Today the village of Sagopshi (formerly called Sagopshin) is a fairly large settlement on the territory of the Malgobek district of Ingushetia. The population of the village is over 11 thousand inhabitants. Life here remained relatively peaceful even during the active phase of the two Chechen wars that raged on the territory of the neighboring republic.
But it was not always so. In the fall of 1942, in the area of Sagopshin, Malgobek, the villages of Upper and Lower Kurp, as well as the nearest settlements, fierce battles raged. Here, as part of the Mozdoko-Malgobek defensive operation, Soviet troops stopped the advance of the Germans, including the elite 5th motorized SS Viking division, blocking the enemy's path to the Caucasian oil.
The summer-autumn campaign of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front in 1942 assumed an active offensive by German troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The main idea of the operation, codenamed "Blau", was the offensive of the 6th field and 4th tank armies on Stalingrad, their access to the Volga, as well as the offensive on Rostov-on-Don with a further general offensive of German troops in the Caucasus. After German troops occupied Rostov-on-Don, Hitler considered the plan of Operation Blau to be achieved, and on July 23, 1942, a new directive No. 45 was issued to continue the already new operation, code-named Braunschweig.
In accordance with the new plans, Army Group "A" by the forces of the Ruoff Army Group (17th Army and 3rd Romanian Army) was tasked with striking through the Western Caucasus and further along the Black Sea coast with access to the Batumi region and the oil reserves available here in order to taking over this whole area. The forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies were tasked with capturing the oil regions of Maikop and Grozny, as well as the passes of the Central Caucasus, advancing towards Baku and Tbilisi. Army Group B with the forces of the 6th Army was to capture Stalingrad, taking up defenses on the rest of the front on the Don line. The decision to capture Astrakhan was to be made after the capture of Stalingrad.
German units attacking Stalingrad
The Wehrmacht's strike with the advance to the Caucasus pursued an important strategic goal - to get to the local oil. No wonder they say that oil is the blood of war. Without it, planes will not take off into the sky and tanks will not crawl on the ground. Germany throughout the Second World War experienced problems with the supply of hydrocarbon fuels. At the same time, in 1940, the USSR produced 33 million tons of oil, of which about 22, 3 million tons were produced in Azerbaijan (Aznefedobycha) - 73, 63%, more than 2, 2 million tons were produced in the Grozny region (Grozneft), together with Dagneft they gave another 7.5% of black gold production. The surrender of these regions to the Germans could have been a crushing blow to the USSR. Another, but already a secondary task of the Wehrmacht, was the elimination of the channel for the supply of military equipment and industrial goods from Iran to the USSR within the framework of the Lend-Lease program.
Realizing their plan in practice, German troops crossed the Terek River on September 2, wedging into the Soviet defenses. A fierce defensive battle unfolded in the Malgobek area and the villages located in its immediate vicinity, which blocked the way for the Germans to the Alkhanchurt Valley, from which Grozny oil was already a stone's throw. One of the points for its attack, the German command chose the area around the village of Sagopshin south of Malgobek.
It was near Sagopshin, at the entrance to the Alkhanchurt Valley, that one of the largest oncoming tank battles of the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1942 took place on the Soviet-German front. Up to 120 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battles on both sides. On the Soviet side, the 52nd Tank Brigade, which at that time was commanded by Major Vladimir Ivanovich Filippov (from 1942-29-10 - Lieutenant Colonel), took part in the battle, and from the German side, units of the elite 5th Motorized SS Viking Division. The battle that unfolded near Sagopshin is now called the "Caucasian Prokhorovka", naturally, making allowances for the number and strength of units and formations participating in the battles.
