In the first article of this cycle, we examined the current state and immediate prospects of the submarine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation; now we have a non-strategic nuclear submarine fleet next in line.
To date, the Russian Navy, not counting SSBNs and special-purpose nuclear-powered ships, includes 9 nuclear-powered missile cruiser (SSGN) submarines and 18 multipurpose nuclear submarines (MAPL). Of course, 27 submarines look impressive on paper. But it should be understood that the overwhelming majority of our submarines were commissioned in the late 80s - early 90s of the last century. We have only two more or less new (in terms of construction time) submarines: this is Severodvinsk, on which the naval flag was raised in 2014, and Gepard, which was commissioned in 2001. Accordingly, the number of ships in service (and not on paper) will be determined primarily by the throughput of repair facilities.
Four enterprises are engaged in the repair of nuclear submarines in Russia:
1) JSC Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center (hereinafter - Zvezdochka), located in Severodvinsk;
2) Shipyard "Nerpa", Snezhnogorsk (Murmansk region) - is a branch of "Zvezdochka", so in the future we will count it as part of "Zvezdochka";
3) JSC Far Eastern Plant Zvezda (hereinafter referred to as Zvezda), located in the town of Bolshoy Kamen, Primorsky Krai;
4) PJSC "Amur Shipbuilding Plant" (hereinafter - "ASZ") located, respectively, in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Being neither a submariner nor a shipbuilder and in no way claiming to be the ultimate truth, but wandering around the specialized forums, the author of this article made the following impression about the possibilities of the above enterprises.
"Zvezdochka" can do everything: repairs of any degree of complexity and serious modernization of nuclear submarines.
Zvezda is capable of handling boat repairs, but it will experience certain difficulties with modernization.
"ASZ" is a "black hole" of the nuclear submarine fleet, the ship that got there is waiting for decommissioning and cutting.
Let's take a look at how the above enterprises are going to load in the coming years.
The basis of the non-strategic nuclear submarine fleet of the Russian Federation is today two types of submarines: this is the Project 949A Antey SSGN (which included the deceased Kursk submarine) in the amount of 8 units and 11 MAPLs of Project 971 Shchuka-B (the twelfth submarine of this type, Nerpa, leased to India). At the same time, SSGNs, obviously, are the basis of the strike forces and are designed to combat large enemy ship groupings (including AUG), and MAPLs are focused primarily on anti-submarine warfare.
Let's start with Project 971 Pike-B.
In fact, four modifications of Project 971 "hid" under the general name "Pike-B", for the listing of which we use the NATO classification (in the domestic it is much easier to get confused). Project 971 was dubbed "Akula" by NATO. Now the Russian Navy includes 5 submarines of the "original" 971 (the year of entry into service is indicated in parentheses): "Kashalot" (1988); Bratsk (1989); Magadan (1990); Panther (1990); The Wolf (1991).
This type of submarine was a domestic response to the American Los Angeles nuclear submarine, and the answer was extremely successful. N. Polmar (renowned naval analyst) said at a hearing before the US House of Representatives National Security Committee:
"The appearance of the Akula-class submarines, as well as other Russian 3rd generation nuclear submarines, demonstrated that Soviet shipbuilders closed the noise gap faster than expected."
I would like to recall the famous incident that took place on February 29, 1996, when a domestic submarine got in touch with NATO ships with a request for help: one of the crew members needed emergency medical assistance due to peritonitis. Shortly thereafter, a Russian boat surfaced at the center of a NATO warrant, and the patient was transported from it to a British destroyer and then to a hospital. Such a touching picture of friendship between peoples was "slightly" spoiled by the fact that the NATO squadron, generally speaking, conducted anti-submarine exercises, but until our submariners got in touch, no one knew about their presence in the immediate vicinity of the warrant … then, that they collided with the newest "Pike-B", but it was a mistake: in fact, the Tambov, the ship of project 671RTM (K), asked for help, i.e. boat of the previous type.
