In the previous article, we touched a little on the state of the "mosquito" forces of our fleet using the example of small anti-submarine ships and were forced to state that this class in the Russian Navy did not receive renewal and development. As we said earlier, the Russian Navy had 99 MPKs with a displacement of 320 to 830 tons, and by the end of 2015, 27 units remained in service, built in the 80s of the last century, which will also soon “retire”. especially since their capabilities against 4th generation submarines are extremely dubious. But new IPCs are not being built: the creation of ships of this class has been discontinued, apparently, in the expectation that corvettes will fulfill their role. Which, alas, due to their small number, of course, will not be able to solve the problems of the Soviet TFR and IPC at least to some extent.
Well, now let's look at the shock component of the "mosquito" forces - small missile ships (MRK) and boats (RK). In order not to injure the psyche, we will not recall how many MRK and RC served under the Soviet flag, but we will take December 1, 2015 as a starting point and list only those ships that were laid back in the USSR.
MRK project 1239 "Sivuch" - 2 units.
Unique hovercraft of the skeg type, i.e., in fact, catamarans with two narrow hulls and a wide deck. Speed - 55 knots (interestingly, the Zelenodolsk plant's website says “about 45 knots”. Typo?), Armament - 8 Moskit anti-ship missiles, Osa-M air defense missile systems, one 76-mm AK-176 mount and two 30- mm AK-630. In addition to impressive speed, they have quite acceptable seaworthiness: RTOs of this type can use their weapons in waves of 5 points at a speed of 30-40 knots and in a displacement position - up to 8 points inclusive.
Laid down in the USSR in the 80s, completed in the Russian Federation in 1997-1999, so one can expect that ships of this type will last another 15-20 years. And that is great. The resumption of the creation of ships of this type is hardly rational, since their cost is probably very, very high (a specific hull, a super-powerful power plant), but those that have already been built should be kept as part of the Russian Navy as long as possible, making timely repairs and upgrades.
MRK project 1234.1 "Gadfly" (according to NATO classification) - 12 units.
With a standard displacement of 610 tons, these ships had a highly developed and balanced armament, including two triple launchers for anti-ship missiles P-120 "Malachite", one two-boom air defense system "Osa-MA", 76-mm artillery mount and -mm "metal cutter". The speed of the MRK of this project also inspired respect - 35 knots, despite the fact that missile weapons could be used in waves of up to 5 points.
These ships were laid down in the period from 1975 to 1989, and those of them that are still in service, joined the ranks of the fleet in the period from 1979 to 1992. Accordingly, today their age ranges from 26 to 40 years, and 9 "Gadflies" have not yet crossed the thirty-year milestone. Based on this, it can be assumed that there is a technical possibility to keep them in the fleet for another decade. Another question, is it necessary to do this?
The fact is that the main weapon of RTOs, the P-120 Malachite anti-ship missile system, was developed back in the 60s of the last century, and even at the time of the collapse of the USSR, it was far from being at the peak of technical progress. Its maximum flight range was 150 km, speed (according to various sources) 0.9-1 M, flight altitude on the cruising section - 60 m. a powerful 800-kg warhead, but today this anti-ship missile is completely outdated. At the same time, it no longer makes much sense to modernize almost thirty-year-old ships for new missiles, so their further presence in the fleet will have more decorative than practical function.
MRK project 1234.7 "Roll-over" - 1 unit.
The same MRK "Gadfly", only instead of six P-120 "Malachite" carried 12 (!) P-800 "Onyx". Probably an experienced ship, today it has been withdrawn from the fleet. According to some reports, it was written off back in 2012, but S. S. Berezhnova, which the author of the article is guided by, lists him as part of the Navy at the end of 2015, so Nakat is still on our list.
MRK project 11661 and 11661M "Tatarstan" - 2 units.
Ships of this type were created as a replacement for the small anti-submarine ships of Project 1124, but, being laid down in 1990-1991. were completed already in the Russian Federation as patrol (and missile) ships. "Tatarstan" had a standard displacement of 1,560 tons, speed 28 knots, armed with eight anti-ship missiles "Uran", SAM "Osa-MA", one 76-mm gun mount, two 30-mm AK-630 and the same number of 14, 5 machine guns KPVT. "Dagestan" had the same characteristics, but instead of "Uran" received eight "Calibers", and instead of "metal cutters" - ZAK "Broadsword". "Tatarstan" entered service in 2003, "Dagestan" - in 2012, both ships serve in the Caspian Flotilla.
