Let us now try to figure out what place the shipbuilding programs occupied in the pre-war military development of the USSR. Unfortunately, in a couple of articles that the author intends to devote to this issue, it is absolutely impossible to analyze in any detail the evolution of plans for the construction of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet (RKKF), but it will still be necessary to present some minimum.
As you know, in the 20s of the last century, the young Land of Soviets did not have the means at all for any adequate maintenance and development of its armed forces. The Navy, on the other hand, has always been a very expensive weapons system, so no serious shipbuilding programs could exist at that time by definition. Soviet naval sailors had to limit themselves to a small number of ships left over from tsarist Russia, for the maintenance of which it was still possible to scrape together money in the fleet, gradually completing and modernizing what, again, began to be built under the tsar.
Nevertheless, of course, the USSR could not get by with only ships of pre-revolutionary construction. Therefore, by the end of the 1920s, the first Soviet submarines, patrol boats, etc. began to be developed and built. Without getting into the twists and turns of theoretical research by the apologists of the "Big" and "Mosquito" fleets, we note that in those specific conditions in which the USSR was in the late 20s and early 30s, some significant programs for the construction of heavy ships were completely impossible for a variety of reasons. The country had absolutely no resources for this: no money, no sufficient number of skilled workers, no machinery, no armor, no metal - in general, nothing. Therefore, in the first half of the 30s, the RKKF could only count on the construction of light surface ships, submarines and naval aviation.
In the period 1927-1932, that is, during the first five-year plan (five-year plan) of the USSR, the emphasis was on civil shipbuilding - military orders accounted for only 26% of the cost of the total volume of construction of ships and vessels. But by the next five-year plan, this situation should have changed.
The fundamental document that determined the direction of military shipbuilding during this period was "Basic considerations for the development of the naval forces of the Red Army for the second five-year plan (1933-1935)" (it was not about the five-year plan lasting 3 years, but the priorities of shipbuilding until 1935). The main task of the fleet at that time was the defense of the sea borders of the USSR, and this could be done, according to the developers, by building a powerful submarine and air fleet. It is of interest that despite the seemingly purely defensive orientation, even then the drafters of the document considered it necessary to concentrate efforts on the construction of submarines of medium and large displacement, suitable for action on enemy communications, at a great distance from their shores, but the creation of small submarines for the defense of their own bases should have been limited.
On the basis of this document, the shipbuilding program for 1933-1938 was formed. She was approved by the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) on July 11, 1933, according to her, it was supposed to commission 8 light cruisers, 10 leaders, 40 destroyers, 28 patrol ships, 42 minesweepers, 252 torpedo boats, 60 hunters for submarines, as well as 69 large, 200 medium and 100 small submarines, and a total of 503 surface ships and 369 submarines. By 1936, the naval aviation was supposed to be increased from 459 to 1,655 units. In general, the adoption of this very ambitious program marked a fundamental turn in the relevant industries, since now the military shipbuilding sector accounted for 60% of the total cost of new ships and vessels, and the civilian - only 40%.
Of course, the shipbuilding program for 1933-1938. in no way was it aimed at the oceanic fleet, especially since most of the medium submarines still had to be submarines of the "Sh" type, which, unfortunately, were not very well suited for fighting on sea communications, and absolutely on communications ocean. Also from today's perspective, it is obvious that the program is overloaded with submarines and torpedo boats to the detriment of larger ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, but within the framework of this article we will not delve into this either.
So, despite its obviously "coastal" nature, the program of 1933-1938. in its original version, it was still unaffordable for the domestic industry, and already in November 1933, that is, just 4 months after the adoption of the STO, it was significantly adjusted downward, and the "sequestration" was primarily carried out on relatively large surface ships. Out of 8 light cruisers, only 4 remained, out of 10 leaders - 8, and out of 40 destroyers - only 22, while the plans for the construction of the submarine fleet were slightly reduced - from 369 to 321 units.
But even in a truncated form, the program could not be executed. By 1938 inclusive, the RKKF received only one out of 4 light cruisers (Kirov, and even then, to a certain extent, conditionally), out of 8 leaders - 4, out of 22 destroyers - 7, etc. Even submarines, the usefulness of which was never denied by anyone and never, was built significantly less than the plan - until 1937 inclusive, only 151 submarines were laid, and it is clear that under no circumstances did the ships laid down later had time to enter service before the start. 1939 g.
