In the previous materials, the types and characteristics of tanks developed by Germany, the USSR, England, France and the United States in the interwar period were considered. France and England, based on the experience of using tanks in the First World War, adhered to a defensive concept, providing for the suspension of the enemy's offensive, exhausting him and transferring the war to a positional form. In tanks, they saw a means of supporting infantry and cavalry and the main emphasis was on the development of light and super-heavy tanks. In addition, medium tanks were developed, capable of conducting independent combat operations and resisting enemy tanks and anti-tank artillery. In this regard, there were no independent armored forces in their armies, the tanks were scattered across the infantry and cavalry formations.
Germany, which adopted the "blitzkrieg doctrine" based on achieving a lightning victory by delivering a preemptive strike against the enemy through the use of large tank formations to break through the front and penetrate into the depths of the enemy's territory. In Germany, the focus was on the development of mobile light and medium tanks. German strategists were the first to see the main purpose of tanks in a future war and made good use of it.
In the Soviet Union, they adhered to the Franco-British concept of deterring the enemy, routing and pursuing the enemy on its territory, and the main attention was paid to the development of light tanks to support the infantry and cavalry. There were also no independent armored forces in the Red Army, in the form of companies, battalions and regiments, they were included in the state or were attached to reinforce rifle divisions and brigades.
Against the background of the successes of the German army in the rapid offensive and defeat of Poland, France and England revised their concept and in 1940 began to create tank divisions. In the Soviet Union, against this background, they also began to create mechanized corps and tank divisions to perform independent tasks, but by the beginning of the war the reorganization was not completed.
In the interwar period, models of tanks of various classes were created, from the lightest tankettes to super-heavy "monsters". By the end of the 30s, the classic layout of tanks began to prevail in tank building, with the search for an optimal balance of firepower, protection and mobility of tanks. The experience in the development and operation of tanks showed that the most effective were medium and tanks close to them. By the beginning of the war, future opponents approached with a different number and quality of tanks, they had fundamentally different concepts of their use.
The most effective was the German doctrine, with the help of which Germany in the shortest possible time smashed its opponents with tank wedges and forced them to surrender. At the same time, in terms of the quantity and quality of tanks, Germany often did not surpass its opponents and even achieved impressive results by such means. By its actions, Germany proved that in addition to good tanks, one must also be able to use them competently.
What were the enemy tanks like on the eve of the war? A clear gradation of tanks in today's understanding did not exist then, there were light, infantry, cavalry, cruiser and heavy tanks. For simplicity of qualitative and quantitative analysis, all the main tanks of that time in this review are summarized in three comparative tables - light, medium and heavy, indicating their tactical and technical characteristics and the number of samples produced before the war.
Light tanks
This class is the largest in terms of types and number of tanks, and light amphibious tanks, which were mass-produced only in the USSR and had no serious use for their intended purpose, should also be included here, since almost all were destroyed in the first months of the war. In other countries, manufacturers of armored vehicles, amphibious tanks were not mass-produced.
1) Tanks of the BT series were produced in total 8620, including 620 BT-2, 1884 BT-5. 5328 BT-7 and 788 BT-7M.
Light tanks
Also, tankettes were mass-produced in all countries during this period, but due to their insignificant effect on the firepower of tank and other formations, they are not taken into account in this consideration.
Consideration of the main characteristics in terms of firepower, protection and mobility of light tanks shows that they did not fundamentally differ and were characterized by a crew of mainly 2-3 people, tank weight (5-14) tons, light cannon and machine gun armament, bulletproof armor and relatively good mobility …
Almost all of them were riveted from armor plates, had armor (13-16) mm, only the French H35, R35, FCM36 tanks and the Soviet T-50 tank with 34-45 mm anti-cannon armor stood out. It should also be noted that in the design of the hull and turret of the FCM36 and T-50, the installation of armor plates at rational angles was mainly used.
As cannon armament, 20-45 mm guns were installed on light tanks. French tanks have a short-barreled 37-mm cannon, the German Pz. II has a long-barreled 20-mm cannon and Soviet tanks have a long-barreled 45-mm cannon.
