Another reason for Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War is the condition of its fleet. Moreover, everything is criticized, from ship designs to the personnel training system. And, of course, it goes to the naval command, who, according to many critics, showed simply epic incompetence, stupidity, and sometimes cowardice. Well, perhaps, we will start with the leadership of the Russian fleet.
So, please love and favor: Captain First Rank Nikolai Romanov. Yes, you heard right, it was the captain of the first rank. The fact is that our last sovereign did not manage to become a general during the reign of his father Alexander III and therefore remained a colonel. However, being engaged in naval affairs, he invariably wore the uniform of a captain of the first rank and liked to emphasize that he was a naval man, unlike others and others. What can you say about him as a leader? Well, regrettable as it may seem, he had no deep knowledge of maritime affairs. His acquaintance with the naval specifics was limited to a rather long sea voyage on the cruiser "Memory of Azov", which ended with the memorable incident in Otsu. Of course, no one appointed the heir to the throne to stand "dog" in the stormy sea or determine the location of the ship with the help of a sextant, but on the other hand, is all this really necessary for the future head of state? But in any case, the Tsarevich visited the future theater of military operations, got acquainted with a potential enemy and even nearly died from being hit by a local policeman's saber. It is difficult to say what conclusions he drew from all this, but you cannot reproach him in complete ignorance.
What can be said absolutely definitely, the sea in general and the fleet in particular Nikolai Aleksandrovich loved and did not spare money for it. On duty, he had to enter what was happening in the naval department. Give names to ships under construction, approve the appointment of admirals and senior officers, participate in launches and ceremonial reviews. In general, he was aware of most of the affairs and, so to speak, had his finger on the pulse. At the same time, it cannot be said that he somehow put pressure on his subordinates, intervened during the service, or changed something at his discretion. What our last sovereign, the emperor, is difficult to reproach for is voluntarism. He tried to listen to everyone and did not show his consent or, on the contrary, displeasure. The only thing that the author of this article can recall as an intervention is his "indispensable desire" to have another cruiser of the "Russia" type. I must say that even then these cruisers looked like the most complete anachronism, but you can't trample against the will of the tsar, and our fleet was replenished with one of its most beautiful ships.
But it's okay, in the end, to understand the types of boiler installations, methods of booking and the arrangement of artillery towers is not a tsar's business. His business is to appoint people who would understand everything in this, and to ask them, but … As it seems to me, our last autocrat was a very educated man, well-mannered, one might even say kind. In any case, he did not specifically harm anyone. It is also impossible to say that he would be weak in character, although he was often reproached for this. As Yevgeny Tarle wrote about him, all these Siberian elders, retired captains and Tibetan healers, who supposedly had an influence on him, always wanted what Nikolai himself wanted before their coming. And there was not a single captain, soothsayer or sorcerer who would have at least somehow parted with the preferences of the sovereign and after that retained his "influence". Another thing is that the sovereign did not like (perhaps because of his upbringing or for some other reason) to refuse people close to him. Therefore, it was easier for him to dismiss the minister than to explain what he was specifically dissatisfied with. But all these positive qualities of him were completely crossed out by one circumstance: Nikolai Alexandrovich did not know how to understand people at all. And therefore, quite often he chose the worst performer of all possible for his plans.