A little remark: perhaps one of our dear readers will want to draw parallels with today - after all, now we also have programs for military shipbuilding being disrupted. In fact, looking at the shipbuilding of the USSR in those years, you can see a lot in common - the country also experienced problems literally at every step. The projects of warships, often, turned out to be suboptimal, or contained serious miscalculations, the industry did not have time to master the creation of the necessary units and equipment, and what did succeed was often of poor quality. The terms of construction were regularly disrupted, the ships were built for an extremely long time, not only in comparison with the industrially developed capitalist countries, but even in comparison with tsarist Russia. But, nevertheless, there were differences: for example, already in 1936 the USSR, despite all the above difficulties, had the world's first submarine fleet in terms of number. By that time, 113 submarines were part of the RKKF, in second place was the United States with 84 submarines, and in third place was France with 77 submarines.
The next domestic shipbuilding program began to be developed in December 1935, when the command of the RKKF received appropriate orders from the government of the country, and had 2 key differences from the previous one.
1933-1938 program was compiled by specialists of the Navy and approved after approval by the leadership of the armed forces and the country, adjusted for the capabilities of shipbuilding. But the new program was formed "in a narrow circle", the head of the Naval Forces of the RKKA V. M. Orlov and the head of the Naval Academy I. M. Ludry under the leadership of I. V. Stalin. Thus, we can say that the new shipbuilding program reflected, first of all, the vision of the RKKF by the top leadership of the USSR.
Well, the second difference was that, in spite of a rather amusing tactical justification, the new shipbuilding program "aimed" at the construction of the "Big Fleet", which was based on heavy artillery ships - battleships. Why did this happen?
You can, of course, try to explain the change in the principles of the formation of a new shipbuilding program by the voluntarism of Joseph Vissarionovich, who was impressed by large ships. But in reality, apparently, everything was much more complicated.
It is easy to see how threatening the international situation of those years was. For some time after the First World War, peace was established in Europe, but it, this time, was now clearly coming to an end. In Germany, Adolf Hitler came to power, and his revanchist course was obvious to the naked eye. At the same time, Britain and France, at that time the guarantors of peace in Europe, turned a blind eye to the rearmament of Germany, despite the fact that the latter clearly and grossly violated the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, one could say that the system of international treaties that existed until recently was no longer valid and had to be gradually replaced by something new. Thus, the German navy, according to the Treaty of Versailles, was severely limited both qualitatively and quantitatively. But England, instead of (if necessary - by force) insist on its observance, in fact, unilaterally violated this very advantageous treaty for her, concluding an Anglo-German naval agreement with Hitler on July 18, 1935, according to which Germany was allowed to build a fleet of 35% of the British. In October 1935, Mussolini launched an invasion of Abyssinia, and, again, the League of Nations found no tool to prevent bloodshed.
The political situation in the USSR at that time was extremely difficult. Obviously, in order to ensure peace in Europe and the security of the Land of the Soviets, a new system of international treaties was needed, in which the USSR would participate on an equal footing with the other powers, but the threat posed by Japan in the Far East could hardly be countered with any something by treaties, only by military force. But in Europe, the USSR was looked upon with distrust and apprehension. They willingly traded with him, since the Country of Soviets supplied the bread needed in Europe and regularly paid for its obligations, but at the same time the USSR remained in political isolation: it was simply not perceived as an equal, no one took his opinion into account. The Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact was a good example of this attitude, which was quite good if viewed as a declaration of intent. But in order to be of practical importance, this pact had to have an addition, which would concretize the actions of the parties in the event that France or the USSR were subjected to an unprovoked attack by a European power. Contrary to the wishes of the USSR, this supplementary agreement was never signed.
In order to declare itself as a strong player in the European arena, the USSR needed to somehow demonstrate strength, and such an attempt was made: we are talking about the famous Great Kiev maneuvers of 1935.
Much has been said and said that these maneuvers were thoroughly ostentatious, and had no practical value, but even in this form revealed many shortcomings in the preparation of the Red Army at all levels. This is, of course, so. But, in addition to the military, they also had political significance, which is worth dwelling on in more detail.
The fact is that in 1935 the French army was obviously considered the strongest army in Europe. At the same time, the concept of its use was purely defensive. France suffered enormous losses in the offensive operations of the First World War, and its military leadership believed that defense in future wars would take precedence over the offensive, which should only be taken when the enemy wasted his forces in unsuccessful attempts to break through the French defensive order.
