In a previous article on the structure of the Red Army armored forces in the 30s and immediately before the war, the author, of course, could not omit one extremely controversial decision of the leadership of the Red Army and the country, which to this day causes a lot of negativity among history lovers discussing it. We are talking, of course, about the decision taken in February 1941 to form 21 mechanized corps, in addition to the already existing 9, in order to bring their total number to 30.
In order to immediately exclude any omissions on this topic, I responsibly declare: the author of this article is absolutely sure that this decision is erroneous. But let's try to understand the following: could the leadership of the USSR, having the information that it actually possessed at the beginning of 1941, make any other decision, and if so, what?
In the comments to the previous article, the author, with great surprise, got acquainted with the most interesting theses expressed by dear readers. Briefly, they can be formulated as follows:
1. The decision to form additional mechanized corps is the clearest evidence of the absolute ignorance in military affairs of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.
2. It is quite obvious that the industry of the USSR could not provide tanks for 30 mechanized corps in an acceptable timeframe - not to mention the fact that such formations required not only tanks, but also artillery, cars and much more. So instead of focusing on creating the most powerful tank troops, since they had set themselves such a task, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin at the end of the 30s did not come up with anything smarter than building a gigantic fleet of 15 battleships and the same number of heavy cruisers.
In general, the leadership of the Red Army and the USSR seems to be such megalomaniacs - give one 32 thousand tanks, the second one - almost the first largest fleet in the world, and all this, one can say, almost simultaneously, and even on the eve of a war, to which neither, neither the others could have time at all. And they were not needed in such quantities.
The easiest way is to understand the reasons that prompted S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov "wish the strange", that is, strive to get an additional two dozen mechanized corps, which in 1941 did not have a sufficient number of military equipment or personnel. To do this, it is enough to remember about the existence of 2 documents. The first of them is called the "Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Red Army", approved in March 1941. Although, strictly speaking, such a document does not exist, because the "Plan" is a set of documents, which, together with maps, appendices and tables, are should be measured in cubic meters. But it contains information about the armed forces of the probable adversaries of the USSR, as seen by the leadership of the Red Army according to the intelligence it has.
Alas, the quality of this intelligence … to put it mildly, left much to be desired. So, for example, the armed forces of Germany alone were estimated at "225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, and up to 260 divisions, 20,000 field guns of all calibers, 10,000 tanks and up to 15,000 aircraft, of which 9,000-9,500 are combat ". In fact, at that time (spring 1941), the Wehrmacht had 191 divisions, including those that were just in the stage of deployment. In terms of tanks and artillery, our scouts overestimated the real strength of the Wehrmacht by about twice, and in aviation - even three times. For example, the same tanks in the Wehrmacht, not even in the spring, but already on June 1, 1941, numbered only 5,162 units.
In addition, the General Staff of the Red Army believed that in the event of a military conflict, the USSR would have to fight not only with Germany: if the latter attacked, then not alone, but in alliance with Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland. Neither G. K. Zhukov, nor S. K. Tymoshenko, of course, did not expect the appearance of Italian troops on the state border, but at the same time they did not exclude the possibility of a war on two fronts, with a coalition of European powers in the west and with Japan and Manzhou Guo in the east. This judgment was perfectly logical and sound, but it only exacerbated the problem of erroneous intelligence. In total, according to the military, from the west and east of the USSR, up to 332 divisions could simultaneously threaten, including 293 infantry, 20 tank, 15 motorized and 4 cavalry, and, in addition, up to 35 separate brigades.
Counting 3 brigades per division, we get (roughly) almost 344 divisions! Moreover, we are not talking about the full strength of the armed forces of our potential adversaries, but only about that part of them that they could send for the war with the USSR. It was assumed, for example, that Germany out of a total of 260 divisions would be able to send 200 divisions against the USSR, etc.
What did the USSR have to parry such a blow? Alas, our forces were significantly inferior to the power that threatened us - as the General Staff saw it, of course.
As you know, the size of the armed forces of the USSR was determined by mobilization plans (MP). So, according to the MP-40, that is, the mobplan operating in June 1940, the Red Army, in case of war, was going to deploy 194 divisions (of which 18 were tank divisions) and 38 brigades. That is, counting 3 brigades per division, roughly 206 divisions. And if we had compiled the MP-41 on the basis of the previous one, it would have turned out that at the beginning of 1941 the enemy would have outnumbered us in the number of divisions by almost 1.67 times! Let us repeat - this ratio stemmed from the overestimated data of the General Staff about the armed forces of our enemies, but only then no one knew about this.
