In the fall of 1902, the tests were completed, so that on October 6, the commander of the cruiser V. F. Sarychev took the Boyarin to Kronstadt. The passage took 2 days, and upon arrival, the ship, of course, became the object of close interest of the MTC commission - however, a very scrupulous inspection did not give rise to any special complaints. It was recognized that "Boyarin" does not need any additional tests, with the exception of mine shooting and checking the bells of loud combat. The cruiser was included in the detachment that was supposed to go to the Far East, and it would be interesting to dwell on this moment in a little more detail.
Previously, Russian warships traveled to Vladivostok one by one, or in small detachments. This time, the leadership of the Naval Ministry decided to act differently and form a powerful squadron consisting of the battleships Retvizan and Pobeda, the cruisers Bayan, Bogatyr, Boyarin, Diana and Pallada, as well as 7 destroyers, to which they were going to add 5 more. But that was not all, since it was assumed that this detachment would catch up with the cruisers Askold and Novik in the Indian Ocean. The size of the detachment was not the only "unusual" thing: the point was that this time it was supposed to combine the transition to the Far East with intensive combat training, including the development of evolutions, artillery exercises, etc. Rear Admiral E. A. Stackelberg.
Unfortunately, nothing came of this venture, and on April 22, 1903, the Rear Admiral brought only Retvizan and Pallada to Port Arthur. “Bayan” and 5 destroyers could not be attached to the squadron, “Askold” and “Novik” E. A. Stackelberg could not catch up, while his ships were greatly stretched. "Diana" was detained in Nagasaki by order of the command, but at least she walked with the detachment to the very end. "Bogatyr" and 2 torpedo boats were in Hong Kong by April 22, the rest of the torpedo boats were in Amoe, Pobeda was just on its way to Colombo. As for the "Boyar", it did not leave Kronstadt for Libava, like the rest of the ships of EA's detachment. Stackelberg, and to Copenhagen, to eliminate minor comments of the ITC. On the crossing, the cruiser got into fresh weather - the wind reached 5 points, and demonstrated excellent seaworthiness: it held up well against the wave, there was almost no water on the forecastle, bursts and crests of waves fell on it only occasionally. It was noted that "Boyarin" perfectly rises on the wave, while the screws were not exposed.
After a short repair, on November 19, the cruiser caught up with E. A. Stackelberg in Portland, after leaving which an extremely unpleasant incident occurred on the Boyar. Literally a few hours after leaving, the ship's senior mechanic I. F. Blumenthal. As a result, the cruiser again separates from the detachment and goes to Vigo to interpose the body to the ground.
After these, in every respect, painful troubles, the cruiser reunites with the detachment, but not for long - in Port Said, the squadron of E. A. Stackelberg is crumbling completely. "Boyar", who had received instructions to leave the Red Sea to separate from the detachment and go to demonstrate the flag in the Persian Gulf, while still in Portland, went ahead. For technical reasons, "Pobeda" could no longer follow the detachment, "Bogatyr" was forced to tow the defective destroyer "Boyky" and also could not keep up, and the rest of the ships soon had to split up.
In general, the squadron fell apart like a house of cards. Interestingly, two years later, the ships of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, nothing of the kind happened, although his squadron was much larger. The contrast of the detachment of E. A. Stackelberg, against the background of the transition of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, is all the more striking because the first went in peacetime, having the opportunity to enter any ports for any need, while Z. P. Rozhestvensky was forced to rely only on his own strength.
But back to "Boyarin". On January 30, 1903, the Boyarin arrived in Djibouti, from where it moved to the ports of the Persian Gulf. At the same time, on February 19, the Consul General of Russia G. V. Ovseenko. On the whole, the political mission of "Boyarin" ended quite successfully: it is interesting that the Sultan in Muscat, in conversation with the Russians, recalled visits to "Varyag" and "Askold", which obviously made a huge impression on him.
Having completed this, of course, an important task, "Boyarin" resumed the campaign and, without any adventures, arrived in Port Arthur on May 13, 1903. At this time, the Pacific Squadron conducted maneuvers, into which the "newcomer" immediately joined: "Boyarin" played the role of a rehearsal vessel and a close scout for battleships squadron. The teachings and the subsequent review of the Governor have already been described several times, and there is no need to repeat them here, we will only note the opinion that was formed by E. I. Alekseeva about "Boyarin" and "Novik".
