Yes, our readers, who are like cognac, seasoned and experienced, are something! They are able to start a discussion, let's say, out of the blue, splashing gasoline on seemingly extinct coals.
However, sometimes it brings quite amazing results.
This is how one of our readers (Valery) suddenly threw at me a very interesting topic that concerns stormtroopers, so much so that I really had to climb through the reference books. The second, Alexei, surprised even more. Just at the waterline, to be honest.
Here's the thing. Back in 2012, I created quite extensive and for that time quite such material.
"Operation Wonderland, or Alexandra Matrosovs of the North Seas."
It turned out quite cumbersome, I agree, but now it will save you from a lot of quotes and inclusions.
So, Alexey asked a question to which, in fact, the answer was not immediately found. And in general, considering "Wonderland" and everything that was connected with it, many do not even think about this moment. Eight years ago, I didn't think too much, but it's a pity.
The question is outrageously simple: but how did it happen that the German ship ended up here:
Indeed, few answer this question and few ask it. They simply take it for granted: Admiral Scheer came to the Northern Sea Route and started to make a row there. And then he left. But if you look at the map, then inevitably you begin to wonder: how could this have happened at all?
How was a German raider able to sneak into the Kara Sea unnoticed? This is not the Kola Peninsula, this is the Krasnoyarsk Territory … In fact, it is the deepest rear. Really some kind of nonsense, or an oversight. And in theory, in those days someone should have suffered very badly, because there is either negligence, or something else, unpleasant.
For which in those days it was easy to get to the unsmiling guys from the NKVD for a conversation. With or without it - but get it.
And there was a reason. The Scheer sank the Alexander Sibiryakov, damaged Dezhnev and the Revolutionary in the port of Dikson, plowed the entire island, burned a fuel warehouse, a weather station …
And nothing to anyone? Where is bloody Stalin? Where was the executioner Beria? On the weekend, or what? So the war seemed to go on, not to relaxation …
And, in fact, where was our valiant Northern Fleet? Allied naval forces (oh, this is generally a topic, it turns out!)? Our equally gallant Air Force?
Why was a German heavy cruiser so easy to get into such a distance, in the middle of the NSR, and then just as calmly and without a single scratch (ice does not count) go back?
Yes, no matter how hard our science fiction writers tried to compose fairy tales, the guns of the Sibiryakov and Dezhnev (76 mm) were not able to simply reach the cruiser at those distances. And to damage it … Well, break the boat there or an anti-aircraft machine gun …
And a battery of 152-mm museum relics on Dikson, which was operated by an artilleryman, but the calculations were recruited from those who were just at hand, and even a rangefinder was missing from the equipment on the battery, which was being prepared for shipment to the mainland! Not to mention the rangekeepers who can work with him.
So the tales about the hit of 152-mm shells from the "battery" of senior lieutenant Nikolai Kornyakov in the "Sheer" will remain fairy tales. Beautiful, but fairy tales. 43 shells of the battery were fired into the white light, like a penny, but they did their job. It was unrealistic to hit even such a whopper as Sheer from a distance of 5, 5 km (at the beginning of the battle) and 7 km (at the end), and the fact that one shell fell half a kilometer from the Sheer (okay, 3 cable sounds cooler) - already an achievement, whatever one may say.
It is clear that the Scheer had experienced sailors who were able to distinguish a fountain from a 152-mm projectile and a 76-mm one. They also distinguished, which negatively affected the desire to come closer.
It makes sense to recall the Norwegian events, when a completely prehistoric Norwegian battery, which could still shoot at plesiosaurs, sank the heavy cruiser Blucher. So a heavy projectile, he is not aware that it is ancient. And it breaks through. Especially if you hit at close range.
And point-blank it was necessary to approach, since the battalion of the marines aboard the "Scheer" was waiting for that in the event of a landing. There were no teleports then. But the battery, which fired at the sound and everything else, could not be suppressed, and therefore there was a tiny, but a chance to get a shell of medium (by naval standards) caliber.
On the whole, the Scheer did not expect that there would be anyone able to resist on Dixon.
But this is a separate topic for conversation, there was enough surprise for everyone, both ours and the Germans. And we will return to the events that were discussed at the beginning.
And the first person I would like to involve as a witness is the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsova.
Nikolai Gerasimovich is a more than controversial figure in the history of that war, but his books cannot be accused of excessive speculation. And in "Course to Victory" everything that happened, although it was presented from the office in the General Music School, which was located quite far from the theater of events, that from the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, was presented quite objectively. For that time and circumstances. In general - time-tested, you can believe.
So, Kuznetsov writes that on August 24, 1942, just the day before the sinking of Sibiryakov, the head of the British naval mission in Arkhangelsk informed the command of the Northern Fleet that Admiral Scheer left anchorage in West fjord in an unknown direction and has not yet been discovered.
Question: where?
