In this article we will try to analyze the state and development prospects of our non-nuclear submarine fleet.
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us try to answer the question: why do we need diesel submarines (SSK) in the age of atomic energy? Do they have their own tactical niche, or is the diesel-electric submarine a “weapon for the poor,” ersatz boats for those who are unable to create atomarines?
In order to understand all this, let us recall two very interesting episodes "from the life" of diesel-electric submarines. The first of them is the Falklands Conflict of 1982. As you know, from the Argentinean side one and only submarine "San Luis" took part in sea battles. Strictly speaking, the Argentines also used Santa Fe, but the boat was in such a terrible technical condition that it could barely go under the periscope, so its quick death was obviously predetermined and had nothing to do with the type of its power plant. Quite another matter - "San Luis", built according to the German project "Type 209". In 1982, it was one of the best (if not the best) diesel-electric submarines in the world, but it faced a very difficult task. The boat had to fight almost alone against an entire squadron of British ships. Of course, the Argentine aviation was trying to do something, but for a number of reasons it could not coordinate its actions with the San Luis, and the command never sent surface ships into battle. The enemy of the "San Luis" was many times superior to the Argentine diesel-electric submarine in numbers, and in addition, the British sailors and officers of those years were distinguished by the highest professionalism. But, as if all this was not enough, one should not forget that within the framework of the distribution of functional responsibilities between the NATO naval forces, the fleet of the former "mistress of the seas" was focused on anti-submarine activities. The KVMF was supposed to fight against Soviet submarines breaking into the Atlantic and to protect communications from those of them who still succeed.
So, on the one hand, two small aircraft carriers, including anti-submarine helicopters, nine ships of the "destroyer-frigate" class (at the beginning of the conflict, then there were more), and on the other - one single submarine. And what is the result? The San Luis attacked British ships at least twice, and possibly three times. The most colorful episode was on May 1, when this boat attacked the destroyer Coventry, accompanied by the frigate Arrow. The torpedo turned out to be defective, control was lost, and the homing head "captured" a torpedo trap that was towed by the frigate and hit it.
After that, two British frigates and three helicopters pursued the San Luis for 20 hours, while the frigates maintained hydroacoustic contact with her, and the helicopters attacked with torpedoes and depth charges. Despite all this, "San Luis" managed to survive and get out of the attack.
The second case (May 8) - the submarine "San Luis" attacked an unknown target with a torpedo. Acoustics "San Luis" even heard the sound of a hit, but the torpedo did not work. Perhaps all this was a mistake, and in fact there was no enemy near the San Luis, but there is some reason to believe that the Argentines managed to get into the Splendit atomarine (there is information that after this incident, Splendit immediately also left the area of hostilities and went to Great Britain, and there were no other ships and vessels in the area of attack of "San Luis"). However, the British do not confirm anything of the kind.
And, finally, the third incident took place on the night of May 10-11, when the San Luis attacked the frigates Alacriti and Arrow with a two-torpedo salvo from a distance of only 3 miles. The torpedoes, as usual, refused, the British did not find the boat.
The second episode is the Joint Task Force Exercise 06-2 exercise, held in December 2005, in which the non-nuclear Swedish submarine Gotland first "destroyed" the US Navy nuclear submarine covering the AUG led by the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan, and then attacked surface ships and "sunk" the aircraft carrier.
And this is not an ordinary case in the exercises of the Western Navy. In 2003, the same "Gotland" was able to defeat the American and French atomarines. The Australian submarine of the Collins class and the Israeli submarine Dauphin managed to penetrate the anti-submarine defenses of the US AUG.
How did non-nuclear boats do this?
To begin with, let's pay attention to the key condition for victory in underwater combat. Obviously (at least in exercises), the winner will be the one who can detect the enemy first, while remaining undetected himself. In combat conditions, this may not be the end, and some options for the attacked submarine are possible: it can get out of the blow.
What determines the fulfillment of the key condition? The power of the sonar complex of the boat and its level of quietness must be balanced so as to allow the detection of the enemy before the enemy can do it.
All of the above is quite obvious and probably does not require confirmation, but what will be written below is the guesses of the author, who, as already mentioned, is neither a shipbuilding engineer nor a submariner officer and works exclusively with open press data.
