This is the final article in the series "Thousands of tanks, dozens of battleships". But first, let's return to the question of planning the construction of the "Big Fleet" in the pre-war USSR.
As we said earlier, the first step towards the creation of an ocean-going fleet of the Country of Soviets can be considered 1936. It was then that the country's leadership approved a program providing for the construction of warships of all classes with a total displacement of 1,307 thousand tons, which was supposed to bring the USSR into the ranks of first-class sea powers. Nevertheless, the implementation of this program was completely disrupted, and starting from 1937 a strange dualism began to be seen in the construction of the fleet, which we talked about in sufficient detail in the previous article. On the one hand, “megalomaniac” plans for the construction of warships of increasing total displacement continued to be created - and this despite the obvious weakness of the shipbuilding industry, which was unable to implement the previous, more modest plans. On the other hand, despite the fact that such plans were fully approved by the management in the person of I. V. Stalin, they, nevertheless, were not approved and thus did not turn into a guide to action. In fact, shipbuilding management was carried out on the basis of annual plans, which were very far from the "highest approved", but not approved shipbuilding programs, which was considered by the author earlier.
Nevertheless, it will be interesting to consider how the projects of the shipbuilding programs of the USSR evolved on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.
The evolution of military shipbuilding programs. 1936-1939
It is quite possible that the deafening failure of the shipbuilding program, approved in 1936, to a certain extent affected the fate of the people who prepared it. In any case, all the responsible officials who took part in its development, including the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army V. M. Orlov, head of the Naval Academy I. M. Ludry, Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense Industry R. A. Muklevich, were arrested in the summer and autumn of 1937, and, later, were shot. But it is reliably known that already on August 13-17, 1937, at meetings of the Defense Committee, the issue was considered and a secret decree was issued on adjusting the shipbuilding program, and the number, classes, and performance characteristics of ships were to be revised.
This improved program was drawn up by the new head of the UVMS M. V. Viktorov and his deputy L. M. Haller and, with the approval and support of K. E. Voroshilov, represented by I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov already on September 7, 1937. Despite the minimum time that remained with the developers, it can be considered much more logical and balanced from the point of view of naval art for the following reasons:
1. The standard displacement of battleships has become much more realistic. Instead of 35 thousand tons for battleships of type "A" and 26, 5 thousand tons for battleships of type "B", 55-57 and 48 thousand tons, respectively, were adopted, while the first received 406-mm guns, and the second - 356 mm. at a speed of 29 and 28 knots. respectively. The protection of both battleships was supposed to be sufficient to withstand 406-mm shells and 500 kg aerial bombs.
2. For the first time, aircraft carriers were included in the shipbuilding plan. Even if they were only 2 ships of 10,000 tons each, this would be quite enough for the birth of a domestic carrier-based aviation, development of the necessary technologies, etc.
3. The program first included heavy cruisers, which at that time were planned to be armed with 254-mm guns. The fact is that the previous program provided for the construction of light cruisers of type 26 or 26-bis, that is, of the type "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky". The latter were quite adequate to the strategies of "concentrated strike" and "mosquito" fleet, but not very well suited for the ocean-going fleet. They were not strong enough to withstand foreign heavy cruisers, and were not optimal for the needs of the line squadrons. The new program introduced the division of cruisers into light and heavy, and the performance characteristics of the latter were supposed to provide them with an indisputable superiority over the most powerful "Washington" cruisers of the first-class naval powers. At the same time, light cruisers were optimized for service with squadrons.
At the same time, the new program had some drawbacks. The number of leaders and destroyers increased in absolute terms, but decreased in proportion to one heavier ship. It is also difficult to call an increase in the number of small submarines (from 90 to 116 units) adequate, while reducing large ones (from 90 to 84 units). Nevertheless, this program, of course, more met the needs of the fleets than the previous one. Alas, given the fact that the number of ships that needed to be built grew from 533 to 599, and their displacement from 1, 3 to almost 2 million tons, it was even less feasible. It is interesting, by the way, that the number of ships according to the decoding provided by the sources gives not 599, but 593 ships: most likely the decoding and the final figures were taken from various versions of the program.
