The plans of the tsarist General Staff to conduct not one, but two offensive operations at once (against Germany and Austria-Hungary) are often criticized. The "premature" offensive was even more criticized - before the mobilization was completed. Russia was forced to launch an offensive on the 15th day of mobilization, and the main mobilization activities were completed in only 30-40 days. But these are somewhat misconceptions, the Russian generals of that war - Brusilov. Alekseev, Denikin noted that the plans were generally correct. These ideas were born by Soviet historiography, which was hostile to the "Second Patriotic War".
Russia could not wait for the completion of mobilization, since during this time the German corps could defeat the French armed forces and capture Paris, forcing France to peace. Russia would have to fight the victorious German army and the Austro-Hungarian forces virtually alone (Britain could not provide significant help, especially immediately). Throwing all forces only against Austria-Hungary, the Russian army risked getting bogged down in a "patchwork empire", this was in the interests of the Germans. It was necessary for the Russian army to defeat the Austro-Hungarians and go to Silesia in order to provoke Berlin's retaliatory actions (to withdraw troops from the western direction) in 2 weeks. It was a gamble, as was the modernized Schlieffen plan. At that time, there were no mechanized corps, tank groups, or powerful aviation that could provide a breakthrough of the front to a great depth and the successful development of the offensive. And the throughput capacity of the railways was not high. It should be noted, and the fact that the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, despite their shortcomings, were a first-class European army.
A full-blown blow to Germany also did not solve the problem: Russia received a powerful blow from the Austro-Hungarian group, which was concentrating near Krakow and planned to advance north to close the "Polish bag". And the Germans had the opportunity to quickly transfer forces from the Western Front.
The main strategic mistake of the Russian command, as well as the German, Austrian, French, was the fact that everyone was preparing for a short battle. The economies of the countries were not ready for a long war, as were the armies of the countries.
An interesting fact is that the Russian command for the first time in the world used a system of separation of battle formations, this made it possible to make a wide maneuver of forces, to build up strike capabilities. On the 15th day of mobilization, the Russian command had about a third of the forces at the front (27 infantry, 20 cavalry divisions), on the 23rd day, up to a third of the Armed Forces were added, by 30-40 days, up to 12-17 divisions were withdrawn to the front. After that, more divisions from Siberia had to come up. And France and Germany used an ancient strategy - to gather all the forces and throw them into battle at once to decide the outcome of the war in a general battle.
Northwestern Front
The commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front was General Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky (1853 - 1918). This was a staff officer who had served in the ranks for only three years. In 1898, Zhilinsky was a military agent for the Spanish army in Cuba during the Spanish-American War (1898). He presented a detailed and interesting report about his observations, in which he showed a fairly complete picture of this war, clarifying the reasons for the failures and defeats of the Spanish armed forces. Almost all of his service was in the headquarters and military-diplomatic missions (he proved himself to be a good diplomat). From February 1911 he headed the General Staff, in March 1914 he was appointed commander of the Warsaw Military District and the Warsaw Governor-General. In July 1914, he received the post of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front (as part of the 1st Army of Rennenkampf and 2nd Army of Samsonov).
Zhilinsky did not have time to really study the theater of action, to get used to the role of the commander of the troops of the Warsaw Military District, and then the Commander-in-Chief of the Front. Therefore, he acted uncertainly.
The North-Western Front had significant forces - there were more than 250 thousand fighters in the two armies. The 1st Army (commanded by General Pavel Rennenkampf) was deployed east of East Prussia (Neman Army), and the 2nd Army (commanded by General Alexander Samsonov) was deployed south of East Prussia (Narevskaya army). In the 1st army there were 6, 5 infantry and 5, 5 cavalry divisions with 492 guns, in the 2nd army - 12, 5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions with 720 guns (the front forces were to grow to 30 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions) … The front had 20-30 airplanes, 1 airship.
The action plan was dictated by the natural and geographical conditions and the fortifications of the Germans in East Prussia. At the coast there was a powerful Königsberg fortified area, to the south the system of Masurian lakes, swamps and the Letzen fortress. The 1st Army of Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf was supposed to advance from the line of the Neman River in the interval between these two obstacles. The 2nd Army of Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov was supposed to advance from the border of the Narew River, bypassing the Masurian reservoirs and Letzen. The two Russian armies planned to unite in the area of the city of Allenstein, thus breaking into the defenses of the Germans and defeating the troops opposing them.