The allies monitored the Norwegian and North Seas rather closely. They have already been taught from experience how the breakthroughs of the German raiders on supply communications end. But the Sheer was not there. If he is not there, where the Allied intelligence has searched everything well, then the Scheer has gone the other way? Is it logical? It is logical.
At the North Pole, the cruiser has nothing to do. In the south is land. So - to the east, to the Barents Sea.
So, in theory, you should have sounded the alarm? Raise planes, send submarines to the lines, raise alarm on all ships and observation posts.
However, if we study all the documents, we are unlikely to find any evidence that such events took place.
It is hardly possible to find reliable descriptions of the events of 1941-42 in the bulk of the memoirs. It is quite obvious that at least 80% of the memories are similar to one scenario: in a tongue twister, it tells how everything was not very good since June 22, 1941, we retreated, and then everything became good. And from the moment of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk, an almost step-by-step description of victories begins.
Talking about Admiral Arseny Grigorievich Golovko is also very difficult. He did not win such laurels as, for example, Admiral Oktyabrsky, whose desperate cowardice and ability to politically maneuver were praised by the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union in 1958.
The Hero's head was not given. "The omnipresent admiral" (an excellent nickname in my opinion) was the youngest naval commander who received at his disposal not even the fleet, but … the embryo of the fleet. And nevertheless, he did it. With the forces that the Northern Fleet had, ensure the escort of the northern convoys … Only for these operations could Golovko be made a Hero.
However, back to our events.
If you carefully read the memoirs of Golovko and Kuznetsov, some dissonance in the dates will come to light. Golovko writes that he learned about the release of "Sheer" on the 22nd, Kuznetsov - on the 24th. In general, it does not matter, because the memoirs were written not in hot pursuit, but much later.
When the admirals got information about the Scheer, it doesn't really matter. What is important is what has been done. And it was done … that's right, nothing.
And here I just answer the question with a question: what could Admiral Golovko have done?
Are we watching?
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the most formidable warships of the USSR Northern Fleet were destroyers, of which there were eight units. Plus patrol ships, hastily made up of merchant ships and steamers (yes, the same "Sibiryakov" and "Dezhnev"), 15 submarines.
By the time of the events described, the number of destroyers had decreased to 7, and only 8 submarines remained.
As you can imagine, the "watchdogs" of merchant ships turned out to be so-so. Slow, poorly armed, but with excellent seaworthiness even in ice conditions. The very thing is to protect the water area from submarines. On "Sheer" - no options. Proven by Sibiryakov.
So if anyone could pose a threat to the cruiser, it was destroyers and submarines. But even here not everything is smooth.
Three "Noviks" still tsarist building with 102-mm guns, we immediately remove from the agenda. Yes, the Noviks were excellent ships, they were not afraid of bad weather and excitement, but they had no weapons for 1942 about anything.
"Sevens" … What is good for the Black Sea, turned out to be not very good in the North. The seaworthiness of the destroyers left much to be desired and ended in tragedy with the "Crushing".
But in fact, in August 1942, two Project 7 destroyers ("Crushing" and "Thundering") and two "Noviks" ("Uritsky" and "Kuibyshev") were in service.
Alignment: 8 130-mm guns and 8 102-mm guns in our country against 8 150-mm guns and 6 283-mm guns at "Scheer" …
Yes, there were torpedoes, but the distance of the torpedo attack still needs to be approached somehow.
I will say this about submarines: in the North, the most difficult thing is to find a ship. Huge spaces, okay, if it's a polar day. In short - without aviation anywhere. By the way, when all of their seaplanes were smashed on the Scheer, the Germans also started having problems with the search. Radar, of course, is a matter (our destroyers did not have them then), but an imperfect matter.
So, without the help of aircraft, a submarine will find a single ship in such vast spaces … It is doubtful.
But that August we had TWO submarines left for the entire Northern Fleet. Shch-422 and K-21. The rest were under repair.
Aviation … There was no aviation. For two regiments of torpedo bombers, as of August 26, there were 2 (TWO) IL-4 serviceable and ready for flight in the 35th MTAP. Plus "reconnaissance bombers" MBR-2, of which they scraped together as many as a dozen.
So, two (four) destroyers, two submarines, two torpedo bombers and ten flying boats.
This is all that Golovko had at his disposal.
Sadly? Quite.
Allies. By the way, what about our allies?
It turned out very interesting with the allies. On August 23, the heavy cruiser "Tuscaluza" and 5 destroyers arrived in Murmansk. And they were informed that the Sheer was dragging along somewhere nearby.
Further opinions diverge by 180 degrees. The British (who were in charge of the cruiser) claim that they were ready to give the Germans cabbage soup, but no one asked them about it. It is clear that it would have to be coordinated through the naval mission in Arkhangelsk and the admiralty in London.
I don’t want to try to figure out who is cunning here, the facts are more important. And the facts say this: on 23 August a heavy cruiser and 5 destroyers arrived at the port, and 24 have already rushed back.