And this is best seen by the immediate head of the naval department, the emperor's august uncle, admiral-general and grand duke Alexei Alexandrovich. Strictly speaking, it was not Nicholas himself who appointed this post, but his father, Emperor Alexander III the Peacemaker. In 1881, when he ascended the throne after the assassination of Emperor Alexander II, he first of all dismissed all of his father's ministers. Including his uncle - Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. The so-called counter-reforms began, and the new emperor was not going to endure a relative known for his liberalism. At that time, the only Grand Duke wearing a naval uniform was his brother Alexei Alexandrovich. He became the new chief chief of the fleet and the naval department, and since 1883, the admiral general. Unlike his nephew, he once tasted all the "delights" of the ship's life. While sailing under the command of the famous Admiral Konstantin Nikolayevich Posyet, midshipman Romanov scrubbed the deck, stood on watch, both day and night, was an understudy trainee in all command and executive positions. (Despite the fact that the Grand Duke received the rank of midshipman at the age of seven.) Then he passed all the stages of naval service, participated in foreign campaigns, circled the Cape of Good Hope, was a senior officer of the frigate Svetlana, suffered a shipwreck, while refusing to leave the first sinking ship. In the Russo-Turkish War, not without success, he commanded naval teams on the Danube. In general, everything went to the point that the fleet in his person would receive, to the greater glory of the Fatherland, a wonderful and knowledgeable leader, but … this did not happen. Alas, having reached the highest ranks, Alexey Alexandrovich became a completely different person. According to his cousin Alexander Mikhailovich, “Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich enjoyed a reputation as the most handsome member of the Imperial family, although his colossal weight would serve as a significant obstacle to success with modern women. A secular man from head to toe, le "Beau Brummell", who was spoiled by women, Alexey Alexandrovich traveled a lot. The thought of spending a year away from Paris would have forced him to resign. But he was in the civil service and held a position no more no less than the Admiral of the Russian Imperial Fleet. It was difficult to imagine the more modest knowledge that this Admiral of a powerful power had in naval affairs. The mere mention of modern transformations in the navy made a painful grimace on his handsome face. Absolutely not interested in anything that would not relate to women, food or drinks, he invented an extremely convenient way to arrange meetings of the Admiralty Council. He invited his members to his palace for dinner, and after Napoleon's cognac entered the stomachs of his guests, the hospitable host opened the meeting of the Admiralty Council with a traditional story about an incident from the history of the Russian sailing navy. Every time I sat at these dinners, I heard from the mouth of the Grand Duke a repetition of the story about the death of the frigate "Alexander Nevsky", which took place many years ago on the rocks of the Danish coast near Skagen."
It cannot be said that during the management of the naval department by Grand Duke Alexei, affairs completely stopped. On the contrary, ships, ports were built, reforms were carried out, the number of crews, sheds, docks was increased, but all this can rather be attributed to the merits of his deputies - "managers of the naval ministry." As long as they were smart people, Peshchurov, Shestakov, Tyrtov, everything was, at least outwardly, relatively well. But, despite them, the healthy body of the fleet was slowly but surely corroded by the rust of formalism, inertia, petty economy, which ultimately led to Tsushima. But how did such an intolerable situation come about? According to the author, one should start looking for reasons during the time of the management of the naval department of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. The brother of the reformer king was an outstanding man. Under his leadership, the wooden sailing Russian fleet was replaced by a steam and armored fleet. In addition, he led the State Council, was the chairman of the committee for the liberation of the peasants, and also the governor in the Kingdom of Poland. Despite the fact that, in general, the Russian fleet and industry were very seriously inferior to those in Europe, the ships under construction were quite at the level of foreign analogues, and sometimes even surpassed them. For example, it was in Russia that the idea of an armored cruiser was first embodied. Or the strongest at that time battleship "Peter the Great" was built. There were, however, and controversial projects like round battleships-popovok, but in general, without bending your heart, we can say that the Russian fleet with it tried to keep up with the times and was, if not at the forefront of progress, then somewhere very close. But there was one very serious flaw in all this, which negatively affected subsequent events. When Konstantin Nikolaevich headed the Russian fleet, the Crimean War was going on. Then, after the conclusion of the peace, his brother began the "Great Reforms." The treasury was in an extremely constrained position, and the Grand Duke decided that in order to save money, the budget of the Naval Department would remain unchanged, that is, ten million rubles. This, of course, in those conditions was the right decision, but such a scarcity of funding could not but affect the way of doing business in the ministry. One of the consequences of these savings was the very extraordinary timing of the construction of new ships. For example, the armored frigate "Prince Pozharsky" was under construction for more than nine years, "Minin" - thirteen, "General-Admiral" and "Duke of Edinburgh" (the very first armored cruisers in the world) for five and seven years, respectively. The aforementioned "Peter the Great" is nine years old. Among other things, this led to the fact that when the war with Turkey began on the Black Sea, with the exception of the populations, there was no fleet at all, and it was not possible to send ships from the Baltic by conducting a new "expedition to the archipelago". Then they got out of the situation by equipping commercial steamers with cannons and improvised minion boats - mine boats. On these fragile ships, the Russian sailors achieved the absolutely incredible - they took possession of the sea, fighting against the newest armored ships built for Turkey in England. Who has not heard then about the heroism of young lieutenants Stepan Makarov, Fyodor Dubasov, Nikolai Skrydlov? Who did not admire their insane attacks, because on the boat it was necessary to come close to the enemy ship and, lowering the mine on a not so long pole, blow it up, risking their own lives. Was not Lieutenant Zinovy Rozhestvensky who stood up to the guns instead of the out-of-order artilleryman Vesta and fired until the Turkish battleship stopped chasing?
