75 years ago, in February 1945, the Red Army launched the Lower Silesian Offensive. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev defeated the German 4th Panzer Army, advanced 150 km deep into Germany and reached the Neisse River in a wide area.
The threat to the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, aimed at Berlin, was eliminated, part of the Silesian industrial region was occupied, which undermined the military-economic power of the Reich. Soviet troops besieged the cities of Glogau and Breslau in the rear, where an entire army was blocked.
General situation
The battle for Silesia began in January 1945, when the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (1st UV) under the command of I. S. Konev conducted the Sandomierz-Silesian operation (January 12, February 3, 1945). This operation was an integral part of the larger-scale Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army ("Vistula-Oder operation. Part 2"). Russian troops defeated the German 4th Tank Army and the 17th Field Army (Kielce-Radom grouping). The armies of the 1st UV liberated the southern part of Poland, including Krakow and the part of Silesia belonging to the Poles. Konev's troops crossed the Oder in several places, seized bridgeheads and in early February established themselves on the right bank of the river. Conditions were created for the further liberation of Silesia, an offensive on Dresden and Berlin.
At the same time, the battles continued after the end of the main battle. Parts of the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov and the formations of the 4th Panzer Army of Lelyushenko finished off the blocked enemy grouping in the Rutzen area. Troops of the 5th Guards Army of Zhadov and the 21st Army of Gusev fought in the area of the city of Brig. The city stood on the right bank of the Oder, the Nazis turned it into a powerful stronghold. Soviet troops occupied the bridgeheads to the south and north of Brig and tried to connect them. In the end, they solved this problem, connected bridgeheads, blockaded the city and took it. One large bridgehead was created. There were also local battles, finishing off the remnants of German troops in the rear, expanding and strengthening bridgeheads, etc.
Meanwhile, the German command in the shortest possible time formed a new defensive line, the basis of which was the fortified cities: Breslau, Glogau and Liegnitz. Lacking the resources and time to equip a new powerful defensive line like on the Vistula, the Germans focused on fortified cities with a double system of fortifications (external and internal), strong points. Powerful brick buildings, railway stations, depots, barracks, old medieval fortresses and castles, etc. were turned into defense centers, the streets were blocked with anti-tank ditches, barricades, and mined. Defense centers were occupied by separate garrisons armed with anti-tank rifles, machine guns, mortars and faust cartridges. They tried to connect all small garrisons with communications, including underground ones. The garrisons supported each other. Adolf Hitler ordered to defend the fortress to the last soldier. The morale of the German troops was high until the very surrender. The Germans were real warriors and fought not only because of the threat of punitive measures, but also as patriots of their country. Inside the country, they mobilized everyone they could: officer schools, SS troops, various security, training and special units, militias.
The German Empire then had several industrial regions, but the largest were the Ruhr, Berlin and Silesian. Silesia was the largest and most important East German province. The area of the Silesian industrial region, the second in Germany after the Ruhr, was 5-6 thousand square kilometers, the population was 4.7 million people. Here, cities and towns were densely located, the territory was built up with concrete structures and massive houses, which complicated the actions of mobile connections.
The Germans concentrated large forces for the defense of Silesia: formations of the 4th Panzer Army, 17th Army, Army Group Heinrici (part of the 1st Panzer Army) from the Army Group Center. From the air, Hitler's troops were supported by the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the Silesian grouping consisted of 25 divisions (including 4 tank and 2 motorized), 7 battle groups, 1 tank brigade, and corps group "Breslau". It also had a large number of separate, special, training units, Volkssturm battalions. Already in the course of the battle, the Hitlerite command transferred them to this direction.
Lower Silesian operation plan
The new operation became the development of the Vistula-Oder strategic operation and part of the general offensive of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front. Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev recalled:
“The main blow was planned to be delivered from two large bridgeheads on the Oder - north and south of Breslau. The result should have followed the encirclement of this heavily fortified city, and then, taking or leaving it in the rear, we intended to develop an offensive with the main grouping directly to Berlin."
Initially, the Soviet command planned to develop an offensive in the Berlin direction from bridgeheads on the Oder. Front troops delivered three strikes: 1) the most powerful grouping, which included the 3rd Guards, 6th, 13th, 52nd, 3rd Guards Tank and 4th Tank Army, 25th Tank Army, The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, was concentrated on the bridgehead north of Breslau; 2) the second grouping was located south of Breslau, here the 5th Guards and 21st armies were concentrated, reinforced by two tank corps (4th Guards Tank and 31st Tank Corps); 3) on the left flank of the 1st UV front, the 59th and 60th armies, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps were supposed to attack. Later, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was transferred to the main direction. From the air, Konev's troops were supported by the 2nd Air Army. In total, the troops of the 1st UV numbered about 980 thousand people, about 1300 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 2400 aircraft.
The Soviet command decided to throw both tank armies (4th Tank Army of Dmitry Lelyushenko, 3rd Guards Tank Army of Pavel Rybalko) into battle in the first echelon, not to wait for a breakthrough of the enemy's defense. This was due to the fact that the offensive began without a pause, the rifle divisions were drained of blood (5 thousand people remained in them), tired. Tank formations were supposed to strengthen the first strike, break the enemy defenses and quickly enter the operational space.