At the same time, the Soviet maneuvers of 1935 were supposed to demonstrate to the world a completely different concept of warfare, namely, the theory of a deep operation. The "external" essence of the maneuvers was to demonstrate the ability of troops saturated with modern military equipment to penetrate enemy defenses, and then, with mechanized and cavalry units, operating with the support of airborne troops, to surround and crush the enemy. Thus, the Kiev maneuvers "seemed to hint" not only at the gigantic military power of the USSR (more than 1,000 tanks and 600 aircraft were involved in the exercises for 65 thousand personnel of the participating troops), but also at a new strategy for the use of ground forces, which leaves far behind the views of the "first European army". In theory, the world should have shuddered when it saw the power and perfection of the army of the Soviet Union, and the leaders of the European countries should have seriously thought about the benefits of allied relations with the newly-minted military giant …
Alas, in practice, the Kiev maneuvers did not entail anything like that. It cannot be said that they were underestimated by the military specialists of that era - although today we speak of them as a show, but in terms of the impact on foreign attaches, the show was a success. For example, the French General L. Loiseau, who was personally present at the exercises, noted: "With regard to tanks, I would consider it correct to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place." Nevertheless, there were no noticeable changes in the position of the USSR in the political world arena - it still remained a "political pariah", as it was before.
All this could well have been directed by the leadership of the USSR and I. V. Stalin thought that even the most advanced ground and air forces would not give him the necessary political preferences, and would not help him integrate into the new system of international security in positions acceptable to the USSR. They, of course, were extremely important for ensuring the country's security in the event of a war, but they were not at the same time an instrument of big politics.
But the mighty "Big Fleet" could well become such an instrument. Soviet tanks and aircraft were still too far from England, Japan and France, but the navy was a completely different matter. The entire history of mankind has irrefutably testified that a powerful navy was a gigantic political advantage of a country that has it; such a country could not be ignored by anyone in big politics.
In other words, it is very easy to assume that I. V. Stalin needed not at all because of any personal preferences, but as a foreign policy instrument designed to ensure the USSR a worthy place in the world and make it a full participant in international agreements. This assumption explains well a number of absurdities that accompanied the process of creating the shipbuilding program for the Big Fleet.
So, for example, the former People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov in his memoirs asserted that the program for the construction of the "Big Fleet" "was adopted in a hurry, without sufficient justification for it both from an operational point of view and from the point of view of technical capabilities." We will talk about the technical capabilities a little later, but for now let's pay attention to the "operational point of view" - and again, recall the words of Admiral N. G. Kuznetsova:
“There were no clearly formulated tasks for the fleet. Oddly enough, I could not achieve this either in the People's Commissariat of Defense or in the Government. The General Staff referred to the lack of government directives on this issue, while Stalin personally laughed it off or expressed very general assumptions. I realized that he did not want to initiate me into the "holy of holies" and did not find it convenient to pursue this more persistently. When there was talk about the future fleet in one or another of the theaters, he looked at the map of the sea and only asked questions about the capabilities of the future fleet, without revealing the details of his intentions."
So, it is quite possible to assume that no "holy of holies" actually existed: if I. V. Stalin needed the fleet precisely as a political instrument, then he could not, of course, say to his naval commanders something like: "I need a fleet not for war, but for politics." It was much easier (and politically more correct) to gather the most responsible and competent persons in the construction of the fleet, which in 1935 V. M. Orlov and I. M. Ludry, and work with them in the style: "We need a battleship of roughly this size, and you, comrades, come up with why we need it this way, and quickly."
And if this was so, as the author of this article suggests, then it becomes completely understandable, for example, a very strange concept of using the linear forces of the USSR fleet, which appeared at about that very time. If in almost all navies of the world at that time battleships were considered the main force of the fleet, and the rest of the ships, in fact, provided their combat use, then in the USSR everything was exactly the opposite. Light ships were considered the main striking force of the fleet, capable of crushing enemy squadrons by delivering a concentrated or combined strike against them, and battleships were only supposed to provide the action of light forces and give them sufficient combat stability.
Such views look extremely strange. But if we assume that the leadership of the RKKF was simply instructed to quickly substantiate the need to build battleships, then what other options could they have? Only to quickly integrate the use of battleships into the tactical calculations that existed at that time, which, in fact, was done: the concept of a small naval war was "reinforced" by battleships. In other words, all this does not look like an evolution of views on naval art, but an urgent need to justify the usefulness of heavy ships in the fleet.
So, we see that the program for building the "Big Fleet" could have been dictated by political necessity, but how timely and feasible it was in the USSR? Today we know that not at all: the level of development of shipbuilding, armored, artillery, and so on. enterprises and industries have not yet allowed to begin to create powerful fleets. However, in 1935 it all looked completely different.