A. P. Bogolyubov. Attack of a Turkish steamer by a destroyer boat "Joke" on June 16, 1877
Less than thirty years will pass, and these lieutenants will become admirals and lead ships into battle in a completely different war. Makarov, by that time a well-known sailor, hydrographic scientist, artilleryman, innovator in many areas of maritime affairs, from the organization of service to work on the unsinkability of ships, will lead the Pacific Fleet after the first defeats. In a short time, just over a month, he succeeded in the almost impossible: to create a combat squadron from the collection of ships. To instill self-confidence in people who were confused after the unsuccessful start of the war. Of course, there were some annoying mistakes that led to losses, but only those who do nothing are not mistaken. One of these mistakes - an external raid that was not worn out in time, led to the death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" along with him, as well as many members of the crew and the headquarters of the fleet. Rozhestvensky received the Second Pacific Squadron under his command. Composed largely of newly built warships with inexperienced crews, the second squadron will make its unparalleled voyage to the Far East and die almost entirely in the Battle of Tsushima. Rozhestvensky himself will be seriously wounded at the very beginning of the battle and will be taken prisoner. Dubasov, who commanded the Pacific squadron in 1897-1899, will not receive an assignment to the war, but will be a member of the commission to investigate the so-called Gul incident. He will go down in history as the Moscow governor-general who led the suppression of the December armed uprising. Skrydlov was also the head of the Port Arthur squadron before the war. Under his leadership, the Russian ships devoted a lot of time to combat training and achieved great success in it, but did not get along with the imperious governor of the Far East E. I. Alekseev and was replaced by Stark in 1902. Alas, after that the Russian ships were more in the "armed reserve" and safely lost the acquired skills. After the death of Makarov, Nikolai Illarionovich was appointed commander of the fleet, but did not have time to enter the besieged Port Arthur and did not go out to sea himself. He made no attempts to break through. The cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment that remained in his subordination were commanded by admirals Bezobrazov and Jessen in campaigns and battles.
But these are the commanders. And what about the officers of lower rank? Unfortunately, we can say that the years of routine and inertia, when the main criterion of professionalism was his Majesty's qualifications and "blameless service" were not in vain for the officer corps. People emasculated mentally, weaned from taking risks, taking responsibility. To be interested in something that, at least one iota, went beyond the scope of duties. But what can I say, the navigator of the squadron, which had been based in Port Arthur for several years, did not bother to study the local conditions. The commander of the Retvizan, Schensnovich, wrote in his memoirs that he first saw the local skerries when the Japanese were taking him prisoner. But he is still one of the best! There were, of course, exceptions who were not afraid to take responsibility. For example, Nikolai Ottovich Esen, the only one who refused to destroy the battleship subordinate to him, and prepared him for a breakthrough. His efforts were not destined to be crowned with success, but at least he tried. But there were other examples as well. Let's say Robert Nikolaevich Viren. While he commanded the cruiser "Bayan", he was considered one of the most combat and initiative officers. But as soon as the rear admiral's eagle flew to his shoulder straps, they changed the man! Militancy and initiative also disappeared somewhere. In Soviet times, they said: - a normal officer, until the ram climbed on his head (a hint of astrakhan, from which the winter hats of senior officers were made). It seems that under the king it was the same.