Battle
The offensive began on the morning of February 8, 1945. Artillery preparation had to be reduced to 50 minutes due to a lack of ammunition (communications were stretched, railways were destroyed, supply bases remained far in the rear). In the directions of the main attack in the Breslau area, the front command created a great advantage: in the arrows at 2: 1, in the artillery at 5: 1, in the tanks - 4, 5: 1. Despite the reduction in artillery preparation and bad weather, which interfered with the effective actions of aviation, the German defense was on the first day of the operation. Soviet troops created a gap up to 80 km wide and up to 30-60 km deep. But in the future, the pace of the offensive dropped sharply. In the next week, until February 15, the right flank of the 1st UV managed to pass only 60-100 km with battles.
This was due to a number of reasons. The Soviet infantry was tired, suffered heavy losses in previous battles, and did not have time to recover. Therefore, the arrows passed no more than 8-12 km per day. The Germans fought desperately. In the rear, the surrounded German garrisons remained, which diverted part of the forces. The 3rd Guards Army of Gordov blocked Glogau (up to 18 thousand soldiers), the fortress was taken only at the beginning of April. The area was wooded, swamps in places, spring thaw began. This reduced the pace of movement, it was possible to move mainly only along the roads.
The troops of the right wing of the front reached the Bober River, where the Nazis had a rear line. Soviet troops crossed the river on the move, seized bridgeheads and began to expand them. Lelyushenko's army broke through to the Neisse River. However, the infantry of the 13th Army could not keep up with the mobile formations. The Nazis were able to cut off the tank army from the infantry, and for several days it fought surrounded. Konev's front commander had to urgently leave for the location of Pukhov's 13th Army. Oncoming attacks by the 13th and 4th Panzer Armies (it turned back) the blockade was broken. An important role in this battle was played by Soviet aviation, which had air supremacy. The weather these days was good, and Soviet planes delivered a series of strong blows to the enemy. The 3rd Guards Army of Gdova, leaving part of its forces for the siege of Glogau, also reached the line of the r. Beaver. Thus, despite some troubles, the troops of the right wing of the 1st UV successfully advanced.
In the center and on the left wing of the front, the situation was more complicated. The Nazis put up powerful resistance in the area of the Breslav fortified area. This delayed the movement to the west of the second shock group of the front - the 5th Guards and 21st armies. Gluzdovsky's 6th Army, which was supposed to take Breslau, first broke through the defenses, and then dispersed its forces and got bogged down in the enemy's defenses. The left wing of the front, the 59th and 60th armies, could not break the Nazis' defenses at all. Here our troops were opposed by approximately equal enemy forces. Already on February 10, Konev was forced to order the armies of the left wing to go on the defensive. This worsened the situation in the center of the front, here the Soviet armies had to fear the flank attacks of the enemy.
Meanwhile, the German command, trying to prevent the fall of Breslau, reinforced the troops in this direction. Marching reinforcements and separate units went here. Then the 19th and 8th Panzer and 254th Infantry Divisions were transferred from other sectors. The Nazis constantly counterattacked Gluzdovsky's 6th Army and Zhadov's 5th Guards Army. Our troops fought heavy battles, repelled enemy attacks, and continued to move along the communications, knocking down German barriers and storming strongholds. To increase the firepower of the advancing troops, Konev transferred the 3rd Guards Division of heavy rocket launchers from the front reserve to the Breslav sector.
To develop the front offensive, it was necessary to resolve the issue of the Breslav fortified area. The capital of Silesia had to be taken or blockaded in order to free the troops for a further offensive to the west. The command stretched the front of the 52nd army of Koroteev, which narrowed the sector of the 6th army and free up part of its forces for an attack on Breslau. The 5th Guards Army was reinforced with Kuznetsov's 31st Tank Corps. To prevent the Nazis from breaking the path to Breslau with a blow from the outside, Konev turned Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army to the south and southeast. Two tank corps, which at this time reached Bunzlau, turned south.
On February 13, 1945, mobile formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies united west of Breslau, encircling 80,000 troops. enemy grouping. At the same time, Rybalko's tankers inflicted a strong flank attack on the enemy's 19th Panzer Division. As a result, the German command could not immediately throw troops to break through the encirclement ring while it was weak. Our troops quickly sealed the "cauldron" tightly, not giving the Germans the opportunity to unblock it and break through from the city itself. Konev decided that it was not necessary to divert significant forces of the front for a decisive assault on Breslau. The city had a perimeter defense and was prepared for street battles. Only parts of the 6th Army of General Vladimir Gluzdovsky remained to besiege the city. It consisted of the 22nd and 74th rifle corps (at various times 6-7 rifle divisions, 1 fortified area, tank heavy and tank regiments, heavy self-propelled artillery floor). Zhadov's 5th Guards Army was already sent to the outer ring of the encirclement on 18 February. As a result, the forces of the 6th Army with reinforcement units were approximately equal to the Breslau garrison.
