This year marks 70 years since the events described. And I, to the best of my ability, would like to attract your attention and remind once again of that strange and tragic performance that took place in the summer of 1942 on the Northern Sea Route.
I will introduce the characters.
Head of operations in the Arctic, "Admiral of the Arctic" Admiral Hubert Schmund.
Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral A. G. Golovko.
Pocket battleship Kriegsmarine "Admiral Scheer"
Year Built - 1933
Displacement: 15,180 brt
Crew: 1150 people.
Armament:
6 guns of 286 mm caliber
8 guns of caliber 150 mm
6 anti-aircraft guns of 88 mm caliber
8 anti-aircraft guns caliber 37 mm
10 anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber
2 x 533 mm four-tube torpedo tubes
1 Ar-196 aircraft
Icebreaking steamer "Alexander Sibiryakov"
Year Built - 1908
Displacement: 1,384 brt
Crew: 47 people.
Armament:
2 guns of 76 mm caliber
2 45 mm guns
2 anti-aircraft machine guns caliber 20 mm
Description of the raid of the German heavy cruiser "Admiral Scheer" in the Kara Sea in August 1942 and its reflection has always held a special place of honor among Russian historians. The heroic battle of the icebreaking steamer "Alexander Sibiryakov" and the defense of Dixon can be called heroic deeds without exaggeration. They will forever remain events about which they say “to posterity - as an example!”.
In July-August 1942, after the defeat of PQ-17, the movement of allied convoys in the USSR was interrupted. This break was a feat of the German command to conduct Operation Wunderland (Wonderland). Its essence consisted in an attack on Soviet sea communications in the Kara Sea by the forces of large surface ships.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1942, the "pocket battleships" in the North were clearly toiled with idleness, and the crews were quietly furious, and the leadership of the Kriegsmarine repeatedly had to reject various projects of the cruiser commanders. It was proposed to send their ships to the Atlantic ports of France, from where it would be possible to resume raids on the allied ocean communications, etc. In principle, the RWM headquarters did not object to the raid into the South Atlantic, but a breakthrough there in terms of optimal weather conditions and daylight hours could not be undertaken earlier than mid-November. In addition, before carrying out such a campaign, "Lyuttsov" should have replaced at least half of the eight main diesel generators, which was not possible before March 1943. Similar work had already been carried out on the Scheer, but before the raiding it should have undergone six weeks of maintenance. … Thus, there was enough time to carry out some short action in the northern waters.
The order to start the development of an operation against the Northern Sea Route followed in May 1942. The command of the "Nord" group took it up with optimism, but the Admiral of the Arctic, who directly directed the actions of the fleet in the Arctic, immediately expressed great doubts about the viability of the plan due to the lack of intelligence communications data, and most importantly, information about weather and ice conditions. At the initial planning stage, the possibility of creating a tactical group from Lyuttsov and Sheer was not ruled out, which could, if the conditions were right, attack the PQ-17 caravan from the east, already on the way to the mouth of the White Sea! The final plan of the operation was presented by the commander of the "Nord" group, Admiral Rolf Karls, to the RWM headquarters on 1 July.
During the development, the Germans came to the conclusion that the main difficulties would arise not as a result of the opposition of the Soviet fleet, but because of weather conditions. Together with them, the enemy had a chance to deliver a counterstrike, which, under certain conditions, could even lead to the destruction of German ships. Thus, the basis for success was to be accurate and comprehensive reconnaissance, as well as maximum secrecy. With the decrease (due to the grounding of "Lyuttsov") raider forces to one ship, these requirements all the more increased.
The commander of the Scheer, Captain 1st Rank Wilhelm Meendsen-Bolken, was ordered to attack convoys and destroy the structures of polar ports, acting on the routes of ships between Novaya Zemlya and the Vilkitsky Strait. According to the calculations of the German staff officers, this could paralyze the movement along the NSR until the end of navigation.
The operation was originally scheduled for mid-August. The determination of the Germans was reinforced by the message received at the beginning of the month from Tokyo that on the 1st of the Bering Strait a convoy of 4 icebreakers and 19 merchant ships passed in the western direction. According to German estimates, the caravan was supposed to approach the Vilkitsky Strait (connects the Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea) on August 22. Already from this conclusion, one can easily understand how poorly the command of the "Nord" group imagined the difficulties of navigating the Northern Sea Route - in reality the convoy reached this point only on September 22. Otherwise, the Germans could have achieved serious success - the caravan bearing the name "EON-18" (Special Purpose Expedition), in addition to 2 icebreakers and 6 transports, included the leader "Baku", who were transferred to the North from the Pacific Fleet, the destroyers "Razumny" and "Furious". Due to a number of features of the measures that were carried out on ships in preparation for sailing in ice, as well as inevitable ice damage, the combat effectiveness of destroyers was significantly reduced, and they could become easy prey for a "pocket" battleship. It is fair to say that, to put it mildly, the "sevens" were not suitable for action in the Arctic Ocean and the seas.