The noise level of the boats of Project 971 "Akula" was reduced relative to 671RTM (K) by 4-4.5 times.
Of course, in the future the USSR was not going to stop there and started building an improved version of Project 971, which received the NATO designation "Improved Akula". Due to their low noise, these boats did not establish parity any more, but took the lead. The Americans noted that at operational speeds of the order of 5-7 knots, the noise of the Improved Akula-class boats, recorded by hydroacoustic reconnaissance means, was lower than the noise of the Improved Los Angeles (that is, the Improved Los Angeles). At the same time, according to the head of the operations department of the US Navy, Admiral D. Burd, American ships were unable to accompany the nuclear submarine "Improved Akula" at speeds less than 6-9 knots.
The Russian Navy currently has 4 Improved Akula MAPLs: Kuzbass (1992); Leopard (1992); Tiger (1993); Samara (1995).
Subsequently, ships of this type were further improved: the ship, on which part of the proposed innovations were worked out, was the Vepr (1995), which received the designation Akula II, and the first serial (and alas, the only one that entered service) boat of the new modification was Cheetah "(2001) in NATO terminology -" Akula III ". In terms of a number of parameters (including the noise level), these two ships are very close to the 4th generation of nuclear submarines.
Project 971 Shchuka-B MAPLs, along with the previous type 671RTM (K), became the favorite ships of Russian submariners who appreciated them for their reliability, convenience and combat power, and, in the end, ships of this type are amazingly beautiful. They, of course, were able to cope with the tasks of anti-submarine defense, while the backbone of the American submarine forces were nuclear submarines such as Los Angeles and Improved Los Angeles.
In other words, for their time the ships of Project 971 "Schuka-B" were both perfect and extremely formidable weapons. The problem is that this time is forever a thing of the past.
In order to understand who (if something happens) our MPS will have to fight, let's make a small excursion into the history of the American Navy.
For a long time, the US Navy had a concept according to which multipurpose nuclear submarines had their main task to destroy Russian submarines on the lines of anti-submarine defense. But the development of Soviet technologies led to the fact that there was absolutely no need for domestic SSBNs to go to the ocean. The increased range of ballistic missiles allowed submarine missile carriers to hit targets in the United States, while in the seas of the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk, and the growing naval power of the Land of the Soviets made it possible to ensure supremacy over water and in the air in these areas.
The deployment areas of the Soviet SSBNs were located near the Soviet naval bases and were covered with everything that the USSR Navy had at its disposal. Including numerous land-based aviation, many surface ships, and, of course, the newest atomarines "Shchuka" and "Shchuka-B". These areas in the American fleet were called "Bastions": the US Navy, with all its might, had no opportunity to invade the "Bastions", defeat them and put them under its control in order to destroy the Soviet SSBNs at the beginning of the conflict, and then it would have been late.
From here, in fact, came the changes in the US naval strategy. The fleet demanded submarines capable of searching for and destroying Soviet submarines directly in the Bastions. To do this, the Americans needed anti-submarine atomarines capable of successfully operating in the zone of domination of the Soviet Navy and Air Force. And such ships were created - a series of nuclear submarines "Seawulf". They were the first nuclear submarines of the 4th generation, and, in terms of the aggregate of their combat qualities, they have become, and perhaps still remain, the most formidable multipurpose nuclear submarines in the world. Of course, nothing is given for free, and the cost of the newest American nuclear submarines turned out to be unaffordable even for the US budget. As a result, the Americans built only three Seawulfs, and later switched to cheaper, but somewhat less efficient Virginias.
However, "Virginias", although they are in fact a kind of "version of light", were designed in compliance with certain requirements, one of which was the preservation of noise at the level of "Seawulf". And besides, the "Virginias" have preserved from their formidable "ancestors" a very perfect sonar complex. In general, "Virginias" represent an unconditional step forward in comparison with "Improved Los Angeles" and out of all our eleven MAPLs of Project 971, only two submarines are somewhat equivalent to the "Virginias": "Vepr" ("Akula II") and "Cheetah" ("Akula III"). At the same time, the US Navy already has 15 Virginias and 3 Seawulfs.