The problem was that the situation with the railway network in Lithuania was better. Railways approached the border and troops could pull up from the entire Baltic region and the center of the empire. In Poland, in the zone of concentration of forces of the 2nd army of Samsonov, the situation with communications was worse. In addition, the army had to open hostilities not simultaneously, but according to the degree of readiness. This was a serious mistake by the command.
Another mistake was made when they learned from intelligence that the Germans had assembled the main forces on the Eastern Front in Prussia, and only one Landwehr corps (territorial troops, secondary military formations) covers the border with Poland in the direction of Berlin. At the Headquarters, a plan arose for delivering another blow: the Northwestern and Southwestern fronts were supposed to tie the Germans and Austrians on the flanks with battles, and at Warsaw they decided to create a new grouping that would strike in the Berlin direction. Therefore, the units that were supposed to strengthen the 1st and 2nd armies of the North-Western Front began to gather near Warsaw in order to create the 9th army.
Yakov G. Zhilinsky
German forces, plans
It is clear that for the German command, Russia's plans were not a secret, they themselves knew very well the conditions of the terrain. For 10 years the German command envisaged that Russian forces would strike from the territory of Poland at the base of the "Prussian salient" and worked out possible countermeasures.
Prussia was defended by the 8th Army under the command of Colonel General Max von Pritwitz. General Waldersee was the chief of staff. The 8th Army had three army (1st, 17th, 20th) and one reserve corps (1st reserve corps) and a number of separate units. A total of 14, 5 infantry and 1 cavalry division - 173 thousand soldiers, about 1044 (with fortress) guns. The Germans had 36 aircraft and 18 airships (used for reconnaissance). On August 6, the chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Moltke, demanded General Max Pritwitz to buy time before the transfer of troops from the Western Front and to hold the Lower Vistula. The commander of the 8th Army decided to first stop the advance of the 1st Russian army and sent 8 divisions to the east, hiding from the 2nd Russian army with 4 divisions and occupying the inter-lake gaps with 1 and 5 divisions. The strength of the Germans was significant, in addition, it is necessary to take into account the formations of the Königsberg and Letzen garrisons, the militias of the Landsturm. As a result, it turned out that the two Russian armies did not have a serious numerical advantage. The advantages of the Russian armies in cavalry, in the conditions of swamps, lakes, forests with narrow roads, were reduced to naught. There was no significant advantage in field artillery either. And in heavy guns they were generally inferior (for the Germans - 188, for the Russians - 24).
According to the original plan of the German command, East Prussia could be abandoned, retreat beyond the Vistula. But the problem was that Königsberg was the second most important city in the empire. It was considered the heart of Germany, the place of the coronation of the Prussian kings, the beginning of the history of Prussia. Pre-war propaganda in colors frightened by the horrors of the Russian occupation, "bloodthirsty hordes of Cossacks." East Prussia was the ancestral home of many generals and officers and soldiers. How to retreat without a fight in such a situation? As a result, the command of the 8th Army decided to fight and defeat the Russian armies separately. The organization of the operation was carried out by talented officers - General Grunert, Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman.
Maximilian von Prithwitz und Gaffron
General P. K. Rennenkampf
The 1st Army was commanded by an experienced general, P. K. Rennenkampf (1854 - 1918). He graduated from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (1881). During the years of the Ihetuan uprising in 1900-1901, he gained a name and wide popularity in military circles, thanks to a dashing cavalry raid. Then Rennenkampf, in the style of A. Suvorov, with several hundred Cossacks in a short period of time covered hundreds of kilometers, captured a number of cities and towns, taking prisoners and disarming thousands of enemy garrisons, taking fright. He saved hundreds of Russian employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway from painful death, "boxers" killed hostages, subjecting them to torture. During the Russo-Japanese War, he commanded the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division and the Consolidated Corps. He participated in a number of battles, was wounded near Liaoyang, and at Mukden he showed great courage, holding back positions on the left flank from the onslaught of the army of General Kawamura. He made successful raids behind enemy lines and earned a reputation as a proactive and decisive commander.
During the revolution, in 1906, he led a combined detachment, acting tough and decisive, following the train from Manchu Harbin, restored the communication of the Manchurian army with Western Siberia, which was interrupted by the revolutionary movement in Eastern Siberia ("Chita Republic"). General suppressing revolutionary actions in the railway lane. For this he received the reputation of an "executioner" in Soviet historiography and literature. In 1918, he was executed, while being subjected to bullying and torture.