What caused this haste? Another mystery, but I think I know the answer. Of course, the Sheera were not scared. The Tuscaloosa, with nine 203mm guns, might well have puzzled the Admiral Scheer. And also five destroyers …
I remind you, August 1942. The situation on all fronts is so-so. At sea too. And suddenly the British Admiralty just like that easily drives a cruiser and five destroyers to the Soviet Union. Why???
Yes, all for that: for gold. It is worth looking at what the Tuscaloosa heavy cruiser was.
It was President Roosevelt's personal yacht. Until 1942, it was on this ship that Roosevelt made all sea inspection trips. That is, the ship had a proven, rechecked and reliable crew.
That is, one that can be trusted with gold, which will not fold the handles, like the crew of the "Edinburgh" in May of the same 1942 …
So the only reason a cruiser could fly with such an escort was gold, with which the USSR paid for everything that did not go under Lend-Lease. And this also explains the speed with which the cruiser and her escort went back.
It is clear that the Americans and the British were not up to the search for the Sheer. True, on the way back, the Tuscaloosa and the destroyers sank a German minelayer who was trying to set up an obstacle in the Norwegian Sea.
In general, the only thing that remained was to count on what was at hand. And there was, as we have already found out, a little.
Admiral Golovko had a very difficult choice.
The Northern Fleet had no forces at all to resist the raider. We must also take into account the submarines that provided reconnaissance to the Sheer.
And the question is, which is better: to pretend that the fleet commander does not know anything about the Sheer, or knows, but has no idea what to do with this knowledge?
Golovko was frankly lying. Since the main headquarters of the fleet knew that the Scheer was somewhere near our shores, it would not have worked out completely to say that “they knew nothing about it”. Therefore, the headquarters of the Northern Fleet pretended that they simply could not find the Sheer. Which is actually true.
"Granaries" flew in the alleged area of the appearance of the "Admiral Scheer", but the proposed area was not just large, it was huge. And the range of the MBR-2 was very small. Therefore, it is no wonder that they could not find a needle in a haystack, which was a cruiser.
True, the "Admiral Scheer" could not find the convoy, which was going through the Northern Sea Route.
Therefore, Golovko pretended that he was completely unaware of where the raider was. A very delicate game, on the edge. Indeed, in the event of the discovery of the Sheer, Kuznetsov and everyone above could have demanded, in the spirit of the times, "to take urgent and decisive measures."
Could you? Easy.
What could Golovko have done in that situation? Well, yes, really throw everything that was at hand, see the list above.
The worst could happen if the destroyers actually found the Sheer. The result of the battle is very difficult to predict. Perhaps the raider would have received some damage. Maybe not. 80 millimeters of armor is 8 times more than that of "sevens".
It is possible to analyze the probable battle between Sheer and our destroyers, but I am afraid that the result will definitely not be in our favor.
And so what happened?
And what happened is this: Sheer really roamed the Arctic, the convoy did not find it, sank the icebreaker Alexander Sibiryakov and damaged the SKR-19, which is Dezhnev. Burned a fuel warehouse, a weather station and buildings on Dikson.
SKR-19, aka the icebreaking steamer "Semyon Dezhnev"
And he was forced to leave because of the rabid artillery lieutenant Nikolai Kornyakov with his museum cannons and the MBR-2 pilot, who, through his negotiations with the radio operator Dixon, convinced the commander of the Admiral Scheer that a whole squadron of torpedo bombers was coming to the rescue. Which in fact was not, but Wilhelm Meendsen-Bolken, the raider commander, chose not to aggravate the situation and did not want to fight the Soviet torpedo bombers.
In general, Admiral Golovko squeezed the maximum out of the situation. He made it so that the order to throw everything that was into battle was not received. And he did not set himself up. He did not destroy either people or ships in a senseless battle.
It is clear that there is still a difference if you missed something for lack of information, and completely different if you knew everything, but did nothing.
Admiral Golovko chose the first one. As a result, the whole operation "Wonderland" failed, and moreover, it forever discouraged the Germans from trying to do something on our northern communications. Obviously, Admiral Scheer's campaign in terms of fuel, ammunition and other expenses was not worth the sunken old steamboat and several burned buildings on Dikson.
Well, in the end, you can answer the question asked: how did the "Admiral Scheer" end up abeam of the Krasnoyarsk Territory near Dikson Island? It's simple: there was no one and nothing to look for it. Therefore, they did not find it.
But Admiral Golovko made the right choice, not sending hundreds of sailors to their death. For which many thanks to him. As well as our gratitude and gratitude forever to the commander of the "Alexander Sibiryakov" Kacharava, the artilleryman Kornyakov, the commander of the "Semyon Dezhnev" Gidulyanov and everyone else …
German planning crashed against Russian improvisation, and crashed quite impressively.
It is difficult to say why Admiral Golovko was not made a Hero of the Soviet Union, unlike some colleagues who clearly did not deserve this, here, perhaps, the question is with what conscience Arseny Grigorievich left our world.
I am sure with a clean one.