On the other hand, Shchuki-B has a very large modernization potential. Currently, there is a project 971M, which provides, literally, the construction of a new submarine in the hull of an old one at a price of less than half of modern atomicity. The volume of alterations is very large, but for this money we get a boat that is very close to the 4th generation and is quite capable of withstanding the Virginias. At the same time, according to some reports, the service life of the modernized MPSs is increased by 10 years.
Initially, there was talk that 6 boats would be modernized under the 971M project, and Zvezdochka was supposed to do this. However, as of 2017, we are already talking about only four: "Leopard", "Wolf", "Bratsk" and "Samara". At the same time, the "Leopard" was put into modernization in mid-2011, and the contract for its "transformation" into the 971M was signed in December 2012. The boat had not returned to the fleet until they were sent, the terms of its delivery to the sailors were constantly shifting "to the right". Not so long ago, they talked about 2018, but now about 2019. On the one hand, this is understandable by the global scale of work on the ship. Modernization of "Leopard", according to some sources, should have cost 12 billion rubles. still in old prices. But on the other hand, such rates do not at all inspire optimism: it should be assumed that the delivery of four MAPLs of project 971M to the fleet in 2019-2025 will become the limit of Zvezdochka's production capacity for the next decade. And this is if the fleet under the new GPV 2018-2025 has enough money for all four nuclear submarines!
What is the fate of the rest of the boats of Project 971? Sadly, but, most likely, two boats "Kashalot" and "Magadan" will leave the Russian Navy: both of them are now at the Amur shipyard, and they have little chance of returning from there. "Vepr" ("Akula II") is completing repairs at "Nerpa" (a branch of "Zvezdochka") and, probably, after it will be repaired ("Akula III") "Gepard" (this is not an expensive modernization, but rather about the average repair, although it is possible that the "Cheetah" will need a major overhaul).
You can also, probably, vouch that the "Kuzbass" ("Improved Akula"), which completed the repair in 2016, will remain in the ranks, but about the "Tiger" and "Panther" everything is not so simple. These ships were repaired in 2002 and 2008.accordingly, so by 2025, obviously, the next one will be needed, but will these boats receive it? Until 2025, they have practically no chances of serious repairs, but will the military invest after 2025 in ships of 32 and 35 years of age? Which, even after an expensive renovation, will no longer become equal to the American Virginias? Let's put it bluntly: hardly.
Most likely, and even in the most optimistic version, by 2025 we will have 4 boats, modernized according to the 971M project, and 2 more boats approaching the 4th generation "Vepr" ("Akula II") and "Gepard" ("Akula III "), and all these boats will be in the fleet, and not in repair or waiting. In addition, it is possible that Kuzbass will remain in the fleet, while the rest will most likely go to the reserve, from which they will never return. Not that they couldn't be put into operation, but what's the point? Today, when the boats being upgraded according to the 971M project are 22-28 years old, it makes sense to invest a lot of money in order to provide the fleet with four powerful atomarines that can last 12-15 years after repair or even a little longer, but why invest heavily in 35 year old ships? To send them to scrap metal 5 years after they have been repaired?
Oh, if the Russian Federation had the money and production capacity to "drive" all eleven ships under the 971M modernization program within the next decade, or at least nine, with the exception of the newest "Cheetah" and "Vepr"!.. But no money, we have no capacity for this …
Therefore, our forecast for ships of project 971: seven ships by 2025, four 971M and one each Akula II, Akula III and Improved Akula, while the latter, Improved Akula, by 2030. will leave the line. And, no matter how sad it is to realize, this scenario should be viewed as optimistic. And by 2035, we will most likely have to say goodbye to all ships of the Schuka-B project - by that time all of them, except for the Gepard, will have passed 40 years in the fleet.