Returning to the order that reigned in the naval department of Russia, we can say that the habit of petty economy and long-term construction dates back to the time of the rule of the Grand Duke Constantine. And what is typical, although the financing of the fleet subsequently improved significantly, neither the savings nor the long-term construction have gone anywhere. But if under the previous management the leadership was ready for innovation, then this cannot be said about Aleksey Alexandrovich. When designing cruisers and battleships, foreign projects were taken as samples, as a rule, already outdated, which, combined with the speed of work of domestic shipbuilding, led to very sad results. So, based on the German battleships of the "Sachsen" type, the Baltic rams were built: "Emperor Alexander II", "Emperor Nicholas I" and the notorious "Gangut" (one cannon, one mast, one pipe - one misunderstanding). The prototype of "Navarina" was the English "Trafalgar", and "Nakhimova" was the "Imperial". Here we must also understand that progress at that time was moving by leaps and bounds, and while the ships were being built, a lot of new products appeared that the sailors would like to introduce. However, this led to delays in construction, and during this time new improvements appeared. Not to mention the fact that new items not provided for by the initial project and estimate made the structure heavier and made it more expensive. Thus, the ships took a long time to build, were expensive and eventually ceased to meet modern requirements even at the time of construction.
By the end of the 19th century, the situation had improved somewhat. First, the wise heads of the high authorities have finally reached the simple truth that unification is a blessing. The ships began to be built in series, which undoubtedly facilitated the management of the formation composed of them in battle. True, one cannot say that the first episodes turned out to be very successful. And if the battleships of the "Poltava" type at the time of laying were quite on the level, then it is rather difficult to say about the "Peresvet" and "Goddesses". And then a second insight occurred: since we do not always manage to build modern ships according to our own designs, and simple borrowing does not lead to the desired results, then we need to order promising weapons abroad and then replicate them at our shipyards. I must say that our leadership came to this conclusion after reviewing the Japanese shipbuilding programs. It was not a secret against whom these militaristic plans were directed, and therefore the work began to boil. For convenience, I will compare our shipbuilding programs with those in Japan. Moreover, they soon had to become opponents in battle.
Japan's efforts to create a powerful navy are well known, so they are briefly discussed. At first, the Japanese Empire bought warships wherever possible without a special system, including used ones. Let's say "Esmeralda-1" in Chile, which became the "Izumi" in the Japanese fleet. Then they tried to give asymmetrical answers to the classic battleships available to China of the "Ding-Yuan" type. The result is a technical oxymoron called the Matsushima-class cruiser. Judge for yourself, the creation of maestro Bertin, who meticulously fulfilled all the wishes of the customer, is most logical to call "armored battleship of coastal defense in a cruising corps." In order to be a cruiser, he lacked speed, for an battleship he lacked armor, and a monstrous weapon never got anywhere in his entire career. Nevertheless, the Japanese were able to win the war with China with the freak show they had, gained some experience and soon abandoned dubious experiments, ordering warships from the best European shipyards, primarily in Great Britain. The first two squadron battleships (apart from the captured Chin-Yen), Fuji and Yashima, were modeled after the Royal Sovereign, but with slightly better armor protection and a weakened (305mm gun instead of 343mm) main caliber. However, the latter was more modern and therefore effective. This was followed by a pair of "Shikishima" and "Hattsuse" of the type improved "Majestic" and even more advanced "Asahi" and finally "Mikasa". Together they organized a fairly similar squadron and, no less important, having put them into operation in 1900-1902, the Japanese managed to properly train the crews before the war.
