Secrets of the V-2 rocket. The "miracle weapon" of Nazi Germany

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Secrets of the V-2 rocket. The "miracle weapon" of Nazi Germany
Secrets of the V-2 rocket. The "miracle weapon" of Nazi Germany

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Work on the creation of ballistic and cruise missiles began in imperial Germany at the end of the First World War. Then the engineer G. Obert created a project of a large rocket on liquid fuel, equipped with a warhead. The estimated range of its flight was several hundred kilometers. Aviation officer R. Nebel worked on the creation of aircraft missiles designed to destroy ground targets. In the 1920s, Obert, Nebel, brothers Walter and Riedel conducted the first experiments with rocket engines and developed ballistic missile projects. "One day," Nebel argued, "rockets like this will force artillery and even bombers into the dustbin of history."

In 1929, the Minister of the Reichswehr gave a secret order to the head of the ballistics and ammunition department of the Armaments Directorate of the German Army Becker to determine the possibility of increasing the firing range of artillery systems, including the use of rocket engines for military purposes.

To carry out experiments in 1931, at the ballistics department, a group of several employees was formed to study liquid fuel engines under the leadership of Captain V. Dornberger. A year later, near Berlin in Kumersdorf, he organized an experimental laboratory for the practical creation of liquid jet engines for ballistic missiles. And in October 1932, Wernher von Braun came to work in this laboratory, soon becoming the leading rocket designer and Dornberger's first assistant.

In 1932, engineer V. Riedel and mechanic G. Grunov joined Dornberger's team. The group began by collecting statistics based on countless tests of its own and third-party rocket engines, studying the relationship between fuel and oxidizer ratios, cooling the combustion chamber and ignition methods. One of the first engines was the Heilandt, with a steel combustion chamber and an electric starter plug.

Mechanic K. Wahrmke worked with the engine. During one of the test launches, an explosion occurred and Vakhrmke was killed.

The tests were continued by mechanic A. Rudolph. In 1934, a thrust of 122 kgf was recorded. In the same year, the characteristics of the LPRE designed by von Braun and Riedel, created for the "Agregat-1" (A-1 rocket) with a take-off weight of 150 kg, were taken. The engine developed a thrust of 296 kgf. The fuel tank, separated by a sealed baffle, contained alcohol at the bottom and liquid oxygen at the top. The rocket was unsuccessful.

The A-2 had the same dimensions and launch weight as the A-1.

The Kumersdorf test site was already small for real launches, and in December 1934 two missiles, "Max" and "Moritz", took off from the island of Borkum. The flight to an altitude of 2.2 km lasted only 16 seconds. But in those days it was an impressive result.

In 1936, von Braun managed to persuade the Luftwaffe command to buy out a large area near the fishing village of Peenemünde on the island of Usedom. Funds were allocated for the construction of the missile center. The center, designated in the documents by the abbreviation NAR, and later -HVP, was located in an uninhabited area, and rocket firing could be fired at a distance of about 300 km in the northeastern direction, the flight trajectory passed over the sea.

In 1936, a special conference decided to create an "Army Experimental Station", which was to become a joint test center of the Air Force and the army under the general leadership of the Wehrmacht. V. Dornberger was appointed commander of the training ground.

Von Braun's third rocket, named Unit A-3, took off only in 1937. All this time was spent on designing a reliable liquid-propellant rocket engine with a positive displacement system for supplying fuel components. The new engine incorporates all the advanced technological advances in Germany.

"Unit A-3" was a spindle-shaped body with four long stabilizers. Inside the rocket body there was a nitrogen tank, a liquid oxygen container, a container with a parachute system for registration devices, a fuel tank and an engine.

To stabilize the A-3 and control its spatial position, molybdenum gas rudders were used. The control system used three positional gyroscopes connected to damping gyroscopes and acceleration sensors.

The Peenemünde Rocket Center was not yet ready for operation, and it was decided to launch A-3 missiles from a concrete platform on a small island 8 km from Usedom Island. But, alas, all four launches were unsuccessful.

Dornberger and von Braun received the technical assignment for the project of a new rocket from the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, General Fritsch. "Unit A-4" with a starting mass of 12 tons was supposed to deliver a charge weighing 1 ton over a distance of 300 km, but the constant failures with the A-3 disheartened both the missilemen and the Wehrmacht command. For many months, the development time of the A-4 combat missile was delayed, on which more than 120 employees of the Peenemünde center had already worked. Therefore, in parallel with the work on the A-4, they decided to create a smaller version of the rocket - the A-5.