The first phase of the operation began on 8 August. On that day, the U-601 submarine crossed the Kara Sea, which was supposed to perform the functions of reconnaissance of Soviet sea communications and ice conditions. Six days later, U-251 proceeded to the area of White Island - Dixon. Two more submarines - "U-209" and "U-456" - operated off the western shores of Novaya Zemlya and maximally diverted the attention of the forces of the White Sea Military Flotilla (BVF).
On August 15, U-601, which occupied a position at the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya, transmitted a summary of the state of ice to Narvik. The news turned out to be quite favorable, and shortly after noon on the 16th, the Admiral Scheer, escorted by the destroyers Eckoldt, Steinbrink and Beitzen, left the anchorage in Bogen Bay. A day later, the raider reached Bear Island, where the destroyers were released. Foggy and cloudy weather reigned on the sea, because of which the raid almost broke off at the very beginning. On the afternoon of August 18, a few dozen cables from the Sheer, a single merchant ship suddenly emerged from the fog. Meendsen-Bolcken immediately ordered a change of course, and soon the steamer was out of sight. Most likely, the discovered transport turned out to be the Soviet "Friedrich Engels", which since August 9 made a test single flight from Reykjavik to Dixon. If the Scheer had sunk the ship, there might not have been any "drip" flights at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943.
On the afternoon of August 21, when the Scheer was crossing the loose ice, a message was received from an air reconnaissance officer about the discovery of a long-awaited caravan. According to the report, it included 9 steamers and a two-tube icebreaker. The ships were just 60 miles from the cruiser, east of Mona Island, and were on a head-on, southwest course!
But who could the Arado find, because as we know, the ships and vessels of the EON-18 were several thousand miles from the shores of Taimyr? The fact is that on August 9, the so-called Arkhangelsk went along the Northern Sea Route. "3rd Arctic convoy" consisting of 8 dry cargo ships and 2 tankers, which were sent to the ports of the Far East and America. On August 16-18, the vessels focused on the Dikson roadstead and then went east to support the Krasin icebreaker; later the icebreaker Lenin and the British tanker Hopemount joined the convoy. The caravan had no security in the Kara Sea - until now, enemy ships did not appear in these parts. It is easy to imagine how the meeting between the Sheer and the defenseless convoy could have ended!
It is easy to see: the report from the seaplane indicated that the ships were heading south-west, and not east, as was the case. Obviously, being afraid to approach the steamers, the pilot saw what he should have seen based on the preliminary data. This "false sight" cost the Germans dearly - Meendsen-Bolken decided to stop moving to the east and took a wait-and-see attitude in the area of the Ermak bank. Here he would inevitably meet with the convoy if he moved westward, bypassing Mona Island from the north. In case the ships went between the island and the mainland, they should have been discovered by "Arado", which again flew off for reconnaissance.
The entire evening of August 21 and the night of the 22nd cruiser carried out radar surveillance and waited for the prey to jump out on it by itself. The wait dragged on, and meanwhile the radio interception service recorded the intensive radio traffic, gradually moving away to the northeast. Meendsen-Bolken suspected something was wrong and, despite the fog, which sometimes limited visibility to 100 m, continued to move east. However, the favorable moment was largely missed.
The plane, sent out early in the morning on August 25 for ice reconnaissance and clarification of the ship's coordinates, landed unsuccessfully on its return and was completely out of order. He had to be shot from a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun. In just 5 days of Operation Arado made 11 sorties. This accident, obviously, proved to the raider commander that luck was clearly not on his side, after which he lost hope of catching up with the convoy and turned in the opposite direction.
The retreat to the west was carried out at a significantly higher speed. By 11 o'clock the cruiser passed the Nordenskjold archipelago and approached the Belukha island. Here from "Sheer" they noticed an unknown Soviet ship, which, as it turned out later, was an armed icebreaker steamer of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (GUSMP) "Alexander Sibiryakov" (1384 brt).
The unequal battle between Sibiryakov and Sheer became one of the legendary and heroic pages of the Soviet fleet in the Great Patriotic War. Many pages have been written about him, but, unfortunately, like every legend, over time, the battle began to acquire non-existent details, most of which pursued a "holy" goal: to make it even more beautiful, even more heroic. In this endeavor, some authors crossed the border of reason, obviously not realizing that feat cannot have comparative degrees.