However, the attentive reader has already noticed that when considering the prospects for the repair of "Shchuk-B", we take into account only "Zvezdochka" and "ASZ", but not the Far East "Zvezda". Why? To answer this question, consider the second core of our submarine forces - Project 949A Antey SSGN.
These ships, "aircraft carrier killers", do not need a special introduction, because, probably, there is not a single person who is at least somewhat interested in the state of the modern Russian fleet and does not know about them.
Opinions differ about their combat effectiveness. Some see Antaeus as an ultimatum weapon capable of guaranteed to “multiply by zero” enemy AUGs at the beginning of the conflict. Others, on the contrary, consider the 949A ships almost useless, because, in their opinion, 24 Granit anti-ship missiles will not be enough to overcome the air defense of the AUG order. According to the author of this article, the truth is somewhere in between.
In order to use their main weapon at a range close to the limit, the Anteyas need external target designation, which is not so easy to obtain and not so easy to transfer to a submarine. For this purpose, the USSR used the Legend marine space reconnaissance and target designation system and Tu-95RTs target designation aircraft. But it was not possible to "make friends" satellites with submarines, because too much had to be done too quickly: detect the target by the satellite, classify it, calculate target designation, transfer it to the submarine … In theory, all this worked perfectly, but in practice, failures occurred regularly … And the "carcasses" built in 1962 and duty-bound to operate in an area controlled by enemy carrier-based aircraft without fighter cover, had little chance of fulfilling the task.
Today, there is no "Legend" anymore, the "Liana" (full impression) that replaced it has not "come", confining itself to only four companions, which is absolutely not enough. Theoretically, the ships of Project 949A could receive target designation from over-the-horizon radar stations (if the latter nevertheless learned how to do this) or (which looks more realistic) from A-50 or A-50U AWACS aircraft operating in the interests of the fleet. But the author is not aware of a single exercise in which the Aerospace Forces and the Navy would try to work out such interaction.
It should be understood that the need to deploy 24 huge anti-ship missiles "Granit" could not but affect the characteristics of the "Anteyev". The boats of the project 949A are more than 1.8 times the mass of the Shchuka-B MAPL. Perhaps this did not affect the maneuverability of missile submarines too much (in fact, their power plant is a double power plant "Shchuk-B"), but still one can hardly expect from the Anteyev the same capabilities to resist enemy submarines as from the boats of Project 971. After all, "Antei" are highly specialized missile submarines designed to destroy squadrons of surface ships, and not for anti-submarine warfare.
But still, despite the absence of external target designation, Project 949A still remains a formidable opponent of aircraft carrier strike groups. Even in cases when Antey is forced to rely on its own SAC, he is still capable, with luck (the AUG entrance into its patrol zone), strike at it with a "dagger" blow from a distance of 120-150 km, and possibly more (for SAC boats Project 949A indicated a maximum detection range of 230-240 km, but, of course, everything here is very dependent on hydrology). And whatever calculations the supporters of the American "Aegis" system give, giving a second-by-second timing, how one "Arlie Burke" destroys a full salvo of Project 949A SSGNs, but in a real battle everything happens "a little" not according to the formulas. The remarkable British Sea Wolfe air defense missile system, which intercepted 114-mm shells in flight without any problems during exercises, in real combat conditions often could not react to an Argentine subsonic attack aircraft. Instead of “paper” 85% efficiency, the air defense missile system “slept through” almost 40% of attacks, and in the rest it showed about 40% efficiency. The same applies to the American Patriot air defense systems: in the ideal conditions of the Desert Storm (absence of electronic warfare, salvo launches of Scuds), they demonstrated 80% efficiency at best.
But what is the 80% effectiveness of air defense when attacking 24 Granit anti-ship missiles? This is 4-5 missiles that have broken through to the target, which may not be enough to destroy an aircraft carrier, but in order to severely damage and disable it, disrupting the fulfillment of a combat mission, more than.
