German "brotherhood in arms" on the basis of these two facts alone. Especially in the context of considering other episodes of Soviet-German relations, which cannot be called "fraternal" in any way.
So, summing up, we can draw the following conclusions. During the German-Polish war, the Soviet Union did not intend to provide any assistance to Germany. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland pursued exclusively Soviet interests and was not caused by the desire to help Germany in any way with the defeat of the Polish army, whose combat capability by that time was already irresistibly striving for zero, namely, the unwillingness to transfer the entire territory of Poland to Germany … During the "liberation campaign", the Soviet and German troops did not carry out any joint operations and did not practice any other forms of cooperation, and local conflicts took place between individual units of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. All Soviet-German cooperation, in fact, was aimed precisely at resolving such conflicts and as painlessly as possible creating a previously non-existent Soviet-German border. Thus, the allegations that during the Polish campaign the USSR was an ally of Germany are nothing more than insinuations that have little to do with the realities of Soviet-German relations of that period.
In the context of the discussion of Soviet-German cooperation, another episode is of interest, which, oddly enough, for many publicists serves as the main argument in proving that parts of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1939 entered Poland as allies. We are talking, of course, about the "joint Soviet-German parade" that took place in Brest on September 22. Alas, more often than not, mentions of this parade are not accompanied by any details, as if we are talking about a fact that is completely obvious and known to every reader. However, the publicists can be understood: after all, if you start to understand the details of the Brest parade, then the idyllic picture of the Soviet-German brotherhood in arms is somewhat spoiled and everything that happened in Brest does not look as straightforward as many would like. But first things first…
On September 14, units of the German 19th Motorized Corps under the command of General of Tank Forces G. Guderian occupied Brest. The garrison of the city, led by General K. Plisovsky, took refuge in the fortress, but on September 17, it was taken. And on September 22, the 29th tank brigade of the brigade commander S. M. Krivoshein approached the city. Since Brest was in the Soviet sphere of influence, after negotiations between the command of the 19th MK and the 29th Tank Brigade, the Germans began to withdraw their troops from the city. Thus, initially the parade was, in fact, a solemn procedure for the withdrawal of German units from Brest. It remains to answer two questions: was this action a parade and what role was assigned to the Soviet troops in it?
In the 1938 Infantry Regulations, rather stringent requirements are applied to the parade.
229. A parade commander is appointed to command the troops being taken out to the parade, who gives the necessary instructions to the troops in advance.
233. Each individual unit participating in the parade sends to the command of the parade commander linemen, under the command of the commander, at the rate of: from a company - 4 linemen, from a squadron, a battery - 2 linemen, from motorized units - each time by special instruction parade commander. On the bayonet of a linear rifle, indicating the flank of the unit, there should be a flag measuring 20 x 15 cm, the color of the buttonholes of a kind of troops.
234. The troops arrive at the place of the parade according to the order of the garrison and are formed in the places indicated by the line, after which the line will fall into place, left in the rear rank of the unit.
236. Troops are formed in the line of battalions; each battalion - in a line of companies; in battalions - statutory intervals and distances; an interval of 5 meters between battalions. The unit commander is on the right flank of his unit; in the back of his head - the chief of staff; next to and to the left of the commander is the military commissar of the unit; to the left of the military commissar is the orchestra, which is equal in its first rank to the second rank of the right-flank company. To the left of the orchestra, two steps away in one line, there are assistant # 1, the bannerman and assistant # 2, who are equal in the first rank of the right-flank company. The head battalion commander is two steps to the left of Assistant No. 2. The rest of the command staff are in their places.
239. The troops at the place of the parade, before the arrival of the host of the parade, greet:
a) military units - the commanders of their formations;
b) all the troops of the parade - the commander of the parade and the chief of the garrison.
For greeting the command is given: "Attention, alignment to the right (to the left, in the middle)"; orchestras don't play.
240. The host of the parade arrives at the right flank of the parade. When approaching the troops at 110-150 m, the parade commander gives the command: "Parade, at attention, alignment to the right (left, in the middle)." The command is repeated by all commanders, starting from the commanders of individual units and above. With this command:
a) the troops take a position "at attention" and turn their heads in the direction of alignment;
b) all command and control personnel, starting with platoon commanders and above, put their hand to the headdress;
c) the orchestras play "Counter March";
d) the commander of the parade comes up with a report to the host of the parade.