Near Sagopshin, the 5th SS Viking Motorized Division deployed a large grouping of its forces: the Westland and Nordland motorized regiments, the Viking tank battalion, parts of the self-propelled anti-tank battalion and all the artillery. Although the division suffered losses in previous battles and experienced shell hunger, the available funds in both tanks and infantry were still significant. The Viking tank battalion had 48 combat vehicles, mainly Pz III medium tanks with long-barreled 50-mm cannons (34 vehicles), as well as 9 Pz IV tanks and five light Pz II tanks. Also, the Germans had here at least a dozen self-propelled guns from the Viking SS anti-tank battalion, most likely, these were some models of the Marder self-propelled guns, which were actively used by the Germans in the battles for Stalingrad and the Caucasus in the summer and autumn of 1942. This is evidenced by the memoirs of the German tanker Tike Wilhelm, who described them as guns on self-propelled carriages. The number of German tanks and anti-tank guns is taken from the article by Stanislav Chernikov “Tank battle at Sagopshin. Caucasian Prokhorovka.
On the Soviet side, Major Filippov's 52nd Tank Brigade was the only mobile formation in this direction. Most likely, by that time it had no more than 40-50 tanks on the move. In addition to the tanks of the 52nd brigade, from the Soviet side, a battalion of motorized infantry and the 863rd anti-tank regiment of Major F. Dolinsky took part in the battle on September 28. In favor of the Soviet side were favorable defensive positions, favorable terrain conditions, which were supplemented by competent actions of the commanders. In the same sector, the 57th Guards Rifle Brigade, which had previously been subjected to massive attacks, defended itself. On September 26, the Germans broke through its positions, and in the battle on September 28, the infantry of the brigade, during a massive attack of enemy tanks, partly retreated, partly fled, not providing the enemy with proper resistance.
The 52nd Tank Brigade was part of a military formation, the process of its creation began on December 21, 1941 in Tbilisi. The personnel for her were the soldiers and officers of the 21st reserve tank regiment, the 28th reserve rifle brigade, the 21st fighter aviation school and the 18th reserve transport regiment. From December 22, 1941 to August 3, 1942, the brigade studied complex combat vehicles, putting together crews, platoons, companies, battalions and the brigade as a whole. By the time it was sent to the front on August 8, 1942, the brigade was fully equipped with weapons and equipment. On May 11, it included 10 KV-1 heavy tanks, 20 T-34 medium tanks and 16 T-60 light tanks, the number of personnel being 1103 people.
By the end of September - beginning of October 1942, the composition of the brigade's military equipment was already very motley, for example, according to data on October 1, 1942 (two days after the battle), the brigade included 3 heavy KV-1 tanks, 3 medium tanks - T -34, 8 light tanks - T-60, 9 American - M3L and 10 British MK-3, also included two captured T-3, which, with a high degree of probability, became trophies of the battle near Sagopshin. Also, these figures indicate that the brigade's losses in the battles of August-September 1942 were replenished through the supply of Lend-Lease equipment: American M3 Stuart (M3L) tanks and British Mk III Valentine (MK-3) tanks. At the same time, the Soviet side reported on the results of the battle on September 28 about the loss of 10 tanks - five burned out and five knocked out.
Filippov and Dolinsky jointly developed a plan for the future battle. They decided to defend themselves in a narrow area between the Sunzhensky and Tersky mountain ranges. Three lines of anti-tank defensive posts (PTOPs) were created here, each of which consisted of a tank ambush, anti-tank guns on the flanks and machine gunners. The first line of defense, which consisted of three such ambushes, was designed to smash the main shock "ram" of the Germans, disperse their forces and inflict maximum damage on the enemy. On this line were placed tanks M3l and "thirty-four", on the second line of PTOPs were all available KV tanks and 76-mm guns. The third line was needed for the most part in order to defeat those German forces that would manage to break through the first defensive lines. Soviet commanders were able to prepare a real trap from an echeloned defense in the direction of the enemy's strike. On September 28, the advancing German units fell into a trap set for them, bogged down in the defense of Soviet anti-tank guns, and everything that happened during the many hours of battle later went down in history as a tank battle in the Battle of Malgobek, and the modern researcher T. Matiev called the incident “Caucasian Prokhorovka ".
In the morning of September 26, the commander of the 5th SS Motorized Division "Viking" received a radiogram from the commander of the 1st Panzer Army, which set the task of the day: "". On September 26, the Nazis did not manage to reach Sagopshin, but they did not abandon their attempts to break through, besides, they really managed to advance in this direction, pushing the infantry of the 57th GSBR.