Operation development
Thus, the first phase of the operation was generally successful. The Germans were defeated. The German 4th Panzer Army was defeated, its remnants fled across the Bober and Neisse rivers. Our troops captured a number of large centers of Lower Silesia, including Bunzlau, Liegnitz, Zorau, etc. The garrisons of Glogau and Breslau were surrounded and doomed to defeat.
However, this success was achieved at the limit of the physical and moral strength of the fighters and the material capabilities of the 1st UV. The soldiers were tired of the incessant fighting, 4-5 thousand men remained in the divisions. Movable hulls have lost up to half of their fleet (not only combat losses, but also wear and tear of equipment, lack of spare parts). The railways were not rebuilt and supply problems began. The rear bases fell further behind. The norms for issuing ammunition and fuel were reduced to a critical minimum. Aviation could not fully support the ground forces. The spring thaw struck the unpaved airfields, there were few concrete strips and they were far in the rear. The Air Force had to operate from the deep rear, which sharply reduced the number of sorties. The weather conditions were bad (during the entire operation, only 4 flight days).
The neighbors could not support the offensive of the 1st UV. Zhukov's troops fought heavy battles in the north, in Pomerania. At the junction with the Konev front, the 1st BF went over to the defensive. The 4th Ukrainian Front was unsuccessful. This allowed the Germans to transfer troops to the Silesian direction from other sectors. Konev's armies no longer had such an advantage as at the beginning of the operation.
As a result, the front command decided that the strike in the Berlin direction should be postponed. A further attack on Berlin is dangerous and will lead to large unjustified losses. By February 16, 1945, the plan of the operation was changed. The main shock group of the front was to reach the Neisse River and capture bridgeheads; center - take Breslau, left flank - throw the enemy into the Sudeten mountains. At the same time, the work of the rear, communications and normal supplies was being restored.
On the right flank, stubborn battles were fought in the area of the cities of Guben, Christianstadt, Zagan, Zorau, where the Reich's military industry enterprises were located. The 4th Panzer Army again reached Neisse, followed by the troops of the 3rd Guards and 52nd armies. This forced the Germans to finally abandon the r. Beaver and withdraw troops to the Neisse line of defense - from the mouth of the river to the city of Penzig.
Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army returned to the Bunzlau area and was aimed at Gorlitz. Here Rybalko made a number of miscalculations, underestimating the enemy. The Germans prepared a strong flank counterattack in the Lauban area. Soviet tank corps, exhausted by previous battles, and stretched out on the march, came under enemy counterstrike. The Nazis reached the rear and flank of the Soviet 7th and partly the 6th Guards Tank Corps and tried to cover our tank army from the east. The fighting was extremely fierce. Some settlements and positions changed hands several times. Our command had to take up the regrouping of the forces of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, to transfer units of the 52nd Army to its aid. Only by February 22, the German shock group was defeated and thrown back to the south. As a result, Rybalko's army was unable to fulfill the main task - to take Gorlitz. Subsequently, heavy fighting in the direction of Gorlitz and Lauban continued. Rybalko's army was taken to the rear for replenishment.
This operation was completed. The command of the 1st UV began to develop a plan for the Upper Silesian operation, since as a result of the Lower Silesian operation, such a front line was formed that both sides could inflict dangerous flank strikes.1st UV could attack the enemy in Upper Silesia. The Wehrmacht had the possibility of a flank attack on the southern wing of the Konev front in the direction of Breslau and try to recapture the Silesian region.
Fortress Breslau
Already in the summer of 1944, Hitler declared the Silesian capital the city of Breslau (Russian Breslavl, Polish Wroclaw) a "fortress". Karl Hanke was appointed Gauleiter of the city and commandant of the defense area. The population of the city before the war was about 640 thousand people, and during the war it grew to 1 million people. Residents of western cities were evacuated to Breslau.
In January 1945, the Breslau garrison was formed. The 609th Special Forces Division, 6 fortress regiments (including artillery), separate units of infantry and tank divisions, artillery and fighter units became its main. The Breslau fortress had a large combat-ready reserve, which consisted of Volkssturm (militia) fighters, workers of military factories and enterprises, members of National Socialist structures and organizations. In total, there were 38 Volkssturm battalions, up to 30 thousand militias. The entire garrison numbered about 80 thousand people. The commandants of the fortress garrison were Major General Hans von Alphen (until 7 March 1945) and General of the Infantry Hermann Niehof (until the surrender on 6 May 1945).
Even during the Sandomierz-Silesian operation, the leadership of Breslau, fearing a blockade of the city, where there were a lot of refugees and a breakthrough of Soviet tanks, announced the evacuation of women and children to the west, in the direction of Opperu and Kant. Some of the people were taken out by rail and road. But there was not enough transport. On January 21, 1945, Gauleiter Hanke ordered the refugees to walk west. During the march to the west, there was frost, country roads were littered with snow, many people died, especially small children. Therefore, this event was called the "death march".