The governor noted that both cruisers arrived in Port Arthur completely serviceable and ready for action. At the same time, he commented on the "Boyar" as follows: "A solidly built cruiser and a good sea vessel. Very profitable, in terms of coal consumption, a scout … "of the shortcomings, noting only the excessive spaciousness of the officers' premises, which led to" an excessive increase in the corps. " At the same time, about "Novik" E. I. Alekseev responded more critically:
“The building has the usual disadvantages for the Shikhau plant, since in order to achieve a greater stroke, both the hull and the boilers and machines, out of weight savings, are given dimensions close to the limit of the fortress limit. He came in perfect order and carried out all the running orders so far without refusal, but in fresh weather, against the wave, he should reduce the speed. It will require great care in maintaining and repairing soon."
However, the governor noted that the Novik and Boyarin had a common drawback: the low quality of their radio stations, which made it possible to maintain communication no further than 10-15 miles, while the older ships of the Pacific squadron kept 25, and under good conditions, even 60 miles. The opinion was that here foreign contractors cheated heavily, since it was known that modern "wireless telegraph" stations installed on the ships of the German fleet could provide communication for 50-100 miles. But in general, of course, two small cruisers of the 2nd rank were extremely necessary and useful additions to the Pacific Squadron. It is interesting that during his short service "Boyarin" visited Chemulpo several times: in fact, the "Varyag" and "Koreets" just replaced the "Boyar" and the gunboat "Gilyak" carrying stationary service there.
The "Boyarin" met the beginning of the war, being in the third line of ships on the outer roadstead: there were 4 of these lines, and the "Boyarin" was in the second, counting from the coast, or the third, counting from the sea. Due to such an unfortunate location, the attack of the Japanese destroyers on the Boyarin was not seen, and they did not participate in repelling it, but then Vice Admiral O. V. Stark sent cruisers Novik, Askold and Boyarin to pursue the enemy destroyers. The cruisers left the outer raid at 01.05, 02.00 and 02.10, respectively.
Of the three cruisers that went out to sea, only the Boyarin opened fire. At dawn, the cruiser found a destroyer leaving Port Arthur, chased it and opened fire, but it turned out to be "Strong", which, due to a disassembled vehicle, entered the patrol chain later than other destroyers and lost its squad. Not finding "security colleagues", but realizing that a single destroyer might be "misunderstood" by other ships of the squadron, "Strong" went to Dalny, and at dawn found that "Boyarin" was chasing him, which soon opened fire on him …
The destroyer understood that they had come under "friendly fire", but the flashlight, with the help of which the "Strong" could give identification, was not ready for immediate action. Therefore, the destroyer crew had to endure several unpleasant moments when the Boyarin's shells fell next to their ship. In the end, on the "Strong" they nevertheless put their flashlight in order and gave a prearranged signal, after which the commander of the "Boyar" considered it necessary to apologize for the shooting in a return signal.
In the opinion of the author of this article, this was a pure formality on the part of V. F. Sarychev, because if anyone should apologize here, so the destroyer himself. The fact that at dusk it will be almost impossible to distinguish a Russian destroyer from a Japanese one by silhouette alone is, generally speaking, self-evident. "Boyarin", apparently, was oriented precisely in the direction of movement of the ship leaving Port Arthur. But what the commander of the "Strong" was thinking, whose destroyer, in fact, was lost and could be mistaken for an enemy ship, but at the same time was not ready to immediately give identification - this is a big and unpleasant question. Perhaps he reasoned that since he was leaving for Dalny, then he should not meet any ships, which was logical, but serves as a good illustration that the requirements of the charter and the safety of the ship cannot be replaced by any logic. An unexpected force majeure situation occurred, and the lack of readiness of the lantern almost led to damage to the destroyer and human casualties.
I returned to the Boyarin squadron already before dark, anchored in the same place at about 08.00, but immediately had to weaken the anchor again, because at 08.00 the Japanese cruisers appeared - "dogs": "Yoshino", "Chitose", "Kasagi" and Takasago. Squadron Commander O. V. Stark immediately sent a cruiser into battle against them, immediately canceled this order, threw destroyers into the attack, but canceled this order too, and finally ordered the squadron battleships to de-anchor in order to join the battle with the whole squadron. Of course, while all this was happening, the Japanese, having carried out (I must say, very superficial) reconnaissance, left. They lost sight of them at 09.10 and O. V. Stark, who had led his main forces into the open sea, turned back to the parking lot in the outer roadstead.