Missile boats of project 1241.1 (1241-M) "Molniya" - 18 units.
The main missile boat of the Russian Navy. The standard displacement is 392 tons, 42 knots, four supersonic P-270 Mosquitoes, a 76-mm AK-176 and two 30-mm AK-630. On one of the boats ("Tempest") instead of two "metal cutters" installed ZAK "Broadsword". The bulk of these boats entered service in 1988-1992, one in 1994, and the Chuvashia, laid down in 1991, even in 2000. Accordingly, the age of 16 missile boats is 26-30 years, thanks to the anti-ship missiles Mosquito ships still retain their relevance and, most likely, can be retained in the fleet for another 7-10 years. The nineteenth ship of this type is also part of the Russian Navy, but launchers for Mosquitoes have been dismantled from it, which would make it wrong to count it in missile boats.
RC project 12411 (1241-T) - 4 units
We ignore minor nuances. It turned out like this: in the USSR, a missile boat was developed for the latest supersonic Mosquito missiles, but the anti-ship missiles were somewhat late, which is why the first series of “Lightning” was armed with old “Termites” with the same artillery. The ships were commissioned in 1984-1986, today they are from 32 to 34 years old, and their main armament has lost its combat significance in the 80s of the last century. It is pointless to modernize these ships due to their age, to keep them in the Navy too, so we should expect their decommissioning in the next 5 years.
RC project 1241.7 "Shuya" - 1 unit.
The "Lightning" of the first series with "Termites" was put into operation in 1985, but with dismantled "metal cutters" and the ZRAK "Kortik" installed in their place, which was subsequently also dismantled. Obviously, this ship will be withdrawn from the fleet in the next 5 years.
RC project 206 MR - 2 units
Small (233 t) hydrofoil boats. 42 knots, 2 Termit missiles, a 76-mm gun mount and one AK-630 assault rifle. Both boats entered service in 1983, they are now 35 years old and both are obvious candidates for decommissioning in the very near future.
Thus, from the "Soviet legacy" as of December 1, 2015, 44 small missile ships and missile boats served in the Russian Navy, of which 22 had real combat value, incl. two "Sivuch" and 18 "Lightning", armed with anti-ship missiles "Moskit", as well as two Caspian "Tatarstan". Nevertheless, until 2025, the bulk of these ships may well remain in service - today the Nakat left the fleet, and it should be expected that 7 boats armed with Termit missiles will soon follow, but the rest may well serve until 2025 and beyond.
Perhaps this is why the GPV 2011-2020. did not provide for the massive construction of shock "mosquito" forces - it was supposed to put into operation only a few ships of the project 21631 "Buyan-M". These ships are an enlarged and "rocket" version of the small artillery ship of Project 21630. With a displacement of 949 t, Buyan-M is capable of developing 25 knots, its armament is UKSK with 8 cells, capable of using the Caliber family of missiles, 100-mm AU -190 and 30-mm AK-630M-2 "Duet" and SAM "Gibka-R" with missiles 9M39 "Igla".
But, given the low speed and the fact that "Buyan-M" belongs to the ships of the "river-sea" class, it can hardly be considered as a replacement for small missile ships and boats, focused on strikes against enemy ship groups in our near sea zone … Most likely "Buyan-M" is just a "cover" for cruise (not anti-ship!) Missiles "Caliber". As you know, ground deployment of short-range (500-1,000 km) and medium-range (1,000-5,500 km) cruise missiles is prohibited by the INF Treaty of December 8, 1987, nevertheless, the armed forces of the United States and the Russian Federation certainly feel the need for such ammunition. The Americans compensated for the absence of such missiles by deploying the sea-based Tomahawk missile, but we, after the death of the USSR fleet, did not have such an opportunity. In this situation, the transformation of our "Calibers" into "river deployment" missiles is a logical step that does not violate international treaties. The system of river channels of the Russian Federation allows the Buyany-M to move between the Caspian, Black and Baltic Seas, on rivers these ships can be reliably covered by ground-based air defense systems and aircraft, and they can launch missiles from any point on the route.
Probably, if absolutely necessary, "Buyany-M" is able to operate at sea, having received an anti-ship version of the "Calibers" in service, but, obviously, this is not their profile. This is also "hinted" by their composition of radar weapons, but we will talk about this a little later.