In addition, the Japanese built a number of rather specific ships at European shipyards, namely armored cruisers. Here we need to make a small footnote. As indicated above, the ancestor of this class of warships was Russia. The ships of this class that we built were, as a rule, single raiders, designed to interrupt the trade of the "Lady of the Seas" - England. Accordingly, the British armored cruisers were "anti-raiders" and were intended to protect them. For this, they had impressive dimensions, good seakeeping ability, and an impressive power reserve. However, there were armored cruisers for a different purpose. The fact is that the classic squadron battleships intended for linear combat were too expensive, and there was a need for this kind of combat units. Therefore, in countries with limited financial capabilities, smaller ships were built, with a short cruising range and seaworthiness, but with strong weapons. In Europe, these were Italy and Spain, but the main buyers of such "armadillos for the poor" were, first of all, the countries of Latin America. Moreover, Argentina purchased mainly the products of Italian shipyards, namely the famous cruisers of the Garibaldi type, and the Chileans preferred Armstrong's products, where the O'Higins cruiser was built for them, which became to some extent a prototype for the Japanese Asam … In total, two pairs of the same type of cruisers "Asama", "Tokiwa" and "Izumo" with "Iwate" were built in England, which were different, but nevertheless very similar in design. Two more cruisers with similar performance characteristics were built in France and Germany. Thus, the Japanese had another squadron of the same type of ships. It is believed that they were going to use them as a high-speed wing, but nothing like this happened during the entire Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese armored cruisers in all clashes of the main forces held on to the battleships at the end of the column. Based on this, it is logical to assume that the Japanese did not spend their money very productively, because for the same money it was possible to build four battleships with much more powerful weapons and armor. Nevertheless, the islanders adhered to their opinion on this matter and the construction of ships of this class did not stop after the war, except that they radically increased their armament. However, be that as it may, "Asamoids" were quite popular ships and quite successfully fought the entire war. Here, as it seems to the author of this article, their versatility played a role. Good armor made it possible to put these ships in line, and good speed (although not as high as indicated in the performance characteristics) made it possible to reinforce the detachments of light armored cruisers with them. With the latter in the Japanese Navy was, as it were, softer … full of seams. The fact is that the Japanese, like many other poor countries, preferred the so-called Elsvik type cruisers. Since their inception, these small ships with large cannons have invariably fascinated potential customers with their performance characteristics. But the thing is that the flip side of high speed and powerful weapons was the weakness of the hull and completely unsatisfactory seaworthiness. It is not surprising that the British, where this class of ships appeared, did not add a single similar ship to their fleet. The Japanese had fourteen such ships. Firstly, this is a pair of "Kassagi" and "Chitose" built in the USA and the Englishmen of the same type - "Takasago" and "Yoshino". These fairly fast and modern ships were part of the detachment of Admiral Shigeto Deva. They were called dogs in our fleet. Three of them were armed with eight-inches, in theory, were a formidable weapon, but during the whole won they did not get anywhere, except for one case. Another group was the already obsolete ships of the Sino-Japanese War veterans. "Naniwa", "Takachiho" and who was late for that war, already mentioned "Izumi". The formally armored "Chiyoda" can also be attributed to them. These ships were already old and had served a lot, but, nevertheless, the Japanese had overhauled them before the war and re-equipped them with modern artillery of 120-152mm caliber. The third group consisted of Japanese-built ships. Akitsushima, Suma, Akashi, Niitaka with Tsushima. Some of them were completed during the war and they had the same disadvantages as other Elsviks, plus a slightly lower speed. They were part of the detachments of admirals Uriu and Togo Jr. I have already mentioned the Matsushima-class cruisers, and therefore I will not repeat myself. Here the attentive reader may exclaim, but what about the Japanese Garibaldians "Nishin" with "Kasuga"? The author, of course, remembers these ships, but he also remembers that their acquisition was a successful impromptu. That is, it was not originally planned.