However, all this confusion had little effect on the Boyarin - he went with the whole squadron, and returned with it, but did not get up at anchor, but maneuvered in the roadstead, waiting for orders from his superiors. They followed immediately: at 09.59 O. V. Stark ordered the cruiser to approach with a signal, and then from the flagship battleship, a semaphore transmitted to the Boyarin the order to make reconnaissance in the direction of the southeast.
This moment, in fact, became the finest hour of the "Boyar", because it was to the southeast, 20 miles from Port Arthur, that Heihachiro Togo lined up his main forces for the attack. The battleships of the 1st combat detachment were the first to go into battle, followed by the armored cruisers of the 2nd detachment, and the "dogs" closed the column. And so, when the United Fleet moved to Port Arthur, it was discovered by the Russian cruiser.
Of course, "Boyarin", which was mistaken on Japanese ships for a cruiser of the "Diana" class, immediately turned around and fled to its main forces, firing only 3 shots from the aft 120-mm cannon from 40 cables. Over the distance, the gunmen did not hit anyone, however, the main purpose of the shooting was not to harm the Japanese, but to attract the attention of their own - this had to be done as quickly as possible, since the Russian battleships were at anchor at that moment. In addition, the "Boyar" immediately raised the signal "I see an enemy squadron of eight ships." O. V. Stark immediately ordered the rest of the 1st rank cruisers to go to the rescue of the Boyarin. However, they did not have time - everything happened so quickly that the Boyarin entered the outer raid at full speed even before the rest of the cruisers had time to leave.
In the battle that followed, "Boyarin" did not play practically any role: at first, he kept at a distance, so as not to be exposed to the fire of the enemy's heavy ships, then - went to the wake of "Askold". There were no hits on the cruiser, but one projectile flew very close to the rear pipe, which made it stagger, and the air pressure threw out flame and coal from the aft stoker.
Immediately after the battle, an unknown ship was seen on the horizon, accompanied by a destroyer. The squadron commander immediately sent Boyarin to intercept and destroy them, but it was quickly revealed that they were the mine cruiser Horseman and the tugboat Silach, which were returning from Torton Bay. Then, at 17.10 "Boyarin" received an order to escort the minelayer "Yenisei" to Talienvan Bay: in fact, this order was the first in a series of numerous mistakes that led to the death of the cruiser.
The decision itself to send the Yenisei under the escort of the cruiser was absolutely correct, since the possibility of the appearance of Japanese destroyers at Talienwan could not be ignored. Therefore, it was necessary, of course, to entrust the "Boyarin" with the protection of the "Yenisei" for the entire duration of the combat operation, until its completion: in other words, the "Yenisei" should have been protected on the way to the mine-laying site, during these sets, and then escorted back. Instead, the "Boyarin" received an order only to bring the "Yenisei" to the place, and then return to the squadron, which he did. The cruiser returned to the outer roadstead on the same day at 22.00.
Of course, V. F. Sarychev that he fulfilled the order he received, he could not act otherwise, but those who gave it … You can still somehow understand (but not excuse) Vice Admiral O. V. Stark, who, with the detonation of two newest battleships and one armored cruiser, and even the battle that took place after this, probably had his head spinning. But he was not alone, he had staff officers, and why, no one could give sensible advice to the commander?
After all, it is quite obvious that such a decision led to nervousness on the Yenisei. The weather was crisp, it was snowing, it was not so easy to lay mines, and then at any moment the appearance of Japanese ships was to be expected - the wireless telegraph was catching other people's conversations. "Yenisei", which showed an average speed of 17.98 knots during tests. and armed with 5 * 75-mm and 7 * 47-mm guns, in theory it was able to repel the attack of one, and with luck - and several destroyers. But - precisely that in theory, since if he were caught while laying mines, he could not quickly give a move, and in addition, the presence of a mass of barrage mines on it in the complete absence of armor made any fire contact extremely dangerous. But the Japanese, in addition to destroyers, also had high-speed cruisers, a meeting with one of which would have been fatal for the Yenisei …
In general, the commander of the "Yenisei" V. A. Stepanov was forced, on the one hand, to set up obstacles as quickly as possible, and on the other, to constantly keep the calculations at the guns and in general to be ready “to march and fight” at any moment, which, naturally, made it difficult to lay mines. They were set all night on January 28, and then all day. Thus, by 19.00, 2 obstacles were set up for as much as 320 mines, stretching for 7 miles, with 317 of them “installed” normally, and only 3 surfaced. They, of course, had to be destroyed, which was done with the help of pyroxylin bombs, for the installation of which it was required to swim up to the mines in a boat.