The first iteration of the MP-41, adopted in December 1941, assumed a significant increase in the formations of the Red Army: according to it, the number of divisions that should be deployed in case of war increased to 228, and brigades to 73, which gives us just over 252 divisions. but, obviously, this value was categorically insufficient. Simply because in this case, too, the Red Army was inferior in the number of divisions to Germany alone - how could one count on opposing a whole conglomerate of powers in the west and east? After all, having 344 counting divisions, the probable enemy still surpassed the Red Army by more than 36.5%!
And it was then that the next, second version of the MP-41 was adopted, which included the formation of a huge number of additional mechanized corps. We all find this plan extremely ambitious, but let's look at it impartially.
According to the new version of the MP-41, the number of Soviet divisions increased to 314, but there were only 9 brigades, so we can say that the number of counting divisions of the Red Army reached 317. Now the difference with the potential enemy was not so great and was only 8, 5%, but … But it was necessary to clearly understand that equality in numbers (which, after all, did not exist) does not give equality in quality, and this, in the opinion of the author of this article, in the General Staff of the Red Army could not fail to understand.
The fact is that 344 enemy divisions, which were counted by our scouts at the beginning of 1941, had already been formed. And the USSR had yet to form its counting 317 divisions, the expansion was literally explosive - in fact, the number of our troops had to be increased from 206 divisions, which were planned for deployment in 1940.(and for which we did not have enough personnel or weapons, except for tanks, of course), up to 317. Naturally, the newly formed formations could not instantly acquire combat capability. And even if we assume that a military-technical miracle happened, and the Red Army managed during 1941 to bring the number of its formations to 317 full-fledged divisions - how much will the armed forces of Germany and Japan increase during this time? I must say that our valiant intelligence, for example, in April 1941 reported (special message No. 660448cc) that in addition to the 286-296 divisions (!) Available in Germany at that time, the Wehrmacht was forming an additional 40 (!!!). True, there was still a reservation that the data on the newly created divisions needed to be clarified. But in any case, it turned out that since the beginning of the year, the number of the German Armed Forces increased by 26-36 divisions, and several dozen more were in the stage of formation!
In other words, the leadership of the Red Army and the USSR saw the situation in such a way that in terms of the size of the armed forces, the Country of Soviets was catching up, and at the same time the chances of achieving not only superiority, but at least equality of forces in the next year and a half looked rather illusory. How could you compensate for the numerical lag?
Tanks are the first thing that comes to mind.
Just because the USSR really and very seriously invested in the tank industry, it was something that could give a return and quickly. But … was it really impossible to moderate your appetites? After all, the USSR had already produced tanks by 1941, more than all other countries of the world put together. In total, since 1930, that is, in 10 years, our country has built 28,486 tanks, although, of course, many of them have already exhausted their resources and were not in service. Nevertheless, in terms of the number of tanks, the Red Army was still ahead of all its potential enemies, so why was it necessary to build so many more? After all, 30 mechanized corps, with a staff of 1,031 tanks, demanded 30,930 tanks for their equipment!
All this is true, but when assessing the decision to increase the number of mechanized corps, 2 very important aspects that dominated our general staff should be taken into account.
First. As the battles in Spain and then in Finland irrefutably showed, the time for tanks with bulletproof armor is over. After the infantry formations of the armies of potential adversaries received small-caliber anti-tank guns, any hostilities with such tanks should have led only to their unjustified losses. In other words, the Red Army did have a huge tank fleet, but, alas, it is outdated. At the same time, it was believed that the same Germany had long mastered the production of tanks with anti-cannon armor - let us recall the well-known story of how the Germans tried to impress the Soviet commission with the perfection of the German tank industry, demonstrating the T-3 and T-4, and the Soviet representatives were extremely unhappy, believing that real modern technology is being kept secret and hidden from them.
The second is, again, the "remarkable" miscalculations of our intelligence. Of course, our agents greatly overestimated the number of German troops, but what they reported about the production capabilities of the Third Reich is truly amazing. And then we get to the second document, without which it is impossible to understand the decision to increase the number of mechanized corps to 30. We are talking about the "Special message of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the direction of the development of the German armed forces and changes in their state" dated March 11, 1941. Let's quote the document in terms of the analysis of the German tank industry:
“The total production capacity of 18 currently known German factories (including the Protectorate and the General Government) is determined at 950-1000 tanks per month. Bearing in mind the possibility of the rapid deployment of tank production on the basis of existing auto-tractor plants (up to 15-20 plants), as well as an increase in the production of tanks at factories with an established production of them, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks per year. … Provided that the French tank factories located in the occupied zone are used, Germany will be able to receive up to 10,000 additional tanks a year."