Let's not forget that the planned economy was taking, in general, only the first steps, while the role of the enthusiasm of workers and employees was excessively exaggerated. As you know, the first and second five-year plans led to a multiple increase in the production of the most important products, such as steel, cast iron, electricity, etc. times, but orders of magnitude. In 1935, of course, the second five-year plan had not yet ended, but it was still obvious that the country's industrialization was proceeding very successfully and at a very high rate. All this, naturally, gave rise to a certain "dizziness from success" and overestimated expectations from the development of domestic industry for the next 7-10 years. Thus, the country's leadership had certain grounds to assume that the further development of industry at an accelerated pace would allow the construction of the "Big Fleet" in a relatively short time, although, alas, these assumptions were incorrect.
At the same time, in 1935, the military industry of the USSR in terms of production capacities for the ground army and air forces reached quite acceptable indicators, sufficient to provide the Red Army with military equipment. The Kirov and Kharkov factories entered the stable production of the main models of battle tanks: T-26, T-28 and BT-5/7, while the total production of armored vehicles reached its peak in 1936, then declined: for example, in 1935 it was 3 055 tanks were produced, in 1936 - 4 804, but in 1937-38. 1,559 and 2,271 tanks, respectively. As for the planes, in 1935, only the I-15 and I-16 fighters were produced 819 aircraft. This is a very large figure considering that, for example, the Italian Air Force in 1935 had 2,100 aircraft, including those in training units, and the Luftwaffe's strength even in 1938 was less than 3,000 aircraft. In other words, the situation with the production of the main types of military equipment in the USSR looked so that it, this production, reached the required level and did not require significant further expansion - thus, the further development of the industry could be oriented towards something else. So why not the navy?
Thus, we come to the conclusion that for the construction of the "Big Fleet" by 1936, in the opinion of the country's leadership, there were all the necessary prerequisites: it was needed as a political tool to increase the influence of the USSR in the world, and, at the same time, it was assumed that its construction by the forces of Soviet industry not to the detriment of the army and the air force. At the same time, the "Big Fleet" did not then become the result of the development of domestic naval thought, but was, to a certain extent, "lowered to the fleet from above", which is why, in fact, further suggestions arose that this fleet was just a consequence of whims I. V. Stalin.
The approval of the Big Fleet construction plan, of course, went through several iterations. The first of them can be considered report No. 12ss, directed to the USSR People's Commissar for Defense K. E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A. I. Egorov, signed by the head of the Red Army Naval Forces V. M. Orlova. According to this document, it was supposed to build 12 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 26 heavy and 20 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 155 destroyers and 438 submarines, while V. M. Orlov assumed that this program could well be implemented in just 8-10 years.
This program was corrected by the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense: it had not yet been approved, but had already been adopted as a guide to action, which was expressed in the Resolution of the STO USSR No. OK-95ss "On the program of marine shipbuilding for 1936", adopted on April 27, 1936, providing for an increase in the construction of warships in comparison with the previous program. At the same time, the program continued to be adjusted: on May 27, 1936, the STO adopted a decree on the construction of 8 large battleships of the "A" type, with a displacement of 35,000 tons, armed with 9 * 406-mm guns and 24 - small type "B" with a displacement of 26,000 tons and the main caliber of 9 * 305-mm cannons, and they were supposed to be built in just 7 (!) years.
And, finally, once again the revised program is considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and finally approved by a closed resolution of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of June 26, 1936. According to the approved program during 1937-1943. it was necessary to build 8 battleships of type "A", 16 battleships of type "B", 20 light cruisers, 17 leaders, 128 destroyers, 90 large, 164 medium and 90 small submarines with a total displacement of 1 307 thousand tons.
Perhaps a respected reader will have a question - why, wishing to consider the state of the pre-war shipbuilding of the USSR, we devote so much time to the shipbuilding program for 1937-1943? Indeed, after it, many other documents were created: "Plan for the construction of warships of the Red Army Naval Forces", developed in 1937, "Program for the construction of combat and auxiliary ships for 1938-1945.", "10-year plan for the construction of ships of the RKKF" from 1939, etc.
The answer is very simple. Despite the fact that the above documents were usually considered by both the Politburo and the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, none of them was approved. This, of course, did not mean that they were completely useless waste paper, but they were not the official document determining the construction of the USSR navy either. In fact, the military shipbuilding program adopted in 1936 for 1937-1943. became the program document of the fleet right up to 1940, when the shipbuilding plan for the 3rd five-year plan was approved. In other words, global projects for the creation of a super-powerful military fleet with a total displacement of 1, 9, and even 2.5 million tons have never been officially approved, although they received the approval of I. V. Stalin.
The shipbuilding program of the Big Fleet, approved in 1936, represents the point from which it is worth considering what was planned to be built and what was actually ordered for construction.