Nevertheless, the commander of the minelayer did not believe that the Yenisei had completed its combat mission to the end. Yes, the obstacles put by him blocked the approaches to Dalny port, with the exception of the only remaining fairway, but due to weather difficulties and a slight hitch on one of the obstacles, an unnecessary passage about 5 cables wide was formed, and the density of the second minefield should have been strengthened. Since there were still 82 mines left on the minelayer on the evening of January 28 (initially there were 402 on it), V. A. Stepanov decided to spend the night in Dalny, and in the morning to finish laying the mines. Therefore, he went directly to the port, from where he handed over the scheme of the minefields set by him to the headquarters of the Governor, and spent the night in the port of Dalniy.
The morning of January 29 began with … a theatrical performance. All commercial ships stationed in Dalniy were quickly expelled from there along the abandoned fairway. Then from the Yenisei, in front of the astonished audience, they defiantly mined the fairway, dropping 2 mines on it. In fact, instead of pyroxylin, there was sand in the mines, so nothing interfered with shipping, but who knew about that?
With the installation of the last 82 minutes "Yenisei" managed until noon, and then a tragedy occurred. They found two mines that surfaced, and the commander of the minelayer, fearing unnecessarily lingering in a dangerous area, ordered not to lower the boats, but to "turn back" - to approach the mines in reverse and shoot them with guns. Against this decision V. A. Stepanov was warned by the mine and navigator officers, but it was accepted. And so, when the Yenisei moved stern forward, another mine suddenly surfaced and exploded under the bridge. The supply of pyroxylin detonated, and the Yenisei sank in just 15 minutes, killing 95 people, including its commander. V. A. Stepanov was not killed by the explosion, but preferred to pay for his mistake at the highest price: he refused to leave the dying ship.
The tragedy is over, the oxymoron has begun. In Dalny, they heard the sound of an explosion, deciding that the Yenisei was the victim of a torpedo attack, and then still managed to mistake the silhouettes of commercial ships sailing from Pot-Arthur for Japanese warships. As a result, the head of the Dalniy garrison, the notorious Major General A. V. Fock, ordered an immediate telegraph to the governor about the attack by the Japanese destroyers.
In Port Arthur, the telegram was received and immediately sent the Boyarin to Dalny, where he went at 2.30 pm the same day, accompanied by the destroyers Vlastny, Impressive, Sentinel, and Rapid. And again, this was not the first and not the last "ghost chase" in the history of the world's navies, and everything could have ended well for the cruiser, but the second big mistake was made: V. F. Sarychev did not receive an accurate mine-laying scheme in Talienvan Bay.
It turned out like this: Rear Admiral M. P. Molas, of course, warned the Boyarin commander that there were mines in the bay, and even indicated their place on the map, but the problem was that he marked the minefield areas only approximately. It is more than likely that M. P. Molas at that time simply did not have the information given to V. A. Stepanov, the scheme of obstacles that Yenisei actually put up on the night of January 28-29!
And so, "Boyarin" with torpedo boats set off for Talienvan Bay, having only the most approximate idea of the minefields. As a result, having approached the Zuid-Sanshantau island for about 2-2.5 miles, the cruiser entered the minefield line. The explosion thundered at 16.08. practically in the center of the ship on its left side, most likely - between the 2nd and 3rd boiler rooms, but closer to the side coal pits. The cruiser was enveloped in coal dust, he received a roll of 8 degrees and quickly landed in the water. V. F. Sarychev still believed at that moment that the cruiser could still be saved. All watertight bulkheads, doors, necks were battened down immediately after the cruiser weighed anchor and went to Talienvan, so now the Boyar's commander ordered to start the pumps that take water from the stoker's compartments and apply a plaster. However, the steam lines were interrupted and after a few minutes the pumps stopped.