On the night of September 28, the Viking battle group spent on a large corn field, ready to continue its offensive in the direction of Sagopshin at dawn. Tanks and self-propelled guns on carriages took up a perimeter defense, while Russian artillery fired harassing fire on them. The motorized Westland regiment, which came closer to the tanks, began to suffer the first losses. And yet, the damage from the artillery fire was more moral than physical. Even in Soviet reports it was noted that at dawn on September 28, the enemy "with a force of 120 tanks supported by machine gunners and strong artillery and mortar fire, launched an offensive from the Ozerny region in two columns, three-echelons." At the same time, the number of German tanks in the document was exaggerated, on that day the Germans could simultaneously use no more than 50-60 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Tanks KV-1 and T-34 of the 52nd tank brigade
The plan of the German offensive provided for: the 1st company of the Viking tank battalion with the main forces of the Westland regiment attacked Sagopshin from the front. The 2nd company of the Viking tank battalion bypasses Sagopshin from the north and enters the Sagopshin-Nizhnie Achaluki road, blocking it and, depending on the situation, attacks Sagopshin from the rear. The decision on the time of the attack was made by the commander of the Viking tank battalion. His calculation was to make the most of the morning fog, which was supposed to exclude the superiority of the T-34 and KV tanks in effective firing range, since the German Pz III and Pz IV tanks were quite vulnerable in this regard.
Before the fog cleared, the Germans managed to go deeper into the defenses of the Soviet units, overcoming the first positions. However, as soon as the defenses of the fog were lifted, deadly fire rained down on the enemy from all directions. The tanks were hit by artillery and mortars from a distance of less than 700 meters, and rifle and machine-gun fire pressed the motorized infantry to the ground, cutting it off from military equipment. The Germans noted that enemy artillery fired at them from the heights from Malgobek. The frontal attack of the battalions of the Westland regiment on Sagopshin did not lead to anything, the infantry lay down, while the head company commander, Hauptsturmführer Willer, was almost immediately killed (corresponding to the Hauptmann / captain in the Wehrmacht).
Not noticing that the infantry was screened out by fire and retreating, the German tanks tried to continue the attack, advancing close to the Soviet positions. At the same time, already at the first line, they lost six tanks. The tank of the commander of the Viking tank battalion, Sturmbannführer (Major) Mühlenkamp, was also destroyed. Later, describing this battle, he noted that the sun broke through the clouds earlier than expected, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, after which the fog instantly cleared. Then he discovered that they were already in the middle of the enemy's field defensive positions, in the line of his trenches and strongholds. At 800 meters from him, he saw Soviet tanks, which he identified as T-34. According to Mühlenkamp's recollections, both tanks and artillery fired at them. Quite quickly, the battalion commander's tank was knocked out, the first shell hit the stern of the tank behind the turret, and the engine flared up. The second hit was in the front hatch, the driver was injured. The third hit was in the tower on the right from behind. A two-hundred-kilogram hatch fell into the fighting compartment, chopping off the hand of the radio operator, who at that time was firing from a machine gun. Mühlenkamp managed to survive this battle, he left the already burning tank through the lower hatch and helped the seriously wounded driver and radio operator to get out. Already near the abandoned combat vehicle, a gunner from the Mühlenkamp crew was mortally wounded by machine gun fire from a Soviet tank that had passed 100 meters away from them, in the commander's tank this is always the battalion's liaison officer - Untersturmführer (lieutenant) Kentrop. Later, Mühlenkamp twice transferred to other tanks in order to establish control of the battalion, but the tanks were hit twice, the first time at 9 o'clock in the morning, the second time already at 15 o'clock in the afternoon.
Pz III tanks of the 5th SS Motorized Division "Viking" and resting tank crews
Around a counter tank battle flared up, in which all the armored vehicles of the Viking division got bogged down. In this battle, the Germans suffered serious losses. Tankmen of the 52nd brigade and artillerymen of the 863rd anti-tank regiment managed to knock out the tanks of the commanders of the 1st and 3rd German companies of Hauptsturmführer Schnabel and Hauptsturmführer Darges. Also in the battle, the self-propelled gun of the commander of the 3rd company of the 5th anti-tank battalion, Hauptsturmführer Jock, was destroyed, who was seriously wounded by shrapnel in the shoulder. All this made it difficult for the Germans to control the battle, reducing the organization of the attack. Very soon, howitzers and "Katyushas" joined the Soviet tanks and anti-tank crews, the batteries of which occupied positions in Sagopshin and Malgobek itself, and Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield.