The icebreaking steamer "Alexander Sibiryakov", although it was under the operational control of the Navy and had a military command of 32 people, as well as weapons (two 76-mm cannons, two 45-mm and two 20-mm "Erlikons"), was a civil ship and performed a national economic flight. On August 23, the steamer left Dikson to deliver 349 tons of cargo to polar stations on Severnaya Zemlya and to build a new station at Cape Molotov.
In a number of domestic publications, in particular in the memoirs of Admiral A. G. Golovko, it is mentioned that on August 22 from the headquarters of the Northern Fleet the first warning was sent to the GUSMP about the possibility of the penetration of enemy surface raiders into the Kara Sea. On the 24th, this warning was allegedly repeated. What was the root cause of these warnings is not clear from the memoirs. At the same time, as the Commander of the Northern Fleet pointed out, measures were taken to organize aerial reconnaissance of the northern part of the Barents Sea, and submarines were sent to Cape Zhelaniya. And only after the second warning, the headquarters for maritime operations in the Western sector of the Arctic (a structural unit of the GUSMP) located in Dikson sent information to the merchant ships.
Archival materials do not confirm the admiral's words. There are no traces of such a warning in the materials of the merchant fleet. The extract from the radio journal of the already mentioned transport “Belomorkanal” for August 19 - 30, published as Appendix No. 7 of the collection "Northern Convoys", does not contain information on receiving any notification before August 25. The first submarine aimed at the position to Cape Zhelaniya - Lunin's K-21 - left Polyarny only at 21:00 on 31 August.
Another reason to feel the difference in the approaches of the memoirists is given by the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. In them, in particular, it is written: "On August 24, 1942, a senior officer of the British military mission in Arkhangelsk, Captain 1st Rank Monde, informed the command of the Northern Fleet that, according to British intelligence, a few days ago, a German" pocket "battleship (heavy cruiser)" Admiral Scheer left the Westfjord in Norway and disappeared in an unknown direction. And that it has not been found yet”. Obviously, Admiral Golovko was uncomfortable showing the true source of valuable information - the British, whom he ardently criticized in his memoirs. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the British information unequivocally indicated that the "pocket" battleship departed specifically for operations in the eastern part of the Barents Sea or in the Kara Sea.
On the evening of the 23rd, a detachment of allied ships entered the Kola Bay, consisting of the American heavy cruiser Tuscaloosa and five destroyers. With evidence of the presence of a "pocket" battleship somewhere nearby, the commander of the British Home Fleet Admiral John Tovey initially expressed his intention to detain the ships in Murmansk, which, ultimately, other command authorities rejected due to fear of air raids. The command of the Northern Fleet showed no interest in delaying this powerful formation, which in all likelihood could have been achieved using diplomatic channels. The next morning, the detachment went to England. On the evening of August 25, based on the decryption data received from the Admiralty, to the south of Bear Island, British destroyers intercepted and destroyed the German minelayer Ulm heading for Cape Zhelaniya.
As for the memoirs of A. G. Golovko, his, to put it mildly, tendentious coverage of events cannot but suggest that he tried to blame his failure to take measures to protect navigation in the Kara Sea on the allies and the omissions of the GUSMP leadership. One way or another, but when at 13:17 an unknown warship was spotted from the Sibiryakov, the ship's commander Senior Lieutenant Anatoly Alekseevich Kacharava did not have any preliminary information. His ability to independently and correctly understand a difficult situation only increases respect for the feat of the commander and crew of the steamer.
Anatoly Alekseevich Kacharava
For Meendsen-Bolcken, the action against a single Soviet ship was obviously both simple and complex. Its outcome, of course, was not in doubt - the cruiser surpassed the Sibiryaks in all respects, at the same time, the destruction of the old steamer added little laurels to the Kriegsmarine crown. The prospects for capturing data on ice conditions, movement of convoys, cipher materials, etc. looked much more tempting. Assuming that the Russians would be able to destroy or refuse to provide the necessary information, Meendsen-Bolken decided, for a start, to try to obtain it by fraudulent means. The Scheer turned its nose at the enemy to hide its characteristic "profile" and raised the American flag. 10 minutes after mutual detection from the raider, the first question was semaphored in Russian: "Who are you, where are you going, come closer."
The dialogue between the two ships lasted for about 20 minutes. Obviously, the Sibiryakov did not immediately realize that they were facing an enemy ship. Apparently, Kacharava was alerted by unnecessarily annoying inquiries about the state of the ice. It is possible that the cruiser gave out poor knowledge of the Russian language. At 13:38, when the ship asked for the name of the met ship, in response, instead of the signalized Tuscaloosa (the Germans knew about the location of this American cruiser in the Barents Sea from radio interception data), the Sibiryakov was able to disassemble the Sisiam! A ship flying an American flag with a Japanese name could not but alert the Soviet man, brought up in the spirit of vigilance. Without delay, Kacharava ordered to increase the speed to the maximum and turned to the coast, to which (Belukha Island) was about 10 miles. A few minutes later, a radio message was broadcast in plain text: "I see an unknown auxiliary cruiser, which is requesting the situation." Hearing that the steamer was on the air, the Germans immediately began to interfere and semaphore the demand to stop the transmission. They did not receive a reply from the Soviet ship. Moments later, at 13:45, the first volley of 28-centimeters burst out.