However, V. M. Viktorov did not stay on the post of commander-in-chief of the MS of the Red Army - he held this post for only 5 months, and then P. A. Smirnov, who previously served as … the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. Taking office on December 30, 1937, he led the Naval Forces of the Red Army until June 1938, and under him the program for the construction of the "Big Fleet" received further changes. The document submitted for consideration to the People's Commissariat of Defense on January 27, 1938 was called "The program for the construction of combat and auxiliary ships for 1938-1946." and was designed for 8 years. It is usually said that, according to this document, it was supposed to build 424 ships, but the calculation of the decryption by ship classes gives only 401 units. with a total displacement of 1 918.5 thousand tons.
It was assumed that by January 1, 1946, this program will be fully implemented. Its distinctive features are:
1. Rejection of B-class battleships. In essence, this was a completely correct decision - firstly, the tasks that were or could arise before the Naval Forces of the Red Army did not require the presence of two types of battleships, and secondly, battleships of the "B" type in their size came close to the battleships of the " A "without possessing their firepower.
2. Decrease in the number of battleships from 20 to 15 with an increase in the total number of cruisers from 32 to 43.
3. Reduction of plans for the construction of submarines - from 375 to 178 units. This was a very controversial decision. On the one hand, the number of submarines according to the 1937 plans was very large, and the distribution by their subclasses was not optimal. So, for example, it was planned to build 116 small submarines with extremely low combat potential. The plans developed under P. A. Smirnov (most likely, their true creator was L. M. Haller), it was this subclass of ships that underwent the maximum reduction, to 46 units. In addition, underwater minelayers were introduced into the shipbuilding program, which were absent in the plans of 1936-37. But still, such a sharp reduction does not seem reasonable, given that they were divided into 4 fleets, and the ships of the "D" and "Sh" types, which were built before that, can hardly be called successful submarines.
4. Another unsuccessful decision was the transfer of heavy cruisers from 254 mm to 305 mm caliber. As a result of the associated increase in displacement, they turned from very strong cruisers to very weak battleships. However, this, most likely, is not the fault of the sailors, especially since the original version of the program included cruisers with 254-mm cannons, and their fulfillment of the wishes of V. M. Molotov, whom they could not resist.
However, the new People's Commissar was released quite a bit - on June 30, 1938 P. A. Smirnov was arrested and tried as an enemy of the people. His place was taken by the temporary acting People's Commissar of the Navy P. I. Smirnov-Svetlovsky, and two months later he was replaced in this position by M. P. Frinovsky, who before that had nothing to do with the fleet at all. P. I. Smirnov-Svetlovsky, being a sailor, became M. P. Frinovsky.
However, on March 25, 1939 and M. P. Frinovsky, and P. I. Smirnov-Svetlovsky were removed from their posts and then arrested. They were replaced by a very young commander of the Pacific Fleet: we are, of course, talking about N. G. Kuznetsov, who became first deputy people's commissar, and then - the people's commissar of the Navy, and all subsequent pre-war plans for shipbuilding were created already under him.
Novations of the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsova
Already on July 27, 1939 N. G. Kuznetsov submits for consideration by the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR a document called "10-year plan for the construction of ships of the RKKF".
This program differed from the previous ones by a noticeable increase in light strength. The number of battleships and cruisers remained at the same level (15 units each), and N. G. Kuznetsov doubted the need for such a large number of them, but with I. V. Stalin did not argue about this, with one exception. It is known that N. G. Kuznetsov made an attempt to persuade the country's leadership to abandon the construction of heavy cruisers - in the form in which they were included in the program (project 69), he considered them unnecessary for the fleet. However, to convince I. V. Stalin did not succeed - the latter had a strange disposition towards these ships.
Then the new People's Commissar began to link his proposed program with the capabilities of the domestic industry.