The Germans themselves later claimed that their tank battalion was hit by more than 80 enemy tanks, but now they were already exaggerating the number of Soviet tankers. Despite this, the joint actions of Soviet tankmen, artillerymen and aviation made a depressing impression on the Germans. Especially serious losses were suffered by the Westland regiment and its first battalion, which came under concentrated fire from artillery of various calibers. "", - recalled after the fight Mühlenkamp.
In the second half of the day, the Germans, having come to their senses and having regrouped their forces, again decided to go on the offensive. By that time, the Viking tank battalion had already lost about a third of its combat vehicles. The battle flared up with renewed vigor, dividing into several separate battles. According to the documents of the 52nd Tank Brigade, about a dozen German tanks broke through to the brigade's command post, where Major Filippov was forced into battle with them on his tank, having recorded five enemy vehicles on the account of his crew. At the same time, the situation remained difficult, so the brigade commander threw his reserve into battle - a company of 7 tanks, which attacked parts of the SS men in the flank, knocking out several enemy vehicles. Even Mühlenkamp appreciated the skillful actions of Soviet tank crews: "". Around this time, Mühlenkamp was hit for the third time in a day.
M3L tanks of the 52nd tank brigade
The commander of the anti-tank artillery regiment, Dolinsky, had to enter into battle with the Germans, he personally stood up to the gun, the crew of which died in battle, knocking out two enemy tanks. Also distinguished was the battery of senior lieutenant P. Dym, which destroyed several tanks in a day (according to documents, as many as 17, but this is an obvious exaggeration), several cars and an enemy artillery battery. As a result, having suffered heavy losses and having failed to break through the Soviet defenses, the Germans retreated. The Westland regiment withdrew two kilometers to the west, hiding behind the folds of the terrain. Having retreated, the Germans, before nightfall, built a defense line in the lowland in front of Sagopshin.
On September 28, the Germans did not confine themselves to a frontal strike. About a dozen enemy tanks under the command of Obersturmführer Flügel with an assault of machine gunners on armor outflanked the Soviet positions and rushed around Sagopshin from the north. The Germans began their advance even before the start of the carnage that unfolded in the valley. At the same time, they were very lucky, according to the marks-poles, which were accidentally forgotten by Soviet sappers, they discovered a passage through a minefield and used it. Fortunately for the defending Soviet fighters, this group stumbled upon Soviet tanks on the gentle slopes of the gorge, which slowed its advance. By the second half of the day, Flugel's tanks blocked the Sagopshin-Nizhnie Achaluki road, but could not build on their success and took up defensive positions in the area, awaiting reinforcements. They did not know that the main forces of the tank battalion and the Westland regiment suffered huge losses in the valley and were stuck there in the Soviet echeloned defense.
Around the same time, Soviet heavy artillery concentrated fire on Flugel's tanks, the tankers were forced to occupy the abandoned Soviet anti-tank ditch, hiding the tanks in them in the tower. Here they waited for the day, deciding to retreat at nightfall. At night, they still managed to capture several groups of prisoners from among the Soviet infantrymen, who did not expect to find an enemy here, and on September 29 they left their positions.
Commander of the 52nd Tank Brigade Major Filippov
The battle on September 28, 1942 at Sagopshin lasted about 10 hours. According to Soviet data, the Germans lost 54 tanks and self-propelled guns in battle, of which 23 were burned out (most likely less). According to the official report, the losses of the Filippov brigade amounted to 10 tanks, of which five combat vehicles were irretrievably lost. At the same time, German documents confirmed that the Viking's own losses of armored vehicles that day were superior to those of the Soviet Union. On September 29-30, they continued their attempts to break through in this direction, but this time mainly with one infantry. In many ways, it was at Sagopshin that the fate of the entire Malgobek battle was decided, and it, in turn, put an end to the plans of the German command to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus.