It took two years to design the A-5, and in the summer of 1938, they carried out its first launches.

Then, in 1939, on the basis of the A-5, the A-6 rocket was developed, designed to achieve supersonic speeds, which remained only on paper.

The A-7 unit, a cruise missile designed for experimental launches from an aircraft at an altitude of 12,000 m, also remained in the project.

From 1941 to 1944, the development of the A-eighth took place, which by the time development ceased became the base for the A-9 rocket. The A-8 rocket was created on the basis of the A-4 and A-6, but also was not embodied in metal.

Thus, the A-4 unit should be considered the main one. Ten years after the start of theoretical research and six years of practical work, this rocket had the following characteristics: length 14 m, diameter 1.65 m, stabilizer span 3.55 m, launch weight 12.9 tons, warhead weight 1 ton, range 275 km.

Secrets of the V-2 rocket. "Wonder weapon" of Nazi Germany
Secrets of the V-2 rocket. "Wonder weapon" of Nazi Germany

Rocket A-4 on a conveyor carriage

The first launches of the A-4 were to begin in the spring of 1942. But on April 18, the first prototype A-4 V-1 exploded on the launch pad while the engine was preheating. The decrease in the level of appropriations postponed the start of complex flight tests until the summer. The attempt to launch the A-4 V-2 rocket, which took place on June 13, attended by the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition Albert Speer and the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, Erhard Milch, ended in failure. At the 94th second of the flight, due to the failure of the control system, the rocket fell 1.5 km from the launch point. Two months later, the A-4 V-3 also did not reach the required range. And only on October 3, 1942, the fourth A-4 V-4 rocket flew 192 km at an altitude of 96 km and exploded 4 km from the intended target. From that moment on, the work proceeded more and more successfully, and until June 1943, 31 launches were carried out.

Eight months later, a specially created commission on long-range missiles demonstrated the launches of two A-4 missiles, which accurately hit the conventional targets. The effect of successful launches of the A-4 made a stunning impression on Speer and Grand Admiral Doenitz, who unconditionally believed in the possibility of bringing governments and people of many countries to their knees with the help of a new "miracle weapon".

Back in December 1942, an order was issued on the deployment of mass production of the A-4 rocket and its components in Peenemünde and at the Zeppelin factories. In January 1943, an A-4 committee was created under the general leadership of G. Degenkolb at the Ministry of Armaments.

Emergency measures have been beneficial. On July 7, 1943, the head of the missile center at Peenemünde Dornberger, the technical director von Braun and the head of the Steingof test site made a report on the testing of "weapons of retaliation" at Hitler's Wolfschanz headquarters in East Prussia. A color film was shown about the first successful launch of the A-4 rocket with comments by von Braun, and Dornberger made a detailed presentation. Hitler was literally mesmerized by what he saw. 28-year-old von Braun was awarded the title of professor, and the management of the landfill achieved the receipt of the necessary materials and qualified personnel out of turn for the mass production of his brainchild.

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Rocket A-4 (V-2)

But on the way to mass production, the main problem of missiles arose - their reliability. By September 1943, the launch success rate was only 10-20%. The rockets exploded in all parts of the trajectory: at the start, during the ascent and when approaching the target. It was only in March 1944 that it became clear that strong vibration was weakening the threaded connections of the fuel lines. The alcohol was evaporated and mixed with the steam-gas (oxygen plus water vapor). "Infernal mixture" fell on the red-hot nozzle of the engine, followed by fire and explosion. The second reason for detonations is a too sensitive impulse detonator.

According to the calculations of the Wehrmacht command, it was necessary to strike at London every 20 minutes. For round-the-clock shelling, about a hundred A-4s were required. But to ensure this rate of fire, the three rocket assembly plants in Peenemünde, Wiener Neustatt and Friedrichshafen must ship about 3,000 missiles a month!

In July 1943, 300 missiles were manufactured, which had to be spent on experimental launches. Serial production has not yet been established. However, from January 1944 until the beginning of the rocket attacks on the British capital, 1588 V-2s were fired.

Launching 900 V-2 rockets per month required 13,000 tons of liquid oxygen, 4,000 tons of ethyl alcohol, 2,000 tons of methanol, 500 tons of hydrogen peroxide, 1,500 tons of explosives and a large number of other components. For the serial production of missiles, it was necessary to urgently build new factories for the production of various materials, semi-finished products and blanks.

In monetary terms, with the planned production of 12,000 missiles (30 pieces per day), one V-2 would cost 6 times cheaper than a bomber, which on average was enough for 4-5 sorties.