Without justifying the arrests of N. G. Kuznetsov, note that V. M. Orlov, and the leaders of the USSR Navy who followed him, nevertheless, either did not fully, or did not at all correspond to their position. They also did not show themselves as organizers, although, of course, a series of permanent appointments / displacements did not leave them time to properly delve into the matter and how to prove themselves. This thesis well illustrates the situation with the design of Type A battleships - and the point here is not even that the terms of its design were disrupted, and all three versions of the technical design were rejected. Displacement restrictions resulting from the initial desire to meet the international standard of 35,000 tons played a huge role in this. Permits to increase the displacement were given extremely reluctantly, presumably due to logic: “If the imperialist countries can build full-fledged battleships in such a displacement, why can't we? In fact, no country in the world was able to create a battleship with 406-mm guns, protection of shells of the same caliber and some acceptable speed, but in the USSR, of course, they could not know this.
Thus, when creating battleships, there were quite objective difficulties, but there were even more those that we created ourselves. Technological problems were quite surmountable, but the design process for the "first ships of the fleet" was set very badly. In theory, there were as many as two institutes, ANIMI and NIIVK, which were supposed to solve all the issues related to the development of the battleship project, but they did not cope, and most importantly, there was no center, an authority that would plan and control the work of various design bureaus, factories, institutes, engaged in the development of weapons, armor, equipment, etc. necessary for the battleship, and also promptly resolved the issues arising in this case. It is clear that designing a battleship is a very difficult task, because the range of its equipment is extremely large, and the overwhelming majority of it had to be created anew. So, for a long time this process went on by itself, no one controlled it: the design bureaus worked either in the forest, some for firewood, the results of their work were either not communicated to other developers, or were brought in with a great delay, etc.
Nor can it be said that all our fleet commanders with V. M. Orlova and before M. P. Frinovsky ignored the possibilities of the shipbuilding industry. Nevertheless, the first program of the "Big Fleet" (1936) was created in private, the circle of people who took part in its development was extremely limited - and this was hardly the desire of the sailors. And V. M. Orlov, as soon as this program received "publicity", tried to organize joint work with the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding, although he managed to do little. M. P. Frinovsky has achieved an increase in funding for shipbuilding programs. P. I. Smirnov-Svetlovsky made great efforts precisely for their practical implementation, for "linking" the dreams of the fleet and the capabilities of the shipbuilding industry of the USSR - it was thanks to his work that the laying of the battleships of Project 23 (Project "A") became possible after all.
But still, we can say that systematic work with the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry to link global plans of the fleet with annual operational plans for shipbuilding and specific current actions began precisely under N. G. Kuznetsov. Despite the fact that the "10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships" was not approved by the country's leadership, nevertheless, the approval of I. V. He received Stalin, and later N. G. Kuznetsov strove to be guided by this document.
Under the leadership of the new People's Commissar, the ten-year plan was split into two five-year periods, from 1938 to 1942. and 1943-1948. respectively. At the same time, the first five-year plan was drawn up jointly with the People's Commissariat for Shipbuilding, becoming a compromise between the desires of the fleet and the capabilities of the industry. For the sake of fairness, let us point out that he also remained overly optimistic in some ways, but nevertheless was, as they say now, a working document, in contrast to the unbridled projection of the same program of 1936.
Of course, the very modest scale of the "5-year shipbuilding plan for 1938-1942" became the flip side of realism.
As we can see from the table, it was supposed to double the number of battleships and heavy cruisers in construction, but none of them were expected to be in service during the first five years of the program. Of the light cruisers, until the end of 1942, in addition to the Kirov already delivered to the fleet, only 1 cruiser of Project 26 was expected, four - 26 bis and five new projects 68. All heavy ships and the bulk of light cruisers and destroyers were to join in operation already during the next "five-year plan".
I must say that this "5-year shipbuilding plan for 1938-1942" was also not approved by anyone. But N. G. Kuznetsov was not embarrassed by this. Under his leadership, the "Plan for the construction of warships and auxiliary ships of the Navy for 1940-1942." during which the "5-year plan" was automatically fulfilled, and the new People's Commissar insisted on its approval. In essence, this document was supposed to become a link between the annual plans of the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry and the 10-year program of the People's Commissar of the Navy.
In this respect, “Memorandum of the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy N. G. Kuznetsov to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. V. Stalin on the need to approve the program for the construction of warships and auxiliary ships for 1940-1942. prepared by him on July 25, 1940. We will not cite its text in full, but list its main theses.