Many authors write that Sibiryakov was the first to open fire on the enemy. It generally does not stand up to elementary criticism and deprives A. A. Kacharava of common sense! Firstly, 64 cables - the distance at which the battle began - is too long for firing from Lender's 30-caliber cannons. Secondly, it is difficult to get from them and at a shorter distance, and, finally, the most important thing: it is foolish to provoke a more powerful enemy ship to open fire, when the purpose of the above-described Kacharava maneuver was to save the ship and passengers on the coastal shallow.
An unequal battle began. Practically not hoping to hit the enemy's ship, the artillerymen of the Sibiryakov, led by junior lieutenant S. F. Nikiforenko, returned fire. At the same time, Kacharava ordered the installation of a smoke screen, which covered the ship quite well for some time. Meendsen-Bolcken fired with German precision and economy. In 43 minutes, he fired only six volleys, half of which were fired only by the bow turret. At 13:45, a radio message was sent from Sibiryakov: "The cannonade has begun, wait," and almost immediately after it, "We are being fired upon." After 4 minutes, this message was repeated. It was the last one adopted by Soviet radio stations. "Scheer" managed to reliably drown out the wave, and a few minutes later the "pocket" battleship achieved a hit with a second salvo.
Information about the damage received by "Sibiryakov" before his death is very contradictory. The "combers" of history tried too hard to draw a worthy, from their point of view, the end of the heroic ship. It is only known for certain that after the first hits, the steamer lost its speed and received underwater holes in the bow. The debris ignited barrels of gasoline on the deck. According to the testimony of the surviving radio operator A. Shershavin, at 14:05 the last radio message was broadcast from the ship: “Pompolit ordered to leave the ship. We are on fire, goodbye. " By this time, Kacharava was already wounded, and there was no hope of saving the ship.
August 5, 15:00. The last minutes of "A. Sibiryakov" … Several surviving members of the team from "A. Sibiryakov" are visible in the foreground wearing life jackets …
At about 14:28, the cruiser ceased fire, firing a total of 27 heavy shells and achieving four hits. During the battle, he approached the "Sibiryakov" at a distance of 22 cables. Despite the fatal damage, the Soviet ship still continued to fire from the stern cannon! The courage with which the crew of the steamer accepted the battle is noted in almost all foreign studies. A boat was launched from the Sheer in order to pick up Soviet sailors who were in the water. According to German data, most of those in the water refused to be rescued - out of 104 team members, the Germans picked up only 22 people, incl. and the wounded commander, mostly from the only surviving boat. Some of those being rescued, such as the stoker N. Matveev, even tried to resist, because of which the sailors from the Sheer had to resort to using weapons. Many, despite the order, remained on the sinking steamer and waited for the German boat to leave; they subsequently perished along with the ship. The 23rd survivor was the fireman P. Vavilov, who reached the empty boat and sailed on it to Belukha Island. He lived on it for 36 days (!!!) before he was rescued by a seaplane of polar aviation. At about 15:00, the smoking wreck of the "polar" "Varyag" plunged into the cold waters of the Kara Sea.
Unlike many "figures" whose combat successes did not find post-war confirmation, or people who did not really accomplish anything and were made heroes thanks to the efforts of official propaganda, Anatoly Alekseevich Kacharava and his team accomplished a real feat. It does not need embellishment, and undoubtedly consists of two things. First, not being afraid of death, the captain went on the air and thereby provided invaluable information about the presence of an enemy surface ship in an area that was considered completely safe until that time. Secondly, "Sibiryakov" took an unequal battle, and its flag remained unfired. Kacharava's act is quite comparable to the exploits of the commanders of the British destroyer Gloworm (Gerard B. Roop) and the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay (Edward S. F. Fidzhen), widely known abroad. Both officers of His Majesty's fleet received the highest military awards of Great Britain - the Victoria Cross (24 awards in the Navy during the entire war). Moreover, Jervis Bay was sunk by the same Sheer. However, for A. A. Kacharava did not find a place among more than 11 thousand awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. The modest Order of the Red Star (until the end of his life - 1982 - who devoted his entire life to the navy, this patriot of the Motherland received another Order of the Red Star, the Order of Lenin and the Red Banner of Labor) was considered quite sufficient in this case.