Since 1913, he commanded the troops of the Vilna military district, so he knew the upcoming theater of military operations well.
The offensive of the Neman army
On August 14, General Gurko's 1st Cavalry Division conducted reconnaissance in force, capturing the city of McGrab. On August 17, the entire 1st Russian army crossed the border on a 60-kilometer front. On the northern flank was the 20th army corps of General V. Smirnov, in the center was the 3rd corps of N. Yepanchin, on the southern flank of the 4th corps of E. Aliyev. The flanks were covered by cavalry: on the right flank - the Consolidated Cavalry Corps of Khan of Nakhichevan and the 1st Separate Cavalry Brigade of Oranovsky; Gurko's cavalry division operated on the left flank.
The German command poorly organized reconnaissance, missed a favorable moment for the first strike, which could disrupt the Russian offensive - the German troops were ready already on August 10-11, when the 1st Army was just concentrating. Pritvitz chose a wait-and-see tactic. Only after learning about the advance of the Russian army, Pritwitz began to push his units forward. The command of the 8th Army decided to give battle near the city of Gumbinnen, 40 km from the German-Russian border. A barrier was set up against Samsonov's 2nd army - the 20th corps, General Scholz and the Landwehr units. According to the calculations of the Germans, they had about 6 days before the onset of the 2nd Russian army, during which time it was necessary to break the corps of the 1st Russian army.
The 1st Army Corps (AK) of Hermann von François with the cavalry division (left flank), the 17th AK of August von Mackensen (center), 1st Reserve AK von Belov (right flank) were put up against the 2nd Army. The Germans had 8, 5 infantry, 1 cavalry division and 95 batteries, including 22 heavy (74, 5 thousand bayonets and sabers, 408 light and 44 heavy guns - according to other sources, 508 cannons, 224 machine guns). The 1st Army of Rennenkampf had 6, 5 infantry and 5, 5 cavalry divisions and 55 batteries (63 thousand bayonets and sabers, 380 guns, 252 machine guns).
The plans of the command of the 8th Army were almost thwarted by the arrogant commander of the 1st AK Francois. He, contrary to orders, continued to move forward towards the Russian forces, responding to the orders of the command that he would withdraw only "when the Russians were defeated." François on August 17, near the town of Stallupenen, 32 km from Gumbinnen, attacked units of the 3rd corps of Epanchin. Russian troops, accustomed to the absence of the enemy, marched without reconnaissance, in columns, in isolation from other forces. The 27th division was attacked from the flank, the Germans struck at the Orenburg regiment, which was marching in the vanguard. On the march, the Russian column was subjected to flank fire from machine guns and artillery. The regiment suffered significant losses. The division began to withdraw.
At the headquarters of the 8th Army, upon learning that François had entered the battle, violating the order, they were furious and again ordered to retreat, not to disrupt the plans of the command. He proudly refused. At this time, the Russians came to their senses, the 25th Infantry Division approached, the units of the 27th Division came to their senses. In the course of a fierce battle, our units took Stallupenen, defeated the Germans, recaptured not only their wounded, but also captured the Germans, captured the commissary reserves, 7 guns. François's corps retreated, but he announced victory, stating that he retreated only because of the order of the command. Although if he had stayed, his corps would have simply been crushed, parts of the 20th Russian AK were approaching.
On August 18, Rennenkampf regrouped his forces and resumed the offensive of the 1st Army. The combined cavalry corps of General Khan of Nakhichevan (4 cavalry divisions) was sent to Insterburg. The cavalrymen were to raid the German rear. But the raid did not work, the German command learned about the movement of the corps and transferred the Landwehr brigade by rail. On the 19th, at Kauschen, the Russian cavalry corps clashed with the German Landwehr brigade. Khan Nakhichevan had 70 squadrons and 8 batteries against 6 battalions and 2 batteries of the Germans. The corps commander decided not to bypass the enemy, but to attack him. After all, under his leadership was the Russian military elite - the Horse Guards, where representatives of the best aristocratic families served.