Thus, until recently, the Project 949A Antei could be regarded as a rather formidable naval weapon, although it did not become a wunderwaffe due to the lack of external target designation, but nevertheless, under certain conditions, poses a terrible danger to enemy surface ships. Alas, the years go by quickly.
Despite the indisputable advantages of the Granit anti-ship missile system, it must be remembered that this is a development of the 70s of the last century, which was put into service in 1983, that is, 34 years ago. During this time, the electronic "stuffing" of the rocket, of course, has become very outdated and, probably, today does not fully meet the requirements of naval warfare - it is quite possible to assume an increased vulnerability of the missile's AGSN to the effects of electronic warfare.
Therefore, our SSGNs needed new missiles, and the current project for their modernization implies not only updating the equipment of missile carriers, but also installing 72 launchers for new missiles Caliber, Onyx and, probably, Zircon instead of Granites. Such a number of modern missiles in one salvo practically guarantees an oversaturation of the air defense of a modern AUG and the destruction of an aircraft carrier, but again - only if the modernized SSGN can approach the AUG within the range of its detection by the ship's SAC (or if the AUG itself approaches the SSGN patrol area), despite the fact that in terms of low noise and the capabilities of the hydroacoustic complex, Project 949A SSGNs, even after modernization, will be inferior to the 4th generation submarines of the US Navy and will not be able to oppose the Seawulfs and Virginias on equal terms.
Nevertheless, the modernized "Antaeus" will remain a rather formidable weapon. The problem is that out of 8 such boats currently in the Russian Navy, only four are expected to be upgraded."Irkutsk" and "Chelyabinsk" are going through it now, and after them, probably, will come the turn of "Omsk" and "Vilyuchinsk" ("Omsk", perhaps, has already started modernization).
The problems are the same: such a modernization seems to be extremely large-scale and complex, and therefore expensive, despite the fact that Zvezda's specialists, as one might assume, do not yet have enough experience to implement projects of this level. It follows from this that the next decade "Zvezda" will be busy with work on "Antaeus" and will not be able to do anything else.
As can be understood from open sources, in the coming years "Zvezdochka" will be focused on the modernization of "Schuk-B", and "Zvezda" - "Anteev". It is far from the fact that Zvezda will succeed, that the deadlines will not shift “to the right” and that within the framework of the GPV 2018-2025. four refurbished SSGNs will return to the fleet, but … let's say they did return. What will happen to the remaining four? Alas, their prospects are completely bleak.
The fact is that by 2025 the age of Voronezh, Orel and Smolensk will reach 33-36 years, and only Tomsk, transferred to the fleet in 1996, will still be relatively young, 29 years old. Accordingly, only Tomsk has any hope for modernization under the next GPV 2026-2035, but extremely illusory. Firstly, taking into account the actual timing of our ship repair, the modernization of the four Anteyevs will still be delayed, and secondly, such an upgrade will take several years, and it is far from the fact that the Navy will want to pay for the obsolete ship entered service in the year 2030 or even later.
It is most likely that while four Anteyas are undergoing modernization, the second four will serve, especially since Tomsk and Oryol completed repairs in 2017, Smolensk in 2014, and only Voronezh in 2011 But as the upgraded ships enter service, they will leave the fleet and go for disposal. Moreover, the main reason for this will not be their technical condition, but the absence of the main weapon, for which these boats, in fact, were created.
Although the author does not know when the production of "Granites" was discontinued, it can be assumed that this happened quite a long time ago. Already in the early 2000s, "Granit" was not considered a missile at the forefront of military-technical progress, and in 2001, the design of its modernized version was started. But these works were not completed (about 70% of the development work was completed), after which they were stopped in 2010. Thus, the updated version of "Granit" did not take place, of course, no one will restore the production of missiles according to the original and already outdated project, and the missiles released earlier by 2025, with the highest probability, will expire all warranty periods. Thus, the unmodernized Project 949A SSGNs will lose their main weapons, and as multipurpose nuclear submarines, they are untenable even now. Accordingly, their presence in the Russian Navy will lose all meaning.