Having sunk the Sibiryakov and captured part of its crew, Meendsen-Bolken did not come close to answering the questions that interested him a step. Although there were both an engineer and a meteorologist among the rescued, the information received from them did not give practically anything new, except for information about the victim of the cruiser. This is confirmed by the materials of J. Meister, which he could obtain only from German archival materials.
Without a doubt, the information of "Sibiryakov" became the first formidable news about the enemy's raider, which made the leaders of the Northern Fleet and the GUSMP aroused. At 14:07, Dixon's radio station ordered all ships at sea to stop transmitting. The GST flying boat set off in search of the icebreaker steamer, which returned with nothing, but, in turn, was spotted from the Sheer. Finally, at 15:45, the Germans intercepted and decoded a new radio message from A. I. Mineev, in which all ships were informed about the presence of an enemy auxiliary cruiser in the Kara Sea. Meanwhile, the raider has already rushed to the north-west of the battlefield. counted on new meetings with Soviet merchant ships on the non-existent communication Cape Zhelaniya - Dikson. Until the end of the day, he crossed the line connecting about. Privacy and Islands of the Arctic Institute. Suddenly, a lot of floating ice was found in this area. The cruiser even had to overcome one ice field.
All this time, the horizon remained absolutely clear, and by about the beginning of August 26, Meendsen-Bolcken finally came to the conclusion that it would be very difficult to find ships at sea, especially after the loss of surprise. The prospect of an attack on a port looked much more tempting. Not only will it probably be possible to catch several steamers by surprise there, but it would be more likely that information about the routes of the GUSMP, the state of the ice, etc., could be obtained from the base. Even the usual small-scale nautical charts of the area were already of great interest to the Germans. From this point of view, Dixon seemed to be the most preferable. On the one hand, unlike Amderma, it is quite remote from the naval and air bases of the Northern Fleet, on the other hand, the Germans have already managed to make sure that it is from this point that the movement of ships in the Kara Sea is controlled. Thus, there should have been materials of interest and, in addition, for the Russians, the defeat of their coastal command post would certainly have been a heavy blow. Despite the previous setbacks, the goal of the operation - to paralyze traffic along the Northern Sea Route - was still quite real.
The situation in the Soviet headquarters indicated that the enemy's auxiliary cruisers were multiplying like cockroaches. One allegedly fired at Cape Zhelaniya on the morning of the 25th, while the other sank the Sibiryakov (a simple calculation of speed and distance showed that it could not be the same ship). The third became known in the morning of the 26th. At 01:40, the radio station at Cape Chelyuskin reported an enemy ship passing by at high speed to the east. It is not known what could have caused this discovery, but the caravan, which had been pursued for so long by the Scheer, had passed the cape just five hours earlier. The news that the enemy's armed ship was overtaking a defenseless convoy brought the leadership of the Northern Sea Route to a state close to panic. At 14:30 the head of the GUSMP, the famous polar explorer Hero of the Soviet Union I. D. Papanin contacted the SF command by radio and in a rather nervous and harsh manner asked Golovko to immediately give an order to the BVF commander, Vice-Admiral G. A. Stepanov about the dispatch of a naval bomber flight with a stock of bombs to destroy an enemy raider. A few hours earlier from the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the Commanders of the Northern Fleet and the BVF received orders to strengthen monitoring of the situation on the GUSMP route, the need to control the movement of all merchant ships in the theater (which had never happened before) and the development of measures to counter the enemy.
But with the existing management system, it was not necessary to count on any quick implementation of any concrete steps. In the afternoon, the Chief of Staff of the BVF reported to the Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet the planned activities, namely:
• to organize aerial reconnaissance in the Kara Sea (the area of which is 883 thousand km2) by two (!?!) GUSMP aircraft;
• send three submarines of the Northern Fleet to positions north of Cape Zhelaniya, to the Kara Gates Strait and to the Kara Sea, to the east of the 80 ° meridian (the search for a raider in this area by one submarine is quite comparable to the problem of finding a needle in a haystack);
• to relocate a group of seaplanes-bombers (what a proud name for the outdated MBR-2, isn't it?) To the hydro aerodromes of Dikson Island and Cape Chelyuskin;
• to put before the allies the question of sending a cruiser and destroyers to the Kara Sea (want to, laugh, want to not);
• instruct the commander of the BVF Northern Detachment to strengthen reconnaissance and increase the readiness of their assets, and to tightly control the navigation regime of ships in his area (to be sure, thunder will not break out - the man will not cross himself!).
That is, the measures were promptly developed, reported where to be, the effectiveness of such "measures" will quietly keep quiet.