And what about the Russian fleet? Learning about the grandiose Japanese plans, our leadership stirred, and in 1898, in addition to the shipbuilding program of 1895, a new one was adopted, which was called “For the needs of the Far East”. According to this document, by 1903 in the Far East there should have been 10 squadron battleships and all armored cruisers (with the exception of the outdated Donskoy and Monomakh), that is, four. Ten armored cruisers of the first rank and the same number of the second. In addition, it was supposed to build two minelayers and 36 fighters and destroyers. True, the Minister of Finance Witte immediately considered the appropriations required for the implementation of this program excessive and obtained an installment plan. Now the implementation of this program was planned for 1905, which, of course, was too late. However, the responsibility should not be removed from the leadership of the fleet. If they understood the danger so well, why not transfer funds from other directions. Such as the construction of a naval base in Libau or the construction of battleships for the Black Sea Fleet, which was already two orders of magnitude more powerful than its only potential enemy. But back to the program. It was supposed to be based on squadron battleships with a displacement of about 12,000 tons, a speed of 18 knots, armament of 4 - 305 mm and 12 - 152 mm guns. In addition, it was supposed to have a powerful booking and a fair amount of autonomy. In general, when asking such performance characteristics, our admirals showed a fair amount of optimism. Our battleships of the "Peresvet" class had a similar displacement, which obviously did not meet the new requirements. It was possible to build analogues of the Black Sea "Potemkin-Tavrichesky", but it had a slightly lower speed. The result is known to everyone, being impressed by the characteristics of the "Tsarevich" ordered in France, our admirals decided to clone it at Russian shipyards, thus obtaining the "Borodino" project. For this choice they were not kicked only by the lazy one. Indeed, it was rather difficult to reproduce the project of maestro Lagan. A complex hull with littered sides, a turret arrangement of medium-caliber artillery, all this made the construction heavier and slowed down the entry of ships into service, which negatively affected the course of the campaign. However, at the time of the choice of the project, no one knew this yet, and the "Tsarevich" had its own strengths: good armor, large firing angles for medium-caliber guns, which made it possible to concentrate fire on the course corners. In any case, there was no way to wait any longer for the new project. In order to avoid downtime, the Baltic Shipyard was even forced to build a third battleship of the Peresvet type, Pobeda, which can hardly be called a good decision. (The advantages and disadvantages of this project are discussed in detail in the series of articles "Peresvet" - a great mistake. "Dear Andrey Kolobov). But be that as it may, all ten battleships provided by the program were built. Three "Peresvet", "Retvizan", "Tsesarevich" and five types of "Borodino". Most of them took part in the Russo-Japanese War. Some researchers ask themselves what would have happened if another project was taken as the basis for the “Borodino people”? Let's say "Retvizan" or "Potemkin Tavrichesky" … It's hard to say. History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, I am telling you as an alternative:) Most likely, today's historians would now criticize the decision to reject Lagan's project and build casemate battleships. So, ten battleships belonged to three different types (if we count "Tsarevich" and "Borodino" as one type, which is somewhat incorrect). Even worse, only four of them made it to Port Arthur before the war. Thus, if the main forces of the Japanese had only two types of battleships, then the Russian squadron had four, which made it difficult to maneuver, supply and lead them in battle.
Cruiser "Bayan". K. Cherepanov
As for the armored cruisers, the range of types was no less. Formally, all three Russian raiders belonged to the "Rurik" type, but they had no less differences, since they were built in different years. Weapons, armor, types of CMU and so on differed. Large, not very well-armored, they were excellent raiders, but very poorly suited for battle in the line. However, under Ulsan, "Russia" and "Thunderstorm" with honor endured the trials they had inherited, and the death of "Rurik" was largely an accident. The golden hit, which was lucky for the Japanese Imperial Navy, disabled the steering, which could not be repaired. Be that as it may, the heroic cruiser sank not from enemy artillery fire, but after the crew, exhausted of the possibilities for resistance, opened the kingstones. So we can say that while the Russian raiders were used for their intended purpose, they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them. Bayan stands somewhat apart. Considerably smaller than other Russian armored cruisers, but very well armored and fairly fast, it carried almost half the weapons of its Japanese opponents. Nevertheless, the Bayan project, as a cruiser intended for power reconnaissance in the squadron, should be recognized as quite successful. And it remains only to regret that she was the only such cruiser in our fleet. (The construction of its sisterships after the RYA, however, can hardly be called a reasonable decision, but here, after all, how many years have passed!) Alas, armored cruisers were always quite expensive ships with an unclear purpose at that time. Therefore, the RIF leadership preferred to build the cheaper six-thousanders cruisers. The first of them were the well-known "goddesses", so nicknamed because they bore the names of ancient deities. The ships, frankly, turned out to be so-so. Large, but weakly armed for their size and at the same time slow-moving, and therefore not capable of performing the functions assigned to them. It is no accident that in the Port Arthur squadron "Diana" and "Pallada" sailors without any respect called "Dasha" and "Broadsword". "Aurora", however, did not get the derogatory nickname, since since the time of the second squadron she had a reputation as an excellent ship. Although Zinovy Petrovich had his