The first combat training unit of V-2 missiles (read "V-2") was formed in July 1943. In August, the structural organization and staffing of special units were developed as part of two divisions, one of which was mobile (between Cape Gris-Ne and Peninsula Contantin in northwestern France) and three stationary in the areas of Watton, Wiesern and Sottevast. The Army Command agreed with this organization and appointed Dornberger as Special Army Commissioner for Ballistic Missiles.

Each mobile battalion had to launch 27 missiles, and the stationary one - 54 missiles per day. The defended launch site was a large engineering structure with a concrete dome, in which assembly and maintenance areas, a barracks, a kitchen and a first-aid post were equipped. Inside the position was a railway line leading to a concreted launch pad. A launch pad was installed on the site itself, and everything necessary for the launch was placed on cars and armored personnel carriers.

At the beginning of December 1943, the 65th Army Corps of Special Forces of V-1 and V-2 missiles was created under the command of Lieutenant General of Artillery E. Heinemann. The formation of missile units and the construction of combat positions did not compensate for the lack of the required number of missiles to start massive launches. Among the leaders of the Wehrmacht, the entire A-4 project over time began to be perceived as a waste of money and skilled labor.

The first scattered information about the V-2 began to come to the analytical center of British intelligence only in the summer of 1944, when on June 13, when testing the radio command system on the A-4, as a result of an operator error, the missile changed its trajectory and after 5 minutes exploded in the air over the south -western part of Sweden, near the town of Kalmar. On July 31, the British exchanged 12 containers with the debris of the fallen missile for several mobile radars. About a month later, fragments of one of the serial missiles obtained by Polish partisans from the Sariaki area were delivered to London.

Having assessed the reality of the threat from the long-range weapons of the Germans, the Anglo-American aviation in May 1943 put into effect the Point Blank plan (strikes against missile production enterprises). British bombers conducted a series of raids aimed at the Zeppelin plant in Friedrichshafen, where the V-2 was finally assembled.

American planes also bombed the industrial buildings of factories in Wiener Neustadt, which produced individual missile components. Chemical plants producing hydrogen peroxide became special targets for bombing. This was a mistake, since by that time the components of the V-2 rocket fuel had not yet been clarified, which did not allow the release of alcohol and liquid oxygen to be paralyzed at the first stage of the bombing. Then they re-targeted the bomber aircraft to the launching positions of the missiles. In August 1943, the stationary position at Watton was completely destroyed, but the prepared positions of the light type did not suffer losses due to the fact that they were considered secondary objects.

The next targets of the allies were supply bases and stationary warehouses. The situation for the German missilemen was getting more complicated. However, the main reason for delaying the start of the massive use of missiles is the lack of a completed V-2 sample. But there were explanations for this.

Only in the summer of 1944 was it possible to find out the strange patterns of missile detonation at the end of the trajectory and on approach to the target. This triggered a sensitive detonator, but there was no time to fine-tune its impulse system. On the one hand, the Wehrmacht command demanded the start of a massive use of rocket weapons, on the other hand, this was opposed by such circumstances as the offensive of Soviet troops, the transfer of hostilities to Polish territory and the approach of the front line to the Blizka training ground. In July 1944, the Germans again had to move the test center to a new position in Heldekraut, 15 km from the city of Tukhep.

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Camouflage scheme of the A-4 missile

During the seven-month use of ballistic missiles in the cities of England and Belgium, about 4,300 V-2s were fired. 1402 launches were made in England, of which only 1054 (75%) reached the territory of the United Kingdom, and only 517 missiles fell on London. Human losses amounted to 9,277 people, of which 2,754 were killed and 6,523 were wounded.

Until the very end of the war, the Hitlerite command did not manage to achieve a massive launch of missile strikes. Moreover, it is not worth talking about the destruction of entire cities and industrial areas. The possibility of a "weapon of retaliation" was clearly overestimated, which, according to the leaders of Hitlerite Germany, should have caused horror, panic and paralysis in the enemy camp. But rocket weapons of that technical level could in no way change the course of the war in Germany's favor, or prevent the collapse of the fascist regime.

However, the geography of the goals that the V-2 achieved is very impressive. These are London, South England, Antwerp, Liege, Brussels, Paris, Lille, Luxembourg, Remagen, The Hague …

At the end of 1943, the Laffernz project was developed, according to which it was supposed to strike V-2 missiles on the territory of the United States at the beginning of 1944. To carry out this operation, the Hitlerite leadership enlisted the support of the command of the navy. The submarines planned to transport three huge, 30-meter containers across the Atlantic. Inside each of them should have been a rocket, tanks with fuel and oxidizer, water ballast and control and launch equipment. Arriving at the launch point, the crew of the submarine had to move the containers to a vertical position, check and pre-launch the missiles … But time was sorely lacking: the war was drawing to a close.

