In the summer of 1915, perfectly understanding the sad prospect of the loss of Poland, the Russian command again began to create Polish national combat formations. And this time with the inclusion of prisoners. A year and a half later, this in no way prevented Russian politicians from resenting the absolutely identical actions of the German and Austrian occupation authorities.
Operational measures to form the Polish units almost coincided in time with the remarkably loyal to Poland and the Poles speech of Prime Minister Goremykin, an inveterate conservative and Russophile. What was it? The last goodbye or campaigning before it's too late? But of course, we were not talking about creating a Polish army, they were just ready to put everyone they could under arms. However, the results of the great organizational work were truly deplorable. It was all to no avail, not least because it was useless: there was no longer any real possibility to carry out recruiting on Polish lands.
And in August 1915, three Polish members of the State Council sent their colleagues, members of the State Council and deputies of the State Duma, an extensive note on urgent measures to change the position of Poles in Russia. Among other things, it raised the question of land ownership, which had been hanging for Poland since 1865, about restrictions on state and military service, on religious issues, on language … Quite timely, isn't it?
July 23 according to Art. Art. (August 5) 1915 the Russians left Warsaw. Immediately after the fall of the capital of the Kingdom of Poland, the State Duma extended the powers of members of the Duma and the State Council, elected from the Polish provinces, for a period until the liberation of the Polish lands. But it was no longer possible to ignore the fact that the situation on the Polish question had already changed fundamentally.
Kudashev, who represented Russian diplomacy at the headquarters, wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 7 (July 25, Old Style), 1915: “… Regarding our abandonment of Warsaw and a possible turn in the mood of the Poles, General Yanushkevich expressed the following idea to me:“The statement of I. L. Goremykin on the autonomy of Poland was made very timely. Now let the Poles choose between us and the Germans. If it turns out that they prefer the latter, then this will relieve us of all our promises to them, present and past. This remark reflects, as I think, the general's true, unfriendly attitude towards the Poles and disagreement with any concessions to their political aspirations”(1).
Yes, the mobilization in Polish lands was no worse than throughout Russia. But here it was not the patriotism of the masses that worked more, but the fact that the Polish peasant had much less chance of evading the draft. The Poles, in addition, still had much more opportunities not to get up under arms - starting with the right of "the last breadwinner" and ending with a considerable number of cases of commissioning from the filing of doctors. The fact is that among the doctors there were many not only Poles, who, not without risk, rescued "their own", but also the Germans. The latter, not hiding their sympathy for Germany and Austria - the enemies of Russia, considered it a duty not to give the Russian tsar one or another "extra" soldier.
But what kind of soldiers were the Poles in the Russian army, whom Napoleon himself considered excellent fighters? We admit that they are far from the best. A textbook study by Lieutenant General, Professor of the Academy of the General Staff N. N. Golovin (2) testified: the ratio of losses of "bloody" and prisoners of soldiers conscripted from Great Russian and Polish provinces is strikingly different - 60 to 40, or even 70 to 30 percent for "Great Russians" versus 40 to 60 for "Poles". Let's leave these data without quite pertinent comments here. However, it must be remembered that Polish soldiers also fought “bravo” in the ranks of the Austrian and German armies.
The "legions" of riflemen, and the Polish brigades subsequently formed in France, do not count. But how the Poles could have fought in the "national" Polish armed forces is easy to judge, at least based on the results of the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. But after all, the Red regiments near Warsaw also fought desperately, and a high percentage of prisoners in the troops of M. Tukhachevsky gave only the brilliant maneuver of General M. Weygand and J. Pilsudsky from Vepsch, who overthrew the ambitious plans of the red Bonaparte. And the tragic fate of these prisoners, about which, unlike the constantly "hyped up" drama of Katyn, few people remember - in general, a topic for a separate military-historical study.
The occupation of Russian Poland by the Austro-Germans did not bring her anything good. First of all, the new masters of the Kingdom were simply unable to ensure the supply of large Polish cities with food at least at the same level as before the invasion, not to mention the pre-war conditions. Even worse, from the first days of the occupation, a large-scale export from Polish territories to the inner regions of the two empires began not only of industrial products, but also of materials and equipment, and for the most part, not for military purposes.
From the telegram of the Ambassador in London A. K. Benkendorf to the Foreign Minister dated February 23 / March 7, 1916:
… American agents are extremely afraid of the consequences of the famine and the complete ruin of that part of the population that did not emigrate to Russia. They believe that about one and a half million emigrated to Russia and that the vast majority of the adult male population remained. Lacking the means, the latter would more easily yield to German pressure, most often in the form of emigration to Germany as workers or in the form of a special recruitment of recruits, which has already been mentioned. If I insist on this point, which does not directly relate to my competence, it is because I am convinced that at the time of the conclusion of peace, the Polish question, the foundations of which we so happily laid down, will play an absolutely paramount role, and that the moment has come to develop a plan based on the principle of nationality, so openly proclaimed during this war, and so that no German or Austrian project could interfere with our plans. If these powers have not reached an agreement even today, then this cannot serve as a basis for the future. One should not lose sight of the fact that the public opinion of the allied countries expects this decision from Russia. To reckon with the aspirations of the Polish public, while continuing to rescue Poland from its present state of complete impoverishment, seems to me the first necessary basis. At the present moment England is fully counting on the solution of the Polish question on behalf of the imperial government. I believe that the time is coming when circumstances will require making this decision with the necessary completeness to neutralize all the efforts of our enemies in this direction (3).