Presumably, a nuclear propulsion device, with all its advantages, has one serious drawback: it creates more noise than a non-nuclear boat going under electric motors. A significant role in these noises is played by circulation pumps that move the energy carrier, and other units inherent in nuclear submarines, while it is impossible to completely turn off the reactors on a military campaign. Accordingly, it can be assumed that of the two submarines, nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, built at an equal level of technology and design thought, a diesel nuclear submarine will have less noise. This is indirectly confirmed by the information about the noise level of our third-generation boats, the nuclear-powered project 971 "Shchuka-B" and diesel project 877 "Halibut". With a natural noise level of 40-45 decibels, in calm weather the noise level of "Shchuka-B" is estimated at 60-70 decibels, and "Halibut" - 52-56 decibels. Here, again, it is worth mentioning that it is completely unknown who and when measured these noises …
At the same time, as far as can be understood from open sources, the dependence of noise and detection range is by no means linear. It means that if, say, a boat has reduced noise by 5%, then the range of its detection is reduced not by 5%, but much more significantly.
As for the hydroacoustic complexes, the diesel submarine itself is small, and it is unlikely that it is possible to install a SAC as powerful in it as on an atomarine (although a similar attempt was made in the USSR, but more on that below)
So, if the above assumptions are correct, the success of foreign non-nuclear submarines (and the nickname "Black Hole" of ours) appeared as a result of such a combination of their own noise and the power of the SAC, which allow diesel-electric submarines to be the first to detect nuclear submarines. And as long as such a combination remains possible, diesel-electric submarines will remain ships with their own tactical niche, and not "weapons for the poor."
What can and cannot do diesel submarines? Due to their low noise, they are almost an ideal means of dealing with an outnumbered enemy, whose location is known in advance and does not change. For example, the Royal Navy at the Falklands found itself in this position - the aircraft carrier group was forced to maneuver in approximately the same area. And the analysis of the actions of "San Luis" shows that if the Argentines had not one, but five or six boats of this type with trained crews and combat-ready torpedoes, then during their attacks the British formation could well have suffered such heavy losses that the continuation of the operation would become impossible.
Judging by the available data, the successful use of Australian, Swedish and Israeli non-nuclear submarines against the AUG was achieved in conditions when the aircraft carrier, according to the conditions of the exercises, was "tied" to a certain square and its location on the submarine was known. That is, no one created any problems for non-nuclear submarines with access to the enemy's maneuvering area, and it was only a matter of checking whether the standard defense of the AUG could withstand the attack of non-nuclear "quiet".
Consequently, diesel-electric submarines represent a formidable danger and a strong deterrent for all who wish to operate with large forces for a long time in the immediate vicinity of our shores. However, due to their design features, diesel-electric submarines have significant restrictions on the speed and range of the underwater course. Thus, the boat of Project 877 "Halibut" is capable of overcoming 400 miles under water at a speed of only 3 knots: it can move faster, but only at the cost of a sharp drop in range. That is why diesel-electric submarines can be effectively used only against an enemy whose location is known in advance and does not change for a long time. And this imposes significant restrictions on the combat use of diesel-electric submarines.
So, for example, the role of diesel-electric submarines in anti-submarine warfare is sharply reduced. Of course, a diesel-electric submarine in a duel situation is capable of destroying a nuclear-powered submarine, but the problem is that such a situation is only possible if the diesel-electric submarine attacks the ship's warrant, which covers the nuclear submarine from under the water, or … in general, by accident. Of course, no one bothers to deploy the veil of diesel-electric submarines on the paths of the likely following enemy nuclear submarines, but due to the relatively weak SAC and low underwater speed, the search capabilities of these boats are rather limited. In addition, the short submerged range in combination with low speed does not allow diesel-electric submarines to quickly move into the area where an enemy submarine was found. Or, for example, to escort SSBNs on the route of its advance.
Thus, diesel-electric submarines, being undoubtedly an important and useful weapon system of the Russian Navy, still cannot solve the entire spectrum of submarine warfare tasks.
What does our navy have at its disposal today? The most numerous are the diesel-electric submarines of project 877 "Halibut" already mentioned in the article. Today, there are 15 boats of this type in service, including five different subtypes.
Diesel-electric submarines of the "original" type 877 remained in service four units: B-227 "Vyborg"; B-445 "St. Nicholas the Wonderworker"; B-394 "Nurlat"; B-808 Yaroslavl. In NATO, the boats were designated "KILO".
Diesel-electric submarines of type 877LPMB B-800 "Kaluga", on which some new items used in the next sub-series were tested. So, for the first time on boats of this type, at Kaluga, not a classic six-bladed, but a seven-bladed saber-shaped propeller was used.