1. N. G. Kuznetsov emphasized that this program is a systemic one, that is, part of the "big" plans for the construction of the fleet;
2. At the same time, the commander-in-chief noted that the fulfillment of the 5-year plan "does not meet even the minimum needs of naval theaters in the ship composition." In fact, with the full implementation of the program and taking into account the previously introduced ships, at the beginning of 1943each of the country's 4 naval theaters received, on average, 3 modern light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers and 15 minesweepers, while of the heavy ships for their support there would only be 3 old battleships of the "Gangut" class. These forces were completely insufficient even to perform such modest tasks as "ensuring the exit of submarines, protecting communications, assisting the army, the population of reconnaissance operations, providing mine laying, not to mention operations against enemy bases and coastlines";
3. Despite the above, N. G. Kuznetsov, said that given the real capabilities of our industry, it is impossible to demand more from it.
As for the second stage of the 10-year program, its elaboration was of a purely preliminary nature, nevertheless, specialists from the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry were initially involved in it. The level of planning has clearly increased, since, based on its results, it was concluded that it was obviously impossible to implement the "10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships" in the period up to 1948 in terms of heavy ships.
Thus, we can say that it was under N. G. Kuznetsov, a giant step was taken to bring the plans of the Navy in line with the capabilities of the domestic shipbuilding industry. Of all the leaders of the pre-war Russian Navy, it was Nikolai Gerasimovich who came closest to the sound concept of building a fleet as a system of long-term, medium- and short-term plans, the planning and implementation of which would be provided with resources and interconnected with each other. In words, this is elementary, but in practice, and even in such a complex industry as shipbuilding, it turned out to be very difficult to achieve this.
"Big Fleet" is being phased out
Unfortunately, even a relatively modest shipbuilding plan for 1940-41. in the form in which it was proposed by N. G. Kuznetsov, turned out to be impracticable, which is clearly seen from the table below.
As you can see, in 1940 it was planned to lay down about half of the total number of ships planned according to the "Program for the construction of warships and auxiliary ships for 1940-1942", and only one of 5 heavy ships was laid down. As for 1941, then, in the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) No. 2073-877ss "On the plan of military shipbuilding for 1941" of October 19, 1940, the collapse of the creation of the "Big Fleet" is clearly visible: one recently laid down battleship is ordered to be dismantled, new heavy ships not to be laid down. The readiness dates of previously laid down battleships and heavy cruisers were shifted to the right, the leaders' bookmarks were stopped, one of them, recently begun by construction, was planned to be dismantled. The laying of light cruisers, submarine destroyers and small ships continued.
Thus, the main reason that N. G. Kuznetsov failed to achieve the implementation of the "Program for the construction of warships and auxiliary ships for 1940-1942." In this respect, a memorandum addressed to I. V. Stalin, signed by the People's Commissars of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov and the shipbuilding industry I. Tevosyan, dated December 29, 1939. It directly states that:
1. The production base for building the fleet according to the plan for 1940 is insufficient. At the same time, the people's commissariats, which could supply what is needed for the shipbuilding industry, do not do this, since "the existing capacities at the factories of these people's commissariats are loaded with other orders";
2. The investments envisaged by the plan for 1940 are insufficient, and in a number of positions they are even lower than they were in 1940;
The conclusion from the aforementioned was made simple: without special measures and personal intervention of I. V. Stalin's implementation of the program of military shipbuilding for 1940 is not possible. It is important not to forget that it was not a question of the Big Fleet construction program, but a relatively modest plan for 1940.
conclusions
Having examined in the previous article a number of figures for the actual bookmarks and delivery of ships, and comparing them with the plans for military shipbuilding, which were proposed by the leadership of the Navy, we see that by the time the creation of the "Big Fleet" began, there was nothing in common between the plans and capabilities of the shipbuilding industry, but themselves plans for the number of ships and their performance characteristics were poorly balanced. During 1936-1939. both of these shortcomings were gradually eradicated, while the interconnection of the wishes of the sailors with the capabilities of the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry was to take place in 1940-1941.
