Every year in March, Russia celebrates the Day of the Submariner. Usually, by this date, it is customary to remember the achievements of our fleet, its exploits, history, and the replenishment of new ships. However, a rather important question remains in the shadows about how prepared the modern Russian fleet is for emergency situations with submarines and overcoming their consequences. As noted by Viktor Ilyukhin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor and laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology, plans for the development of emergency rescue and search facilities in our country are constantly thwarted. The lessons of the Kursk submarine tragedy remain unlearned.
The tragedy with the Kursk nuclear submarine missile cruiser (APRK) took place on August 12, 2000. After a series of explosions on board, the nuclear-powered ship sank at a depth of 108 meters, 175 kilometers from Severomorsk. The disaster killed all 118 crew members on board the submarine. As the state commission later found out, the explosion of torpedo 65-76 "Kit" in torpedo tube No. 4 led to the disaster. As it was possible to establish, most of the crew of the boat died almost instantly or within a few minutes after the explosion.
Only 23 people were able to survive the sinking of the submarine, hiding in the aft, 9th compartment of the submarine. All crew members gathered in the 9th compartment were from 6-7-8-9 compartments of the Kursk. Here they also found a note from Lieutenant Commander Dmitry Kolesnikov, the commander of the turbine group of the movement division (the 7th compartment of the Kursk APRK). As Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, who commanded the Northern Fleet, later noted, after the explosion on board, the surviving submariners fought for just over an hour for the survivability of the aft compartments of the boat. Having done everything in their power, they went to the 9th compartment-shelter. The last note, which was made by Lieutenant Commander Dmitry Kolesnikov, was written by him at 15:15 on August 12, 2000, this is the time indicated in the note.
As experts later established, all submariners remaining in the 9th compartment died within 7-8 hours (maximum) after the tragedy. They were poisoned by carbon monoxide. It is believed that sailors, when charging the RDU (regenerative breathing device) with fresh plates or hanging additional regenerative oxygen plates in an open form (not in RDU installations) in safe places in the 9th compartment, or accidentally dropped the plates, allowing them to come into contact with the oil in the compartment. and fuel, or accidentally spilled oil on the plates. The subsequent explosion and fire almost instantly burned out all the oxygen in the compartment, filling it with carbon dioxide, from the poisoning of which the submariners lost consciousness and then died, there was simply no oxygen left in the compartment.
They would not be able to escape, even if they managed to leave the ill-fated 9th compartment on their own through the emergency hatch (ASL). In this case, even those who would have managed to get to the surface would not have been able to live in the Barents Sea for more than 10-12 hours, even being in diving suits, the water temperature at that time was + 4 … 5 degrees Celsius. At the same time, the search actions were announced by the leadership of the fleet only more than 12 hours after the disaster, at the same time the boat was recognized as emergency. And the first ships arrived at the site of the sinking of the submarine only 17 hours later. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the emergency rescue buoy (ASB), which was supposed to surface automatically after the tragedy, having precisely indicated the location of the submarine, actually remained on board, which the surviving submariners simply could not know about.
The tragedy of the Kursk APRK was the last major disaster in the Russian nuclear fleet, revealing a large number of problems in the organization of search and rescue support (PSO) of the Russian Navy. The lack of modern vessels, the lack of the necessary diving equipment, and the imperfection of the organization of work were revealed. Only on August 20, 2000, the Norwegian ship "Seaway Eagle" was admitted to the rescue operations at the scene of the tragedy, the divers from which were able to open the aft escape hatch of the submarine the next day. By that time, there was no one to rescue on the boat for a long time, as it will later become known, all the submariners died before the start of the search and rescue operation.
All accidents and disasters that occur in the fleet are the starting point for action and taking measures to equip the fleet with modern means of rescuing crews in distress. The Kursk disaster was no exception. The country has taken a number of measures aimed at improving the means and forces intended to rescue submarine crews. Thus, in 2001-2003, abroad, it was possible to purchase modern remotely controlled unmanned vehicles (ROV), as well as deep-sea normobaric spacesuits and other special equipment, some documents regulating rescue operations were rewritten and re-approved. Taking into account the experience gained, new models of diving and rescue equipment were developed, and improved systems of rescue of submariners were introduced on some submarines.
As Viktor Ilyukhin noted in an article published in the VPK newspaper issue No. 10 (723) of March 13, 2018, due to the acquisition of imported equipment, the capabilities of Russian rescuers increased slightly, since many operations that were previously carried out by divers in ordinary deep-sea equipment began to be performed with the help of a ROV or with the use of special rigid normobaric spacesuits, which are, in fact, a mini-bathyscaphe, reliably protecting its operator from the enormous pressure of the water column. Thanks to their application, the process of examining submarines has accelerated, and the process of delivering life support equipment to the crews of emergency boats has been simplified.