In other words, our valiant Stirlitz estimated the potential of German production of tanks from 11,400 to 30,000 vehicles per year! That is, according to our intelligence, it turned out the following: at the beginning of 1941, the Wehrmacht and the SS had 10,000 tanks, and by the end of the year it cost Germany nothing to bring their number to 21,400-22,000 units - and this was provided that the military -Hitler's industrial complex will not make any efforts to expand, but will be limited only by the current capabilities of existing tank factories! If Germany uses all the resources available to her, then the number of tanks at the beginning of 1942 could reach 40,000 (!!!) units. And after all, we are talking only about Germany, and she had allies …
Here you can ask - where did our leadership get such amazing naivety, where did the belief in such an unthinkable number of tanks that Germany allegedly could produce? But, in fact, was there much that was naive in this? Of course, today we know that the real capabilities of the German military-industrial complex were much more modest, the figures for the actual production of tanks and assault guns for 1941 are different, but almost nowhere they exceed 4 thousand vehicles. But how could the USSR have guessed about it? The pre-war tank production in the USSR reached its peak in 1936, when 4,804 tanks were produced; in 1941, more than 5,000 of these combat vehicles were planned to be produced. At the same time, it would be extremely foolish to underestimate the most powerful German industry - one should expect that it will at least in no way yield to the Soviet one, and perhaps even surpass it. But in addition to the actual German production, Hitler received the Czech Skoda, and now also the industry of France … In other words, the knowledge at the disposal of the leaders of the USSR did not allow revealing the gross error of Soviet intelligence in assessing the number of German tanks and the possibilities of German production. They could be considered somewhat overestimated, but it was quite possible to empirically assess the capabilities of the German tank industry at 12-15 thousand tanks per year, taking into account Czech and French factories. And again, such a conclusion could be doubted if we knew for sure that at the beginning of 1941 the German armed forces had about 5 thousand tanks, but we were sure that there were twice as many of them …
We can only admit that thanks to the "wonderful" picture given by our intelligence department, the formation of 30 mechanized corps with almost 31 thousand tanks in their composition does not look redundant. Oddly enough, but rather here we should talk about reasonable sufficiency.
But the implementation of such plans was far beyond the borders of the domestic industry! Why was it not obvious to anyone? This is where numerous reproaches to G. K. Zhukov, and attempts to somehow justify his actions (“maybe he didn’t know?”) Is usually followed by a pejorative: “The Chief of the General Staff didn’t know? Ha!.
In fact, after many decades since those times, the personality of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov seems to be extremely contradictory. During the years of the USSR, he was often portrayed as an impeccable brilliant military leader, after the collapse of a great country, on the contrary, they interfered with the mud. But the real G. K. Zhukov is equally infinitely far from the image of the "light elven knight" and from the "bloody orc butcher." It is also very difficult to evaluate Georgy Konstantinovich as a military leader, because he does not fit the "black and white" definitions to which, alas, the reading public so often gravitates. On the whole, this historical figure is extremely complex, and in order to at least somehow understand it, a full-fledged historical study should be undertaken, for which there is neither time nor place in this article.
Of course, Georgy Konstantinovich did not come out with education, but it cannot be said that he was completely dark. The evening courses that he attended, studying to be a furrier master, and which allowed him to pass the certificate for the full course of the city school - this, of course, is not a gymnasium, but still. In the First World War, after entering the army, G. K. Zhukov is being trained as a cavalry non-commissioned officer. Later, already under Soviet rule, in 1920 he graduated from the Ryazan cavalry courses, then, in 1924-25. studied at the Higher Cavalry School. These were, again, refresher courses for command personnel, but nevertheless. In 1929 he graduated from the courses of the highest commanding staff of the Red Army. All this, of course, is not a classic military education, but many commanders did not have this either.
G. K. Zhukov, of course, made a mistake in insisting on the formation of additional mechanized corps. And, frankly, in 1941 Georgy Konstantinovich did not fully correspond to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. But you need to understand that for that time, alas, it was more than a natural situation. Alas, not the “old guard” represented by M. N. Tukhachevsky, nor K. E. Voroshilov could not create an effective management structure for the Red Army, while S. K. Tymoshenko simply did not have time for this. As a result, G. K. Zhukov found himself in exactly the same situation as many other top commanders of the Red Army - being, of course, a talented officer, he received an appointment that he simply did not have time to grow up to.