As for the "Big Fleet", then during 1936-1938. domestic military shipbuilding "took acceleration", significantly increasing the number of built tonnage. The peak point of the pre-war construction of the ocean-going fleet should be considered 1939. But the impending war led to a gradual curtailment of the Big Fleet program, which began to be felt since 1940 and, obviously, had an impact on the 1941 naval shipbuilding program.
And now we can return to the beginning of our series of articles, and draw several conclusions about the construction of the armed forces of the USSR in the pre-war period. We are, of course, talking about "megalomaniac" plans for the formation of 30 mechanized corps and the construction of almost the strongest navy in the world at the same time, for which many fans of military history like to reproach the leadership of our country. In fact, the following happened.
1. By 1936, a military industry was created in the USSR, which on the whole satisfied the needs of the land and air forces of the Land of the Soviets. This, of course, did not mean that one could rest on our laurels, of course, production should have been developed further, but on the whole, the task of creating an industrial basis for providing the armed forces at that time was largely solved;
2. Around the same time, the leadership of the USSR realized the need for the oceanic Navy of the USSR as an instrument of international politics;
3. The ongoing industrialization in the country has significantly increased the industrial capabilities of the USSR: the country's leadership has a feeling that the necessary prerequisites for the creation of the "Big Fleet" have been created;
4. In view of the above, it was decided to start creating the “Big Fleet, starting in 1936;
5. However, already in 1937 it became clear that the planned withdrawal of the USSR into the ranks of the first-class maritime powers in 8-10 years was beyond the power of the country. As a result, a strange dualism arose, when dozens of battleships and heavy cruisers were planned on paper, but the actual bookmarks of the ships did not come close to meeting these plans. In other words, the Defense Committee, SNK and I. V. Stalin personally considered and approved (but did not approve) plans to create a gigantic fleet with a total displacement of 2-3 million tons with pleasure, but at the same time, the annual plans for naval shipbuilding, on the basis of which new ships were laid, were drawn up taking into account the real capabilities of the People's Commissariat the shipbuilding industry;
6. In fact, 1939 was a watershed in many ways. The Second World War began, while the hostilities against the Finns revealed a lot of gaping holes in the preparation and provision of the Red Army. At the same time, Soviet intelligence was unable to determine the real number, the number of weapons and the growth rate of the Wehrmacht - the leadership of the Red Army and the country believed that they would be opposed by a much larger enemy than it actually was. In addition, it became clear that many of the RKKA's weapons systems were outdated and in need of replacement;
7. Accordingly, since 1940there is a turn from the creation of an ocean-going fleet towards the further expansion of the industrial base to meet the needs of the country's land and air forces.
8. By the beginning of 1941, when it was decided to create 30 mechanized corps, no "Big Fleet", no 15 battleships were on the agenda. - The USSR refused to continue the construction of the fourth battleship Sovetskaya Belorussia, and the dates for launching and commissioning of the other three were once again postponed. No new heavy ships were bookmarked, the focus shifted to the construction of light forces, while the rate of bookmarking of the latter also decreased.
In other words, the "Big Fleet" and "30 mechanized corps" never competed with each other for the simple reason that when the country began to increase the production of tanks and other weapons for the ground air force, the construction of the ocean-going fleet was actually curtailed. At the same time, the desire of the Red Army to get at its disposal 30 mechanized corps was the result of an excessively overestimated military potential of Germany and obviously could not be realized by industry during 1941. Moreover, no one tried to do this.
Even on June 22, 1941, the shortage of 27 tank corps was about 12, 5 thousand tanks. At the same time, during 1941, the industry was instructed to produce only 1,200 heavy KV tanks and 2,800 medium tanks T-34 and T-34M. In other words, we see that the plans to create 30 mechanized corps and the actual capabilities of our industry did not intersect with each other in any way. All this is surprisingly similar to the situation that developed when trying to create the "Big Fleet".