The situation was extremely unpleasant. The cruiser had no move, sat in the water through the windows, the roll was growing, reaching 15 degrees to the port side. But the main problem was that a very strong wind (about 5 points) and a large swell carried the cruiser to the island, to a minefield. And in these conditions, the commander of the "Boyar" V. F. Sarychev decided that the cruiser was doomed and was about to explode on another mine, and therefore decided to leave the ship.
He ordered to stop work on the establishment of the patch and to evacuate, which was done - the entire team, excluding 9 people, apparently killed in the flooded compartments, switched to destroyers.
Then 2 destroyers, one of which was V. F. Sarychev, left for Port Arthur, while the other two were delayed. The fact is that the officers of the cruiser did not share the conviction of their commander that the Boyarin would certainly sink, and wanted to be sure of its death. For this, it was decided that the destroyer Sentinel, free from the Boyarin's command, would again approach the cruiser and blow it up with a self-propelled mine.
The "Sentinel", approaching the "Boyarin" by 3 cables, tried to fire a mine shot from the stern torpedo tube, but was unsuccessful. Due to the excitement, the mine did not come out completely, but only moved forward, Aubrey's device turned on on it, so it was impossible to throw it into the water or recharge the device. Then the "Sentinel" made a second attempt to attack the "Boyarin", using a bow mine apparatus for this. This time, the torpedo safely went into the water, but it seems that it sank halfway, as the air bubbles stopped coming out to the surface and there was no explosion. After that, the "Watchman" had no choice but to go to Port Arthur.
The rest is well known. The "Boyarin" left by the crew did not hit any mines, and the destroyers sent on the morning of January 30 together with the steamer of the Society of the East China Railway "Sibiryak" under the general command of Captain 1st Rank N. A. Matusevich was discovered by a cruiser that was stranded on the starboard side at the southern tip of Zuid-Sanshantau Island. The cruiser swayed a little on the wave, which indicated that it was "stuck" loosely on the aground, and could be carried out to sea or to a minefield. Approach the "Boyarin" on a steamer or on a torpedo boat N. A. Matusevich considered it overly dangerous, and indeed it was, so the inspection party arrived at the cruiser in a boat.
Inspection, which took the whole day, showed that the cruiser could well be saved. Bulkheads and hatches were indeed battened down, so the flooding was localized. There was no water at all in the bow of the boiler rooms and in the stern of the engine rooms, the engine rooms themselves were only partially flooded: in the left compartment, water reached the cylinders of the steam engine, in the adjacent right one, it only filled the double bottom space. Above the armored deck, water was only above the boiler rooms, but even there its amount was small and did not interfere with the inspection of the ship.
According to the results of the examination, N. A. Matusevich made an unambiguous conclusion about the need for a rescue operation and … went to Dalny for the night. Alas, the same evening bad weather broke out and a rather strong storm began, and explosions were heard in Dalny. The next morning "Boyarin" disappeared.
Subsequently, the cruiser was found - it was found lying on the left side 40 m from the southwestern tip of the island Zuid-Sanshantau. At the same time, in full water, the ship was almost completely hidden under water, so that only the ends of the masts and yards were visible, but at low tide the starboard side protruded a meter from the sea surface. Apparently, the excitement took the "Boyar" off the shallows, and carried away the same to the minefield - from the repeated detonation the cruiser still sank.
In general, we can say that the death of "Boyarin" was the result of many mistakes of all the persons listed above, each of which aggravated the previous one.
If the Boyarin had originally been sent not only to take the Yenisei to Dalny, but to guard it there, then nothing would have happened and, most likely, the minelayer himself would have survived. Under the protection of the cruiser, the Yenisei crew could direct all their efforts to mine laying, without being distracted by the constant readiness to engage in battle. Most likely, in this case, minefields would have been exposed earlier than this happened, and even if not, then V. A. Stepanov did not have such a reason to rush, and it was precisely the rush that ruined the minelay. But even if the Yenisei had blown up anyway, it would not have led to the death of the Boyarin - being in combat escort, the cruiser would have known what had happened and no panic with the "attacking Japanese destroyers" would have happened.