When the host of the parade is on horseback, the parade commander meets him on horseback, holding the saber “up high” and lowering it when reporting.
During the report of the parade commander, the orchestras stop playing. After the report, the parade commander hands the parade receiver a combat note on the composition of the troops withdrawn to the parade.
When the parade receiver starts moving, the orchestra of the head part starts playing "Counter March" and stops playing while the part is greeting and answering the greeting.
241. To the greeting of the host of the parade, the units answer: "Hello", and to the congratulations - "Hurray."
242. When the host of the parade proceeds to the lead unit of the next separate section, the orchestra stops playing and a new orchestra begins to play.
243. At the end of the detour to the host of the parade of troops, the parade commander gives the command: "Parade - VOLNO."
The entire command staff, starting with the platoon commander, goes out and stands in front of the middle of the front of their subunits: platoon commanders - at P / 2 m, company commanders - at 3 m, battalion commanders - at 6 m, unit commanders - at 12 m, formation commanders - at 18 meters. Military commissars stand next to and to the left of the commanders who have come forward.
245. For the passage of the troops in a solemn march, the parade commander gives commands: “Parade, at attention! To the solemn march, at so many linear distances, by port (battalion), alignment to the right, the first company (battalion) straight ahead, the rest to the right, on the shoulder-CHO, step - MARSH.
All the commanders of the individual units repeat the commands, with the exception of the first - "Parade, at attention."
246. On the command "To a solemn march" the commanders of units and formations with military commissars move over and stand in front of the middle of the front of the head battalion; behind them, 2 m away, the chiefs of staff stand, and behind the chiefs of staff, 2 m away, bannermen with assistants; the linemen run out of order and occupy the places indicated by them in advance to mark the line of movement of the troops with a solemn march; orchestras of all separate units fail their units and stand against the host of the parade, no closer than 8 m from the left flank of the troops marching solemnly."
Of course, none of this was observed in Brest. At least there is no evidence of this. But there is evidence to the contrary. In his memoirs, Krivoshein writes that Guderian agreed to the following procedure for the withdrawal of troops: “At 16 o'clock, units of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop in the streets where German regiments are passing by and saluting the passing units with their banners. The orchestras perform military marches”[57]. Thus, based on the words of Krivoshein, no parade in the canonical sense of the word in Brest was even close. But let's not be formalists. Suppose that any joint event in which two commanders receive a parade of troops from both armies passing by can be considered a joint parade. However, even with such a free interpretation of the term "parade" with the identification of the event in Brest as a parade, problems arise. From the above quote by Krivoshein, it follows that there was no joint passage of troops along the same street. The brigade commander clearly states that the parts should not overlap. Guderian's memoirs also mention the events in Brest: “Our stay in Brest ended with a farewell parade and a ceremony with the exchange of flags in the presence of the brigade commander Krivoshein” [58]. As we can see, the general also did not say a word about the participation in the parade of Soviet troops. Moreover, it does not even follow from this phrase that Krivoshein took part in the parade in any way. Rather, he was next to Guderian as an observer, which is quite consistent with the purpose of the brigade commander's presence during all this event - to control the withdrawal of German troops. Indeed, it is completely incomprehensible, on the basis of which Krivoshein is so persistently trying to enroll in the host of the parade. No ceremonial accompanying this post was observed, and the very fact of the brigade commander's presence during the passage of German troops does not mean anything. In the end, at the parades in honor of Victory Day, there are also a lot of foreign delegations, but to call them the host of the parade, oddly enough, does not occur to anyone. But back to the Soviet units. The historian OV Vishlev, referring to the German edition of the Great German Campaign against Poland in 1939, again claims that there was no joint parade. First, German troops left the city, then Soviet troops entered [59]. Thus, we do not have a single written source that would tell us about the joint passage of Soviet and German troops through the streets of Brest.