Boats of type 877M, eight units: B-464 "Ust-Kamchatsk"; B-459 Vladikavkaz; B-471 Magnitogorsk; B-494 "Ust-Bolsheretsk"; B-177 "Lipetsk"; B-187 Komsomolsk-on-Amur; B-190 Krasnokamensk; B-345 "Mogocha". The ships received a new propeller, a modernized GAK (instead of the analog MGK-400 "Rubicon", the MGK-400M "Rubicon-M", created on the basis of a computer, was installed), improved CIUS and control of ship systems. The 877M boats received the NATO designation "Improved KILO"
Project 877EKM (the abbreviation means "export commercial modernized"), in principle, is similar to the 877M, but is intended for operations in tropical seas. The Russian Navy has one boat of this subtype: B-806 Dmitrov. The ship was built for Libya, but the USSR decided to leave one boat of Project 877EKM for themselves in order to train the crews of export boats on it.
And, finally, the project 877V - B-871 "Alrosa" is a boat of the 877M type, but with the replacement of the propeller propeller with a water jet. Alrosa is considered the quietest boat among all Halibuts.
Most of the boats are part of the active forces: out of 15 ships, only 3 are undergoing repairs, and perhaps already only two, since it is unclear whether the B-806 "Dmitrov" came out of repair, it was going to be finished in 2017.
Type 877 boats were excellent weapons for their time. During the years of their design, an attempt was made to create a unified hydroacoustic complex for nuclear and diesel submarines (SJSC MGK-400 "Rubicon"). The SAC turned out to be very large, but for promising nuclear submarines it still "did not go", but it turned out to be much more powerful than everything that the domestic diesel-electric submarines had. As a result, according to some sources, the 877 project was built "around the SJC" which predetermined the rather large size of the "Halibuts". However, their ability to detect an underwater enemy turned out to be very high, which, combined with their own low noise, gave them the key ability of a successful diesel-electric submarine: "to see the enemy while remaining invisible." The book "Jump of a Whale" provides an eyewitness testimony - a representative of the service team S. V. Colon:
“… I witnessed the return of the Sindhugosh submarine from the campaign, in which a training encounter with the submarine of the 209th project took place, I guess it was just to assess their capabilities. It was in the waters of the Arabian Sea. Our lieutenant, a Hindu serving at the Knot, who was at the commander's console, after this battle, in joyful excitement, with a gleam in his eyes, said to me: "They did not even notice us, and were sunk."
Of course, the boats were not without flaws. The author has repeatedly come across remarks that the rather large size of "Halibuts" hampered their use in the Baltic and Black Seas. On the one hand, this is strange, but on the other, it should be noted that most of the diesel-electric submarines of project 877 served in the Northern and Pacific fleets. The SAC was powerful, but did not have on-board antennas, there was also no towed antenna, which is very important for diesel-electric submarines, since when charging the batteries, the standard SAC greatly loses its capabilities due to interference, and the towed antenna is subject to them to a much lesser extent.
Some shortcomings did not prevent the "Halibuts" from being a formidable weapon at the end of the 20th century. But in terms of their technological level, they correspond to the 3rd generation nuclear submarines, and today they are outdated. No matter how powerful their "Rubicon" is, it is inferior in its capabilities to SJC "Shchuk-B" and "Los Angeles". For SJSC MGK-400 "Rubicon", the detection range of submarines is 16-20 km, for surface ships - 60-80 km. (again, under what conditions and at what noise level of the submarine?) At the same time, it is reported that the "Shchuki-B" received the MGK-540 Skat-3 SJC, which is not inferior to the SJC of the American AN / BQQ-5 and AN / BQQ-6, for which the submarine detection range is indicated (apparently - in some ideal conditions) up to 160 km. On the other hand, open sources indicate that AN / BQQ-5 is able to see "Pike-B" no further than 10 km, according to other sources, it is not detected at all at low noise, but then the same applies to "Halibut".
It can be assumed that "Halibut", having a weaker GAC but probably a lower noise level than "Improved Los Angeles" will be about equal to him in a duel situation. But "Halibut" will not be able to compete on equal terms with "Virginia", since it is much quieter than the "Improved Elk" and has a more powerful GAC. In the duel between Halibut and Virginia, “to see the enemy while remaining invisible” will be the American atomarina.