A further escalation of tension is evidenced by a message dated 14:35 from the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, which said that the People's Commissar of the Navy ordered the commander of the Northern Fleet to report on immediate measures to address the situation in the Arctic. In the evening, the command of the Northern Fleet informed the flotilla that with the onset of favorable weather it would send two DB-Zf and four Pe-3 to the Amderma land airfield. At 20:36 there was another call from Moscow, in which the final "verdict" was announced: to transfer 10 MBR-2, six from the fleet and four from the flotilla to Dikson. Thus, it took the whole day to draw up plans and produce reports on the measures taken, which, if Sheer had actually passed Cape Chelyuskin, would have been enough to destroy several convoys!
The most sensible decision taken by the Soviet side for the whole day was the order of Admiral Stepanov to restore the dismantled coastal batteries on Dikson. The fact is that complacency that the enemy would not dare to poke his nose into the Kara Sea had spread so far that when the decision to form the Novaya Zemlya naval base followed in mid-August, they decided to take the coastal batteries for it on Dikson. If Meendsen-Bolken had decided to attack the port immediately after the sinking of the Sibiryakov, he could have arrived at the site no later than noon on the 26th, and would have found the batteries dismantled or not ready for battle. In this case, the outcome of the operation could have been quite different …
At the end of the summer of 1941, two two-gun naval coastal batteries were commissioned on Dikson: 130-mm No. 226 and 45-mm universal No. 246. Later, battery # 569 was added to them. She was armed with two 152-mm field howitzers of the 1910/1930 model obtained from the warehouses of the Arkhangelsk military district. It was they who played the role of the main force of the defenders in the events that soon followed.
Mighty artillery that drove away the "Admiral Scheer"
There were guns on the ships. On the morning of the 26th, the patrol boat "SKR-19" (the former icebreaker ship "Dezhnev") arrived in Dikson, which was supposed to transport the materiel of the batteries to Novaya Zemlya. Its armament consisted of four 76-mm, the same 45-mm guns and machine guns. Artillery (one 75- and 45-mm gun and four 20-mm "Erlikons") was also on the steamer GUSMP "Revolutsioner" (3292 brt) that came to the port in the evening. In addition to them, there was only an unarmed transport "Kara" (3235 brt) at the berths, in the holds of which there were several hundred tons of explosives - ammonal.
The forces of the defenders cannot be called impressive, but the Germans, for their part, did not expect to meet opposition at all. According to them, the port garrison consisted of no more than 60 NKVD soldiers. The plan for the attack on Dixon, worked out by Meendsen-Bolken, provided for the landing of troops up to 180 people who could be separated from the crew without prejudice to the combat capability of the heavy cruiser. The very process of disembarkation undoubtedly provided for the maximum approach of the ship to the shore, anchoring, etc. In these conditions, the slightest opposition by coastal artillery forces put on the agenda the issue of receiving more or less serious damage. The sad experience of breaking through the Oslofjord on April 9, 1940, when the "prehistoric" Norwegian coastal defense managed to drown the newest heavy cruiser "Blucher". Thus, even a small artillery resistance from the coast could already disrupt the landing. From this point of view, the forces and means available to Dixon's defenders turned out to be even more than enough (I just want to sneer: well, where have you and your gunboat flooded to the modern fortified area?).
Preparations to repel a possible enemy attack began in the port only late in the evening. This, in particular, is confirmed by the fact that by the time the battle began, many key figures in Dixon's defense - the military commissar of the Northern detachment of the BVF, regimental commissar V. V. Babintsev and the commander of the "SKR-19" senior lieutenant A. S. Gidulyanov - we went on a boat to reconnoitre a convenient place for installing 130-mm guns. There was too much time to do. The naval batteries were on the barge for subsequent reloading to the "Dezhnev", and only the guns of battery # 569 (commander - Lieutenant N. M. Kornyakov) remained at the berth. Apparently, the preparation for battle of this battery consisted only in returning part of the ammunition to the shore, drawing up a more or less detailed plan of action, and, finally, giving a certain number of local residents to help the Red Army soldiers, since the shortage of its personnel was more than 50% (I so I understand that they just gathered everyone: radio operators, cooks, local Chukchi hunters).
The preparations were in full swing, when at 01:05 am from the former firing position of battery No. 226 I noticed the dark silhouette of "Admiral Scheer". The corresponding message was immediately broadcast in plain text, and a military alert was announced in the port. "SKR-19" quickly gave up the mooring lines, but did not manage to move away from the berth before the start of the battle. After 25 minutes, the cruiser had already passed along the coast of Old Dixon Island and slowly, orienting herself along the sections that were poorly visible in the conditions of foggy Arctic twilight, began to approach the entrance to the inner roadstead. They found him only when the distance between him and the ships was no more than 30-35 cables.