In other words, reasonable planning of the mining operation in the Talienvan Gulf would most likely lead to the fact that neither the Yenisei nor the Boyarin would die.
But what is done is done, and now the Pacific Ocean Squadron loses a minelayer out of the blue. The same further? In fact, the headquarters of the Steward, if not sanctioned, then made a gross mistake. They sent "Boyarin" in search of Japanese destroyers, but no one bothered to give V. F. Sarychev map of minefields! But the headquarters of the Governor had one, it was handed over to him by the commander of the Yenisei on the evening of January 28, while the Boyarin went to carry out the order only at 2.30 pm on January 29!
Of course, V. F. Sarychev understood that it was not in vain that on January 27, the cruiser under his command "escorted" the Yenisei, which was packed with mines almost to the clot. But he got the minefields scheme, even an approximate one, only by chance.
The fact is that Rear Admiral M. P. Molas did not know at all that the Boyarin was being sent somewhere, he was going to involve the Boyarin in the next stage of mining, to escort the Amur minelayer. For this, M. P. Molas and called V. F. Sarychev to himself. The fact that "Boyarin" has already been sent to Talienvan, M. P. Molas did not know. The rear admiral himself, most likely, has not yet received the mining scheme transferred to the headquarters by the commander of the Yenisei, and, probably, supplied V. F. Sarychev's data not about the actual location of the barriers, but about where they should have been according to the plan. At the same time, due to bad weather, coastal landmarks were poorly seen on the Yenisei, and the actual position of the mines could differ from the planned ones.
But the unfortunate fact is that if not for an accidental coincidence, then V. F. Sarychev would have been sent to Talienvan without any schemes at all!
So, we can say that the leadership of the Squadron made every effort to ensure that a double tragedy occurred, however, after the Boyarin went out to sea, responsibility for the further operation fell on the shoulders of its commander, V. F. Sarychev. And what did he do?
We will not discuss the need to go to the mine-laying area without having an accurate map of minefields: in the end, V. F. Sarychev received an order, which, as you know, is not being discussed. Although, in fact, there are many questions here: unfortunately, materials about the orders received by V. F. Sarychev, the author of this article has almost none. But even if we assume that external circumstances and “accidents inevitable at sea” are to blame for the explosion of the Boyarin, then the actions of V. F. Sarychev after the explosion should be considered shameful and completely unworthy of the honor of a naval officer.
Report by V. F. Sarycheva is, perhaps, quite true: after it became clear that the steam lines were broken and the cruiser lost speed, and the wind and swell carried him to the place of the alleged minefield, he probably sincerely believed that the ship was doomed. Although here the question already arises - Talienvan Bay seems to be not the Mariana Trench, and it was not far from the island, where the presence of great depths could hardly be expected. So why would V. F. Sarychev not try to give up the anchor? Yes, the steam engines did not work, but a similar operation could have been carried out manually, and while at anchor, it would have been possible to save the ship from death and wait for the tugs. As for the destroyers accompanying the Boyarin, they obviously could not become tugs due to their small size, and even forced to "pull the strap" against the wind, reaching up to 5 points and a large swell. But why not try to drop the anchor?
However, one must understand that the author of this article, for all his enthusiasm for the fleet, saw the sea mainly in pictures or from the beach, so perhaps there were some reasons understandable to real sailors, due to which it was impossible to do this. But what cannot be understood or justified is the behavior of V. F. Sarychev after he decided to leave the ship.
If V. F. Sarychev decided that the Boyarin was doomed, he had to do everything necessary to prevent the cruiser from falling to the enemy, that is, he had to order the Kingstones to be opened. No references to the haste of evacuation help here - when the fate of a warship is at stake, you cannot rush that way, and besides, the evacuation still could not have been carried out at once. It is not enough to "whistle everyone upstairs", you need to lower the boats, place the crew in them, check if there is someone left behind on the ship, and so on. That is, the crew had enough time to open the Kingstones, and even if this was associated with a slight delay in the evacuation, which is doubtful, this delay should have been taken. V. F. Sarychev, that he, they say, was sure that the cruiser would soon die, are worth nothing, because it is not enough to be sure that the ship will be destroyed. We must make sure with our own eyes that it has been destroyed! And what did V. F. Sarychev? As soon as the crew was evacuated to the destroyers, which, obviously, were not in danger, instead of being convinced of the death of "Boyarin", he … left for Port Arthur.