Now let's turn to documentary sources. Of all the photographs taken on September 22 in Brest [60] that the author was able to find, only four depict Soviet troops stationed on the roadways of Brest streets. Let's take a closer look at them. Photographs 1 and 2 show a column of Soviet tanks. However, these photographs were clearly taken before the parade: in the place where the tribune will later stand (under the flagpole), it is not; columns of German troops are standing, and how energetically the soldiers of the Wehrmacht turn their heads around, clearly indicates that they are not even ready for a solemn march. The very fact of the presence of some Soviet units in the city is completely understandable: Krivoshein, of course, arrived at Guderian not in splendid isolation, but accompanied, probably, by the headquarters and security, or, if you like, by an honorary escort. Apparently, we see the arrival of this escort in these photos. In photo # 3, we again see a Soviet tank column, but in a completely different place. It also has nothing to do with the parade: there are no German troops on the sidelines, but there are plenty of idle local residents. But with photo No. 4, everything is a little more complicated. On it we finally find at least some attribute of the parade - a German orchestra. Nevertheless, we again cannot conclude that it is the parade that is captured in the photograph: we cannot see the tribune, and the musicians, instead of providing musical accompaniment to the participants of the parade, are inactive. That is, with the same success, the photo could have been taken during the preparation for the parade, but before it began. Watching newsreels, which today thanks to the World Wide Web is available to anyone who wishes, will also not open anything new for us. Frames again with a Soviet tank column (the same) are available on two videos that the author managed to find. However, they also capture not a parade, but the passage of tanks through the streets of Brest, in which not a single German soldier or even more command is visible, but there are townspeople welcoming units of the Red Army. Thus, of the entire volume of film and photographic materials, only one photograph may have been taken during the participation of Soviet troops in the parade. Or, perhaps, at a completely different time, and the Soviet troops there have nothing to do with the parade - we have no reason to assert this. Simply put, the whole version of the "joint parade" is based on a single photograph, and even that one cannot be confidently attributed to the time of the parade. That is, the apologists of the theory of the Soviet-German "brotherhood in arms" have no clear evidence of the participation of Soviet troops in the "joint" parade. Their opponents also have no evidence to the contrary, but no one has yet canceled the ancient formula ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.
Summing up, we can say that the fact of holding a joint parade in Brest is unproven. And the most plausible, as it seems to us, picture of what happened in the city looks like this: first, Krivoshein arrives in Brest with a headquarters and a tank guard column, then the commanders settle all problems related to the withdrawal of German troops. After that, it is likely that Soviet troops enter the city, but they keep their distance from their German colleagues. Parts of the Wehrmacht solemnly walk past the rostrum with Guderian and Krivoshein. Then the general gives the brigade commander a flag and leaves after his corps. Then Soviet troops finally occupy the city. At least this version is consistent with all available sources. But the main mistake of historians, who are running around with the Brest parade as with a written sack, is not even that they are trying to pass off an event as an obvious fact, the reality of which raises very great doubts. Their main mistake is that even if this parade really took place, this fact in itself does not mean anything. After all, Russian and American armed forces nowadays also organize joint parades [61], but it never occurs to anyone to declare Russia and the United States as allies. The joint parade can only serve as an illustration of the thesis about the allied nature of relations between the USSR and Germany in September 1939, but not in any way as a proof of it. And this thesis is incorrect regardless of whether there was a parade or not.
1 Telegram from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Moscow, September 3, 1939 // Subject to Publication. USSR - Germany 1939-1941. Documents and materials. - M., 2004. S. 89.
2 Telegram from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 8, 1939 // Ibid. P. 94.
3 Telegram from the German Ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Ministry dated September 5, 1939 // Ibid. P. 90.
4 Diary of the Secretary General of the ECCI G. M. Dimitrov // Materials of the site https:// bdsa. ru.
5 Vihavainen T. Foreign aid to Finland // Winter War 1939–1940. Book one. Political history. - M., 1999. S. 193.
6 Zefirov MV Ases of the Second World War: Allies of the Luftwaffe: Estonia. Latvia. Finland. - M., 2003. S. 162.
7 Baryshnikov V. N. On the issue of German military-political aid to Finland at the beginning of the "Winter War" // Materials of the site https:// www. history. pu. ru.
8 Baryshnikov V. N. On the issue of German military - political assistance to Finland at the beginning of the "Winter War" // Materials of the site https:// www. history. pu. ru.