The construction of a series of small missile ships of project 22800 "Karakurt" can be considered a real restoration of the "mosquito" fleet. These are small, highly specialized attack ships, the total displacement of which does not even reach 800 tons. Three diesel engines M-507D-1 produced by PJSC "Zvezda", with a capacity of 8,000 hp each, are used as a power plant. each - together they tell the "Karakurt" a speed of about 30 knots. The main armament of the ship is the UKSK for 8 cells for the Caliber / Onyx missiles, the 76-mm artillery mount AK-176MA and the ZRAK Pantsir-ME, as well as two 12.7 mm Kord machine guns. On the first two ships of the series, instead of the "Pantsir", two 30-mm AK-630 were installed.
A number of sources indicate that in addition to "metal cutters" MRKs are equipped with MANPADS, but here, apparently, we are not talking about "Gibka", but simply about the usual MANPADS (pipe on the shoulder).
The radar armament of the project 22800 emphasizes its shock, anti-ship orientation. The Mineral-M general detection radar is installed on the Karakurt, the capabilities of which are extremely great for a ship whose displacement does not even reach 1,000 tons.
In addition to the tasks of detecting and tracking surface and air targets usual for radars of this type, Mineral-M is capable of:
1) automated reception, processing and display of information on the surface situation coming from compatible complexes located on ground vehicles or ships of the tactical group, from external sources (command control systems, remote observation posts located on ships, helicopters and other aircraft), using external means of radio communication;
2) reception, processing and display of information on the surface situation, coming from naval sources of information: combat information and control systems, radar stations, navigation stations, hydroacoustic systems;
3) control of joint combat operations of the ships of the tactical group.
In other words, Mineral-M is terribly network-centric: it can receive (and obviously provide) information to a group of different forces, realizing the principle “one sees - everyone sees”, and can act as a focal point, but that's not all. advantages of this complex. The fact is that "Mineral-M" is able to work not only in active, but also in passive mode, not emitting anything on its own, but detecting and determining the location of the enemy by its radiation. At the same time, depending on the range of radiation, the detection range of radar systems ranges from 80 to 450 km. In active mode, the Mineral-M radar is capable of over-the-horizon target designation, the detection range of a target the size of a destroyer reaches 250 km. Here, of course, it should be noted that the "over-the-horizon" operation of the radar is not always possible and depends on the state of the atmosphere. The given 250 km range, for example, is possible only under the condition of super-refraction. Nevertheless, the usefulness of this radar operating mode for the carrier of long-range anti-ship missiles cannot be overestimated. In general, it can be stated that such a radar would look very good even on a much larger ship.
But on the "Buyan-M" is the radar MR-352 "Positive", which is (as the author, who is not an expert in the field of radar) could understand, a general-purpose radar in the traditional sense of these words, i.e. without numerous "buns" - over-the-horizon target designation, etc. That is, "Positive" provides illumination of the air and surface situation at a distance of up to 128 km, and is not intended to control weapons. In principle, "Positive" can provide target designation for missiles and for artillery fire, but it does not do it as well as specialized radars, because it is still a side function for it. The absence on Buyan-M of a radar like Mineral-M suggests that this MRK is not considered by the leadership of the fleet as a means of naval combat.
The pace of construction of the "mosquito" fleet for the Russian Navy is very impressive, and significantly exceeds the plans of the GPV 2011-2020. Since 2010, 10 Buyan-M missile launchers have been laid, and a contract has been signed for two more. Five ships of this type entered the fleet in 2015-2017, while the duration of construction is about three years. To put it mildly, this is not a very good indicator for serial ships with a displacement of less than 1,000 tons, all the more so for serial ones, but in any case there is no doubt that the other five, the extreme of which is the Grad, will become part of the fleet until 2020.
As for the Karakurt, their first pair was laid down in December 2015, both were launched in 2017, their delivery to the fleet is planned for 2018 and, in principle, these terms are realistic. A total of nine "Karakurt" are currently under construction (7 - at the "Pella" and 2 - at the Zelenodolsk plant), the start of the tenth is being prepared, and a contract has been signed for three more. In total - thirteen ships of project 22800, but a contract with the Amur shipyard is expected for six more ships of this type. Accordingly, it is quite possible to expect that by 2020 the Russian Navy will include nine "Karakurt", and by 2025 there will be at least 19, and this is if a decision is not made on the further construction of RTOs of this type.
In general, we can say that by building Buyanov-M, the Russian Federation secured absolute superiority in the Caspian Sea and to a certain extent strengthened the arsenal of long-range high-precision weapons of the domestic armed forces, but talk about Buyanov-M as a means of anti-ship warfare, according to the author, it is still impossible.