Rescue vessel "Igor Belousov"
A significant step forward was the Concept for the Development of PSO Systems of the Russian Navy for the Period up to 2025, which was approved by the Minister of Defense of the country on February 14, 2014. The first stage of this program, calculated until 2015, provided for the provision of rescuers with modern means of providing assistance to emergency facilities at sea and carrying out underwater operations with minimal damage to the environment, as well as the process of deep modernization of existing deep-sea vehicles and the start of construction of a series of ships of Project 21300 (rescue ship) with rescue deep-sea vehicles (SGA) new generation "Bester-1".
The second phase of the program, scheduled for 2016-2020, provided for the creation of special multifunctional rescue vessels in the near sea and far sea and ocean zones, as well as basing points for the ships of the fleet. The third stage (2021 - 2025) involved the creation of an airmobile rescue system for submariners. This system is planned to be used from non-specialized carrier vessels or combat submarines of the Russian fleet specially equipped for these purposes. Also adopted in 2014, the concept involved the development of means of rescuing submariners in the Arctic, including under the ice.
How the concept is implemented
In December 2015, the composition of the Russian Navy ships was replenished with the ocean-class rescue vessel Igor Belousov. We are talking about the lead ship of the project 21300S "Dolphin". "Igor Belousov" is designed to rescue crews, supply life-saving equipment, air and electricity to emergency submarines lying on the ground or being on the surface, as well as surface ships. In addition, the rescue vessel can search and survey emergency facilities in a given area of the World Ocean, including acting as part of international maritime rescue teams.
This rescue vessel is a carrier of the new generation SGA Bester-1 of project 18271. This apparatus has a working depth of up to 720 meters. One of the features of the device is the presence of a new guidance system, landing and attachment to the emergency submarine. The new docking chamber to the emergency exit from the submarine makes it possible to evacuate up to 22 submariners at a time with a roll of up to 45 degrees. The ship also has an imported deep-sea diving complex GVK-450 manufactured by the Scottish company Divex, supplied by the Tethys Pro company.
Deep-sea rescue vehicle "Bester-1"
Also, within the framework of the adopted concept, the modernization of 4 deep-sea rescue vehicles (SGA) was carried out with the extension of the service life of the devices. But in terms of the revision of the launching devices to ensure the lifting of the SGA with people, as well as the installation of a docking station with pressure chambers to ensure decompression of the submariners, the task was not completed. The need for the Navy's search and rescue support ships with SGA equipped with modular means of supporting the life of the submarine crew and decompression pressure chambers is confirmed by numerous international exercises in which foreign rescue vessels built in the 1970s, retrofitted with modern equipment that meet the requirements of today's day. In this regard, in Russia, the relevance of the modernization of the already existing rescue vessels, which are carriers of the SGA, remains. The main point of implementation of the second stage of the concept was the creation of 11 rescue tugboats of various projects: 22870, 02980, 23470, 22540 and 745MP, as well as 29 roadstead and multifunctional diving boats of projects 23040 and 23370, which, however, are not intended to rescue the personnel of emergency underwater boats lying on the ground.
The problem also lies in the fact that "Igor Belousov" is the only ship of this type in the entire Russian fleet. On June 1, 2016, a rescue ship under the command of 3rd rank captain Alexei Nekhodtsev left Baltiysk, the ship successfully covered more than 14 thousand nautical miles, arriving in Vladivostok on September 5. Today the ship is based there, being part of the Russian Pacific Fleet. According to the concept adopted earlier, it was planned to build 5 serial ships of project 21300, as well as create a multifunctional rescue vessel for the far sea and ocean zones, but work in this direction has not yet begun. Even the requirements for the serial ship of this project have not been specified, which would take into account the experience of testing and operating the already built lead ship "Igor Belousov". In addition, the issue of creating a domestic deep-water diving complex has not been resolved in Russia. It is planned to build a series of rescue vessels by 2027. According to the plans, each fleet is planned to have at least one such vessel.
There is no room for the GVK
The technology of diving operations using the long-term diving method has hardly changed over the past 25 years. This is happening not only because the performance of divers at great depths is very low, but mainly due to the rapid development of robotics and unmanned vehicles, including underwater ones. The top cover of the ill-fated 9th emergency rescue compartment of the Kursk nuclear-powered ship was opened precisely with the help of manipulators of a foreign unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). In all recent search and rescue operations that have been carried out at sea over the past 20 years, a fairly high efficiency of the use of remotely controlled UUVs has been confirmed.
So on August 4, 2005, the Russian deep-sea rescue vehicle of Project 1855 Prize (AS-28), as part of a planned dive in Kamchatka in the area of Berezovaya Bay, got entangled in the elements of the underwater hydrophone system and could not float to the surface. In contrast to the situation with the Kursk, the leadership of the Navy immediately turned to other countries for help. The rescue operation lasted for several days, with the UK, USA and Japan joining in. On August 7, the British TNLA "Scorpion" released the "AS-28". All sailors on board the vehicle were rescued.