9 Telegram from the German Ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Ministry dated September 10, 1939 // Subject to Publication. USSR - Germany 1939-1941. Documents and materials. S. 95–96.
10 Telegram from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 15, 1939 // Ibid. P. 101.
11 Telegram from the German ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Ministry dated September 16, 1939 // Ibid. P. 103.
12 Telegram from the German Ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Ministry dated September 14, 1939 // Ibid. P. 98
13 Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. - M., 2001. S. 251.
14 Ibid.
15 Pribilov V. I. "Capture" or "reunification". Foreign historians about September 17, 1939 // Materials of the site https:// katynbooks. narod. ru.
16 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 251.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. P. 252.
19 Kotelnikov V. Aviation in the Soviet-Polish conflict // Materials of the site https:// www. airwiki. or.
20 Seberezhets S. German-Polish war of 1939 // Materials of the site http: / / wartime. narod. ru.
21 Meltyukhov M. I. Decree. op. P. 266.
22 Ibid. P. 261.
23 Pribyloe V. I. Decree. Op.
24 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 291.
25 Halder F. Occupation of Europe. War diary of the Chief of the General Staff. 1939-1941. - M., 2007. S. 55.
26 Telegram from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Moscow, September 15, 1939 // Subject to Publication. USSR - Germany 1939-1941. Documents and materials. S. 100-101.
27 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. S. 325–328.
28 Churchill W. World War II. Book. 1. - M., 1991. S. 204.
29 Note of the government of the USSR, presented in the morning of September 17, 1939 to the ambassadors and envoys of states that have diplomatic relations with the USSR // Subject to Publication. USSR - Germany 1939-1941. Documents and materials. P. 107.
30 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 354.
31 World Wars of the XX century. Book. 4. World War II. Documents and materials. - M., 2002. S. 152.
32 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 355.
33 Ibid. P. 356.
34 Order No. 005 of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front to the front troops on the goals of the Red Army entering the territory of Western Belarus on September 16 // Katyn. Prisoners of an undeclared war (materials from the site https:// katynbo oks.narod.ru).
35 Directive No. 16633 of the People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov to the Military Council of the Belarusian Special Military District on the start of an offensive against Poland // Ibid.
36 Svishchev V. N. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. T. 1. Preparation of Germany and the USSR for war. 2003. S. 194.
37 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. S. 372-380.
38 Pribyloe V. I. Decree. Op.
39 Meltyukhov MI Stalin's missed chance. Clash for Europe: 1939-1941 Documents, facts, judgments. - M., 2008. S. 96.
40 Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 363.
41 The struggle against the Polish occupation in Western Ukraine 1921-1939. // Materials of the site https:// www. hrono. ru; Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. S. 307.
42 Report of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commander 1st Rank G. I. Prisoners of an undeclared war.
43 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 367.
44 Special message from LP Beria to IV Stalin on the results of the operation to evict the sedge and forest guards from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus // Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKDTs-NKGBGUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's Archives. Documents of the highest bodies of party and state power. - M., 2006. S. 142.
45 Report of the Drohobych regional troika of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to the People's Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR I. A. 1928-1953. - M., 2005. S. 126.
46 Telegram from the German Ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Office dated September 17, 1939 // Subject to Publication. USSR - Germany 1939-1941. Documents and materials. P. 104.
47 Vishlev O. V. On the eve of June 22, 1941. - M., 2001. S. 107.
48 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. S. 320–321.
49 Halder F. Decree. Op. P. 58.
50 Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. S. 329–331.
51 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 337.
52 Ibid. P. 338.
53 Ibid. P. 340.
54 Ibid. P. 360.
55 Memorandum of the employee of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. N. Pavlov to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov // Year of the crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials (materials of the site https:// katynbooks.narod.ru).
56 Secret additional protocol to the German - Soviet treaty of friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany // Katyn. Prisoners of an undeclared war.
57 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. P. 336.
58 Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - M., 2004. S. 113.
59 Vishlev O. V. Decree. Op. P. 109.
60 For a selection of photos and videos about the events in Brest, see https:// gezesh. livejournal. com / 25630. html.
61 On May 9, 2006, the crew of the USS John McCain destroyer participated in the Victory Parade in Vladivostok along with Russian sailors.