But even without taking into account the Buyans, the widespread construction of the Karakurt, in general, guarantees the reproduction of domestic mosquito forces. As we said above, the critical, "landslide" point for them will come in 7-10 years, when the service life of the Molniya-class missile boats will come close to 40 years and they will need to be withdrawn from the fleet. Other RTOs and missile boats, with the exception of Samum, Bora, Tatarstan and Dagestan, will need to be written off even earlier, thus the "legacy of the USSR" by 2025-2028 will be reduced by an order of magnitude (from 44 as of 01.12.2015 up to 4 units).
Nevertheless, if, nevertheless, a contract is signed for the construction of six ships of project 22800 for the Pacific Fleet, then 19 Karakurt will replace 18 Lightning, and other missile boats and MRK of the Gadfly type already today have practically no combat value due to extreme obsolescence of weapons. Thus, we can say that the reduction in the number of our MRK and ROK will not lead to a drop in the level of their combat capability. On the contrary, due to the fact that ships with the most modern missile weapons will be commissioned (one should not forget that the mythical "Zircon" can be used from standard UVP for "Onyx" and "Caliber"), we should talk about expanding the capabilities of the strike components of our "mosquito" fleet. In addition, with the entry into service of the Karakurt, the mosquito fleet will acquire the ability to strike with long-range cruise missiles at the enemy's land infrastructure, just as it was done in Syria.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to predict how many "Karakurt" will be laid in the coming years under the new GPV 2018-2025. Here, perhaps, both an increase in the series to 25-30 ships, and the refusal of their further construction, limiting the series to 13 ships. Nevertheless, there are at least 2 reasons why one should expect the construction of the Pacific "Karakurt".
First, the country's leadership, after demonstrating the capabilities of the Caspian Flotilla to destroy targets in Syria, should look favorably at small missile ships. Secondly, the admirals of our Navy, having a monstrous failure on surface ships, in the absence of frigates and corvettes, will obviously be happy to reinforce the fleet at least with "Karakurt".
Accordingly, the future of our "mosquito" fleet does not seem to cause fears … However, the author of this article will dare to raise another question, which for many will look like a real sedition
Does Russia really need a naval strike "mosquito" fleet?
First, let's try to figure out the cost of these ships. The easiest way to determine the cost of "Buyanov-M". As RIA Novosti reported:
"The contract signed at the Army-2016 forum between the Ministry of Defense and the Zelenodolsk shipyard is 27 billion rubles and provides for the construction of three Buyan-M class ships," Renat Mistakhov, general director of the plant, told RIA Novosti."
Accordingly, one ship of Project 21631 costs 9 billion rubles.
Many publications indicate that the price of one "Karakurt" is 2 billion rubles. However, in most cases, the assessment of Andrey Frolov, Deputy Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, is indicated as the source of this information. Unfortunately, the author was unable to find documents that would confirm the validity of this assessment. On the other hand, a number of sources give completely different figures. For example, Sergei Verevkin, executive director of a separate subdivision of the Leningrad shipyard Pella, argued that:
"The cost of such ships is three times less than the cost of a frigate."
And even if we take the cheapest domestic frigate (project 11356) at pre-crisis prices - it is 18 billion rubles, respectively, "Karakurt", according to S. Verevkin's statement, costs at least 6 billion rubles. This seems to be confirmed by reports that "Pella" handed over to the Feodosiya shipyard "More" an order for the construction of one "Karakurt", and the cost of the contract will amount to 5-6 billion rubles, but the question is that the amount is not accurate - the news cites the opinion of unnamed experts.
And what if S. Verevkin did not mean the frigate of the "Admiral's" series of project 11356, but the newest 22350 "Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov"?
After all, the figure is 6 billion rubles. for one "Karakurt" raises great doubts. Yes, "Buyan-M" is somewhat larger than the ship of project 22800, but at the same time "Karakurt" carries much more complex, and therefore expensive weapons (ZRAK "Pantsir-ME" and equipment (radar "Mineral-M"), however, on "Buyane-M" has implemented a water-jet propulsion, which is probably more expensive than the classic one, but in general one should expect that "Karakurt" costs no less, and even more, "Buyan-M".
Buyan-M's main utility is that it is a mobile launcher for long-range cruise missiles. But it should be taken into account that 9 billion rubles. for such mobility look prohibitively expensive. But there are other options: for example, … the very same container installations of "Caliber", about which so many copies were broken in due time.