Remotely controlled unmanned underwater vehicle Seaeye Tiger
High efficiency is also shown by normobaric spacesuits, which, in contrast to the GVK, take up significantly less space on the rescue vessel. However, unmanned aerial vehicles and normobaric spacesuits are not able to completely replace divers, at least not yet. For this reason, the need for divers when working at depths of up to 200-300 meters in solving not only military, but also civilian tasks still remains. It should be noted that the Igor Belousov rescue vessel has two HS-1200 normobaric spacesuits, as well as the Seaeye Tiger ROV, capable of operating at depths of up to 1000 meters.
Currently available foreign vessels with GVK, as a rule, are designed for underwater technical and diving operations in solving various civilian tasks at depths of up to 500 meters. At the same time, they can be involved in emergency rescue operations in the interests of the naval forces, as happened with the Kursk submarine. As Viktor Ilyukhin notes, in the navies of foreign states, the following trend has emerged in the development of rescuing personnel from emergency submarines lying on the ground. It consists in the development of mobile systems that can rescue the crews of submarines in distress from a depth of 610 meters and are placed on civilian ships. The kits, which, if necessary, can be transported by air or conventional road transport, include SGA, normobaric spacesuits with the ability to dive up to 610 meters and ROV with a working depth of up to 1000 meters, decompression chambers. At the same time, there are no deep-water diving complexes in the composition of these systems.
According to the expert, the experience of various rescue operations tells us that when the locations of the search and rescue support forces are removed from possible areas of submarine accidents, the timely arrival of rescue ships to the site to evacuate the crew of the damaged submarine or maintain its vital functions is not always realistic. It is also necessary to take into account the difficult meteorological conditions that can be observed in the area of the emergency submarine, which also imposes its own limitations, sometimes very significant.
Along with this, extreme factors that can be observed in the compartments of emergency boats: high air pressure and temperature, the presence of harmful gases and impurities - significantly reduce the survival time of the crew. The personnel may simply not wait for outside help; in such a situation, they need to make a decision about getting off the boat on their own, which in some cases turns out to be the only possible rescue option.
Despite the fact that the designers carried out some studies aimed at solving the issues of more efficient use of pop-up cameras, automation of the locking process and reducing the time of this process, there remains a need to improve all elements of the submarine rescue complex. Comparison of Russian airlock systems with foreign counterparts shows us that it takes much more time for Russian submariners to leave, which seriously affects the effectiveness of the rescue operation. Also, the issue of ascent to the surface of life rafts from the side of submarines lying on the ground has not been resolved. At the same time, such a solution would significantly increase the probability of survival of submariners before the rescuers approach the accident site.
The question of rescue submarines and the involvement of civilian ships
As noted by Viktor Ilyukhin, the rescue vessels and rescue deep-sea vehicles currently available in the Russian fleet have a rather large drawback: they are not able to operate in areas that are covered with ice, while they can be ineffective in free water when the seas are intensifying. … In this case, a very good option that would ensure the prompt arrival of rescuers to the accident site with less dependence on weather conditions would be special rescue submarines. For example, combat submarines specially equipped for these purposes, the appearance of which is provided for by the 3rd stage of the concept.
Previously, such boats were available in the USSR. In the 1970s, two Project 940 Lenok diesel rescue boats were built. They later confirmed their effectiveness, but at the end of the 1990s they were withdrawn from the Russian fleet, which since then has not received an equivalent replacement. These boats were carriers of two deep-sea rescue vehicles operating at a depth of up to 500 meters, diving equipment - for work at a depth of up to 300 meters and a set of flow-decompression chambers and a long stay compartment. In addition, the rescue submarines were equipped with special devices and systems, for example, a gas supply system, air supply and utilization of gas mixtures. VVD and ATP supply devices, devices for erosion of silty soil, cutting and welding of metal.
Rescue submarine - project 940
Viktor Ilyukhin also points to the experience of recent years, when all ships were involved in large rescue operations, regardless of their departmental affiliation. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the civilian fleet and multifunctional vessels that can be used in the interests of the Russian Navy during rescue operations. For example, the Russian company Mezhregiontruboprovodstroy JSC owns the Kendrick special-purpose ship, this vessel is equipped with a deep-water diving complex MGVK-300, which provides operation at a depth of up to 300 meters, as well as a ROV for carrying out underwater technical works at a depth of up to 3000 meters. … In this regard, it seems relevant to conduct joint exercises of the Navy and other Russian departments and companies to provide assistance and rescue personnel from submarines lying on the ground.
In general, the expert notes the fact that the first two stages of the implementation of the "Concept for the development of PSO systems of the Russian Navy for the period up to 2025" were not fulfilled. Comparing the current state of the forces and means of rescue of submarine crews with 2000, Ilyukhin notes that significant changes have affected only the Pacific Fleet. In this regard, the issue of updating the designated concept regarding the measures indicated in it and the timing of their implementation seems to be extremely relevant, this must be done as quickly as possible.