As a result, we come to the conclusion that out of 11 MAPLs of project 971 "Shchuka-B" and 8 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey" that are now part of the Russian Navy, a decade later, we will have 7 MAPLs and 4 SSGNs. Yes, of this number, 8 atomarines will undergo deep modernization, but out of 19 ships, 11 will remain, that is, the number will drop by more than one and a half times! And even such a result is achievable only with the allocation of sufficient funds for the fleet in the new GPV 2018-2025 and the shock work of our ship repair industry. And still looks overly optimistic!
At the same time, surprisingly, the number of projects 971 and 949A atomic in service, and not standing in reserve, for repairs or waiting for it will not dramatically increase. Now we have 4 MPSS "Shchuka-B" and 5 SSGN "Antey", ie. 9 ships, and by 2025 there will be either 11 or 10 in case the Gepard will be delivered for repairs by that time.
And what about the rest of the nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy? The first thing to consider when trying to predict their fate: they cannot count on any serious repairs, because both money and capacities will be used primarily for the Anteev and Shchuk-B modernization programs.
Currently, the Russian Navy has three MAPLs of project 671RTM (K) "Shchuka". Boats of this type are outdated, and back in 2013 it was decided that it was inexpedient to modernize them, because the ships were created on the basis of technical solutions of the 70s of the last century and it is impossible to bring them to the parameters required today. Of the three surviving Schucks, Daniil Moskovsky is in reserve, and it is unlikely that it will ever come out of it, Tambov seems to be undergoing repairs, but most likely it has just been taken out of service and is laid up on the territory of a shipyard. (possibly - "Nerpa"). Only one Obninsk remained in the ranks. With the highest degree of probability, by 2025, not a single Project 671RTM (K) ship will remain in the Russian Navy.
Project 945A "Condor" - relatively old 3rd generation boats "Nizhny Novgorod" (1990) and "Pskov" (1993).
They have titanium cases, were overhauled in 2008 and 2015. respectively. In terms of their combat qualities, they are not inferior to the MAPLs of project 971 of the first series, respectively, by 2025 they will become obsolete and, with a high degree of probability, will leave the system, although it is possible that their service life will be extended until 2030, but no further. By this time, the boats will be 40 and 37 years old.
Our list is completed by two "Barracudas", project 945: "Kostroma" and "Karp". And if the fate of their "descendants" - "Condors" is questionable and there may still be various options, then for the "Barracuda", alas, everything is clear. They are in reserve and there they will end their days, because their modernization does not seem justified, moreover, there will be no money or industrial capacities for it.
Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that of the 26 non-strategic atomarines available in the fleet (excluding Severodvinsk), by 2025 it will be good if 13 boats will remain, and by 2030 there will be 11. At the same time, the number of nuclear submarines of project 885 Severodvinsk , Which we will consider in detail in the next article, is limited to 7 boats, and until 2025-2030, apart from them, there will be no new atomarines. This means that the number of SSGNs and MAPLs in the Russian Navy continues to decline, and in the next 15 years will decrease from 27 to 18. Of course, the quality of the Russian Navy's nuclear fleet will become much stronger, but its number, which is still quite insufficient today, will continue to decline.
Someone may object: of the 27 atomarines available today, most are in reserve and repair. This is certainly true. But the count of combat-ready submarines does not give any particular reason for optimism. Today, 1 "Severodvinsk", 5 SSGN "Antey", 4 MAPLs "Shchuka-B", 1 "Pike" and 2 "Condor" are ready for the campaign and battle, that is, 13 boats. By 2030, we will have 18 boats. Obviously, some of them will undergo current repairs, so, alas, no cardinal improvements are foreseen here either.