Another "gift" for the pro-German-minded Poles was the sharp exacerbation of the contradictions between Germany and Austria. Vienna was in a hurry to appoint a governor for the occupied territories, but the operational Germans got ahead of the ally - and Chancellor Berchtold was forced to beg the Allies to immediately issue a statement about the absence of annexationist aspirations. Berlin was preparing the creation of an independent, and in fact a puppet Poland, which would not only break away from Russia, but also seize Galicia from the Habsburgs. Even Franz Joseph, who was out of his mind, exploded and demanded an explanation from Wilhelm. Obviously, this disagreement later became a key one in the creation of a bastard regency kingdom in Russian Poland.
It is indisputable that later Austria, under the impression of the Brusilov defeat, immediately went to the most significant indulgences to the Poles, both in the occupied lands and within the country. Nevertheless, the very fact of the completely inconsistent evolution of the policy of the occupiers in the Polish lands is very indicative. The bureaucracy of the Habsburg monarchy, in whose domains the Poles, perhaps, experienced the least oppression, for the sake of their own salvation again became not opposed to the transformation of the patchwork empire from two to three.
The obstinate Serbia fought to the death against such a prospect, so why not establish the third throne in the conquered Warsaw, or, at worst, in the "royal" Krakow? Therefore, it is possible to give some more indulgences to future subjects. The Poles, unlike other Slavs of the empire, disliked the Russians (and still do not like them for the most part - A. P.), they were (and remain) Catholics and could, along with the Magyars, become a good support for the swinging throne of the Habsburgs.
On June 16, 1916, General A. A. Brusilov to the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M. V. Alekseev:
Austria offers the Poles precisely defined rights … The only way to win the Poles in favor of Russia is now, without delay, to actually fulfill their promise, in amounts … which, of course, should not be less than what Austria offers the Poles.
In turn, Germany, hoping for a separate peace with Russia, at first did not weaken the grip of the occupation regime. The Kingdom of Poland was divided into two zones - the Austrian and the German, from which the Lublin and Warsaw governorships were created. Despite the allied relations, movement between them was prohibited, the most severe passport regime was introduced, numerous requisitions were carried out, and raw materials and equipment were exported to the Central Powers in echelons.
The Russian Foreign Ministry was well aware of the political consequences of the German occupation of the Kingdom. And, it must be admitted, it was prepared very thoroughly ahead of time. Significant in this sense is the letter to the Foreign Ministry dated January 29/16, 1916, from the Russian ambassador to Paris Izvolsky. Long before the German-Austrian declaration on Poland, he reported that a certain Svatkovsky, a representative of the PTA, acquainted the ambassador in Paris with the German-Austrian plans against Russia on the basis of the Polish question. Svatkowski considered it necessary to take preemptive measures, for example, the confirmation by the powers of the Consent of the desirability of the unification of Poland.
Moreover, in order not to waste time, Russia could fulfill this task, repeating, in more definite lines, the appeal of the Grand Duke Commander-in-Chief, with a clearer indication of the future borders and peculiarities of the state structure of Poland (of course, only the features of autonomy were openly discussed). The Concord Powers could then congratulate Russia on her generous decision, which would have made a tremendous impression on the Polish world.
Izvolsky considered it his duty to remind the Foreign Ministry that Russia cannot be indifferent to how the public opinion of the Consent powers will react to the solution of the most important issues for it, to which the ambassador referred to the issues of the Straits and the Polish one. On his own behalf, he added that the French public is inclined to follow the wrong path in both issues, which could cause misunderstandings between Russia and France.
"Rebuilding" Belgium and Serbia and "la liberte de la Pologne" are the last slogans of the Parisian public, which applauded Mr. Barth, who was the first to apply this formula in public. What was meant by "la liberte de la Pologne" is not entirely clear, and for the public it is not at all important, since it will be interpreted in the broadest sense under the influence of traditional sympathies for the Poles (4).
Izvolsky's position was quite simple - it was necessary to wrest the initiative not only from the hands of the Germans, but also from the allies. The former minister openly ignored the intentions of the current minister to internationalize the Polish question. For this Sazonov was rewarded with a rebuke from the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna herself, who did not call him otherwise than "this beast".
However, both Izvolsky and Alexandra Fedorovna and her husband did not take into account that the head of the Russian foreign policy department was not at all tempted by the dubious glory of the "liberator of Poland", and after her, obviously, Finland. He played the Polish card so aggressively, primarily in order to bargain as much as possible for Russia after the victory, which at that time few doubted. Nevertheless, giving instructions to Izvolsky on the eve of the conference in Chantilly, Sazonov did not fail to remind him again that the Polish question was an internal question for the Russian Empire. Internal question!
From the Foreign Ministry telegram to the Ambassador in Paris dated February 24 / March 8, 1916:
Any assumptions about the future demarcation of Central Europe at the present moment are premature, but in general it must be remembered that we are ready to give France and England complete freedom in defining the western borders of Germany, hoping that, in turn, the Allies will give us complete freedom in our delimitation with Germany and Austria. …
It is especially necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question from the subjects of international discussion and on the elimination of all attempts to put the future of Poland under the guarantee and control of the powers (5).
* American plans to provide assistance to occupied Poland were primarily coordinated with Britain. There were no objections, but the British nevertheless put forward two conditions: a) England should not provide any financial subsidies; b) there will be sufficient guarantees against Germany not buying up fatty products intended for the Polish and Russian population.
It is characteristic that England, and not the USA, set a condition for the project to be approved by the Russian government.
Notes (edit)
1. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 Moscow, 1935, series III, volume VIII, part 2, pages 18-20.
2. Golovin N. N. Military efforts of Russia in the First World War, M., 2001, pp. 150-152, 157-158.
3. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 M.1938, series III, volume X, pp. 343-345.
4. Ibid., Series III, volume X, pp. 113-114.
5. Ibid., Series III, volume X, p. 351.