Let's remember the career of Georgy Konstantinovich. In 1933. he received under his command the 4th cavalry division, from 1937 - the cavalry corps, from 1938 - the deputy commander of the ZapOVO. But already in 1939 he assumed command of the 57th Army Corps, which was fighting on Khalkhin Gol. It is possible to evaluate various decisions of G. K. Zhukov in this post, but the fact remains - the Japanese troops suffered a crushing defeat.
In other words, we can say that in 1939 Georgy Konstantinovich demonstrated his worth as a corps commander, and even somewhat more, because he quite successfully led an army group that was deployed on the basis of the 57th corps. But you still need to understand that we are talking about the leadership of several tens of thousands of people - and nothing more.
His next post was G. K. Zhukov receives June 7, 1940 - he becomes the commander of the Kiev Special District. But he, in fact, has absolutely no time to enter the post, because almost immediately (in the same month) it was necessary to prepare the KOVO troops for the campaign, during which Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina became part of the USSR. And after that, a monstrous wave of questions fell upon the newly minted commander - it was necessary to urgently improve combat training (which, in fact, the "Winter War" was at a catastrophically low level), "master" new territories against the background of the reorganization of the Red Army under the leadership of S. K. Tymoshenko, etc. But in January 1941 G. K. Zhukov participates in strategic games, and on January 14, 1941, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
In other words, by the time of the beginning of the formation of two dozen new mechanized corps, Georgy Konstantinovich has been holding the post of chief of the General Staff for a whole month. How much could he have learned this month about the state of the military-industrial complex of the USSR? Let's not forget that he, in fact, had to simultaneously solve many issues related to both current activities and the reform of the Red Army. In addition, one must remember about secrecy in the USSR - information was usually brought to any official, "in the part concerning", and nothing more. In other words, we can safely say that before taking office as chief of staff G. K. Zhukov did not have any information about the capabilities of the USSR military-industrial complex, and it is not known what information he later received access to.
A modern manager who comes to an enterprise is usually given a month, or even two, in order to simply get up to speed, at this time they do not ask him too much, often content only with the level of work of the service, which developed before the arrival of a new leader. So we are talking about enterprises numbering thousands of people, while G. K. Zhukov was an "organization" of millions of people, and no one gave him any "entry periods". In other words, now for some reason it seems to many that if a person has been promoted to chief of staff, then the latter immediately, with a wave of a magic wand, masters all the wisdom that he is supposed to know, and immediately begins to correspond 100% to his position. But this, of course, is not at all true.
It is also impossible to exclude the possible influence of the famous proverb: “You want a lot, you get little. But this is not a reason to want little and get nothing. In other words, if the military needs a certain amount of military equipment, they must demand it. And if the military-industrial complex is incapable of producing it, then it is up to the producers to explain their capabilities to the country's leadership. Well, the business of the country's leadership is to issue the increased socialist industry with a commitment on the first day, and then approve more or less realistic plans. In the industry of the USSR, there were no mute lambs that could be easily offended by the rude military - they could well stand up for themselves, and often imposed their will on the country's armed forces (“take what you give, or you won't get it!”). In other words, G. K. Zhukov, generally speaking, could deliberately ignore the capabilities of the military-industrial complex, and, oddly enough, this approach of the chief of staff also had the right to exist.
But here two other questions arise, and the first of them is this: okay, let's say the leadership of the Red Army did not calculate, or they demanded weapons with a large margin. But why then did the country's leadership, which certainly had to understand the capabilities of the domestic industry, accepted the impossible demands of the military and approved them? And the second question: well, for example, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff did not quite well imagine the capabilities of the domestic industry, or they deliberately demanded too much in order to get the maximum possible. But they should have understood that right now no one would give them another 16 thousand tanks for manning mechanized corps. Why was it necessary to immediately change staffs, destroy already more or less well-coordinated formations, crushing them into newly formed mechanized corps, which were still impossible to staff in 1941? Well, okay, if the war does not happen before 1942 or even 1943, but what if it breaks out in 1941?
But in order to answer these questions as fully as possible, we should leave for a while the history of the formation of tank forces and take a closer look at the state of the shipbuilding programs of the pre-war USSR.