In addition, the "Halibuts" were commissioned in the period 1983-1994 and today they are from 23 to 34 years old. It is not surprising that boats of this type are currently being withdrawn from the Russian Navy, despite the general shortage of submarines in the Russian Navy. In the period 2016-2017, the B-260 Chita left the fleet; B-401 "Novosibirsk"; B-402 "Vologda" and, obviously, this process will continue further. In general, it should be expected that in the next decade all boats of this type will leave the system.
They were to be replaced by non-nuclear submarines of the 4th generation of the project 677 "Lada".
The development of these ships began in 1987 and the designers faced an extremely difficult task, because they had to create a ship that was superior in everything to the previous generation of diesel-electric submarines. It is interesting that the main differences between the newest diesel-electric submarines from the boats of the previous generation strongly resemble those of the MAPL of project 885 "Ash".
Of course, great attention was paid to reducing the noise level of Project 677. Here there is a shift away from a two-body design in favor of a single-body design (although still rather a one-and-a-half-body design), a new all-mode electric motor, special shock absorbers designed to dampen the noise of vibroactive equipment, and a new body coating. Of course, the new Lira hydroacoustic complex, the new BIUS, communication systems, etc., as well as the ability to use cruise missiles: Project 877 and 877M boats did not have such an opportunity. There were many other novelties - in total, about 180 R&D works were carried out on Lada-type boats. There is no doubt that in the case of the successful implementation of the planned indicators, the fleet would receive a non-nuclear submarine capable of successfully fighting the 4th generation atomarines.
Alas, it was the desire to create a truly new non-nuclear submarine that played a cruel joke with the 677 project. Even in the USSR, such a high concentration of new products threatened to seriously delay the development of boats of this type, and only after the USSR was destroyed in 1991, work on the Lada became extremely complicated. Affected by the reduction in funding, coupled with the artificial "acceleration" of development work and the breakdown of cooperation chains, and the general atmosphere of the universal chaos. But it was a question of designing and fine-tuning a variety of components and assemblies of a new, previously unused design.
In 1997, the first boat of the project 677 "Saint Petersburg" was laid, and after it, in 2005 and 2006, the construction of the same type "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" began. Alas, the creation of such a complex system of naval weapons as diesel-electric submarines of the new generation turned out to be too tough for Russia in the 90s. “St. Petersburg”, as expected, turned into a long-term construction - the boat was launched in 2004, but only in 2010 they were able to hand over to the fleet - and then only for trial operation. The newest equipment refused to work, did not show the required power, etc. The construction of the remaining two boats of this type was suspended in 2009 and only in 2013-2015 resumed according to an improved design, while the Sevastopol laid down in 2006 was re-mortgaged in 2015, i.e. 9 (!!!) years after the start of construction with the name “Velikie Luki”.
As a result, the Russian Navy found itself in an extremely unpleasant situation. The existing diesel-electric submarines had already served their deadlines and, alas, no longer fully met the requirements of the war at sea, and there was nothing to replace them. As a result, a half-hearted, but absolutely correct decision was made - to massively build diesel-electric submarines of project 636.3 "Varshavyanka".
Project 636 appeared as an improved export version of the boat 877EKM, and, in fact, is a well-modernized "Halibut". In version 636.3 the diesel-electric submarine received a number of technologies developed in the process of creating the Lada, which allowed the Varshavyanka to become a much more formidable weapon than the boats of the 877 / 877M project. But it should be understood that no upgrades and new technologies can put these boats on a par with the 4th generation submarines. Perhaps it is worth talking about the Varshavyankas as ships of the "three and a half" or "3+" generation, but they cannot fight on equal terms with the Seawulfs and the Virginias. Serial construction of Project 636.3 was carried out not because this boat fully meets the requirements of the Russian Navy, but because the refusal of such construction was fraught with the fact that the Russian fleet would be left without non-nuclear submarines at all. That against the background of the total reduction of the nuclear submarine fleet would turn into a real disaster.