On the French FCM36 and the Soviet T-50, a diesel engine was used as a power plant, on the rest of the tanks they were gasoline, for the first time a diesel engine was used on a French tank. The Soviet T-50 had a serious advantage in mobility.
The German Pz. I and British Mk VI were the weakest in armament and armor and were inferior to Soviet and French light tanks. The firepower of the German Pz. II was insufficient due to the installation of a small-caliber cannon. Soviet mass tanks T-26 and BT-7 were superior in armament to the German ones, in armor they were on an equal footing, and in mobility the BT-7 was superior to German tanks. In terms of the totality of characteristics, firepower, protection and mobility, the Soviet T-50 was ahead of all.
Medium tanks
Medium tanks were characterized by a crew of mainly (3-6) people, weighing 11-27 tons, 37-76, 2-mm cannon armament, good bulletproof armor protection, some tanks had anti-shell protection, and satisfactory mobility.
1) A total of 300 tanks were produced, including 175 Mk II A10 and 125 MkI A9 with similar characteristics.
2) A total of 2,491 tanks were produced, including 1,771 MkV, 655 MkIV A13 and 65 Mk III A13 with similar characteristics.
3) 1248 T-34 tanks were produced by July 1941.
Medium tanks
Armor protection was mainly at the level of 16-30 mm, only the English Matilda I had armor 60 mm thick, and the T-34 had 45 mm armor protection with rational angles of inclination.
The most powerful guns in caliber were the Pz IV and T-34, but the Pz IV had a short-barreled 75mm gun with an L / 24, and the T-34 had a long-barreled 76.2mm gun with an L / 41.5.
In terms of mobility, the T-34 with a diesel engine stood out, a tank speed of 54 km / h and a power reserve of 380 km.
In terms of the aggregate characteristics, all tanks were seriously ahead of the T-34, the German Pz IV and the French S35 were somewhat inferior to it. In the West, a good medium tank was never developed, the T-34 became the first tank in which, for all its shortcomings in the layout of the fighting compartment, there was an optimal combination of firepower, protection and mobility, ensuring its high efficiency.
Heavy tanks
Heavy tanks were characterized by a crew of mainly 5-6 people, weighing 23-52 tons, 75-76 cannon, 2-mm armament, anti-cannon armor and limited mobility characteristics.
German tank Nb. Nz. in fact it was a medium tank, but for advertising purposes, German propaganda everywhere presented it as a heavy tank. In total, 5 samples of this tank were made, three of them were sent to Norway, where they demonstrated the power of the armored forces of the Wehrmacht and practically did not play any role in the hostilities.
The multi-turret Soviet T-35 tanks turned out to be a dead-end branch and were ineffective in real combat. The creation of the KV-2 assault tank with a 152-mm howitzer also did not have further development due to problems with the gun, the large dimensions of the tank and its unsatisfactory mobility.
In terms of the aggregate characteristics, the KV-1 and B1bis with anti-cannon 60-75 mm armor and powerful weapons were adequately represented in the niche of heavy tanks and were successfully used during the war. In terms of firepower, the KV-1 with a long-barreled 76, 2-mm cannon with L / 41, 6 stood out. The French B1bis, armed with two cannons, was not much inferior to it, at the beginning of the war it showed high efficiency and 161 B1bis captured by the Germans were included in the Wehrmacht …
Soviet and German schools of tank building
With the outbreak of war, the advantages and disadvantages of all tanks immediately became visible. None of the light, medium and heavy tanks of England and the United States found application during the war, they had to develop and launch into mass production new light, medium and heavy tanks. Occupied France completely stopped the development and production of tanks. In Germany, light Pz. II tanks were operated by the Wehrmacht until 1943, and medium Pz. III and Pz. IV tanks became the most massive tanks in Germany and were produced until the end of the war, in addition to them in 1942 the Pz. V "Panther" and Pz. VI appeared. "Tiger".