At a front 10 km away, 4 divisions dismounted and launched a frontal attack. The guardsmen marched like a parade, under fire from rifles and machine guns. Therefore, the losses were great. The future hero of the White movement, Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel, distinguished himself in this battle. His squadron in equestrian position captured Kaushen, capturing the enemy's battery (knocked out all the officers, except Wrangel). Wrangel became one of the first Russian officers (in the period from the beginning of the Second Patriotic War), who was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree. The Germans were defeated, but the battered units had to be withdrawn to the rear. Rennenkampf removed Nakhichevan from his post, although later, under pressure from the officers and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (Nakhichevan Khan was the favorite of the whole guard), he was reinstated, giving him the opportunity for rehabilitation.
Battle of Gumbinnen (20 August 1914)
Pritvitz was in dire straits. Rennenkampf appointed a day off for August 20 and was in no hurry to attack the German positions on the Angerapp River. On the same day, Samsonov's 2nd army crossed the border. The German command had to either attack the 1st Army, since the threat of encirclement was becoming stronger or retreat. General François suggested attacking, moreover, he set up a report from the commander of the 1st AK about the "victory" for the battle with the 1st Army. Pritvitz gave the order to attack.
The battle began on the right Russian wing, north of Gumbinnen, where the 1st AK Francois attacked, the blow of 2 German infantry divisions and units of the Königsberg garrison fell on the 28th infantry division of Lieutenant General N. Lashkevich of the 20th AK. Now the Germans were going head-on, in thick chains. In the rear of the Russian troops, François threw cavalry units, which were able to enter from the flank, since the cavalry corps of Nakhichevan was withdrawn to the rear. The German cavalry division, after a fierce oncoming battle, threw back the Oranovsky cavalry brigade. The Germans destroyed the transports of the 28th Division, but they were not allowed to go deeper into the rear. The 28th division suffered heavy losses, but withstood the blow of superior enemy forces. German commanders highly appreciated the training of the Russian infantry. So Colonel R. Franz wrote that the Russian soldiers "were disciplined, had good combat training, were well equipped." They were distinguished by courage, tenacity, skillful use of the terrain and "especially skillful in field fortification." The battle was very fierce, the 28th Infantry Division lost up to 60% of its personnel, almost the entire officer corps. The Germans were able to somewhat press the Russian formations, but at the cost of huge losses, in a number of places the killed Germans covered the ground in several layers. Russian artillery fired very successfully. By the middle of the day, the 29th Infantry Division arrived to the aid of the 28th Division, the Russian units launched a counterattack, and the units of the 1st German AK began to retreat. François even lost control of the corps parts for several hours.
In the center, the situation for the Germans was even worse. Parts of the 17th AK, under the command of General Mackensen, reached their initial lines by 8 am, but Russian forces discovered the Germans and opened heavy fire, forcing them to lie down. German formations suffered significant losses, the 17th AK Mackensen lost up to 8 thousand soldiers and 200 officers. In the afternoon, the soldiers of the 35th Infantry Division wavered and began to flee. A general panic began, Russian troops captured 12 abandoned guns.
On the left Russian flank, near Goldap, von Belov's 1st reserve AK was advancing. But the Germans hesitated, lost their way and entered the battle only by noon. The German units, having met dense defensive formations and having learned about the defeat of von Mackensen's corps, began to withdraw.
Results of the battle
The defeat of the center posed a serious threat to the entire 8th Army, and General Max von Prithwitz ordered a general retreat. General Pavel Rennenkampf first gave the order to continue the offensive, but then canceled it. The command of the 1st Russian Army could not fully assess the scale of the success. In addition, it was necessary to regroup forces, conduct reconnaissance, pull up the rear, the artillery shot all its reserves. The command of the 1st Army knew about the line of defense on the Angerapp River, and it was risky to climb forward without reconnaissance, without replenishing ammunition.
Only on the 21st it turned out that the enemy had simply fled, the Germans were in panic mood. The corps of François and Mackensen lost up to a third of their personnel. The commander of the 20th AK Scholz reported that Samsonov's 2nd Army was already marching through East Prussia, it smelled like a complete disaster. Pritvits gave the order to retreat beyond the Vistula. Moreover, since the water level in the river was low due to the summer heat, the commander of the 8th German army doubted that he would hold on this line without reinforcements.
Pritwitz's panic frightened Berlin, so he was soon removed from his post as commander of the 8th Army. Colonel-General Paul von Hindenburg was appointed to his post, Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff, the hero of the storming of Liege, became the chief of staff. In addition, they decided to strengthen the 8th Army by transferring 2 corps and a cavalry division from the Western Front. In fact, with this victory, the 1st Russian army of Rennenkampf thwarted the "Schlieffen plan".