Since 1941, when the A-4 unit began to take on specific features, the von Braun group made attempts to increase the flight range of the future missile. The studies were of a double nature: purely military and space-based. It was assumed that at the final stage, a cruise missile, planning, will be able to cover a distance of 450-590 km in 17 minutes. And in the fall of 1944, two prototypes of the A-4d missile were built, equipped with swept wings in the middle part of the hull with a span of 6, 1 m with increased steering surfaces.

The first launch of the A-4d was made on January 8, 1945, but at an altitude of 30 m, the control system failed, and the rocket crashed. The designers considered the second launch on January 24 to be successful, despite the fact that the wing consoles collapsed in the final section of the rocket's trajectory. Werner von Braun claimed that the A-4d was the first winged craft to penetrate the sound barrier.

Further work on the A-4d unit was not carried out, but it was he who became the basis for a new prototype of the new A-9 rocket. In this project, it was envisaged to more widely use light alloys, improved engines, and the choice of fuel components is similar to that of the A-6 project.

During planning, the A-9 was to be controlled using two radars measuring the range and line-of-sight angles to the projectile. Above the target, the rocket was supposed to be transferred into a steep dive at supersonic speed. Several options for aerodynamic configurations have already been developed, but the difficulties with the implementation of the A-4d also stopped practical work on the A-9 rocket.

They returned to it when developing a large composite rocket, designated A-9 / A-10. This giant with a height of 26 m and a take-off weight of about 85 tons began to be developed back in 1941-1942. The missile was supposed to be used against targets on the Atlantic coast of the United States, and the launching positions were to be located in Portugal or in the west of France.

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A-9 cruise missile in a manned version

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Long-range missiles A-4, A-9 and A-10

The A-10 was supposedly supposed to deliver the second stage to an altitude of 24 km with a maximum speed of 4250 km / h. Then, in the detached first stage, a self-expanding parachute was triggered to save the starting engine. The second stage climbed to 160 km and a speed of about 10,000 km / h. Then she had to fly through the ballistic section of the trajectory and enter the dense layers of the atmosphere, where, at an altitude of 4550 m, make the transition to a gliding flight. Its estimated range is -4800 km.

After the rapid offensive of the Soviet troops in January-February 1945, the Peenemünde leadership received an order to evacuate all possible equipment, documentation, missiles and technical personnel of the center in Nordhausen

The last attacks on peaceful cities with the use of V-1 and V-2 missiles took place on March 27, 1945. Time was running out, and the SS did not have time to completely destroy all production equipment and finished products that could not be evacuated. At the same time, more than 30 thousand prisoners of war and political prisoners employed in the construction of top-secret facilities were destroyed.

In June 1946, separate units and assemblies of the V-2 rocket, as well as some drawings and working documents, were brought from Germany to the 3rd department of NII-88 (State Research Institute of Jet Armament N88 of the Ministry of Armament of the USSR), headed by S. P. Korolev …A group was created, which included A. Isaev, A. Bereznyak, N. Pilyugin, V. Mishin, L. Voskresensky and others. In the shortest possible time, the layout of the rocket, its pneumohydraulic system were restored, and the trajectory was calculated. In the Prague technical archive, they found drawings of a V-2 rocket, from which it was possible to restore a full set of technical documentation.

On the basis of the materials studied, S. Korolev suggested starting the development of a long-range missile to destroy targets at a distance of up to 600 km, but many influential persons in the military-political leadership of the Soviet Union strongly recommended creating missile forces, based on the already worked out German model. The rocket shooting range, and later the Kapustin Yar training range, was equipped in 1946.

By this time, German specialists who had previously worked for Soviet rocket scientists in Germany at the so-called "Rabe Institute" in Bluscherode and "Mittelwerk" in Nordhausen, were transferred to Moscow, where they headed whole parallel lines of theoretical research: Dr. Wolf - ballistics, Dr. Umifenbach - propulsion systems, engineer Müller - statistics and Dr. Hoch - control systems.

Under the leadership of German specialists at the Kapustin Yar training ground in October 1947, the first launch of the captured A-4 rocket took place, the production of which for some time was re-established at the plant in Blisherod in the Soviet zone of occupation. During the launch, our rocket engineers were assisted by a group of German experts headed by von Braun's closest assistant, engineer H. Grettrup, who in the USSR were engaged in setting up the production of the A-4 and manufacturing instrumentation for it. Subsequent launches were met with varying success. Out of 11 starts in October-November 6 ended in accidents.