According to people unfamiliar with the maritime theme, such containers represent an uberwunderwaffe, which is easy to hide on the deck of an ocean-going container ship, and in the event of a war, quickly "multiply by zero" US AUG. We will not disappoint anyone by recalling that an armed merchant ship that does not fly the naval flag of any country is pirate, with all the ensuing consequences for him and his crew, but simply remember that “a peaceful river container ship ", sailing somewhere in the middle of the Volga, no one will ever bring charges of piracy. To comply with the INF Treaty of the Russian Federation, it will be enough to include several "auxiliary river cruisers" in the fleet, but in the event of a real aggravation of relations with NATO, such containers can be placed on any suitable river ships.
Moreover. Because if a real clash with the US and NATO looms on the horizon, no one will pay attention to the treaties, and in this case, who is stopping the installation of a container with missiles … say, on a train? Or even like this:
Thus, we can state that the task of saturating the domestic armed forces with cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km may well be solved without the participation of Buyanov-M. In order to provide us with absolute superiority in the Caspian, in addition to the existing ships, 4-5 Buyanov-Ms would be enough, and it would not be necessary to equip them with Calibers - to destroy the boats that form the basis of other Caspian fleets, “Uranus is more than sufficient. The price of the issue? Refusal of 5-6 Buyanov-M would allow the Russian Navy to finance the purchase of a naval aviation regiment (we are talking about the Su-35, which cost about 2 billion rubles in the same 2016), which, according to the author of this article, would be for the fleet is much more useful.
With "Karakurt", too, not everything is unambiguous. The fact is that missile boats appeared as a means of fighting enemy surface forces in the coastal zone, but today it is very difficult to imagine enemy surface ships near our coast. Taking into account the extreme danger that aviation poses for modern ships, only an aircraft carrier strike group is capable of "looking at the light", but even that it makes no sense to come closer than several hundred kilometers to our coastline. But sending a group of "Karakurt" to the sea against the AUG is akin to suicide: if the history of naval battles teaches us anything, so only the extremely low resistance of small missile ships (corvettes and missile boats) to air attack weapons. Suffice it to recall, for example, the defeat of the Iraqi fleet in the Iran-Iraq war, when two Iranian F-4 Phantoms sank 4 torpedo boats and a missile boat of the Iraqi Navy in almost five minutes, and damaged 2 more missile boats - although they did not have specialized anti-ship weapons. Yes, our Project 22800 ships are equipped with Pantsiri-ME, which is a very serious weapon, but it should be borne in mind that a ship with a displacement of less than 800 tons is an extremely unstable platform for such equipment.
In addition, sadly, but the "Karakurt" do not have sufficient speed for dashing "cavalry" attacks. For them, a speed of "about 30 knots" is indicated, and this is very little, especially if we remember that when the sea is rough, small ships lose much speed. In other words, under the conditions of the same Far East, our Karakurt will be obviously slower than, say, the Arlie Burke - it has a maximum speed of 32 knots, but in conditions of excitement it loses it much less than the small ships of Project 22800.
Of course, in addition to global conflicts, there are also local conflicts, but the fact is that for them the power of the "Karakurt" is excessive. So, for example, in the well-known episode of the collision of a detachment of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation with Georgian boats, the use of the Kalibr anti-ship missile system would be completely unjustified. It might be an exaggeration to say that all five Georgian boats were cheaper than one such missile, but …
According to the author, in a full-scale conflict with NATO, "Karakurt" can be used only as a mobile missile battery of coastal defense, with the help of which it is possible to relatively quickly cover objects threatened by an attack from the sea. But in this capacity, they are almost inferior to automobile complexes in terms of movement speed, in addition, the ground complex is easier to mask. In general, here we have to admit that a regiment of modern fighter-bombers would be much more useful for the fleet than 6 Karakurt, and in terms of cost, they are apparently quite comparable.
And nevertheless, the author assumes that in the future we will have news about an increase in the production of "Karakurt". For the reason that the number of surface ships of our Navy, capable of going to sea, is decreasing from year to year, and the industry continues to disrupt every conceivable time frame for the construction of new ships - from the corvette and above. And if the first ships of Project 22800 enter service on schedule (which will confirm our ability to build them relatively quickly), then there will be new orders. Not because the Karakurt are a wunderwaffe or a panacea, but because the fleet still needs at least some surface ships.