Since the beginning of the war, tanks of the Soviet Union were adequately represented in every class, among the light T-50, medium T-34 and heavy KV-1. The T-34 became the main tank of the army and the symbol of Victory. For organizational reasons, the T-50 was not put into mass production, instead of the outdated light tanks T-26 and the BT family, simple and cheap light tanks T-60 and T-70 were developed and put into production, which were significantly inferior to the T-50, but the cheapness and simplicity of production in wartime took its toll. A small batch of 75 T-50 tanks confirmed its high characteristics, but in the conditions of the evacuation of the factories at the beginning of the war, it did not work to establish its mass production, all forces were thrown into the mass production of the T-34. Heavy tanks KV-1, also showed themselves at the beginning of the war, on their basis, more advanced KV-85 and the IS family appeared.
All this suggests that the Soviet and German schools of tank building in the pre-war years turned out to be at their best, chose the right path for the development of tanks, creating really worthy samples, then strengthening them with more advanced ones, developed already during the war.
The quantitative ratio of tanks on the eve of the war
After considering the tactical and technical characteristics of tanks, their quantitative ratio on the eve of the war is of interest. In different sources, the numbers differ, but the order of the numbers is basically the same. For a quantitative comparison of tanks in this material, the production of tanks by the industry in the interwar period was used. Naturally, not all of the tanks ended up in the army at the outbreak of hostilities, some were under repair or as training, some were written off and disposed of, but this applies to all countries and the ratio of the released tanks can be used to judge the power of the armored forces of the countries that entered the Second World War. …
1) In the USSR, before the war, 4866 amphibious tanks were produced, including 2566 T-37A, 1340 T-38, 960 T-40.
2) Germany captured in Czechoslovakia 244 light tanks LT vz. 35 (Pz. 35 (t)) and 763 light tanks LT vz. 38 (Pz. 38 (t)), in France 2,152 light tanks, including 704 FT17 (18), 48 FCM36, 600 N35, 800 R35, as well as 297 S35 SOMUA medium tanks and 161 B1bis heavy tanks and included them in the Wehrmacht.
Tank production on the eve of the war
THE USSR. Until July 1941, 18381 light tanks were produced, including 9686 light tanks T-26, 8620 high-speed tanks of the BT series (620 BT-2, 1884 BT-5, 5328 BT-7, 788 BT-7M) and 75 light tanks T-50.
Also, 4866 light amphibious tanks were produced (2566 T-37A, 1340 T-38, 960 T-40). It is difficult to attribute them to tanks, but in terms of their characteristics and capabilities, they were armored vehicles with armor (13-20) mm thick and machine-gun armament.
Medium tanks were produced 1248 T-34 and 503 T-28. Heavy tanks were represented by 432 KV-1, 204 KV-2 and 61 T-35.
In total, 20829 tanks of all classes were produced, of which 18381 light, 1751 medium and 697 heavy, as well as 4866 amphibious tanks.
Germany. Until July 1941, 2827 light tanks (1574 Pz. I and 1253 Pz. II) and 1870 medium tanks (1173 Pz. III and 697 Pz. IV) and 5 heavy Nb. Nz.
After the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938, 1007 light Czechoslovak tanks (244 LT vz. 35 and 763 LT vz. 38) were included in the Wehrmacht, and after the defeat of France in 1940, 2,152 light tanks (704 FT17 (18), 48 FCM36, 600 N35, 800 R35), 297 S35 SOMUA medium tanks and 161 B1bis heavy tanks.
In total, the Wehrmacht had 8,319 tanks of all classes, including 5,986 light, 2,167 medium and 166 heavy tanks.
France. At the beginning of the war, France had 2270 light tanks, (1070 R35, 1000 N35, 100 FCM36), about 1560 obsolete FT17 light tanks (18), 430 S35 medium tanks, 403 B1bis heavy tanks and several hundred other types of light tanks produced in small series …
In total, on the eve of the war, the French army had about 4,655 tanks of various classes, of which 3,830 were light, 430 were medium and 403 were heavy tanks.
England. At the beginning of the war, 1300 MkVI light tanks and 3090 medium tanks were produced in England (139 Matilda I, 160 Medium MkII, 175 Mk II A10, 125 MkI A9, 1771 MkV, 655 MkIV A13, 65 Mk III A13).
In total, England had 4390 tanks of various classes, including 1300 light, 3090 medium. There were no heavy tanks.