own opinion on this matter:) Realizing what happened as a result, under Spitz they decided for the benefit of organizing an international competition in order to choose the best project based on its results. Thus, were built: "Askold", "Varyag" and "Bogatyr". The latter became the prototype for Russian cruisers, of which only one was built in the Baltic - "Oleg". I must say that the resulting cruisers were individually superior to any Japanese armored deck, and so much so that even the newest "dogs" were just legal prey for them. But, unfortunately, the Japanese cruisers did not go one by one, and when there was a chance of meeting the enemy, they were invariably reinforced by their "older brothers" - "asamoids". Our cruisers, on the other hand, were scattered across different formations and therefore could not demonstrate their superiority. There was one Askold in Port Arthur, one Bogatyr in Vladivostok, and one Oleg in the second squadron. There was also one Varyag in Chemulpo, but fortunately it was rather only one. In addition, an unavoidable shortage of armored cruisers affected - low combat stability. It was because of her that "Diana" and "Askold" were forced to intern after the battle in the Yellow Sea. So the author of this article is inclined to agree with some of the researchers who believed the construction of ships of this class was a mistake. In his opinion, it would be more correct to build a cruiser according to the Bayan TTZ. Ships of this type could do everything the same as six-thousanders, but at the same time they are not afraid of any hit near the waterline. However, the leadership of the naval department had their own reasons and according to the program, three "goddesses", two "Bogatyrs", as well as "Askold" and "Varyag" were built. Another "Vityaz" burned down on the slipway, but even with it, only eight cruisers are obtained, instead of the planned ten. You can, of course, also count the "Svetlana" built in France, but in any case, the plan was not fulfilled.
And finally, cruisers of the second rank. The famous Novik was supposed to be the prototype for them. Small and not very well armed, she was very fast and outnumbered any of the cruisers in Japan. Slightly inferior in speed to destroyers, he was their most formidable enemy in the battles of Port Arthur. In his image and likeness at the Nevsky plant were built "Pearl" and "Izumrud". There was also a slightly less high-speed "Boyarin" and a completely indistinct "Almaz", which could more likely be attributed to messenger ships than warships. In any case, instead of the planned ten ships, only five were built. That is exactly half. The opportunity to purchase cruiser-class ships in China or Italy was also missed.
The death of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III". A. A. Touch
Thus, it can be stated that the shipbuilding program of 1895-98 "For the needs of the Far East" was not fully implemented. The construction of warships was unreasonably delayed and ultimately led to a dispersal of forces, giving the Japanese the opportunity to beat us in parts. In addition, the naval command was unable to concentrate the existing warships in Port Arthur in time. The detachment of Admiral Vireneus, consisting of "Oslyabi" and "Aurora", as well as other combat units, stayed in the Red Sea and could not arrive in time to the theater of operations. The battleships "Sisoy the Great" and "Navarin" with the cruiser "Nakhimov" were sent to the Baltic Sea before the war for repairs and modernization, which, incidentally, never took place. The Emperor Nicholas I, which had just undergone a major overhaul (but not modernized), dangled uselessly in the Mediterranean Sea. In general, completely insufficient attention was paid to the modernization of outdated ships. The Japanese, who did not spare money for this, received a hefty reserve suitable for all sorts of auxiliary actions such as patrols, shelling coastal targets, and the like. Our new warships generally met modern requirements, but even here there was a "but". Having built the latest battleships and cruisers, the leadership of the naval department was unable to provide them with modern shells, rangefinders and other necessary devices. Judge for yourself, a Russian twelve-inch projectile with a weight of 332 kg had from 1.5 to 4 kg of explosive in an armor-piercing and 6 kg in a high-explosive projectile, while a Japanese one, with a weight of about 380 kg, had, respectively, 19.3 kg in armor-piercing and 37 kg in a land mine. What kind of equality of combat capabilities can we talk about? As for the newest Barr and Stroud range finders, many ships of the first squadron simply did not have them, while others had one such device each. Also, the notorious economy did not allow for systematic combat training, forcing battleships and cruisers to spend a significant part of their time in the so-called "armed reserve". For example, the cruiser "Diana" spent eleven months in it before the war !!! Also, it was not possible to create the material and technical base necessary to ensure the combat readiness of the latest ships. There was no dock capable of accommodating the battleships, and in case of damage they had to be repaired with the help of caissons.
In general, despite the expended forces and resources, the fleet was unprepared for war.
Used materials:
Tarle E. History of territorial conquests of the 15th-20th centuries.
Romanov A. Memoirs of the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich Romanov.
Belov A. Battleships of Japan.
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