Since the Germans had intercepted the Soviet message, the surprise of the attack could not be counted on. At 01:37, when the outlines of the two ships in the inner roadstead loomed out of the haze, Meendsen-Bolken, obviously guessing that they should have artillery weapons, ordered to open fire. Almost immediately he was answered with 76-millimeter paper "Dezhnev" (in battle, the ship was led by senior assistant senior lieutenant SA Krotov). The patrolman, setting up a smoke screen and gradually increasing the speed, moved across the course of the cruiser to the Samoletnaya Bay, where he could get out from under the fire of heavy guns.
Sheer directed the first volleys against SKR-19. Already the third had direct hits. 280-mm shells pierced the ship's hull and exploded underneath. During the first 8 minutes of the battle, "Dezhnev" received at least four 28- or 15-cm shells, two of which made large holes. The rangefinder and two 45-mm guns were out of order. The loss of the crew was 6 killed and 21 wounded, of which one died soon after. At 01:46 the patrol ship got out of the firing sector, but the damage it received led to the fact that it landed on the ground in a shallow place. During the battle, his gunners fired 35 76-mm and 68 45-mm shells at the enemy, but, unfortunately, did not achieve hits.
SKR-19 ("Dezhnev")
Then, for about 3-5 minutes, the Scheer concentrated fire on the Revolutionary. Hidden in a smokescreen, this steamer received only three hits. A fire broke out on its upper deck. Cabins, navigational and wheel houses were destroyed. The steam line supplying steam to the windlass was also damaged, as a result of which the ship could not weaken anchor and take refuge in the Samoletnaya Bay. Only after the cessation of shelling did the emergency parties manage to repair part of the damage, after which the steamer left the port through the Vega Strait to the south. It was followed by the transport "Kara", fortunately unnoticed by the Germans.
Watchtower "SKR-19" (former icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev")
At this critical moment, a 152mm battery opened fire. The Germans classified her shooting as quite accurate, despite the considerable distance and poor visibility. Bursts of falls were observed at 500-2000 m from the cruiser and were estimated as from 130-mm shells. Further advance on the inner raid was supposed to reduce the distance and, accordingly, increase the accuracy of the battery fire, the place of which the enemy could not determine. Not wanting to risk it, Meendsen-Bolken went on a return course, at 01:46 ordered a ceasefire, and four minutes later the Admiral Scheer disappeared behind the Anvil Peninsula. During this episode of the battle, the cruiser consumed 25 280-mm and 21 150-mm shells.
Apparently, already at this stage of the action, the raider commander realized that the landing would have to be abandoned. And yet, the purpose of the raid could still be partially achieved by the force of the "pocket" battleship's artillery. Moving northward along the coast, the cruiser consistently bombarded the coastal facilities of the largest base in the Kara Sea: from 02:14 to 02:23 the fog observation station on Bolshoy Bear Island (226 105-mm shells); from 02:19 to 02:45 the north coast of Dixon Island (intermittently, 76 150-mm shells). The main attack began at 02:31, when, continuing to bypass the island of New Dixon, the Scheer again put its main caliber into action, this time against the port facilities and the radio center. Without observing the enemy, SKR-19 and battery # 569 fired back. After about 15 minutes, the raider appeared from behind the island, which allowed the Soviet artillerymen to more accurately determine the location of the target. At 02:43 the raider ceased fire, but five minutes later resumed it on the residential town. At 02:57, apparently having learned that the number of ammunition consumed for firing at Dixon was approaching a sixth of the normal ammunition load (at the final stage of the bombing, another 52 280-mm and 24 150-mm shells were fired) Meendsen-Bolken ordered to stop firing.
It is difficult to say whether the German captain considered the base to be crushed, but outwardly the destruction looked very impressive. Two radio masts of the transmitting center were shot down, thick smoke rose from the solarium storage into the sky. In addition, the Germans managed to set fire to the power substation of the radio station and several residential buildings. Fortunately, there were no losses in people on the shore. The success of the raid could be judged by the fact that Dixon's radio stopped working for transmission and did not go on the air for about two days.
As for the ships actually attacked, it took the “Revolutionary” about two days to repair the damage, and “Dezhnev” six days. Thus, the overall result of the attack can be described as more than modest.