So, the Navy desperately needs 4th generation non-nuclear submarines, and what is the situation today? At some point, it was decided that the 677 project did not at all justify the hopes placed on it and the question of stopping work on the Lada and the development of a completely new Kalina ship was seriously considered. The design work was carried out very intensively. But it was clear that the problems faced by the designers would somehow "come out" on the next type of boats, so Saint Petersburg continued to operate in the hope of bringing the equipment to the required conditions. 7 years have passed, but to this day, one cannot say that the "stuffing" of "St. Petersburg" is working satisfactorily. If it had been different, no one would have laid down new diesel-electric submarines for the Pacific Fleet at the end of July 2017 according to the obsolete project 636.3
But it seems that the "light at the end of the tunnel" did appear, and there is reason to expect that "Kronstadt" and "Velikie Luki" will nevertheless reach the required parameters. First of all, this is evidenced by the fact that the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy V. Bursuk announced the desire of the fleet to order the next two boats of the 677 type. on the construction of only two Ladas until 2025. The manufacturer says that 5 years should pass from the moment of making a decision to delivery to the fleet. Taking into account the fact that Kronstadt is going to be launched in 2018 and transferred to the fleet in 2020, it is possible to expect new submarines to enter service by 2025.
In general, for domestic diesel-electric submarines, the following can be stated. At the beginning of GPV 2011-2025, the fleet had 18 diesel-electric submarines of project 877 "Halibut". It should be expected that by 2025 they will all leave the system. They will be replaced by 12 diesel-electric submarines of project 636.3, which, unfortunately, do not fully meet the requirements of modern naval warfare, and four boats of project 677 (most likely, the St. Petersburg will remain an experienced ship and will not reach full combat capability). thus, our non-nuclear fleet expects, albeit small, but still decline in numbers.
In addition, diesel-electric submarines will be redistributed to theaters. If at present, out of 18 diesel-electric submarines of project 877, only 3 boats were located in the Black and Baltic Seas (one in the Black Sea Fleet and two in the Baltic), then six of the 16 new diesel-electric submarines will serve in the Black Sea. Taking into account the need to have at least one diesel-electric submarine in the Baltic Sea (most likely there will be two) for the Northern and Pacific Fleets, in total, there are only 8-9 ships left instead of 15.
On the one hand, given the international situation, we cannot afford to keep the Black Sea Fleet without submarine forces - we need them in the Mediterranean. But on the other hand, we get a "trishkin caftan" when, at the cost of a military presence in the Mediterranean, we greatly expose the North and the Far East.
The conclusion is sad - against the background of a completely insufficient number of multipurpose nuclear submarines to cover the areas of SSBN deployment, in the next decade, we will significantly reduce the number of diesel-electric submarines that will be able to assist the MPS in the implementation of this key mission for the fleet. But, in addition to reducing the number of diesel-electric submarines, which we can use to cover SSBNs, we still lose as such a cover. Instead of 15 boats, we will have only 8-9 (of which six 636.3 submarines will be part of the Pacific Fleet, and 2-3 diesel-electric submarines of project 677 - into the Northern Fleet. 636.3 are unlikely to withstand the Virginias, and we will only have 2-3 diesel-electric submarines of the 4th generation.
Thus, the existing plans for the creation of non-nuclear submarines do not at all cover the shortage in multipurpose atomarines. And due to the massive equipping of the US Navy with 4th generation nuclear submarines, in addition to the quantitative gap, as a result of the disruption of the construction of the Project 677 submarine, we also get a qualitative loss.
A small postscript.
There is one more aspect in the construction of non-nuclear submarines - most likely, until 2025, not a single boat with VNEU will be included in the Russian Navy. However, it should be borne in mind that there are still more questions than answers on air-independent power plants.
Currently, a number of fleets are already operating submarines with VNEU, but information from the open press does not allow us to assess the success of the VNEU application on submarines. Today, there are two main VNEU schemes used on submarines:
1. Power plants with electrochemical generators.
2. Motors with external heat supply (Stirling engines).
The first type of VNEU is implemented on the German submarines of type 212. At the same time, there are enough rumors in open sources that boats of this type turned out to be very capricious and rather noisy. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the source of these rumors was the numerous complaints of the Greek Navy about the boats supplied by Germany.
But it is more than likely that Greece in this case just tried to make a "good face with a bad game." It is very likely that the Greeks, not having the funds to pay the German submarines on time, preferred to criticize the ships supplied to them to smithereens, but not admit their own insolvency.
On the other hand, none of the six boats of this type in the German Navy are currently in operation. This is an alarming signal, but what is to blame for this - the shortcomings and excessive capriciousness of the VNEU, or the scarcity of Germany's military budget, which has already become the talk of the town?