By the second half of 1947, a set of documentation for the first Soviet ballistic missile, indexed R-1, was already ready. She had the same structural and layout scheme of the German prototype, but the introduction of new solutions managed to increase the reliability of the control system and the propulsion system. Stronger structural materials led to a decrease in the dry weight of the rocket and the strengthening of its individual elements, and the expanded use of non-metallic materials of domestic production made it possible to dramatically increase the reliability and durability of some units and the entire rocket as a whole, especially in winter conditions.

The first P-1 took off from the Kapustin Yar test range on October 10, 1948, reaching a range of 278 km. In 1948-1949, two series of launches of R-1 missiles were carried out. Moreover, of the 29 missiles launched, only three crashed. The A-4's range data were exceeded by 20 km, and the accuracy of hitting the target doubled.

For the R-1 rocket, OKB-456, under the leadership of V. Glushko, developed an oxygen-alcohol RD-100 rocket engine with a thrust of 27.2 tons, the analogue of which was the engine of the A-4 rocket. However, as a result of theoretical analyzes and experimental work, it turned out to be possible to increase the thrust to 37 tons, which made it possible, in parallel with the creation of the R-1, to begin the development of a more advanced R-2 rocket.

To reduce the weight of the new rocket, the fuel tank was made load-bearing, a detachable warhead was installed, and a sealed instrument compartment was installed directly above the engine compartment. A set of measures to reduce weight, the development of new navigation devices, and lateral correction of the launch trajectory made it possible to achieve a flight range of 554 km.

The 1950s arrived. The former allies were already running out of trophy V-2s. Disassembled and sawn, they took their well-deserved place in museums and technical universities. The A-4 rocket went into oblivion, became history. Her difficult military career grew into a service to space science, opening the way for mankind to the beginning of endless knowledge of the Universe.

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Geophysical rockets V-1A and LC-3 "Bumper"

Now let's take a closer look at the V-2 design.

The A-4 long-range ballistic missile with a free vertical launch of the surface-to-surface class is designed to engage area targets with predetermined coordinates. It was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine with a turbopump supply of two-component fuel. The rocket controls were aerodynamic and gas rudders. Control type - autonomous with partial radio control in a Cartesian coordinate system. Autonomous control method - stabilization and programmed control.

Technologically, A-4 is divided into 4 units: warhead, instrument, tank and tail compartments. This separation of the projectile is selected from the conditions of its transportation. The warhead was placed in a conical head compartment, in the upper part of which there was a shock impulse fuse.

Four stabilizers were attached with flange joints to the tail compartment. Inside each stabilizer there is an electric motor, a shaft, a chain drive of the aerodynamic rudder and a steering gear for deflecting the gas rudder.

The main units of the rocket rocket engine were a combustion chamber, a turbo pump, a steam and gas generator, tanks with hydrogen peroxide and sodium products, a seven-cylinder battery with compressed air.

The engine created a thrust of 25 tons at sea level and about 30 tons in a rarefied space. The pear-shaped combustion chamber consisted of an inner and an outer shell.

The A-4 controls were electric gas rudders and aerodynamic rudders. To compensate for side drift, a radio control system was used. Two ground-based transmitters emitted signals in the firing plane, and the receiver antennas were located on the rocket tail stabilizers.

The speed at which the radio command was sent to turn off the engine was determined using a radar. The automatic stabilization system included the gyroscopic devices "Horizon" and "Vertikant", amplifying-converting units, electric motors, steering gears and associated aerodynamic and gas rudders.

What are the results of the launches? 44% of the total number of V-2s fired fell within a 5 km radius of the aiming point. Modified missiles with guidance along the directing radio beam in the active section of the trajectory had a lateral deviation not exceeding 1.5 km. Guidance accuracy using only gyroscopic control was approximately 1 degree, and lateral deviation plus or minus 4 km with a target range of 250 km.

TECHNICAL DATA FAU-2

Length, m 14

Max. diameter, m 1.65

Stabilizer span, m 2, 55

Starting weight, kg 12900

Warhead weight, kg 1000

Rocket weight without fuel and warhead, kg 4000

LRE engine with max. thrust, t 25

Max. speed, m / s 1700

External temperature missile shell in flight, deg. From 700

Flight altitude when starting at max, range, km 80-100

Maximum flight range, km 250-300

Flight time, min. 5

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The layout of the rocket A-4

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