In conclusion of the description of the battle, I would like to dwell on a statement that is repeated in almost all domestic publications - "Scheer" got out to sea only after it received three hits of 152-mm and several 76-mm shells. Let's note right away - in the German materials there is no information about hits at all. And in principle, this does not seem surprising. Of the 43 Kornyakov batteries made, about half of the shots fell on the initial stage of the battle. As already noted, the battery did not open fire immediately, but with some delay. By this time, in addition to the fog (we repeat, it was because of it that the raider was found only at a distance of 32 cables), "Dezhnev" put a smoke screen across the entrance to the harbor, which, accordingly, divided the cruiser and the battery. From materials by Yu. G. Perechnev shows that the battery lacked not only linear and radio communication, but even an absolutely necessary rangefinder! The personnel had no experience in firing at sea targets. In such conditions, the hit could have taken place only by accident. In general, they fired into the white light, like a penny.
When, three quarters of an hour later, the cruiser opened fire on the port again, the battery fired four shots, without observing the target at all. After the "Scheer" was again within sight, the smoke of the fires on the Konus Island was added to the above-described shooting conditions, and the distance to the target increased to about 45 cables. It was unlikely that anything more could be seen from the shore than the faint glow of gunfire dissolving in the fog. It is not surprising that all the shells went into milk. However, and without reaching a single hit, the battery fulfilled its task - it prevented the landing of the troops and ultimately saved Dixon from destruction.
Having finished the bombing, Meendsen-Bolken hastened to withdraw in a northwest direction.
As a result, in the early hours of August 28, the cruiser ended up in an area located southwest of the Franz Josef Land archipelago.
Arriving here, "Scheer" himself received a radiogram from the headquarters of the "Admiral of the Arctic". It instructed to start returning to the base at noon the next day, and before that, make another trip to the western part of the Kara Sea towards Bely Island. On the afternoon of the 28th, the ship's radio operators accepted several more orders, which explicitly indicated that the cruiser should return to the Kara Sea, search for ships and, in case of stealth, fire at the port of Amderma. Meendsen-Bolcken did not share such aspirations and believed that in the conditions that had arisen, about which the coastal headquarters still did not have the slightest idea, it made sense to stop the operation and carry it out again after more careful preparation.
In conclusion, it is necessary to summarize. The operation of the Germans failed, but both itself and its failure were unexpected for our command, which was able to carry out retaliatory measures only retroactively. The inconsistency of naval intelligence and the clumsiness of our headquarters were vividly highlighted. In fact, the winner in both combat episodes of the operation was a Soviet man capable of displaying courage and the highest heroism in dramatic situations. But, we repeat: this time the old army axiom was confirmed - the reverse side of heroism is someone's crime.
The Germans also had nothing to brag about. In foreign literature, there is an opinion that, despite insignificant direct damage, Operation Wunderland had great consequences, since it forced the Russians to divert part of the Northern Fleet forces to the Kara Sea, deploy new naval bases, aviation units, etc. there. To us, this conclusion seems far-fetched, since the forces that were actually deployed in the Kara Sea in 1942-1944. were nothing more than formations for the protection of the water area. They provided our sea communications not from hypothetical, but quite real underwater and mine danger, which was created by enemy submarines. And even if the Sheer had not made its raid, this would hardly have affected the number of our forces involved in the Kara Sea.
For the German command, the main conclusion from Wunderland was that operations in Arctic waters require much more training and intelligence support. At the same time, one cannot but come to the conclusion that even the campaign that took place could have been better thought out and organized. Firstly, who prevented from providing the cruiser with not one, but two airborne reconnaissance aircraft in advance? Secondly, why was the seaplane not replaced at Svalbard? Indeed, with the appropriate development of events, he could obtain intelligence in the interests of the cruiser. Thirdly, why did Meendsen-Bolckenu not have documents for communication in the submarine radio network? After all, then there was an opportunity to go on the air, disguised as a submarine, and they radioed from the Kara Sea without any restrictions. Moreover, in this case, he would be able to communicate and set tasks for the boats themselves. But the submarines, acting directly in the interests of the "pocket" battleship, received orders only from the headquarters of the "Admiral of the Arctic".
In other words, the German command had great opportunities for further improving the plans and methods of new operations. In the meantime, it was forced to cancel all actions of this kind and, first of all, already almost accepted for implementation "Doppelschlag". In accordance with her plan, a breakthrough into the Kara Sea would have been carried out by two cruisers - "Admiral Scheer" and "Admiral Hipper", and the first would operate east, and the second - west of the Dixon meridian. This plan seems feasible, since at a meeting at Hitler's headquarters on naval issues on August 26, Admiral Raeder was not able to get the go-ahead for a raid in the South Atlantic. The Fuhrer categorically objected to any operation that diverted the large ships of the Kriegsmarine from the defense of the "zone of fate" - Norway! The main lesson of Operation Wunderland is this: without serious preparation and accurate planning of all types of support, even the most ingenious plan turns into a failed adventure. Moreover, any technique, the most perfect, can break on the heroism and self-sacrifice of the defenders of their land. And this must be remembered both 70 and 170 years after the events that took place.