In the report, the Boyar's (now former) commander, as an excuse for such haste, indicated that he was afraid of the arrival of Japanese destroyers, to capture which, in fact, the cruiser was sent. Of course, the destroyers that received the Boyarin's crew most of all resembled cans of canned sprats and were not very suitable for combat. But this, again, was not a reason to abandon the cruiser without sinking it with torpedoes. And most importantly, V. F. Sarychev left on a torpedo boat for Port Arthur, when two other torpedo boats were delayed in order to try to drown the Boyarin. They did this on their own initiative, but by doing so they added one more claim to the cruiser commander - it turns out that V. F. Sarychev "saving the crews" fled to Port Arthur, not even making sure that the rest of the destroyers followed his example … such is the "worried about subordinates" commander.
It is not surprising that V. F. Sarychev was not satisfied with either O. V. Stark, nor the Viceroy, and on February 12, 1904, a trial was held over the former commander of the "Boyar". Only the surprising mildness of the sentence is strange: V. F. Sarychev was recognized
“Guilty that, when the cruiser received holes, he was not sufficiently convinced of the ship's buoyancy and, thanks to this, did not take proper measures to rescue it, the consequence of which was the hasty removal of the crew from the cruiser and the abandonment of the vessel. Negligence or negligence in the actions of the commander to control the cruiser, which were the cause of the death of the latter, was not recognized by the court in the circumstances of the case."
As a result, instead of demotion and dismissal in disgrace, which V. F. Sarychev fully deserved it, he got off only by writing off to the shore. He was put in command of a coastal battery armed with 47-mm and 120-mm guns, and was even, subsequently, awarded for the defense of Port Arthur. After the war, he managed to rise to the rank of major-general of the fleet and headed the Libau half-crew - well, at least they no longer trusted him to command warships.
As for the unsuccessful rescue operation, which was led by N. A. Matusevich, then A. V. Skvortsov, the author of a monograph dedicated to "Boyarin", considered his actions deserving of reproach, since he "left without any supervision the ship, the salvation of which he was entrusted with." But here it is difficult to agree with the respected historian - in the author's opinion, this reproach to N. A. Matusevich is still not deserved.
What could he do when he found the cruiser? Due to the need to direct the inspection party on the boat, the assessment of the condition of the cruiser was ready by the evening. In an amicable way, "Boyarin" should have been somehow fixed on the rocks, but the problem is that there is no way for N. A. There was no Matusevich. The only thing he still had time to do was to drop the anchor, but this is what N. A. Matusevich and ordered: another question, that he ordered "Do not stop the rope, giving the latter the opportunity to etch as it stretches." Was this the right decision? On the one hand, by stopping the rope, rescuers would have limited the cruiser's mobility, but on the other hand, it was hitting stones anyway, so maybe it really made sense to do as the captain of the 1st rank ordered, so that the cruiser would be "pulled off" in the appropriate wind from aground to open water? Again, only a professional seaman is capable of assessing such a decision, but it can be assumed that N. A. Matusevich had reasons to do exactly as he did it.
As for the fact that he left the "Boyar" unattended … and what, in fact, could give such supervision? It was pointless to watch the cruiser from the shore; anyway, no help could be provided from there. And it was possible to leave a certain number of people directly on the cruiser, but what could they do there when the machines and mechanisms were not working? The cruiser was uncontrollable, and in case of any difficulties, which in fact became a storm, they would only add to the list of those killed on the Boyar.
Thus, we can assume (but not assert for sure) that in this whole story only N. A. Matusevich did not deserve any reproach. As for V. F. Sarychev, then by his actions he destroyed, in fact, not even one, but two cruisers. Of course, this is already an alternative history, but if "Boyarin" had not died, he would have shared the burdens of service with "Novik". Then there would be no reason to constantly keep under steam the only armored cruiser of the 2nd rank remaining in the squadron, which turned out to be "Novik". In this case, its suspension would not have been in such a deplorable state after the breakthrough on July 28, the cruiser would not have had to sail close to the Japanese coast, and who knows, maybe the Novik would still have been able to follow the instructions of the Emperor-Emperor and would have reached Vladivostok.