USA. In the United States, 990 tanks of various classes were produced, including 844 light tanks (148 M1 and 696 M2) and 146 Medium M2 medium tanks. There were no heavy tanks either.
Why we lost the beginning of the war
Consideration of the technical characteristics of tanks and their quantitative ratio, on the one hand, causes pride in our tank builders, who created tanks before the war that are not inferior and even superior to Western images, on the other, the question arises, how is it possible, with such a number of tanks, many times superior to German, we almost lost all the tanks in the first months of the war and rolled back far back.
The old legends that an avalanche of powerful German tanks rushed at us have long been dispelled and the figures given only confirm this. We did not concede to them in quality, but exceeded them many times in quantity. The characteristics of the German tanks were far from being up to par, the powerful Panthers and Tigers appeared only at the end of 1942. With such a mass of our own not very perfect tanks, we could simply tear apart the German tank wedges, but this did not happen. Why?
Probably because the Germans seriously outplayed us in the strategy and tactics of using tanks, they were the first to adopt the blitzkrieg concept, in which tank wedges, with the support of artillery, infantry and aviation, became the main force for breaking through the enemy's defense and encirclement. The breakthrough was prepared by artillery and aviation, suppressing the enemy, tanks rushed at the final stage of the breakthrough and completed the defeat of the enemy.
Our commanders at all levels were not prepared for this. Here, most likely, many factors, both technical and organizational, have affected. Many tanks were of outdated designs and did not meet the requirements of the time. The T-34 tank was still "raw" and suffered from "growing pains", the tank crews were poorly trained and did not know how to use the equipment. The system for providing ammunition and fuel was not organized, often combat-ready tanks had to be abandoned and they were not always destroyed. The poor organization of the repair and evacuation service led to the fact that often knocked out and quite efficient tanks were not evacuated from the battlefield and were destroyed by the enemy.
Of no small importance was the good training of German tankers and their good tactical skills in coordinating the work of tank crews and the command experience gained in battles with Poland and France in managing tank units and formations.
Serious problems in the Red Army were also with the tactics of using tanks, the unpreparedness of the command staff of all levels, especially the highest echelon, to act in a critical situation and the confusion of the first days of the war, led to the loss of command and control of the troops, the hasty introduction of mechanized corps and tank units to eliminate breakthroughs and attacks on well-prepared enemy defenses without the support of artillery, infantry and aviation, and unreasonable long marches over long distances put equipment out of action even before it was put into battle.
All this was expected after the purges of the “big terror”, everyone saw how the initiative and excessive independence ended, the newly baked commanders were afraid to take personal initiative, fear fettered their actions and higher orders issued without taking into account the specific situation were thoughtlessly carried out. All this led to terrible defeat and catastrophic losses of equipment and people, it took years and thousands of lives to correct mistakes.
Unfortunately, all this took place not only in 1941, even during the Prokhorov battle in the summer of 1943, Rotmistrov's fifth tank army was thrown practically without the support of artillery and aviation to break through the quickly organized enemy anti-tank defense, saturated with anti-tank artillery and assault guns. The army did not fulfill the task and suffered huge losses (53% of the tanks participating in the counterattack were lost). Such losses were also explained by the fact that the battlefield was behind the enemy and all the destroyed tanks to be restored were destroyed by the enemy.
Based on the results of this battle, a commission was created that assessed the reasons for the unsuccessful use of tanks and their technical characteristics. Conclusions were made, a new T-34-85 tank appeared with increased firepower, and the tactics of using tanks were seriously changed. Tanks no longer rushed to break through the enemy's anti-tank defense, only after breaking the defense with artillery and aircraft, tank formations and units were introduced into the breakthrough for large-scale operations to encircle and destroy the enemy.
All this happened later, and at the beginning of the war, with good and not so good tanks, we suffered losses and learned to fight. Before the war, more than 20 thousand tanks, albeit not entirely perfect, were produced, and only a very strong country could afford to organize the mass production of tanks during the war. In the 30s, we were able to catch up with the Western countries in tank building and ended the war with Victory, having in service with magnificent models of tanks.