As for the Stirling engines, there are also many questions about them. Of course, there is an objective success of the Swedish submarine "Gotland" in training battles against the American and French fleets. But who was the opponent of Gotland? French nuclear submarine, but with all its undoubted advantages, this is a 3rd generation ship. The defeated American Atomarina is SSN-713 Houston, that is, the usual Los Angeles, not even Improved. Would Gotland have performed the same against Seawulf or Virginia? Question…
An interesting aspect. Our diesel-electric submarine "Halibut" had its advantage in low noise only when using an auxiliary propulsion device (thrusters), which all boats of this type have. But when driving under the main electric motor, the noise level increased significantly over the entire speed range. I wonder what about the noise level of the Gotland with the Stirling engines running? Could it be that the Gotland attacked and succeeded using only batteries with the engines turned off? If so, then the usefulness of Stirling engines is not nearly as high as it seems at first glance.
In this light, the actions of the Japanese Navy are extremely interesting. Having built a large series of non-nuclear submarines of the "Soryu" type with VNEU and having extensive experience in their operation, the Japanese Navy abandoned the Stirling engine in favor of lithium-ion batteries.
This type of battery significantly surpasses conventional diesel-electric submarines in terms of capacity and weight and dimensions, so that, at low speed, submarines with lithium-ion batteries are not too inferior in cruising range to submarines with VNEU. At the same time, lithium-ion batteries require significantly less time to recharge - accordingly, with a diesel engine, diesel-electric submarines are able to "recharge" much faster, reducing the time of increased noise to a minimum. But lithium-ion batteries are not cheap. The open press claims that non-nuclear submarines with VNEU are more expensive than conventional diesel-electric submarines, but boats with lithium-ion batteries are more expensive than VNEU. For example, the bmpd blog states that:
“The contract value of the 11th Soryu-class submarine is 64.4 billion yen (about 566 million dollars) against 51.7 billion yen (454 million dollars) for the tenth submarine of this type. Virtually all of the $ 112 million difference in cost will be the cost of lithium-ion batteries and the associated electrical system."
And if the Japanese Navy, having experience in operating Stirling engines, nevertheless switches to more expensive lithium-ion batteries, does this mean that lithium-ion batteries turned out to be a better choice than Stirling engines? It remains to recall the words of the former commander of the submarine forces of the Japanese fleet, retired vice admiral Masao Kobayashi. In his opinion, the use of lithium-ion batteries:
"… should dramatically change the way non-nuclear submarines operate."
So, in the Russian Federation today and for many years now, work has been carried out on VNEU. But, despite the constant announcements "things are still there" - not a single operating VNEU has yet been demonstrated. But, on the other hand, in terms of lithium-ion batteries, we have advanced quite far, the Rubin Central Design Bureau announced in December 2014 the completion of their tests, and, according to some reports, two new submarines of Project 677 are supposed to be built with lithium-ion batteries. It is interesting that if for "Halibuts" the submerged range was indicated at 400 miles at 3 knots, and for Project 677 - already 650 miles, then the use of lithium-ion batteries will increase this indicator by at least 1, 4 times (words of the former general director of "Rubin" A. Dyachkov) i.e. up to 910 miles, which is 2, 27 times more than the "Halibut". At the same time, A. Dyachkov in 2014 said that we are still using the potential of these batteries only by 35-40%, i.e. it is not excluded that the new "Lada" will have even more impressive opportunities for underwater travel.
In view of the foregoing, the fact that work on VNEU was clearly not set in the Russian Federation does not threaten our non-nuclear submarines with some kind of catastrophe and doom to lag behind the rest of the world's fleets. Much more important for the domestic submarine fleet is not the number of "Calibers" and not the VNEU, but such things as:
1. Effective anti-submarine torpedo armament.
2. Traps-simulators, forcing enemy detection and destruction means to be "distracted" by a false target. Such units were in service with diesel-electric submarines of type 877, but they could only be accepted in exchange for part of the ammunition and had very limited capabilities.
3. Active anti-torpedo systems. To date, the small-sized package-NK torpedoes are at least one of the best means of dealing with attacking torpedoes, but there is no information about their installation on submarines.
4. Means of electronic warfare capable of interfering with the sonar buoy and its carrier - an airplane or a helicopter.
5. SAM, capable of effectively countering enemy anti-submarine aviation.
Are you working in these areas today? As of today, we know only about progress in the area of torpedo weapons: new torpedoes "Physicist" and "Case" have been adopted. The author does not have data in order to compare these torpedoes with the latest imported samples, but, in any case, they will expand the capabilities of our submarines. As for everything else, the author did not come across any information on R&D on the above issues in the open press. Which, however, does not mean that such work is not being carried out.
Previous articles in the series:
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future (part 2)
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future. Part 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