In other words, the plan for the creation of 30 mechanized corps should be regarded as a kind of milestone document in terms of the interaction of the Red Army, the people's commissariats of industry and the country's leadership. The new People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S. K. Tymoshenko and his chief of staff G. K. Zhukov was, in fact, misinformed by intelligence and seriously believed that in 1942 the Wehrmacht could attack with outnumbered and better trained troops armed with at least 20,000 tanks. The indicated number, subject to the transfer of the industry of Germany and the territories under its control to a war footing, according to intelligence, could be doubled. Accordingly, 30 mechanized corps (about 30 thousand tanks) seemed a sensible decision, quite adequate to the level of threats.
At the same time, the industry, of course, could not provide the required flow of military equipment. Tanks with bulletproof armor, the production of which could be set up urgently, and for which there were production capacities, did not solve the problem in any way, since such equipment was already considered to be of limited combat capability. And it was obviously impossible to create the T-34 and KV in the required volumes - the factories were just mastering their mass production, while structurally the tanks were still very raw and required the elimination of many "childhood diseases".
In this situation, the country's leadership and I. V. Stalin faced a situation where the demands of the Red Army looked quite reasonable, but the industry, for objective reasons, could not satisfy them in the required time frame. Accordingly, there was nothing left to do but to agree with the desire of the Red Army to have 30 mechanized corps, but to consider their formation as a long-term goal, to the realization of which one should strive by all means, realizing, nevertheless, that during 1941, and perhaps in 1942 it will be impossible to achieve it. In other words, the creation of 30 mechanized corps became not an operational plan for immediate execution, but a kind of super-goal, by analogy with the 10-year plan for the construction of the "Big Fleet" proposed by N. G. Kuznetsov. To be reached … someday.
At the same time, the idea of deploying a mechanized corps as quickly as possible, followed by a gradual saturation with military equipment, did not seem like such a bad decision. The formation of new formations in advance, even before the arrival of the bulk of military equipment, nevertheless made it possible to solve at least some of the issues of combat coordination and training before the formation was equipped with equipment according to the state. In addition, the formation of such formations required a large number of officers, tank crews, etc., as well as many material resources - radios, cars, tractors, etc., and the sooner the country would start solving these problems, the sooner they would be solved. Taking into account the confidence of the political leadership of the USSR that the war will begin no earlier than 1942, the decision to form 30 MK looks quite reasonable. You also need to understand that the formation of new formations does not end with the start of the war: no one demanded from the USSR to throw understaffed "second stage" MCs into battle, they could be kept in the rear for a while, continuing to saturate them with military equipment.
Was it possible to use the period 1936 - 1941? to prepare for war better than it was done? Yes, absolutely. When the war began, the Red Army faced large deficits in the field of radio communications, vehicles, etc., and if instead of the "Big Fleet" the resources of the USSR were directed to increase the production of the same trucks, high-quality armor-piercing shells, etc., then the benefit from this would undoubtedly be greater than from unfinished battleships and cruisers. And yes, if you knew in advance that the war would begin in the summer of 1941, and not 1942, then, of course, you should not have started forming 30 MKs a few months before the start of hostilities. But you need to understand that the leadership of the pre-war USSR did not have our aftermath, and in 1936 the creation of an ocean-going fleet looked for him to be a timely and feasible task. Despite the fact that the military science of the pre-war USSR was moving in the right direction towards understanding mobile war, many of its aspects remained unclear to us. Many of the needs of the Red Army were underestimated not only by I. V. Stalin, but also by the leadership of the Red Army itself.
On the other hand, one should not forget that the Red Army Navy never, even at the peak of its construction, consumed no more than 20% of the marketable output of the total expenditure on the country's defense. Its costs have always remained relatively modest among other people's commissariats, and the amount of possible savings did not boggle the imagination at all. It would hardly have been possible to close all the real needs of the Red Army even if the USSR completely abandoned the fleet and defense from sea areas, which, of course, could not be done.
And, of course, one should never forget that only the one who does nothing is not mistaken. Evaluate the actions of the USSR leadership in the field of military development in 1936-1941. follows in view of the views that existed at that time, and the information that it possessed. If we do this, we will see that these actions were quite logical and consistent and did not contain any "megalomaniac" in which G. K. Zhukov and I. V. Stalin's modern lovers of military history.
